A. The Narrative

**Northeastern India:** The volatile Northeast region of India, in recent times, is demonstrating signs of returning towards normalcy. A fundamental factor initiating this wind of change is the marginalisation of many armed insurgent movements of the region, as a result of internal as well as external pressures. The absence of violence is beginning to translate into a phase of consolidation of peace. In spite of the fact that certain pockets in Assam, Manipur and Nagaland continue to remain violence prone, an outbreak of peace in those areas too cannot be ruled out. Much would, however, depend on how the prevailing peace is handled, sustained and carried forward to unleash forces of development.

The over five-decades long history of insurgency in the Northeast is as much a narrative of violence and mayhem as an unending story of remoteness, underdevelopment and alienation, each of these phenomena feeding the other. High levels of corruption in government departments, in charge of utilisation of substantial amount of developmental fund allocated by the centre, have resulted in slow economic and industrial development of the Northeast. Inadequate or non-implementation of developmental programmes continuing over decades perpetuates the sense of alienation among the common people, who perceive the Northeast to be far removed from the Indian mainland. The monitoring mechanism of the development programmes have either not been effective or have been bypassed by the respective states.

Deployment of security forces in the region in response to the fragile security situation is an unavoidable evil. However, prolonged deployment of the forces and the longevity of extremism in states like Manipur often reinforce popular perception of government’s
insincerity in resolving the conflict. Accusations of human rights violations and popular opinion against security legislations like the AFSPA are exploited by the extremists to alienate the civilian population further.

The government remaining the sole engine of growth has been a story associated with all conflict theatres. The Northeast is no different. With little infrastructure and industrial growth in the northeastern states, government combines the role of a development initiator and also the dominant provider of employment for a large number of unemployed youth. Poor fiscal management recurrently leading to a freeze on government employment further drives such educated unemployed youth to the lap of the extremists. None or partial implementation of development schemes and the lack of monitoring does no good to the image of New Delhi.

Geographical reality of the Northeast is its remoteness from India and proximity with countries like Bhutan, Bangladesh, Myanmar and China. While Northeast’s locale presents administrative challenges, it has come as a boon to extremist outfits of the region who traditionally have received constant support in the form of funds, arms, safe havens and training from foreign intelligence agencies / terrorists. The arms haul in the port city of Chittagong in Bangladesh in April 2004, in which ten truckloads of arms meant for the ULFA was captured, is an example. Although the Bangladesh route has gradually been plugged, the porous Indo-Myanmar border continues to be a problem area. Post-Bhutan military operations and recent cooperation from Bangladesh, Myanmar remains a critical area for the extremists.

Easy availability of a range of small arms and explosives in the region has augmented the capacities of the extremist groups to carry out their armed insurrections as well as unrestrained extortions over wide geographical areas. The sheer volume of weapons floating about in the region becomes a primary source of escalation and transformation of social tensions into armed conflict.
Generic problems apart, state specific problems like illegal migration from Bangladesh in Assam has led to popular upheavals. Extremist outfits have exploited popular sentiments to garner support, although outfits like the ULFA are known to have formally opined in favour of accommodating the Bangladeshis at least on one occasion in the nineties. On the other hand, outfits in Assam, Manipur, Nagaland and Meghalaya have targeted the Hindi-speaking population to drive a wedge between mainland India and the Northeast. New Delhi, in spite of the use of its soft as well as hard power, remains an unwelcome entity, in many parts of the region.

The overall insurgency situation, encompassing the insurgency and counter-insurgency measures, has invariably impacted on the economic progress and nation-building project in the Northeast. Caught in the crossfire between the security forces and the extremists, civilians have very little option but to live a life of prolonged misery. At the same time, India’s aspiration of moving ahead as a nation continues to be slowed down due to the complications it encounters in the forms of challenges to its security.

**Left Wing Extremism Affected States:** The history of the Left-wing extremism (Naxalism or Maoism, used alternatively in the Study) movement in India, at least in its latest episode, has been one of continuous expansion. Whereas extremist influence was visible over 50 odd districts in 2001, over the next decade such influence had been expanded to over 223 districts. At the root of such expansion lies the familiar tale of underdevelopment, mis-governance, lack of land reforms and a poorly trained police force. Barring Andhra Pradesh, where a police-led response was instrumental in the marginalisation of the military capacity of the extremists, leading to a noticeable reduction in extremism related fatalities, rest of the seven Indian states mainly hit by Left Wing Extremism continues to hopelessly meander through the challenges posed by the extremists.

Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh in his speech on 23 April 2006 identified the problem of Left Wing Extremism as “the single biggest internal security challenge ever faced by our county”. This position has been reiterated subsequently. In terms of fatalities,
the Naxalite violence has surpassed militancy in Jammu & Kashmir and the insurgency movements in the Northeast.

Apart from Chhattisgarh, which is the epicentre of the conflict, Naxalite presence and activities is reported from 20 Indian states. Orchestration of regular violence, however, has been confined to seven states. The 2004 formation of the CPI-Maoist, through a merger of the MCCI and the PWG has boosted the capacities of the extremists, who now control a large swathe of the country’s territory. The outfit aims to overthrow the government by a violent people’s war by 2050.

The military formation of the CPI-Maoist includes estimated 10,000 armed cadres, apart from a huge mass of 100,000 people’s militia. Besides, a number of front organisations have been formed in various states to generate support, funds and cadres for the CPI-Maoist. A section among the intelligentsia too justifies Naxalite activities, if not their violent activities.

States affected by the Naxalites are among the poorest and underdeveloped in the country, and also among the poorly governed. Areas affected by the extremists are inhabited by the tribal population, particularly Chhattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh, Orissa and Jharkhand. Parts of West Bengal and Maharashtra where extremists are present too conform to this narrative. Paradoxically, the areas are mineral rich. Chhattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh, Orissa and Jharkhand account for approximately 85 per cent of India’s coal resources. Exploitation of the natural resources remains crucial for the economic progress of the country. However, entry of the state and the private/public sector companies has also been source of tribal dissent, which has been exploited by the Naxalites.

The state response to Naxalite violence has suffered due to perceptional differences among the states as well as lack of a unified outlook among the regimes in power. Lack of inter-state coordination has been exploited by the Naxalites to move between states and minimise losses. Poor state of police forces has led to deployment of large battalions of para-military forces in several states. However, coordination between the police and
the para-military remains a problem. Inability of the civil administration to restart its activities in many of the tribal areas has been a key factor behind Naxalite growth and sustenance. Andhra Pradesh, however, has been able to put together an effective counter-Naxalite response. Combining development approach with security force operations, it has been able to drive the Naxalite cadres out of the state to neighbouring states.

**B. Significance of the Study**

Assessing the social, political and economic impact, armed movements impose on affected regions and on the country as a whole has never been an easy task. It is an exercise that needs constant revision taking into account the progression in the conflict situation and yet, there can be no finality to the assessment. Probably the enormity of the challenge has prevented such an exercise from being undertaken in Indian conflict theatres- in the Northeast as well as in the Naxalite affected states.

The present study, encompassing five northeastern states and three states affected by Left Wing Extremism, is an attempt to fill the void. It indulges in a stock taking exercise not just in terms of deriving available open source wisdom, but also taking the opinion from the field- from ordinary people who have seen the conflict from close quarters and in some way have been affected by it, from professionals who have analysed it with a perspective and also from the security force personnel, who have been primary participants in a conflict management mechanism. On its completion, the study is in a position to summarise its key findings and suggest recommendations and action plans to make a successful transition from conflict to peace and development.

**C. Objective of the Study:**

The study was carried out to fulfil four basic objectives. Those were:

(i) Identification of extremist affected areas,

(ii) Identification of social, economic and political factors and their dynamics in the extremist affected areas,
(iii) Preparation of model/mechanism for forecasting an area lapsing into extremism, and
(iv) Providing necessary recommendations.

D. Research Hypotheses

The study attempted to test the following hypotheses.

1. Prolonged extremist violence in an area seriously impacts on the levels of governance and economy, thus affecting the developmental projects on the longer run.

2. The retreat of governance from vast areas creates a scenario of ‘islands of development’ occurring in and around the protected cities of the states, while most of the hinterland remain in a state of abject poverty and under-development.

3. The negligible amount of foreign direct investment in the Northeast and also the left-wing extremism affected states is directly linked to the prevailing situation of extremist violence, solutions to which are yet to be found.

4. Continuation of the developmental projects yields very little in conflict theatres as a bulk of the funds are either not spent or pass into the coffers of the extremist factions.

5. Complete disruption of the developmental process further acts as a force multiplier for the extremists as they exploit the popular sense of neglect and alienation to strengthen their existence.

6. Modernization of the police force in extremist-affected states holds the key to a visible augmentation of the capacity to deal with the complexities of extremist violence.

7. Learning from the few counter-insurgency successes in the region would provide important guidelines towards dealing with the problem in the other states.
8. In the absence of an efficient identification and evaluation method of examining the costs that extremism imposes on politics and economy, accurate information on the state of affairs in the region becomes unavailable, undermining the State’s capacity to find ways to protect the people and the integrity of the nation.

E. Coverage and Justification for the selection of particular districts

1. Andhra Pradesh: The Study made assessment of the social, economic and political impact of extremist violence in four districts of Andhra Pradesh - capital Hyderabad, Karimnagar, Warangal and Nizamabad. Hyderabad is the political, administrative as well as intellectual centre in Andhra Pradesh. It was necessary to take into account the opinion of various policy makers, intellectuals and practitioners who area based into the state capital. In addition, popular perception of the capital on the Naxal affected areas was considered to be an important component for the Study. The rest three districts-Karimnagar, Warangal and Nizamabad- during the previous years witnessed significant Maoist activity in varied scales. Warangal and Karimnagar still continue to witness regular Maoist activity. Nizamabad shares borders with the Vidarbha region of Maharashtra where as Warangal and Karimnagar have their borders with Chhattisgarh. A small portion of Karimnagar also touches Vidarbha region, which has been Maoist affected for a number of years. Chhattisgarh’s Dantewada area which is across the inter-state borders has been worst affected by Maoist extremism. In January 2010, Andhra Pradesh government added five more districts including Karimnagar and Warangal to the list of those affected by extremist activity for the purpose of seeking central funds for development of roads.

2. Assam: The project was carried out in four districts of Assam—Nalbari, Kamrup, Tinsukia and Kokrajhar. These districts ensured a fair representation of different strands of extremism that have been witnessed in Assam. Kamrup district, in which state capital Guwahati falls, represents Assam’s urban setting apart from being the theatre of countless explosions and terrorist attacks. Apart from being the intellectual hub, Guwahati is also the seat of Assam’s political and administrative authority. Nalbari has
been one of the hotbeds of extremism in the State. It has liberally contributed cadres and leaders to both the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) and the Bodo insurgent groups. Sharing international borders with Bhutan, Nalbari was also witness to cross border terror, in the days the ULFA along with the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) and the Kamatapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) had found base in that country. Tinsukia, situated in the easternmost part of Assam (also called Upper Assam), represents the industrial belt of the State. Moreover, it is close to Sivasagar district where the ULFA was born on 7 April 1979. Tinsukia and its adjoining districts can also be considered as the hub of Assam’s oil and tea industry. Kokrajhar is the westernmost district of the State and can be described as the gateway to Assam and the Northeast. For a number of years, this district remained the hotbed of Bodo insurgency. It is here that the Bodos and the Santhals (an Adivasi group) fought bitter clashes in the 1990s, leaving behind a large number of internally displaced persons and child and women victims.

3. Chhattisgarh: The project carried out in Chhattisgarh’s four districts—capital Raipur, Rajnandgaon, Kanker and Bastar. All these districts over the years have witnessed Maoist activity in varied scales. The Bastar region spread over 40,000 square kilometres and divided into five districts—Bastar, Bijapur, Narayanpur, Kanker and Dantewada—is the base area of the CPI-Maoist. Thus inclusion of Bastar and Kanker in the Study provided a fair representation of the Maoist activity in the state. The western district of Rajnandgaon shares border with Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh and also with the district of Kanker. Kanker also houses the state’s lone Counter Terrorism & Jungle Warfare Training College. Raipur, the capital of Chhattisgarh, is the political, administrative and intellectual epicentre of the state. It is where the Central zone headquarter of the para-military Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) was based till early July 2010 before being moved out to Kolkata.

1 In December 2003, a month long security force operation, ‘Operation All Clear’ dislodged these groups from that country. Although in recent times, there have been talks about ULFA regaining foothold in Bhutan, it is all in the realm of speculation. The Bhutanese authorities have dismissed such talks. For a detailed account of Operation Clear, see Wasbir Hussain, “Insurgency in India's Northeast Cross-border Links and Strategic Alliances”, Faultlines: Writings on Conflict & Resolution, vol.17, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/faultlines/volume17/wasbir.htm
4. **Jharkhand**: The Study was carried out in four districts in Jharkhand—capital Ranchi, Giridih, Khunti and Latehar. All these districts over the years have witnessed Maoist activity in varied scales. Apart from the fact that Ranchi is the political, administrative as well as intellectual centre in Jharkhand, this district’s rural segment continues to face Naxal activity. It shares its border with other Naxal affected districts like Saraikhela, Chatra, Palamu, Bokaro, Jamshedpur and Purulia district of West Bengal, making it prone to overflow of the Naxal problem. According to the state police sources, out of the 17 police stations in the northern district of Giridih, ten are affected by Left Wing Extremism whereas the rest of the police stations are partially affected. The district of Khunti was carved out of Ranchi on 12 September 2007. The entire district of Khunti is Naxal affected and two of its police stations—Arki and Raniya—are most severely affected. Similarly, in the western district of Latehar, in addition to CPI-Maoist, several splinter groups such as TPC, JPC, JLT, JSJMM often pose serious threat to the law and order situation by indulging in kidnapping for ransom. Moreover, highly forested hilly terrains of the district provide the Naxal squads with natural hideouts, making security force operations extremely difficult.

5. **Manipur**: The project carried out in Manipur’s three districts—Imphal East, Imphal West and Tamenglong. These districts ensured a fair representation of different strands of extremism that have been witnessed in Manipur. Both Imphal East and Imphal West represented the valley areas of the state and in a way, narrated the Meitei brand of extremism and its impact on the lives of the people. According to available information, 91 extremists had been killed in Imphal West district alone in 2008. Similarly, in 2009, Imphal East district police killed 35 extremists. State capital Imphal is in Imphal West district. It thus brought out the urban perspectives of the conflict. Being the political,

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administrative and intellectual centre of the state, the narratives provided by the district were of immense criticality to the Study. Tamenglong, a hill district is home to tribes such as the Zeliangrong Nagas, Kukis and Hmars. Extremist formations claiming to represent each of these tribes have mushroomed in the district bringing with them the associated costs on the lives of the people.

6. Meghalaya: The project carried out in two districts of Meghalaya—East Khasi Hills and West Garo Hills. Both districts ensured a fair representation of different strands of extremism that have been witnessed in the state. West Garo Hills district, spread over 3714 square kilometres, is one of the largest districts of Meghalaya. It shares a border with Bangladesh in its south and with Assam in the north and north-west. As a result, this district has not only been home to a number of extremist outfits belonging to the Garo tribe, but also has been used by several Assam based extremist groupings as a transit route. East Khasi Hills, spread over 2748 square kilometres, borders Bangladesh on its south. Capital Shillong, seat of Meghalaya’s intellectual class as well as the political and administrative authority, is located in this district. East Khasi Hills has remained an area of influence of multiple extremist outfits belonging to the Khasi tribe. In addition, the cosmopolitan nature of capital Shillong has provided enough anonymity to several other outfits belong to different northeastern states who use it for safe haven and meeting points.

7. Nagaland: The study carried out in Nagaland’s three districts—capital Kohima, commercial capital Dimapur and the district of Mon. These districts ensured a fair representation of different strands of extremism that have been witnessed in Nagaland. Both capital Kohima and Dimapur have been theatres of recurrent extremist activities. Dimapur, the commercial capital of the state, also houses Camp Hebron, the headquarters of the NSCN-IM. It is a place where the NSCN-K too has been active. In 2008, another outfit, the NSCN-Unification too originated in this location and engaged the NSCN-IM in a series of clashes. State capital Kohima is the political, administrative and intellectual centre of the state. Six kilometres away from Kohima is the village of Jotsoma, the native village of Naga National Council (NNC) founder, Angami Zapu Phizo. The narratives
provided by the field survey in the districts, thus, were of immense criticality to the Study. Mon district, on the northeastern part of Nagaland, with an area of 1,786 square kilometres, is home to the Konyak tribe, to which NSCN-K Chairman S S Khaplang belongs. Mon district, in the past, too has been the theatre of several extremist activities.

8. Tripura: The project carried out in Tripura’s two districts—South and West. Both districts not only represented fifty per cent of Tripura’s total of four districts but also ensured a fair representation of different strands of extremism that have been witnessed in the state. West district, in which state capital Agartala is located, represents Tripura’s urban setting. It is also the seat of Tripura’s intellectual class, political and administrative authority. The district shares a long border with Bangladesh. The South district had been one of the hotbeds of extremism in Tripura.

F. Major Incidents of violence in the selected districts (State Wise) in the past two years:

The following are a listing of major incidents of violence reported from the districts under survey. From the point of view of the study, major incidents refer to more than three deaths in a single incident. However, for lesser violent states like Tripura, Nagaland and Meghalaya, even incidents involving deaths of a single person has also been included.

1. Andhra Pradesh: Major Incidents of violence in Hyderabad, Karimnagar, Nizamabad and Warangal districts - 2009-2010 (till August)

- 20 July 2010: A dalam (squad) commander, identified as Sola Ramaraao alias Ganesh of the CPI-ML-New Democracy was shot dead in an encounter with police at the Kothaguda forest area in Bakkachintapally village of Warangal district.
- 13 July 2010: P. Rama Rao alias Ganesh, a Naxalite belonging to CPI-ML-New Democracy was killed in an exchange of fire with the police near Bakkachinthapalli in Kothaguda agency mandal in Warangal district.
12 March 2010: CPI-Maoist top leader Kondal Reddy alias Tech Ramana killed in a separate gun battle in Bandala Kodishala forest village in Tadwai mandal in Warangal district.

31 October 2009: Two cadres of the CPI-Maoist were killed in an encounter with the police in the Kodavatancha village of Warangal district.


21 October 2009: An action squad member of the CPI-Maoist was killed in an encounter with police in the Kompelli-Asnanpalli area of Warangal district.

19 October 2009: CPI-Maoist cadres killed Uke Saraiah, husband of Ooke Sammakka, chief of the Lingala Panchayat under Tadvai administrative division in Warangal district.


1 July 2009: The State Secretary of the Praja Pratighatana faction of the CPI-ML, Sudhakar alias Ashok, was killed in an encounter with the police in the Eturunagaram forests near Bhupathipur village in Warangal district.

24 May 2009: Two senior CPI-Maoist cadres, identified as Patel Sudhakar Reddy alias Suryam alias Srikanth and Kanugula Venkataiah, were killed during an encounter with the police at Gaurappa hillocks near Lavvala village in the thick Tadvai forest area in Warangal district.

2. Assam:

22 November 2009: Bomb blast in Nalbari town killed eight persons and injured 53 persons.

6 April 2009: Bomb blast in Maligaon of Guwahati killed seven persons and injured 56 others.
• 1 January 2009: Three blasts in Birubari, Bhangagarh and Bhootnath areas of Guwahati killed five persons and injured 50 others.
• 30 October 2008: Nine blasts in four districts of Assam: Guwahati, Kokrajhar, Bongaigaon and Barpeta. 51 killed in three blasts in Guwahati, 21 killed in three blasts in Kokrajhar, 15 persons killed in two blasts in Barpeta and 10 injured in one blast at Bongaigaon. Total 87 persons were killed and about 200 injured in the blasts.
• 30 September 2008: Dead bodies of four youths recovered from a mass grave in the reserve forest at Kakopather in Tinsukia District. The mass grave suspected to be the dumping ground of dead bodies of those who had been abducted and later killed by the ULFA militants.
• 29 June 2008: Bomb blast at Kumarikata village in Nalbari district killed seven persons and injured 35 others.
• 30 September 2007: Blast in Tinsukia town killed four persons and injured 21 others.
• 20 July 2007: Blast at Srirampur Chariali under Tamarhat police station in Kokrajhar district killed five persons and injured 18 others.
• 30 June 2007: Twin blasts in Tinsukia town killed four persons and injured 12 others.
• 23 June 2007: Blast in Machkhowa (Guwahati) killed six persons and injured 14 others.
• 26 May 2007: Blast in Athgaon area of Guwahati killed seven persons and injured 18 others.

3. Chhattisgarh: Major Incidents of violence in Bastar, Kanker, Rajnandgaon and Raipur Districts- 2009-2010

• 27 June 2010: Three civilians were shot dead by CPI-Maoist cadres in Bastar district on charges of being informers.
• 12 June 2010: June 12: Four armed cadres of the CPI-Maoist killed assistant sub-inspector of Police Shivkumar Mandawi, at a weekly market in full public view in an interior pocket of Kanker district.

• 16 May 2010: May 16: Six villagers, including a sarpanch were killed by the CPI-Maoist cadres near Teregaon in Rajnandgaon district.

• 18 November 2009: November 18: Three persons were killed and two others injured in a bomb blast at a village in the Rajnandgaon district.

• 12 July 2009: CPI-Maoist cadres killed 30 Police personnel, including a Superintendent of Police (SP), in two incidents in the Rajnandgaon district.

• 16 April 2009: Five poll officials were killed and many others injured when CPI-Maoist cadres blew up a van ferrying election officials by triggering a landmine blast at Phulwera village in the Rajnandgaon district.

• 12 April 2009: The CRPF personnel killed three Maoists in a two hour long encounter in the Sarandi area of Kanker district. 11 weapons, including assault guns, were recovered from their possession.

• 18 February 2009: Three CRPF personnel were killed and nine others injured in an ambush carried out by the CPI-Maoist cadres when the CRPF team was patrolling at village Mankapal under Koilibeda police station in the Kanker district.

• 14 January 2009: Two policemen were killed and a woman police constable went missing after the CPI-Maoist cadres opened indiscriminate fire on a police team in a thickly forested area of Pakhanjoor in the Kanker district.


• 16 July 2010: Five Police personnel were killed and five others injured when cadres of the CPI-Maoist triggered a landmine blast blowing up a patrol van carrying Jharkhand Jaguar Force personnel at Kutmu More in Latehar district. The patrol van was following the car of the Superintendent of Police (SP) who was returning after leading a long range patrolling in Maoist-affected areas.
• 25 March 2010: Yamuna Yadav, a local worker of the CPI-ML-Liberation, was shot dead by the CPI-Maoist cadres near Dohnadrup village in Latehar district, after pronouncing him death sentence in a Kangaroo Court (people’s court) accusing him to be a police informer.

• 7 March 2010: Six Maoists were killed in an encounter by police near Tilaiya Damar village in the Latehar district.

• 25 October 2009: Four CPI-Maoist cadres were killed and three others arrested during an encounter with the security forces at Jonha, about 40 kilometres from capital Ranchi.

• 16 September 2009: Two Naxalites were lynched by villagers at Itki, situated on the outskirts of State capital Ranchi.

• 6 September 2009: Five villagers were shot dead by the CPI-Maoist cadres at Pundigiri under Tamar block, 45 kilometres from Ranchi.

• 4 September 2009: Two CPI-Maoist cadres were killed in an encounter with the police in the Ranchi district. A gun battle ensued between the two sides when the Maoists opened fire towards a police picket at Baruhatu forest in the Bundu police station area.

• 17 August 2009: A 10-year-old girl, identified as Gayatri Kumari, a resident of Ulilohor village in Ranchi, was among two persons killed in an attack by the CPI-Maoist on a passenger vehicle on the National Highway-33 near Tamar, 70 kilometers from capital Ranchi.

• 16 April 2009: CPI-Maoist cadres blew up a paramilitary BSF bus ferrying the BSF personnel from Ladhup to Arah at a place about 125 kilometres from capital Ranchi in Latehar district, killing seven BSF personnel, one helper and the civilian driver of the bus.

• 11 April 2009: Five CRPF personnel were killed and three others injured when CPI-Maoist cadres opened fire on them inside Jalko forests under Arki Police station in Khunti district.

• 5 April 2009: Left-wing extremists killed four security guards of the Abhijeet Group at the site office of the group's proposed power plant at Chakla village in Latehar district.
• 13 March 2009: A PLFI cadre, identified as Kanhu Lohra alias Laden, was killed in an encounter with the Police at Kocha village in Khunti district.

• 9 March 2009: An 'area commander' of the CPI-Maoist, identified as Rajesh Toppo, was shot dead by the police during an encounter near Karkari river under Tamar block of Ranchi district.

• 24 February 2009: Three suspected Naxalites were lynched by angry villagers at the village market in Gulu in Khunti district when they were allegedly extorting money from shopkeepers.

• 2 February 2009: Residents of Hesalpidi village in the Ranchi district lynched three CPI-Maoist cadres who were trying to abduct a contractor.

• 31 January 2009: Four villagers were shot dead by suspected cadres of the PLFI in Chalgri village of Khuti district.

• 17 January 2009: Six policemen were killed in a landmine blast triggered by suspected CPI-Maoist cadres in the Latehar district.

5. Manipur: Major Incidents of violence in Imphal East, Imphal West and Tamenglong Districts- 2009-2010

• 21 March 2010: Assam Rifles personnel shot dead four cadres of the United Tribal Liberation Army (UTLA), including the outfit's top leader James Singson, during a counter-insurgency operation in the Leikot area in Tamenglong district.

• 12 September 2009: Four India Reserve Battalion (IRB) personnel were killed and four others wounded in an ambush carried out by the PLA at Ngakha hill in Imphal East district. The extremists used rocket launchers, lethod guns and other sophisticated weapons to target the vehicles.

• 11 June 2009: Three non-local labourers were shot dead and two others injured by unidentified extremists inside the Central Agriculture University campus at Iroisemba under Lampel police station in Imphal West district.

• 15 May 2009: Six suspected KYKL cadres were shot dead by a combined team of Imphal West district police, Assam Rifles and Army during an encounter at a
hillock located between Koutruk and Haraothel at the junction of Imphal West and Senapati districts.

- **13 May 2009:** Four militants of the Military Council faction of the KNF and one Assam Rifles personnel were killed during an encounter at Khoupum area of Tamenglong District.

- **29 April 2009:** Three suspected extremists were shot dead by a combined force of the Imphal West district Police and Army during an encounter at Hiyangthang Tarahei Awang under Wangoi police station.

- **18 February 2009:** Four extremists are killed and three others wounded in a clash between cadres of the NSCN-IM and combined cadres of the PREPAK and Naga National Council at Thanagong village under Nungba sub-division in Tamenglong district.

- **15 January 2009:** Three suspected extremists belonging to an unspecified outfit were killed during an encounter with the security forces at Nongmada under Lamlai police station in Imphal East district.


- On 5 October 2008, an IED planted by suspected United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) cadres exploded at Belguri near Tikrikilla in the West Garo Hills district. Another IED, which failed to explode, was later defused by troops.

- On 22 February 2009, a civilian, Kolar Suting, was shot at and injured by five suspected HNLC cadres at his residence in Mawriang in the East Khasi Hills district.

- On 11 June 2009, two ULFA extremists were killed by a joint team of the Meghalaya Police and Army at Bangalpara village in West Garo Hills district. An AK-47 rifle, two Chinese grenades, three AK-rifle magazines with ammunition and some explosives were recovered from their possession.

- On 23 December 2009, a coal trader, Raja Khongsit was shot dead by four suspected HNLC militants at Pomshutia village in East Khasi Hills District. His wife was left injured in the attack.
7. Nagaland: Major Incidents of violence in Kohima, Dimapur and Mon Districts-2009-2010

- 3 January 2010: A NNC cadre was killed by the rival NSCN-IM militants during an internecine clash at Kigutouma village in Kohima district.
- 9 December 2009: A NSCN-K cadre, Theja Kent Rengma, was killed by the rival NSCN-IM militants in his residence at Tsosinyu village in the Kohima district.
- 24 October 2009: A NSCN-K militant, Hopeto Tuccu, was shot dead by NSCN-IM militants at Phaibijang village near Power Grid colony in Dimapur.
- 17 October 2009: A NSCN-K cadre, Khriebu Pochury, was abducted and subsequently killed by the rival NSCN-IM militants in Kohima.
- 10 October 2009: A NSCN-K militant, Nekavi Chishi, was shot dead by the rival NSCN-IM militants at Diphupar in Dimapur district.
- 27 September 2009: A NSCN-K militant, Tokheho Aye was shot dead by unidentified militants at Tinali in Duncan Bosti junction under Old West Police Station in Dimapur.
- 19 September 2009: A NSCN-K cadre was killed while three others, including a civilian, are injured when three armed men opened fire on three NSCN-K cadres in a hotel at Burma Camp bazaar in Dimapur.
- 30 June 2009: The dead body of a youth, identified as Tinghai, was recovered near Tapi River, about five kilometres from Mon town. The NSCN-IM claimed responsibility for the killing.
- 2 June 2009: A non-local auto driver, abducted in the night of June 1 by suspected extremists, was found dead at Thahekhu colony of Dimapur town.
- 23 April 2009: The dead body of a non-Naga trader, Pradip Prasad, from Bihar, who was abducted from his shop in Super Market on the outskirts of Kohima in the afternoon of 21 April, was recovered by police.
- 23 March 2009: The dead body of the self-styled ‘secretary’ of NSCN-K, abducted by unidentified gunmen from his residence at Medziphema, was recovered from Kiruphema in Dimapur district along the National Highway-39.
• 7 February 2009: Two NNC cadres, M. Sinoi Poh and M. Jopoah, were killed by the NSCN-IM militants in an internecine clash between Somra and Tusom villages in the Dimapur District. However, the NNC claimed that the victims are not its cadres and they are civilians.

• 25 January 2009: A trader, identified as H. Atovi Yepthomi, was shot dead by suspected militants near a temple at New Market area in Dimapur.


• 10 February 2009: Officer-in-Charge of Champahower police Station was injured at Tuibaklaipara village in the West district, when the ATTF militants opened fire at police personnel who were returning from a search operation.

• 1 October 2008: Five low intensity bomb blasts rocked Agartala, state capital of Tripura, injuring 20 people. The blasts occurred in a bus stand and other market places including Radha Nagar, Colonel Chamani area, Gus Bazaar and Gol Market.

G. Questionnaires and Profile of Respondents

G1. Northeastern States: Two sets of questionnaires were administered among 950 respondents in 15 districts of five states. The first set of questionnaire, containing 36 questions, were administered differently among 250 experts (security force personnel, government officials, persons involved with key sectors of economy and business, NGO activists, journalists, college and university teachers). The second set of questionnaire containing 31 questions was administered among 700 common people. Administration of questionnaire was done in rural, semi-urban and urban areas of the identified districts.
Northeast: Total Number of Respondents in the Common People Category - 700

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>74.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>25.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>43.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>43.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-Urban</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Govt Employee</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Govt Employee</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>25.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Employed</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>18.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Sector Employee</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>21.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upto 30 yrs</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>38.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-40 yrs</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-50 yrs</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51-60 yrs</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above 60 yrs</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upto 5 thousand</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>40.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;5-10</td>
<td>188</td>
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<tr>
<td>&gt;10-15</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>&gt;15-20</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;20-25</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;25-30</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;30 thousand</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upto Metric</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Secondary</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduate</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>35.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post Graduate</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>18.7%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Northeast: Total Number of Respondents in the Experts (Professionals) Category - 250

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senior Security Officials</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>26.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Government Officials</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key persons in Business/Trade/Industry</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO Activists</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College/University Teachers</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

G2. Left Wing Extremism Affected States: Two sets of questionnaires were administered among 750 respondents in 12 districts of three states. The first set of questionnaire, containing 44 questions, were administered differently among 150 experts (security force personnel, government officials, persons involved with key sectors of economy and business, NGO activists, journalists, college and university teachers). The second set of questionnaire containing 39 questions was administered among 600 common people. Administration of questionnaire was done in rural, semi-urban and urban areas of the identified districts.
Left Wing Extremism Affected States: Total Number of Respondents in the Common People Category - 600

- Male - 465 (77.5%)
- Female - 135 (22.5%)
- Rural - 203 (33.8%)
- Urban - 356 (59.3%)
- Semi-Urban - 41 (6.9%)
- Central Govt Employee - 10 (1.7%)
- State Govt Employee - 70 (11.7%)
- Self-Employed - 103 (17.2%)
- Private Sector Employee - 196 (32.7%)
- Farmer - 11 (1.8%)
- Others - 65 (10.8%)
- Unemployed - 145 (24.1%)

Age
- Upto 30 yrs - 235 (39.2%)
- 31-40 yrs - 208 (34.7)
- 41-50 yrs - 109 (18.2%)
- 51-60 yrs - 36 (6%)
- Above 60 yrs - 12 (2%)

Income
- Upto 5 thousand - 226 (45.7%)
- >5-10 - 122 (24.5%)
- >10-15 - 59 (11.9%)
- >15-20 - 45 (9%)
- >20-25 - 20 (4%)
- >25-30 - 7 (1.4%)
- >30 thousand - 18 (3.6%)

Education
- Primary - 18 (3.1%)
- Middle - 20 (3.4%)
- Upto Metric - 120 (20.2%)
- Higher Secondary - 108 (18.4%)
- Graduate - 232 (39.6%)
- Post Graduate - 78 (13.4%)
- Others - 11 (1.9%)

Left Wing Extremism Affected States: Total Number of Respondents in the Experts (Professionals) Category - 150

- Senior Security Officials - 26 (17.3%)
- Senior Government Officials - 31 (20.7%)
- Key persons in Business/Trade/Industry - 13 (8.7%)
- Journalists - 21 (14%)
- NGO Activists - 16 (10.7%)
- College/University Teachers - 26 (17.3%)
- Others - 17 (11.3%)

In addition, interviews were held with a number of persons including security force officials, civil society leaders, youth leaders, writers, peace activists, serving and retired bureaucrat, former militant leaders and journalists. Open ended questionnaires were used for eliciting their responses in a free flowing manner. Additionally, general comments were received on a variety of issues relating to terrorism from a number of persons who did not wish to be identified due to various reasons.
H. Component of Objectivity

The selection of the respondents was done at random. The potential respondents were asked about their availability for the entire duration of the questionnaire administration. During the entire process, the respondents were kept free from any influence that would affect their response. None of the questionnaires were filled up in public places. No other person was allowed to be in the proximity of the respondent. In the event of such a scenario not being possible, the persons other than the respondent were requested not to make their opinion during the survey process. Adequate care was taken to ensure a fair representation of respondents on gender, occupation and regional factors.
CHAPTER-II: POPULAR PERCEPTIONS ON THE CONFLICT SITUATION

State of Insurgency/ Extremism in the Northeast and Left Wing Extremism Affected States

The Union Ministry of Home Affairs presented the following assessment of the year 2010. “The highlight of the year has been the dramatic change in the situation in the Northeast. The decline in violence witnessed in 2009 continued in 2010. Twenty security personnel, 94 civilians and 247 militants lost their lives during the year. This is the lowest level of violence witnessed in many years. Barring Assam and Manipur, the other states have shown remarkable improvement. No civilian was killed in Nagaland and Mizoram; no security personnel was killed in Meghalaya, Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland and Mizoram. Most insurgent groups are in talks with the Government or are poised to commence talks.”

It added, “The situation in the Left Wing extremism affected states continues to remain a matter of grave concern. The loss of lives in Silda, West Bengal (15 February 2010); Dantewada, Chhattisgarh (6 April 2010); Bijapur, Chhattisgarh (8 May 2010) and Dhaudhai, Narayanpur, Chhattisgarh (29 June 2010) were the low points during the year. 713 civilians were killed by the naxalites (as against 591 in 2009). The security forces lost 285 personnel (as against 317 in 2009) and were able to neutralise 171 extremists (as against 219 in 2009). It will be apparent that the naxalites have not only spurned the offer of talks but have also escalated the conflict.”

Fatalities in Terrorism related Incidents in 2010 in India

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Civilians</th>
<th>Security Force Personnel</th>
<th>Terrorists</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Andhra Pradesh</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arunachal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

7 ibid.
8 Data provided by South Asia Terrorism Portal is based on the documentation of open source information and hence, is in minor variation with the official data.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Civilians</th>
<th>Security Force Personnel</th>
<th>Terrorists</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assam</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jammu &amp; Kashmir</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madhya Pradesh</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manipur</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meghalaya</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mizoram</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagaland</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tripura</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uttar Pradesh</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bengal</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-wing Extremism</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>720</strong></td>
<td><strong>431</strong></td>
<td><strong>1080</strong></td>
<td><strong>2231</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Data provided by South Asia Terrorism Portal is based on the documentation of open source information and hence, is in minor variation with the official data.*
SECTION A: NORTHEASTERN STATES

A. Spread of Extremism

Is your state or district affected by extremism (Common People)

In the selected districts, the common people were asked about their perception on whether their state/district were affected by extremism. Since all the districts under survey were affected by some degree of extremism, an affirmative response from all the respondents was generally expected. The answers matched the expectations. Majority 87.4 percent of the respondents in the northeastern states said that their state/district is affected by extremism.

As a corollary to the above question, the respondents who had replied in the affirmative, were asked about the extent to which extremism has affected lives of their own and their families. In the Northeast, 59 per cent of the respondents said extremism had affected them and their families only to ‘some extent’. Only 9.2 per cent said that extremism had either a ‘high’ or ‘very high’ impact on their lives.

1. Assam: While among the 200 respondents, 181 answered in the affirmative, 9.5 per cent (19 respondents) said that their state/district is not affected by extremism. The
pattern of responses seemingly was influenced by actual occurrence of extremist violence or the lack of it in one particular area. Of the 181 respondents who had replied in the affirmative, as many as 61.9 per cent of the respondents said extremism had affected them and their families only to ‘some extent’. Only 14.9 per cent (27 respondents) said that extremism had either a ‘high’ or ‘very high’ impact on their lives. Among the respondents, 21.5 per cent said that the impact was ‘nil’ on their personal lives.

2. Manipur: An overwhelming 92.7 per cent answered in the affirmative. Among these 76.1 per cent said that extremism had affected them and their families to ‘some extent’. While only one participant termed the impact ‘very high’, 12 other respondents said extremism had affected them and their families ‘highly’. Fifteen participants, however, said that extremism has not impacted their lives directly.

3. Meghalaya: Among the 100 respondents, 70 answered in the affirmative. Responses of the 30 per cent respondents, who maintained that their state / district have not been affected by extremism, appear to have been influenced by both an absence of direct experience of extremism and also, the noticeably improved security situation in the area. Significantly, 24 of these 30 respondents were from urban and semi-urban settings, which indicated that the impact of extremism in these areas have been minimal. Of the 70 respondents who had responded in the affirmative, only 24 per-cent respondents (17 respondents) maintained that extremism had not affected them and their families, 75.7 per cent (53 respondents) said that extremism had affected them and their families only to ‘some extent’.

4. Nagaland: Among the 149 respondents who answered this question, 130, constituting an overwhelming 87.2 per cent answered in the affirmative. Of the 19 who answered in the negative, seven were drawn from the rural areas. The pattern of responses was uniform across rural, semi-urban as well as urban areas, indicating the spread and impact of extremism all over the state. 108 of the 130 participants who had replied in the affirmative to the previous question responded to the query which attempted to quantify the degree of impact of extremism on their and their families’ lives. 73 participants
representing 67.6 per cent of these respondents said that extremism had affected them and their families to ‘some extent’.

5. Tripura: Among the respondents, 92 per cent answered in the affirmative. Only eight per cent said that their state/district have not been affected by extremism. As a corollary to the above question, the 92 per cent respondents who had replied in the affirmative were asked about the extent to which extremism has affected lives of their own and their families. Over 58 per cent respondents maintained that extremism had not affected them and their families. Only four persons said that the impact was ‘high’, while 37 respondents said extremism had affected them and their families only to ‘some extent’.

B. Factors behind the Growth and sustenance of Extremism:

“The problems of unemployment, population growth, infiltration are behind extremism”, said writer and peace activist Indira Goswami during an interview conducted by a Field Investigator as part of this study in Assam. Indeed, no single factor can explain the rise of insurgency or left-wing extremism in India. The extremist movements which have risen over the years in various parts of the states are rooted in several factors. For example, former ULFA leader Prabal Neog explained, “One is the political exploitation by the Central Government, which has been continuing for years. Then, there is the racial discrimination by the Centre. Adding to it is the Government’s attitude of not doing anything to stop the illegal immigration, both from the neighbouring countries as well as from the other states of mainland India. Then there is the economic exploitation of our state.” In Tripura, Montu Koloy, the surrendered vice-president of NLFT said, extremism is “a result of injustice and years of neglect by the government (state and central both) of the sons of the soil of the state.” Neglect on part of the central government as a factor behind extremism was endorsed even by some high-ranking police officials. A senior IPS officer in Assam said, “It is true to some extent. This is further complicated by the fact that whatever programmes/funding is done by the

10 Interview conducted on October 8, 2009 in Guwahati.
11 Interview with Prabal Neog conducted at Tinsukia, on November 7, 2009.
12 Interview with Montu Koloy, former Senior Vice-President, NLFT.
Government also does not go to the desired target.”

The opinion provide by a senior police official in Manipur too was similar. He said, “The feelings of the people have not been properly understood by the Central Government and the leaders of the country. The system of protest in the late nineteen sixties and early nineteen seventies were not assessed properly. The demand of statehood by the people of the state was turned down thereby inflaming the minds of the younger people. The sense of alienation and deprivation prevailed all over the state which resulted in some people taking recourse to armed movements.”

Authors and activists have even gone further to term the relationship between New Delhi and the northeastern states as antagonistic. In the context of Manipur an author writes, “The antagonistic nature of the relationship between Manipur, the occupied nation, and, India the colonial power, emerges strongly as time passes by. Shaped by such a form of power relationship, people have become more organised in their show of defiance against the imposed rule, which is manifested in the form of mass protests, armed revolutionary movements and human rights activism.”

In Nagaland, however, extremism is based on the Naga aspiration for independence. The demand for a sovereign homeland for the Nagas are based on the premise that the Nagas are an ‘independent nation’ and this ‘uniqueness of Naga history’ must be recognised. The claim of independence has further been complicated by the demands put forward by the NSCN-IM to include parts of Assam, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh in the Nagalim (Greater Nagaland). Non-recognition of this claim and resistance put up by the Indian State has led to the origin of the extremist movement and precipitation of this same. However, over the years, with the wearing out of the emotive content behind Naga sovereignty, several other factors have aided the sustenance of extremism in the state.

Extensive literature survey during the preliminary stage of this project planning had shortlisted six probable reasons for the growth of extremism: economic backwardness of

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13 Interview with Pallab Bhattacharya, Inspector General of Police, Central Western Range, Assam, Interview conducted on 14 November 2009 at Guwahati.

14 Interview with N. Shyamananda Singh, IPS, Inspector General of Police, Managing Director, Manipur Police Housing Corporation, Imphal, held on October 30, 2009.

the state, neglect by the central government, misrule by the successive state governments, unemployment and social insecurity, land alienation and immigration. The respondents were to answer “Yes’ or ‘No’ to each of these reasons in response to the question, “What, according to you, are the main factors behind the growth of extremism in your region/state?”’. By no means was this list of reasons exhaustive. Thus, when perceptions were elicited from the respondents, they were further encouraged to record any additional reason which they thought best explained the growth of insurgency/extremism.

Factors behind the growth of extremism (Common People and Experts)

1. Assam: In Among all the predetermined factors, ‘unemployment and social insecurity’ was listed as the most dominant factor behind the growth of extremism in the state. Of the 200 respondents, as many as 193 responded in the affirmative. Opinion of the experts and the security forces was striking similar. Forty-nine of the 50 expert respondents that included 16 of the 17 security force personnel on whom the questionnaires were administered identified ‘unemployment and social insecurity as the factor behind the growth of extremism. An overwhelming 89.5 per cent (179 respondents) of the common people believed that ‘economic backwardness of Assam’ is a factor behind the growth of
extremism. Ninety per cent of the experts and almost all the security force personnel had similar opinion. As many as 81 per cent of the common civilians, 70 per cent of the experts and 58.8 per cent security force personnel believed that ‘neglect by the central government’ was another valid factor. Further, 84 per cent of the common people blamed the misrule by the successive state governments to be the reason. While immigration was considered to be a valid factor by 75 per cent common people, 76 per cent of the experts and 82 per cent security force personnel (who were among the experts on whom the questionnaire were administered) thought it to be a crucial factor.

2. Manipur: Of the 150 respondents in the common people category, as many as 134 identified ‘unemployment and social insecurity’ as the dominant factor behind the growth of extremism in the state. Opinion of the experts including the security force personnel was strikingly similar. Forty-six of the 50 expert (professional) respondents which included 20 of the 21 security force personnel who participated in the survey, identified ‘unemployment and social insecurity’ as the factor behind the growth of extremism. At the same time, reasons like neglect by central government, economic backwardness and misrule by the state government were also highlighted as major reasons behind extremism. For example, neglect by central government was identified as a valid reason by 85.3 per cent common people respondents and 80 per cent experts. Misrule by the state government was blamed for extremism by 82 per cent common people and 84 per cent experts.

3. Meghalaya: Of the 100 respondents in the common people category, as many as 97 said that ‘unemployment and social insecurity’ is the most important factor. Economic backwardness of the state was identified as a critical factor by 89 respondents. Interestingly, ‘misrule of the state government’ was identified as a factor by 77 per cent of the respondents. Sixty-five per cent common people believed that neglect by the central government has contributed to the growth of extremism in the state. Only 52 per cent common people said that land alienation is a factor behind extremism. Opinions were divided equally on the immigration factor, with 50 per cent supporting and another 50 per cent opining against. Opinion of the experts including the security forces was
strikingly similar. Ninety-four per cent of the 50 expert respondents identified ‘unemployment and social insecurity’ as the factor behind the growth of extremism. Economic backwardness and misrule of the state government was identified as factors by 84 and 82 per cent experts respectively. Sixty-six per cent experts blamed the neglect by the central government.

4. Nagaland: Among the pre-determined factors, ‘unemployment and social insecurity’ was listed as the most dominant behind the growth of extremism in the state. Of the 149 respondents in the common people category, as many as 85.2 per cent (127 respondents) replied positively to this option. Forty of the 50 expert respondents, which included seven of the eight security force personnel who participated in the survey, identified ‘unemployment and social insecurity’ as the factor behind the growth of extremism. Among the common people, economic backwardness of the state was identified as the factor by 75.8 per cent (113 participants), which was supported by 66 per cent experts and 62.5 per cent security force personnel, whose responses were analysed separately. The state government compared to the central government was blamed more by the common people and the experts for the growth of extremism.

5. Tripura: Of the 100 respondents, as many as 79 responded in the affirmative to this option. Opinion of the experts, including the security forces, was strikingly similar. Thirty-nine of the 50 expert respondents identified ‘unemployment and social insecurity’ as the factor behind the growth of extremism. Common people rejected neglect by central government or immigration as valid factors behind the growth of extremism. Options such as economic backwardness and land alienation, however, received divided response with 51 per cent responding in favour and the rest rejecting it. Among the experts (including the security forces), however, economic backwardness was identified as a major factor with 92 per cent opting in favour.
Land alienation as a factor behind extremism (Experts and Security force personnel)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experts</th>
<th>Security force personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><img src="chart1.png" alt="Pie chart" /></td>
<td><img src="chart2.png" alt="Pie chart" /></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. **Assam**: Attempts to control land and concomitant fear of losing one’s land has been a factor behind the growth of extremism, according to experts. Several conflicts have broken out between tribal and non-tribal communities in Assam over the issue, in which extremist outfits have taken part. In October 2008, for example, 55 deaths were reported in the month-long ethnic clashes between the Bodo community and Muslim settlers in Northern Assam’s Udalguri and Darrang districts. The conflict also produced 200,000 refugees who had to be settled in relief camps.\(^{16}\) Responding to the question whether land alienation or control over land is a factor behind extremism, 52 per cent of the experts and 35.3 per cent security force personnel identified it as “one of the important factors”.

2. **Manipur**: While the problem of land alienation as a factor behind the rise of extremism may not have been a valid factor in the valley districts of Manipur, it is certainly an issue to reckon with in the land-scarce hilly regions of the state. A number inter-tribal clashes recorded in Manipur has centred around the issue of land rights. 38.6 per cent of the 44 experts (17 respondents including nine security force personnel)

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identified land alienation or control over land as “one of the important factors”. However, over 55 per cent experts dismissed it as insignificant.

3. Meghalaya: There has been a growing demand from the indigenous population for strict regulation of transfer of tribal land to any other non-indigenous tribes of Meghalaya. The linkages between land alienation and the growth of extremism in the state, however, are not apparent. This emerged clearly from the responses of the experts including the security force personnel. Responding to the question whether land alienation or loss of control over land is a factor behind extremism, 60 per cent of the experts including security force personnel said that it is not a factor at all. Where as only 10 per cent experts said it is the most important factor, 30 per cent identified it as “one of the important factors”. Among the security forces alone, responses of whom were separately analysed, over 69 per cent dismissed land alienation as a factor with 23 per cent identifying it as “one of the important factors”.

4. Nagaland: Unlike other states of the Northeast, alienation from their own land is not seen as an important factor behind the growth of extremism in Nagaland. While the issue of ‘Nagalim’ has been used by the NSCN-IM to drum up support, it is strictly not a land alienation issue. Whereas in Tripura, the entry of the Hindu migrants from East Bengal/East Pakistan/Bangladesh drove the tribals to rise in rebellion, in Nagaland, the primary issue was the uniqueness of the Nagas, or as they say ‘Naga history’, and the demand of their independence from India. Responding to the question whether land alienation or loss of control over land is a factor behind extremism, majority 58.3 per cent of the 48 experts who answered the query said that it is not a valid factor.

5. Tripura: The alienation of the tribal population from their traditional crop land and transfer of such land to the Bengalis resulted in the gradual domination of the Bengali speaking peasantry over settled agriculture, primarily rice cultivation. The occupation of fields for cultivation began during the Princely rule, when the Maharaja of Tripura belonging to the Manikya dynasty encouraged the resettlement of Bengali settlers on the lands in the plains His decision was guided by the objective of gaining more land revenue,
the prime source of income of Princely Tripura. Although in the initial phases the occupation of land by the Bengalis was not perceived as a threat to the tribal identity, beginning 1940s, the situation started changing. Responding to the question whether land alienation or loss of control over land is a factor behind extremism, 55.1 per cent of the experts including security force personnel identified it as “one of the important factor”. While 24 per cent said that it is the most important factor, over 20 per cent dismissed the assumption by saying that it is not a factor at all.

Experts often blame the open market economy for having pushed a large mass of population to the borders of marginality, thus increasing their alienation and deprivation. Such marginalised masses are potential fodder for the extremist outfits who tend to generate popular support around such issues.

**Economic Liberalisation and Globalisation behind intensification of extremism**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experts</th>
<th>Security force personnel</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>48%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36%</td>
<td>64%</td>
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1. Assam: Majority of experts including security force personnel, however, felt that economic liberalisation and globalisation have not played any significant catalytic role in the intensification of extremism in India. Only 46 per cent experts and 29.4 per cent security force personnel accepted such an assumption, while the rest rejected it. Majority

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of the experts that include security force personnel who supported the assumption maintained that economic liberalisation and globalisation has led to job losses and has allowed exploitation of the country’s resources by the foreign countries/ companies. At the same time, movement of weapons has become less cumbersome on the free trade regime, thereby making the global extremism network strong. The overall impact has led to erosion in human values leading to disruption to peace and harmony.

2. Manipur: Over 65 per cent among the experts including security force personnel, felt that economic liberalisation and globalisation have not played significant catalytic role in the intensification of extremism in India. Among the security force personnel alone, responses of whom were analysed separately, 66.7 per cent subscribed to this theory.

3. Meghalaya: Among the experts in Meghalaya 48 per cent (24 respondents) said that economic liberalisation and globalisation have played significant catalytic role in the intensification of extremism in India. Fifty-two per cent among the experts including security force personnel dismissed the proposition. However, among the security force alone, responses of whom were analysed separately, 84.6 per cent rejected the theory.

4. Nagaland: Sixty per cent among the experts including security force personnel felt that economic liberalisation and globalisation have played significant catalytic role in the intensification of extremism in India. Among the security force alone, responses of whom were analysed separately, 50 per cent subscribed to this theory.

5. Tripura: Though in Tripura, the rise of extremism is generally not considered to be connected to the policy of economic liberalisation that started in the early 1990s, being a Marxist ruled state, the prevalent ideology in the state believes in the theory that economic liberalisation accentuates the divide between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have nots’. Fifty per cent of the experts, including security force personnel felt that economic liberalisation and globalisation have played a significant catalytic role in the intensification of extremism in India. Among the security force personnel alone, responses of whom were analysed separately, only 12.5 per cent subscribed to this theory.
C. Image of the extremists: Extremists as People's Representatives

Despite the indiscriminate violence the insurgent/extremist groups in India have indulged in, a definitional problem continues to be an issue in any descriptive analysis on the issue. Whether the extremists should be addressed as terrorists or militants or insurgents continues to haunt the analysts even today. Moreover, extremist groups continue to have some level of popular support base in specific areas where people perceive them to be their genuine representatives, fighting for their interests. It is important, thus, from the point of view of the anti-extremist measures, that the actual perception of the people is taken into account.

The respondents were asked how they would like to describe the extremist groups in their state. They were given the options of describing them as ‘liberators’, ‘terrorists’ and ‘other’. The option ‘other’ provided the respondents the freedom to use their own terminologies which they thought best described the cadres of these multiple outfits.

**How will you describe the extremist groups in your state? (Common people)**

![Graph showing responses to the question.]

1. **Assam:** While 97 respondents (48.5 per cent) in the common people category described the extremists as ‘terrorists’, a significant 23.5 per cent (47 respondents) termed them ‘liberators’. People expressing such opinion were curiously dominant in the district of Nalbari, which in the past had contributed a large number of cadres to the
ULFA. Voicing a similar opinion Dilip Patgiri, member of the Assam Jatiyatabadi Yuva Chhatra Parishad (AJYCP), a prominent youth organisation in Assam said during an interview, “To me ULFA is not an extremist outfit, they are revolutionaries. They are much different from dacoits, robbers”. Similarly, former ULFA leader Prabal Neog said, “It is true that when a revolution keeps on stretching too long, there is a chance of the revolution turning into terrorism. But this situation has still not come in Assam.” The fact that a sizeable section of the population continue to view the extremists as ‘liberators’ signified that the state’s psychological operations are yet to succeed in altering the mindset of the people. A senior police official endorsed this and said, “State is not able to highlight the excesses committed by the extremists. It has not successfully integrated into a psychological operation against the extremists. In fact, there is no psychological operation.” Even the former Chief Secretary of Assam, H N Das said, “State usually pursues ad hoc policy. They give attention during a bombing, and after that they forget everything.” This is an area which needs focus as far as psychological operations of the state administration are concerned.

2. Manipur: The perception that Manipur was forcibly merged into India and thereafter was treated shabbily has passed on to the younger generations by the old. In this background, the (Meitei) extremist organisations’ plank of independence of Manipur has generated a lot of support among the common people. For example, a 70-year old woman said during the survey, “People support (the extremists) willingly. Some people give support because the extremists are doing good, like punishing rapists or thieves, etc. Some support them for their courage and bravery for fighting against the police and the mighty Indian Army.” This feeling has been kept alive by the over-ground sympathisers of the extremist outfits. Recurrent violence and extortion is gradually eroding the support

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18 Interview held on June 22, 2009 at Guwahati, Assam.
19 Interview held on November 7, 2009 at Tinsukia, Assam.
20 Commenting on the state’s inability to conduct psychological operations, Prashant Rajguru, Executive Editor, Amar Asom, an Assamese daily, said, “The state has no credibility to launch a psychological operation. People do not believe either the state or the extremists.” Interview conducted on October 9, 2009 at Guwahati, Assam.
21 Interview with B J Mahanta, IGP (Law and Order), Assam, conducted on 18 October 2009.
22 Interview conducted on June 23, 2009 in Guwahati, Assam.
23 R.K.Sonatombi, a 70 year old woman in Imphal East district was responding to query regarding the support the extremists enjoy among the local people.
base of the outfits. However, at the same time, a perceived ‘attitude of neglect and discrimination on part of New Delhi’ is continuing to translate into sympathy for the armed factions, considered to be representing the anguish of the common masses. Importantly, not a single respondent of the 146 who responded to the query described the extremists as terrorists. 57 persons termed them as insurgents, thereby highlighting the perception that the armed groups are waging a political struggle against the state and not otherwise. However, the degeneration of the groups to mere extortionists was underlined by 52 respondents who described them as ‘money making groups’. Seventeen persons said that the groups could be described as both ‘liberators as well as terrorists’.

3. Meghalaya: The responses, in spite of 57 per cent describing the extremists as ‘terrorists’, were at best divided. Twenty-one respondents, 17 of whom were from urban and semi-urban settings, described the extremists as liberators. Another 22 respondents chose the ‘other’ option. Explaining their responses, 26 common people maintained that the extremists are involved in murders, bomb blasts, extortion, etc. While 14 others said that the extremists are spreading terror among the people, 13 respondents maintained that the extremists are working for the freedom of the state. Seven others said that the extremists are working for the rights and interests of the people. Twelve respondents, however, maintained that the extremists are working towards fulfilling their own selfish interests. In spite of a majority of the respondents terming extremism as terrorism, the pattern of response did indicate some level of support behind the extremist cadres.

4. Nagaland: Whereas 37.9 percent (55 respondents) of the 145 common people who answered the question indicated that they would term the extremists as ‘terrorists’, 31 per cent (45 respondents) said that the extremists are actually ‘liberators’. This indicated the substantial support the extremists continue to enjoy among the local population, but have also helped in dispelling the myth that most Nagas regard the Naga insurgent groups as ‘liberators’. Another 45 respondents chose the ‘other’ category. 20 of these respondents said that the extremists are both terrorists and liberators. Whereas eight persons said that the extremists are merely working for their own interests, five others maintained that the
extremists are nothing but money-making groups. Six respondents said that it is appropriate to call them ‘insurgents’.

5. Tripura: An overwhelming 97 respondents in the common people category described the extremists as ‘terrorists’. The responses were uniform across rural, semi-urban and urban settings. Explaining their responses, 28 common people maintained that the extremists work against the public interest. Another 25 maintained that since the extremists are involved in killings, bomb blasts and extortion, they can only be described as terrorists. Voicing similar opinion, ten others maintained that the main aim of the extremists is to spread terror among the people. The pattern of opinion was significant and demonstrated the level of popular support the anti-insurgency drive in the state had managed to garner. Once the extremists, pretending to espouse the cause of the common people, stand stripped off popular support, it is only a matter of time that the state secures a victory against extremism. This is a lesson for many other states in the Northeast and also the states that are currently affected by left-wing extremism.

Extremist groups have mushroomed in the region claiming to represent the interests of the various communities inhabiting the states. Certain ethnic groups have been represented by multiple outfits, each claiming to be the genuine representative of the community. In Manipur, for example, the UNLF which an objective of establishing an “independent socialist Manipur” has often spoken about holding a United Nations mediated plebiscite to decide the issue of independence of Manipur. Its chairman has argued, “Whether we remain with India or whether we become a sovereign, independent nation, let the people decide.” Similarly the PLA, which too aims at the independence of Manipur purportedly “takes up arms and fights for all the dependent and colonised people of Manipur”. In Meghalaya, the ANVC played on psyche of the Garos who suffered from a perceived domination by the Khasis. Similarly, the HNLC spoke of the superiority of the Khasis to widen its area of influence. In Nagaland, the NNC as well as

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25 The RPF’s original website [http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Congress/4568/](http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Congress/4568/) is no longer available. However, the opening text of the site continues to be available at [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/rpf-m.htm](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/rpf-m.htm).
both the factions of the NSCN claim to be working towards the desire of the Naga people to find their own homeland consisting of the Naga inhabited areas of India and Myanmar. In Tripura, the NLFT has an objective of establishing an independent Tripura through an armed struggle and secure liberation from ‘Indian neo-colonialism and imperialism’ and furtherance of a ‘distinct and independent identity’.\textsuperscript{26} Similarly, the ATTF had a three point agenda: (i) Expulsion of all Bengali-speaking immigrant settlers who entered Tripura after 1956, (ii) Restoration of land to tribals under ‘Tripura Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act’, 1960 and (iii) Removal of names of migrants who entered Tripura after 1956 from the electoral roll.\textsuperscript{27}

The project intended to elicit popular perceptions on this aspect. The respondents in the common people category were asked whether there is any extremist group which claims to represent their community or ethnic group.

\textbf{Is there any extremist group who claim to represent your community/ethnic group?}

\begin{center}
\textit{(Common people)}
\end{center}

\begin{figure}
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\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{chart.png}
\caption{Chart showing the percentage of respondents who answered 'Yes' or 'No' to the question.}
\end{figure}

\textbf{1. Assam:} A majority 65.5 per cent (131 respondents) answered in the negative whereas the rest, 34.5 per cent (69 respondents) believed that their ethnic group is being represented by certain extremist outfit. Significantly, out of these 69 respondents, 38

\textsuperscript{26} National Liberation Front of Tripura, South Asia Terrorism Portal, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/tripura/terrorist_outfits/Nlft.htm

\textsuperscript{27} All Tripura Tiger Force, South Asia Terrorism Portal, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/tripura/terrorist_outfits/Attf.htm
belonged to the rural area, which indicated that the belief that the extremists represent the interests of the ethnicities or communities is more prevalent in the rural areas compared to the urban or the semi-urban settings.

2. Manipur: An overwhelming majority 87.3 per cent answered in the positive. This underlined the common ground between the proclaimed objectives of the extremist groups and the perceptions of the people regarding such claims.

3. Meghalaya: An overwhelming majority 96 per cent (96 respondents) answered in the affirmative. The pattern of response was uniform across rural, semi-urban and urban settings. This confirmed the trend established in the response to the earlier question. The common people remain well versed with the claims of the extremist outfits and are aware that the outfits have attempted to derive strength by seeking popular support along ethnic lines. This, however, is not an indication of the level of popular support behind the extremists.

4. Nagaland: Only 39 per cent of the respondents answered in the affirmative. This was a significant finding considering the fact that the extremists were defined as ‘liberators’ by 31 per cent of respondents in response to the earlier question. It is indicative of the growing divide between the extremists and the common people who find a mismatch between the claims and the actual activities of the extremists on the ground.

5. Tripura: An overwhelming majority 92 per cent answered in the negative. This indicated the gap between the proclaimed objectives of the extremist groups and the differing perceptions of the people regarding such claims of the extremist groups.

In a related question, the respondents in the common people category were asked whether there is any extremist group which enjoys support in their community/ locality.
Do extremist groups enjoy support in your community/ locality? (Common people)

1. **Assam:** 64.5 per cent respondents answered in the negative and the rest said ‘yes’. Such support appeared to be more prevalent in the rural areas of the state, as 48 of the 71 respondents who had answered in the affirmative belonged to the rural areas. However, to the question, whether such support to the extremist groups is based on fear or is voluntary, the response was clearly divided. An equal number of 32 participants opted for each of these options.

2. **Manipur:** Majority 74 per cent (111 respondents) maintained that the extremists do enjoy support from the community/locality. Probed further, while 35 respondents maintained that people support the extremists on their own, another 35 persons said that the support is generated through fear of the extremists. Another 41 respondents said that both voluntary support and support through fear is responsible for the mass following behind the extremists.

3. **Meghalaya:** A majority 73 per cent replied in the negative. Moreover, 17 of the 27 persons who maintained that extremists enjoy support in the community/locality do so through compulsion or generation of fear. The success of the state in neutralising the extremists in Meghalaya to a large extent is significantly due to the erosion of popular support for the outfits.
4. **Nagaland**: A minority 45.2 per cent of the respondents maintained that the extremists do enjoy support from the community/locality. Probed further, only 16 respondents maintained that people support the extremists on their own. Thirty-two respondents of the ones who had said extremists enjoy support of the local people said that such support is generated through fear by the extremists. Another 17 respondents said that both voluntary support and support through fear is responsible for the common people supporting the extremists.

5. **Tripura**: 93 per cent of the respondents answered in the negative. Moreover, all the seven persons who maintained that extremists enjoy support in the community/locality do so because of the fear they are able to generate. Unlike other states of the Northeast, extremists in Tripura have lost support of the people they once claimed to represent. And with the state’s grip firming up over the extremist strongholds, support generated through fear is unlikely to continue for long.

The next question asked the respondents whether they perceive the extremists to be the representatives of popular interests/aspirations.

**Do the extremists today represent the interests/ aspirations of the people?**
*(Common People & Experts)*

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<th>Common people</th>
<th>Experts</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>15%</td>
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1. Assam: An overwhelming 83.5 per cent in the common people category answered in the negative. Significantly, 17 out of these 26 respondents, who seemed to think that the extremists represent interests and aspirations of the people, were from the rural areas. It indicated comparatively larger popular support for the extremists in rural settings. In comparison, only 64 of the 167 respondents who replied in the negative were from the rural areas. The rejection of the extremists as the representative of the people was significant, though comparatively less intense in the experts’ as well as in the security force personnel category. Thirty four of the 50 experts, who include 12 of the 17 security force personnel, maintained that the extremists do not represent the aspirations of the people.

2. Manipur: Only 38.7 per cent of the 150 respondents in the common people category answered in the positive. Similarly, 80 per cent of the experts’ category, which included the security force personnel, also said that the extremists today do not represent the aspirations of the people. All but one of the 21 security personnel, responses of whom were analysed separately, had similar opinion. The rejection of the extremists as the representative of the people was significant. The responses indicated that although the extremists claim to be representing the interests of the people, these claims are gradually considered to be a sham by majority of the people.

3. Meghalaya: A majority 79 per cent of the 100 respondents in the common people category answered in the negative. Among the 21 persons who said the extremists represent popular aspirations, the percentage of those drawn from rural areas was higher. The experts, who included security force personnel, were much more categorical than the common people. Close to 90 per cent of this category said that the extremists today do not represent the aspirations of the people. Among the security forces, whose responses were analysed separately, 100 per cent respondents had similar opinion.

4. Nagaland: Over 70 per cent of the 139 common people who answered the question replied in the negative. The experts were even more emphatic in their rejection of the extremists. Close to 88 per cent of the experts’, which included the security forces, also
said that the extremists today do not represent the aspirations of the people. Barring a lone personnel, rest six in the category of the security forces, whose responses were analysed separately, had similar opinion. The popular rejection of the extremists as representative of the people was significant.

5. Tripura: An overwhelming 99 per cent of the 100 respondents in the common people category answered in the negative. Similarly, 97.9 per cent of the experts’ category, which included the security forces, also said that the extremists today do not represent the aspirations of the people. All the security forces, responses of whom were analysed separately, had similar opinion.

D. Use of Violence:

Violence allows the extremist groups numbering few hundreds or thousands, to wield a disproportionate amount of influence on society. Further, violence is an effective instrument to attract attention of the authorities who otherwise would not pay heed to the peaceful protests. “In Assam, (peaceful) protests never yielded fruit”, said writer and peace activist Indira Goswami, who once played mediator between the ULFA and the Government of India.28 A professor in Nagland University said during the interview, “From the beginning of (the Naga) national movement, some people wanted peaceful protest and wanted to put forward their demands in the form or representation and petitions but when the Government of India neither paid any heed nor paid due respect to the sentiments and aspirations of the people, they started adopting violent methods.”29 Such arguments are also made to justify the use of violence by the extremists. However, in case of ULFA, a number of persons argued that the outfit did not have an agenda of violence during its origin in 1979. Former ULFA leader Prabal Neog said, “There was a phase of peaceful protests in the state but such protests were crushed with the use of force by the Government. This led the movement to turn violent, which continues till today.”30

In Manipur too, a senior police official said, “The peace loving people of the state have

28 Interview conducted on October 8, 2009 at Guwahati.
29 Interview with John Sema, Professor, Nagaland University, held at Kohima on November 19, 2009.
30 Interview with Prabal Neog at Tinsukia, Assam on November 7, 2009.
demanded autonomy and equality before resorting to armed struggle but it has been neglected. The people feel that they have been subjugated and treated as third class citizens. Denial of opportunities of employment, neglected infrastructure construction and discrimination by the Central Government and leaders are main points.”

Even though Meghalaya witnessed limited extremist violence during the days when both the HNLC and the ANVC were influential, the incidents were widespread and targeted a range of victims. The main objective of the outfits, like their counterparts in other states of the region, was to create terror and gain benefits from it.

While this phenomenon of moving from a peaceful phase to a violent one could be true for ULFA or some other outfits, as a matter of general trend, not all extremist outfits go through peaceful phase before resorting to violence. As is commonly known in the Northeast, the easy availability of small arms has promoted a culture of violence and the gap between the formation of an outfit and its recourse to organized violence is rather brief. What explains the use of violence by the extremists? The questionnaire attempted to elicit the response of the common civilians. The respondents were asked to answer ‘Yes’ or “No’ to four options which explained such a phenomenon.

31 Interview with N. Shyamananda Singh, IPS, Inspector General of Police, Managing Director, Manipur Police Housing Corporation, Imphal, held on October 30, 2009.
32 Media reports have indicated that militant groups in the Northeast are procuring weapons from China. The reports suggested that the Chinese army is going through a process of modernisation in a big way and the process of includes upgradation of weapons. In the process of modernisation, the old weapons are often offloaded to the arms dealers and the militant groups take advantage of the situation to procure the same through clandestine arms dealers. In recent past, a number of militant leaders belonging to various outfits have visited China. See R Dutta Choudhury, ‘NE ultras procuring Chinese arms”, Assam Tribune, January 14, 2010.
33 During interviews held with several persons in Assam, different perceptions were expressed regarding the concept “culture of violence”. Admitting that it exists, former ULFA leader Prabal Neog said, “This happened because of the deprivation faced by the people of Assam. Deprivation leads to creation of anger within the masses and this anger take the form of a rebellion.” Prashant Rajguru, Editor, Assam Tribune said, “After emergence of the ULFA, all smaller communities/ tribes formed their own groups to achieve the aspirations of the people. Sometimes the groups forget the hopes and aspirations of the people and resort to violence/ extortion for their own benefit.”
Why extremist groups are using violence to express their anger?

(Common People & Experts)

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<th>Common people</th>
<th>Experts</th>
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<tr>
<td>66.8%</td>
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<td>74.7%</td>
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<tr>
<td>55.8%</td>
<td>67%</td>
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A = The authorities do not listen to peaceful protests by the people;
B = Easy availability of weapons and lure of easy money by demonstration of force
C = To send out a message to the authorities to take the group seriously;
D = To keep the masses, who are the main support base of the extremists, under control through the element of fear

1. Assam: Seventy-four per cent of the common people and 58 per cent of the experts believed that the recourse to violence by the extremists is a corollary to the lack of attention from the authorities to peaceful mode of protests. This view was, however, supported by a minority (41 per cent) of the security force personnel who were among the people interviewed under the ‘expert’ category. Over 76 per cent of the respondents in the common people category, 82 per cent of experts and 94 per cent security force personnel believed that easy availability of weapons and lure of easy money have resulted in the unceasing violence by the extremists. As many as 60.5 per cent respondents in the common people category, 82 per cent of experts and 88.2 per cent security force personnel believed that the indulgence in violence sends a message to the authorities to take the group seriously. Similarly, 76.5 per cent security force personnel, 70 per cent experts and 60 per cent common people said that violence is used by the extremists as an instrument to generate fear and keep the masses under control. After all, the masses are the main support base of the extremists.
2. Manipur: 76.7 per cent of the common people and 60 per cent of the experts said that the recourse to violence by the extremists is a natural progression from the original method of peaceful mode of protests. Among the security forces, only 38.1 per cent respondents supported this view. Sixty per cent of the respondents in the common people category and 84 per cent of experts, however, believed that availability of weapons and lure of easy money have resulted in the unceasing violence by the extremists. Even security forces agreed with this. 85.7 per cent of the 21 security force personnel who participated in the survey said availability of small arms and lure of easy money is promoting extremist violence in the state. As many as 71.3 per cent respondents in the common people category, 84 per cent of experts and 85.7 per cent security force personnel believed that the indulgence in violence sends a message to the authorities to take the group seriously. 84 per cent experts (including the security forces) and 90.5 per cent security force personnel whose responses were calculated separately, said that violence is used by the extremists as an instrument to generate fear and keep the masses under control.

3. Meghalaya: The belief that recourse to violence by the extremists is a corollary to the lack of attention from the authorities to peaceful mode of protests, however, was supported by 83 per cent of the common people and 74 per cent of the experts. Even among the security forces whose responses were analysed separately, more than 84 per cent supported this view point. Sixty-seven per cent of the respondents in the common people category and 78 per cent of experts believed that easy availability of weapons and lure of easy money have also added to the violence potential of the extremists. Among the security forces alone, over 69 per cent thought so. As many as 83 per cent respondents in the common people category, 86 per cent of experts and 69 per cent security force personnel believed that the indulgence in violence sends a message to the authorities to take the group seriously. Similarly 69 per cent common people, 62 per cent experts (including the security forces) and 69.2 per cent security force personnel whose responses were calculated separately, said that violence is used by the extremists as an instrument to generate fear and keep the masses under control. This pattern of response
indicated that while extremists might have taken to violence after their peaceful protests failed, recourse to violence was made possible through the easy availability of small arms.

4. Nagaland: Over 76 per cent of the common people appeared to support the conclusion that easy availability of weapons and lure of easy money by demonstration of force is the reason behind the indulgence in violence by the extremists. 88 per cent of the experts agreed with this view point. Among the security forces, whose responses were analysed separately, more than 87 per cent too shared similar opinion. Over 65 per cent common people said that violence is an effective means to keep the masses, who are the main support base of the extremists, under control. 68 per cent experts and 62.5 per cent security force personnel supported this view point. Similarly, over 65 per cent common people said that indulgence in violence makes the authorities sit back and take the group seriously. A peaceful group, in comparison would demand less attention. While 62.5 per cent security forces agreed with this view, among the experts support for such a conclusion was 58 per cent. However, majority in all the three category of respondents rejected the view that orchestration of violence becomes a necessity for the extremists as the authorities do not listen to peaceful protests by the people. While among the common people, only a bare majority 51 per cent indicated that authorities do listen to peaceful protests, among the experts 58 per cent, and among the security forces 62.5 per cent, had similar view.

5. Tripura: The belief that recourse to violence by the extremists is a corollary to the lack of attention from the authorities to peaceful mode of protests, however, was supported by only 49 per cent of the common people and 41 per cent of the experts. Among the security forces, only 12.5 per cent respondents supported this view. Seventy per cent of the respondents in the common people category and 65.3 per cent of experts, however, believed that easy availability of weapons and lure of easy money have resulted in the unceasing violence by the extremists. Surprisingly, only 50 per cent of the security forces thought so. As many as 67 per cent respondents in the common people category, 63.3 per cent of experts and 87.5 per cent security force personnel believed that the indulgence in violence sends a message to the authorities to take the group seriously.
While 51 per cent experts (including the security forces) and 50 per cent security force personnel whose responses were calculated separately, said that violence is used by the extremists as an instrument to generate fear and keep the masses under control, only 24 per cent common people agreed with this view. This pattern of response again reinforced the belief that the weakening of the extremists in Tripura has led to a rise in the level of the sense of security among the common people.

E. Terror Funding

It is commonly argued that extremism in the Northeast has developed from being a small scale industry to a large scale one and sheer economics of budgets of the militant groups are quite revealing. Extremist outfits in the region have been able to generate considerable finance to keep the fire of revolution burning. According to available figures, for 2005-06, the ULFA had a budget of Rupees 70 crore, an increase of 10 per cent over the previous year's budget. The NSCN-IM, on the other hand, maintains an annual budget to the tune of Rupees 20 to 25 crores. It defines tax-collection as its traditional and inalienable right. The outfit maintains that “collection of taxes by the NSCN is wrongly labelled by India as ‘extortion’. Every nation collect revenue from its citizens, and Nagaland is no exception. Money is, thus, sourced from both the civilians, the business houses and also from the government. In Meghalaya, within five years of its inception in 1992, according to rough estimates, the HNLC had collected more than Rupees Five crores. Till 1997, the group had looted 14 banks, offices and petrol pumps, harvesting Rupees 65 lakhs through such exercises. The arrest of the HNLC 'finance secretary', Fullstar Rani, on 7 June 2003, revealed that the group was receiving more than Rupees 4.2 crores annually through extortion and other illegal activities. In Manipur, militants collect money from all and sundry with the government and business sectors contributing the maximum. Money is collected round the year from the transporters,

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shops, medicine stores, government departments as well as individuals. In December 2005, then chief of army staff Gen J.J. Singh presented two receipts to home minister Shivraj Patil and the Prime Minister’s Office accusing that Manipur chief minister Okram Ibobi Singh has paid Rupees 50 lakhs and Rupees One crore to the KYKL and the PLA respectively. Refusal to accede to the extremist demands has often resulted in abduction, killing and shutting down of the shop or transport business.

**Primary source of funding for extremists (Experts and security force personnel)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experts</th>
<th>security force personnel</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>87.6%</td>
<td>89.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73%</td>
<td>68.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70%</td>
<td>69.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79.6%</td>
<td>81.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A = Extortion from business community/industrial houses; B = Contribution by the politicians; C = Leakage of development funds; D = Extortion from common people

1. **Assam:** While almost all the experts including the security force personnel believed that the extremists have managed to generate significant finances from the business community and industrial houses, there were some differences of opinion about the contribution made by the politicians to extremist coffers. Sixty eight per cent experts including 41.2 per cent security force personnel believed that contribution by politicians is not the primary source of funding for the extremists. Over 80 per cent of the experts interviewed said that leakage of development funds and extortion from common people

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37 Saikat Datta, “Manipur CM Gave Rs 1.5 Crore To Separatists”, *Outlook* (New Delhi), December 12, 2005.
are a crucial source of income for the extremists. This view was supported by a majority of the security force personnel. In addition, funding from the foreign powers was identified as another major source of finances.

2. Manipur: Over 98 per cent experts including all the 21 security force personnel believed that business community and industrial houses have contributed significantly to the coffers of the extremists. While over 79 per cent of the experts believed that politicians too have contributed to the extremists, a marginally less 75 per cent security personnel confirmed this. 98 per cent experts including all the security force personnel said that leakage of development funds constitute a major source for extremist finance. Similarly, 95.9 per cent of the experts including all the security force personnel said that extremists collect substantial funds from the common people as well.

3. Meghalaya: 98 per cent experts (including the security force personnel) and all the 13 security force personnel maintained that extortion from the business community and business houses constitute the primary source of funding for the outfit. While 80 per cent experts maintained that politicians have contributed to the coffers of the outfits, over 84 per cent security forces believed so. In comparison, leakage of development funds did not appear to be a critical source of funding for the outfits. Barely 52 per cent experts and 54 per cent security forces said that leakage from developmental funds constitute a primary source of funding for the extremists. While only 56 per cent experts believed that extortion from common people has contributed significantly to the extremists’ coffers, over 69 per cent security forces confirmed this.

4. Nagaland: 94 per cent of the experts who answered the question believed that business community and industrial houses have contributed significantly to the coffers of the extremists. The opinion was supported by all the security force personnel. While 88 per cent of the experts believed that politicians too have contributed to the extremists, a marginally less 87.5 per cent security forces (views of whom were analysed separately) confirmed this. 86 per cent experts and 75 per cent security force personnel said that leakage of development funds constitute a major source for extremist finance. Whereas
78 per cent of the experts said that extremists collect substantial funds from the common people as well, among the security forces 87.5 per cent supported the view.

5. Tripura: Eighty eight per cent experts including 100 per cent security force personnel believed that extortion from the common people is the primary source of funding for the extremists. While 50 per cent of the experts interviewed said that contribution from the politicians is an important source of income for the extremists, only 25 per cent security forces supported this. Similarly, 48 per cent experts believed that extortion from business community and industrial houses constitute a major source of income for the outfits, only 25 per cent security force personnel interviewed confirmed this. A minor 32 per cent experts and 25 per cent security forces said that leakage of development funds is a crucial source of income for the extremists. In addition, funding from the foreign elements was identified as another major source of finances.

F. Support Base and Foreign Backing

Foreign hand behind the growth and sustenance of extremism (Common people)

1. Assam: ULFA, NDFB and some of the Islamic outfits in Assam are believed to have received some level of foreign backing. The ISI of Pakistan and DGFI of Bangladesh have assisted these groups in terms of training, arms supply and provision of other
necessities in Bangladesh. Both ULFA and NDFB had their bases in Bhutan before being dislodged from that country in December 2003. The 28th battalion of ULFA, which is its primary striking force, is based in Myanmar’s Sagaing division. The NDFB’s anti-talk faction is also known to have relocated its cadres to Myanmar after Bangladesh’s Awami League (AL) government’s anti-extremism operations. It is usually mentioned that without the support of the foreign powers, the extremist outfits would never have achieved the state of lethality they managed to. Quite naturally, 93.5 per cent (187 respondents) confirmed the ‘foreign hand’ theory behind extremism in the state.

2. Manipur: In the late 1960s, a group of 200 Meitei youth exfiltrated into Sylhet, where there is a small resident Meitei community, to seek Pakistani assistance in their fight for independence. The attempt failed as the East Pakistani authorities were preoccupied with the rising tide of the Awami League movement and wished to avoid confrontation with India at that juncture. However, China, which was assisting the Naga and Mizo rebels then, came to the aid of the Meitei insurgents. In the subsequent years, all the major extremist outfits in Manipur found bases in both Bangladesh and Myanmar. Of late, the Bangladesh government has initiated steps against many of the outfits. According to reports, the UNLF chief R K Meghen too was arrested in Dhaka in October 2010 and was subsequently handed over to India. However, there are insurgent bases in Myanmar and the links Manipuri ultras have with the lower ranks of the Myanmar army has become crucial for their survival. A number of attacks have been launched by these ultras on security forces from across the Indo-Myanmar border. A majority 83.3 per cent (125 respondents) of the 150 who participated in the survey confirmed the ‘foreign hand’ theory behind extremism in the state.

3. Meghalaya: Both the HNLC and ANVC maintained several camps in Bangladesh and established working nexus with a number of north-eastern outfits who had presence in that country. Almost 92 percent of the 100 respondents in the common people category

confirmed their belief that foreign hand played a crucial role in the growth and sustenance of extremism. The pattern of responses was uniform across rural, semi-urban and urban settings.

4. Nagaland: Naga extremism had received assistance in its early years from China and East Pakistan. In 1966 the first ‘Naga Army’ batch reached China for training through Burmese territory. Many such expeditions followed till 1980, when Beijing stopped arming and training the Northeast Indian rebels. The NSCN-IM along with the ULFA from Assam and other northeastern groups then developed contacts with the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) which wanted them “to open a second front of subversion in the Northeast, in addition to the one in Kashmir.” Linkages with the ISI appeared to have declined after the outfit started negotiating with New Delhi. However, the outfit continues to maintain some bases in Myanmar for decades, along with the NSCN-K. These camps have facilitated both outfits’ indulgence in small arms as well as drugs trafficking. A majority 60 per cent of the respondents confirmed the ‘foreign hand’ theory behind extremism in the state. However, a sizeable majority 35 per cent denied the presence of any foreign hand.

5. Tripura: For a number of years, the NLFT and the ATTF were courted by the ISI and DGFI, who provided logistics and facilitated arms and training for these extremists in Bangladesh. According to an estimate of the Tripura state government in 2005, extremist groups from Tripura had 42 main camps in Bangladesh including 15 of the NLFT-Biswamohan, 18 belonging to the ATTF and nine belonging to the NLFT-Joshua, which were used as their headquarters, training camps and as safe houses for their activities.

leaders.\footnote{“Speech for the Chief Minister’s Conference”, April 15, 2005, http://tripura.nic.in/SpeechesforCMConference.htm} Quite naturally, 99 per cent (187 respondents) confirmed the ‘foreign hand’ theory behind extremism in the state.

Factors keeping extremism alive (Experts and Security force personnel)

1. Assam: 70 per cent of the experts ruled out support of the people as a factor which keeps extremism alive in the state. Only 35.3 per cent security force personnel supported this view. Eighty per cent of the experts and 82.4 per cent security force personnel maintained that the support from foreign powers is a factor behind the trend. Seventy-two per cent experts and 88.2 per cent security force personnel identified hostile terrain as another important factor. While 76 per cent experts said nexus with politicians is a force multiplier for the extremists, this view found support among only 47.1 per cent security force personnel. A very high 92 per cent experts and 94.1 per cent security force personnel said the open and porous borders with neighbouring states/countries has assisted the extremists in no small manner. Some of the experts, however, maintained that popular support behind the extremists has waned. V M Thomas, Executive Director of Don Bosco Institute in Guwahati explained, “At the beginning, the ideology of any
extremist group manages to attract many common people to support it. Later, as we have seen, the changing ideology of such groups and their linkages with other terrorist groups and the nature of their activities make the people demoralized and withdraw support to such groups.”

2. Manipur: Majority of the experts (94 per cent each) believed that hostile terrain and open border with neighbouring Myanmar is keeping extremism alive in Manipur. This view was supported by 95.2 per cent security force personnel whose responses were analysed separately. Similarly, 82 per cent experts and 92.5 per cent security force personnel maintained that nexus with politicians is a crucial factor. A much less 64 per cent experts and 61.9 per cent security force personnel said that support from the foreign powers is crucial. This, in a way, indicated that foreign support may be an important factor, but not the sole reason behind the survival of the outfits. Support from the people as a factor was rejected both by the experts and the security officials. Only 44 per cent experts (which included the security force personnel) and 38.1 per cent security force personnel (whose responses were analysed separately), supported the ‘popular support behind extremism’ assumption.

3. Meghalaya: For the experts (including the security forces), two factors—nexus with politicians and open borders with neighbouring states/countries—were identified as the crucial factors behind continuing extremism. While 92 per cent experts said nexus with politicians is keeping extremism alive in the state, 96 per cent blamed it on open and porous borders. The other factors such as support from the people, support from foreign powers and hostile terrain were supported by less than 50 per cent respondents among the experts. The security forces, responses of whom were analysed separately, differed only to an extent. While 92 per cent said nexus with politicians is keeping extremism alive in Meghalaya, 100 per cent said it is due to open and porous borders. More than 53 per cent security forces felt that support from the people and foreign powers are also important factors. However, only 46 per cent ascribed the strength of the extremists to hostile terrain.

46 Interview held on June 19, 2009 in Guwahati.
4. Nagaland: Majority 94 per cent of the experts, including all the security force personnel, believed that nexus with politicians is keeping extremism alive in Nagaland. Seventy-six per cent experts and a slightly less 75 per cent security force personnel said that open border with neighbouring Myanmar is to blamed for the thriving extremism in the state. While 54 per cent experts said that support from common people is a crucial factor behind extremism, 62.5 per cent security forces, whose responses were analysed separately, agreed. The security forces were equally divided on the issue of foreign support behind extremism. Majority of the experts (62 per cent) however, said that such support is no longer a crucial factor. Similarly, 70 per cent experts said that hostile terrain is not a determining factor behind extremism in Nagaland. More than 87 per cent security forces agreed with this view.

5. Tripura: 78 per cent of the experts ruled out support of the people as a factor which keeps extremism alive in the state. This view was supported by 87.5 per cent security force personnel whose responses were analysed separately. Ninety per cent of the experts and 87.5 per cent security force personnel maintained that the support from foreign powers is a factor behind the trend. While 62.5 per cent security force personnel identified hostile terrain as another important factor, this view was supported by only 28 per cent of the experts. While 48 per cent experts said nexus with politicians is a force multiplier for the extremists, this view found support among 50 per cent security force personnel, indicating rather moderate view on the political support generated by the extremists in Tripura. A very high 87.5 per cent security force personnel and 74 per cent experts said the open and porous borders with neighbouring states/countries has assisted the extremists in no small manner.

G. Role of Media and Intelligentsia

Extremist groups in the Northeast have allegedly benefited from the support they receive from a section of local media and intelligentsia. While civil society and community based organisations have played crucial roles in working towards peace in Nagaland, it is also
alleged that organisations like the Naga Hoho, Naga Students’ Federation (NSF), Naga Mothers’ Association (NMA) and the Naga People’s Movement for Human Rights (NPMHR) have become mouthpieces for the NSCN-IM. Press releases from extremists are published in the vernacular media, sometimes out of forceful compliance and sometimes because persons soft on extremism are in charge of the publication. A journalist in Nagaland noted, “Unlike other states in the country, media in Nagaland is quite under pressure. We can’t say it is a free media, because we continuously work under the pressure of different organisations.”

On few occasions, security forces have arrested media persons for colluding with the extremists. Similarly, a section of the local intelligentsia which shares a belief, just as the extremists, in the theory of exploitation of the northeastern region by mainland India has provided tacit support to the extremists. They have written in favour of the extremist activities, spoken in public functions and also attempted to generate support in their favour. The extremists too have used both the media and the intelligentsia for justifying their activities. In the words of a media person, “Journalists in Manipur have been shot dead and not accounted for, have been kidnapped and threatened. Press units have been ransacked by government forces as well as closed down by armed insurgents. Press personnel have often been humiliated and beaten by security forces while on duty.”

In Assam, ULFA chief Paresh Baruah on 6 January 2010 threatened to carry out attacks on the media and intelligentsia which does not subscribe to the outfit’s view invited criticism from the Journalists’ Forum of Assam (JFA).

At the same time, it needs to be noted that the media and intelligentsia on various occasions have stood up to protest against the arm twisting techniques of the extremists and defended their independence.

49 In its statement on January 10, 2010, the JFA said, “We strongly condemn the callous and irresponsible comments made by self-styled ULFA military chief Paresh Barua and his threats to journalists and intellectuals of the state who dare to oppose the diktat of the banned outfit”. See Samudra Gupta Kashyap, “Assam scribes condemn Barua’s threat”, Indian Express, January 11, 2010.
Role of media in extremism affected state (Experts and Security force personnel)

1. Assam: Although 76 per cent of the experts and 82.4 per cent security force personnel did not appear to believe that media plays an independent and non-partisan role in extremist affected areas, 72 per cent of the experts and 82.4 per cent security force personnel were categorical in their response that the media is not in cahoots with the extremists. Seventy-four per cent experts and 94.1 per cent security force personnel replied in the negative to the statement that media supports the ideology propagated by the extremists.

2. Manipur: Opinion of the experts (including security force personnel) and the security forces alone (analysed separately) was a favourable mandate in favour of the role played by the media and intelligentsia in Manipur. Although only 63 per cent experts and 52.6 per cent security officials felt that media plays an independent and non-partisan role in extremist affected areas, over 85 per cent experts and 73.7 per cent security forces
rejected the statement that the media is in cahoots with the extremists. Similarly, over 87 per cent experts and 80 per cent security forces said that the media does not support the ideology of the extremists.

3. Meghalaya: In the opinion of the experts and the security forces, media in Meghalaya has played an objective role as far as reporting on extremism is concerned. Only 14 per cent experts and eight per cent security forces thought that the media is in cahoots with the extremists. Although 84 per cent experts felt that media plays an independent and non-partisan role in extremist affected areas, the statement received support of comparatively less 69.2 per cent of the security force personnel. Similarly, 20.4 per cent experts and 15.4 per cent security forces said that the media supports the ideology of the extremists.

4. Nagaland: More than 66 per cent experts and 62.5 per cent security forces said that media has played an independent and non-partisan role in extremist affected areas. Over 93 per cent experts and 87.5 per cent security force personnel rejected the statement that the media in general is in cahoots with the extremists in the state. At the same time, more than 79 per cent experts and 62.5 per cent security force personnel also said that media has not been subjected to frequent attacks by the extremists in the state. Majority of both the experts and the security forces were of the opinion that both the state and the extremists have tried exploiting the media. Over 81 per cent experts and 87.5 per cent security forces supported this statement. Similarly, over 95 per cent experts and 87.5 per cent security forces said that the media does not support the ideology of the extremists.

5. Tripura: Opinion of the experts including security force personnel was a clear mandate in favour of the objective role played by the media in Tripura. Over 71 per cent experts and 85.7 per cent security forces rejected the statement that the media is in cahoots with the extremists. Similarly, over 81 per cent experts and 100 per cent security forces said that the media does not support the ideology of the extremists. Although only 53.1 per cent experts felt that media plays an independent and non-partisan role in extremist affected areas, the statement received support of 71 per cent of the security
force personnel. Only 26 per cent experts and 14.3 per cent security force personnel felt that media has borne the brunt of extremist activities. Similarly, only 34 per cent experts and 37 per cent security forces appeared to think that local media and intelligentsia tend to highlight the atrocities committed by the security forces more than those by the extremists. It was apparent that the media has been allowed to be rather free and objective by the political class whereas the extremists have not managed to exercise any significant influence over the contents of the newspapers.

The question whether they think that the local media and intelligentsia provide support and sympathy to the extremist groups, however, revealed interesting results.

**Support from local media and intelligentsia for extremist groups (Common people)**

1. **Assam:** Only 31.5 per cent believed that such support and sympathy exists and 68.5 per cent rejected such an assumption. The response pattern was uniform across the rural, semi-urban and urban settings. The 63 respondents were then asked to respond to four pre-determined explanations of such support and sympathy from the media and intelligentsia. While 60.3 per cent believed that the local media and intelligentsia support the ideology propagated by the extremists, 55.6 per cent rejected the notion that the local
media provide a platform to the extremists. Eighty-one per cent of the 63 respondents, however, believed that the local media and intelligentsia tend to highlight the atrocities committed by the state more than those by the extremists. In addition, eight respondents believed that media provided undue publicity to the extremists.

2. Manipur: The common people were divided in their opinion on the support provided by the intelligentsia and media to the extremists. While 85 common people respondents said that such support is provided, 65 others answered in the negative. The 85 persons who had answered in the affirmative were then asked to elaborate on the nature of support extended to the extremists. More than 67 per cent indicate that the intelligentsia and the media support the ideology propagated by the extremists. 77.6 per cent of those 85 participants agreed that local media does provide a platform to the extremists to espouse their cause. Close to 58 per cent said that the local media tends to highlight the atrocities committed by the security forces more than those perpetrated by the extremists.

3. Meghalaya: A resounding 90 per cent of the 100 common people who participated in the survey said that local media and intelligentsia do not provide support to the extremist groups.

4. Nagaland: Majority of the common people, just like the experts and the security force personnel, too were convinced that the local media and intelligentsia do not provide support and sympathy to the extremist groups. Only 43.5 per cent of the respondents said that such support is provided. The persons who had answered in the affirmative were then asked to elaborate on the nature of support extended to the extremists. More than 57 per cent indicate that the intelligentsia and the media support the ideology propagated by the extremists. 82.5 per cent of those 64 participants agreed that local media does provide a platform to the extremists to espouse their cause. 59.4 per cent said that the local media tends to highlight the atrocities committed by the security forces more than those perpetrated by the extremists.
5. **Tripura:** A resounding 91 per cent common people said that local media and intelligentsia do not provide support to the extremist groups. Although over 55 per cent of the common people appeared to believe that local media have provided a platform to the extremists to espouse their cause, over 88 per cent rejected the statement that the media and the intelligentsia support the ideology propagated by the extremists. Similarly, only 33 per cent believed that the local media and intelligentsia tend to highlight the atrocities committed by the state more than those by the extremists.

**SECTION B: LEFT WING EXTREMISM AFFECTED STATES**

Chhattisgarh, for a number of years, has remained categorised as the worst Naxal affected state. Influence of the Naxalites is near total over the Bastar region, a fact which is admitted even by the police. The ongoing counter-Maoist operations notwithstanding, naxalites have managed to liberate a vast stretch of the state’s area and keep it under their control. Similarly in Jharkhand, the domination of the Maoists has taken place in areas where the state structures have been non-existent or are extremely weak. In addition, the gradual expansion of the Maoists into new areas has also resulted in a retreat of the state. Thus, it would be safe to assume that Jharkhand state’s administrative hold in areas controlled by the Maoists either does not exist, or is so weak that it has failed to deliver. On the contrary, Andhra Pradesh has secured remarkable improvement in its security situation vis-à-vis the Maoists. Extremism related fatalities have drastically reduced in the State. Compared to 2005, when 21 security force personnel were killed in the state, in 2009 not a single security force personnel was killed. When nation-wide Maoist fatalities were in the range of 951 in 2009, Andhra Pradesh accounted for only 26. However, Maoist movement, by no means is dead in Andhra Pradesh. Apart from the fact that the State even today provides the largest number of cadres and prominent leadership to the movement, a significant number of cadres are still based within the state. Maoist activity continues in districts that share borders with Maharashtra, Chhattisgarh and Orissa. In January 2010, Director General of Police (DGP), Girish Kumar, who since has retired, spoke about the spurt in Maoist activities in the State.
The Maoists are involved in large scale extortions in the areas under their influence collecting levy from business houses, officers, businessmen, etc. and are involved in kidnappings for ransom or for some other benefits. They have also been involved in attacks on jails to forcibly release undertrials, suspects and convicts with total disregard to law and criminal justice system. The Maoists exert illegal exercise of power and award punishments as a part of delivering instant justice by holding jan *adalats*.

A. Spread of Extremism

Respondents belonging to the common people category in the selected districts of three states- Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand were asked to confirm the reality of Naxalite activity in their state or district. Since these districts witnessed Maoist activity in the past, an affirmative response from all the respondents was generally expected.

**Is your state or district affected by extremism (Common People)**

![Chart showing 78.4% Yes, 21.6% No]

1. **Andhra Pradesh:** Among the 199 respondents who answered this question, 156 constituting 78.4 per cent answered in the affirmative. Of the 73 respondents belonging to the rural areas who participated in the survey, 57 answered in the positive. The response was an affirmation of a wide spread of extremist activity across both urban as well as rural areas in Andhra Pradesh. 103 of the 156 participants who had replied in the
affirmative to the previous question indicated that they and their families have been affected by extremism in some degree or the other. While only six respondents indicated that they have been affected ‘very highly’ or ‘highly’, 25 respondents said that they have been affected to some extent by the extremist activities. Seventy-two participants indicated that they have not been directly affected by extremism.

2. Chhattisgarh: Among the 200 respondents who answered this question, 198 constituting an overwhelming 99 per cent answered in the affirmative. As many as 110 of the 111 respondents belonging to the rural areas who participated in the survey answered in the positive. 143 of the 198 participants who had replied in the affirmative indicated that they and their families have been affected by extremism in some degree or the other. Over 37 per cent indicated that they have been affected ‘very highly’ or ‘highly’, which indicated a very high percentage of people receiving the brunt of extremism in the state. Only 27.8 per cent of the participants indicated that they have not been directly affected by extremism.

3. Jharkhand: Among the 200 respondents who answered this question, 179 constituting 89.5 per cent answered in the affirmative. Close to 89 per cent of the respondents belonging to the rural areas who participated in the survey answered in positive. The response was an affirmation of a wide spread of extremist activity in Jharkhand. 145 of the 179 participants who had replied in the affirmative indicated that they and their families have been affected by extremism in some degree or the other. While only 17.3 per cent indicated that they have been affected ‘very highly’ or ‘highly’, close to 64 per cent said that they have been affected to some extent by the extremist activities. Only 17.9 per cent of the participants indicated that they have not been directly affected by extremism.

B. What sustains the extremists?

In a contradiction of sorts, the Naxalite movement, termed as a struggle by the tribals against the encroachment of the State and the Multi-national Corporations (MNCs) into
their territory, is led widely by the non-tribals. A majority of the Maoist foot soldiers are tribals, but the top leadership is primarily non-tribal. While many analysts do not see any problem with this contradiction, there are some instances of tribal resentment against such a phenomenon. For example, Gurucharan Kisku alias Marshall, a former tribal Maoist area commander in West Bengal in an interview accused, “The (Maoist) leadership is non-tribal, and does not understand what it means to be Adivasi. The Adivasi identity is based on our village life, language and customs. I felt that this way, our culture was being destroyed.” Such resentment, however, has been rarely expressed.

The Maoist movement today has been interpreted to be an overwhelmingly movement for restoration of tribal rights over ‘Jal, Jangal and Zameen’ (water, forest and land).

Proponents of the developmental approach, on the other hand, argue that bringing in fruits of development- roads, schools, hospitals, employment- to the tribal and impoverished areas would be enough to meet the challenges posed by the Naxalites. Once the basic delivery mechanism instruments of the State are activated, much of the appeal of the Maoists would disappear. The Study elicited popular perceptions on the claims made by the Maoists. It objectively ascertained whether the claims of the Maoists of being the spokespersons for the tribals contain any validity.

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50 For example an author writes, “It is a movement by the severely-underprivileged sections of the society. The anti-Naxal war essentially is a war against these people. If the state reveals the caste identities of the Maoists killed in last 10 years, it will be found that 90 per cent of them are from tribal or Dalit or backward population. This is their movement. They are not supporters of the movement, they are participants, physically or mentally.” See Diptendra Raychaudhuri, “The Danger Of Fighting Maoists Without Knowing Who They Are”, Mainstream, vol. XLVIII, no. 29, July 10, 2010.


Factors behind the growth of extremism (Common People and Experts)

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Common People</th>
<th>Experts</th>
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<tbody>
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<tr>
<td>B 63.8%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>C 95.8%</td>
<td>77.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>D 80.6%</td>
<td>95.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E 53.1%</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
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A = Economic backwardness of the state; B = Neglect by the central government; C = Misrule of the State government; D = Unemployment and social insecurity; E = Land alienation; F = Immigration

1. Andhra Pradesh: Over 91 per cent common people and close to 94 per cent experts said that ‘unemployment and social insecurity’ is the primary factor behind the growth of extremism in Andhra Pradesh. All the security force personnel, who were a part of the experts’ category and whose responses were analysed separately, agreed. ‘Land alienation’ factor attracted 84 per cent positive responses from the common people. 70 per cent experts agreed with this view. Over 70 per cent common people, 90 per cent experts including all the five security force personnel identified economic backwardness of the State as a crucial factor. While 58 per cent common people and 56 per cent experts said that misrule by the State government could be another factor, only 40 per cent
common people and 30 per cent experts blamed ‘neglect by the Central Government’ to be a factor behind Maoist movement.

2. Chhattisgarh: As high as 98 per cent common people and experts identified unemployment and social insecurity as an important reason that sustains Naxalites. Similarly, 96.5 per cent common people and 94 per cent experts indicated that economic backwardness is an important reason. The state government’s performance too came for flak from a high number of participants. Close to 90 per cent common people and 80 per cent experts said that misrule by the state government is also a reason. Majority of the security officials, however, disagreed. Over 88 per cent common people and 76 per cent experts blamed immigration as another important factor. While 61 per cent of the common people blamed the central government, such view was expressed by 56 per cent experts. Neglect by the central government was also identified as a factor by more than 66 per cent security forces.

3. Jharkhand: Over 90 per cent common people identified ‘Unemployment and social insecurity’, ‘economic backwardness of the state’, ‘misrule by the state government’ and ‘neglect by central government’ as reasons behind the growth of Maoist extremism in Jharkhand. Among the experts, including the security force personnel, 96 per cent (including all the 12 security force personnel, whose responses were analysed separately) felt that ‘Unemployment and social insecurity’ is the key reason, while 94 per cent experts and 91.7 per cent security force personnel blamed the misrule by the state government. ‘Economic backwardness of Jharkhand’ was identified as a major reason by 86 per cent experts, whereas 78 per cent blamed the perceived neglect by the central government. Close to 82 per cent among the common people and the experts identified ‘land alienation’ as another important reason.

Commentators have pointed at the centrality of land to the rise of Maoist movement in the country. The entry of the private companies into the tribal areas in search of cheap raw materials and setting up of industrial units has led to widespread resentment among the tribal population. “Displaced from their land and discriminated against in the
industrial job market, they are now fighting to keep their land, their only remaining resource.”53 A prominent tribal activist in Jharkhand explains,

“The state is essentially batting for the corporate houses in the name of the Maoists and instead of creating peace, the government is creating insecurity in the region. Therefore, the Adivasis are in a state of uncertainty precisely because the way they have been treated in the country despite being the indigenous people, who always live with peace and paid the heavy price for the development of the nation (sic). However, the Adivasis are not against of development but they would never like the foundation of development laid over their graves (sic).”54

Commentators allege that the memorandums of understanding (MoUs) signed by the Chhattisgarh government with companies like the Tata Steel and Jindal is nothing but a conspiracy against the tribals. Similarly, the Communist part of India-Marxist (CPI-M)-affiliated Andhra Pradesh Rythu Sangham accuses the State Government of usurping lands of the farmers for various purposes including Special Economic Zones and power plants. Throughout the 1990s, in Bihar (of which Jharkhand was a part) the MCC fought it out with the united private army of the landlords called Ranbir Sena. MCC cadres often retaliated against the Sena by massacring the forward caste men.55 Experts, thus, suggest the use of land reforms as a tool to empower the tribals and solve the Maoist problem. Former Director of the Central Bureau of Investigation R K Raghavan has said, “Unless land reform laws are implemented in full measure, you are not going to see light at the end of the tunnel. Their areas should be free of exploiters,” he said, adding that the tribals had to be convinced that the law would be operated in their favour, providing protection against the exploiters.”56

Land alienation as a factor behind extremism (Experts and Security force personnel)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experts</th>
<th>Security force personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Most important factor</td>
<td>Most important factor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One of the important factors</td>
<td>One of the important factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not a factor at all</td>
<td>Not a factor at all</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. **Andhra Pradesh**: Despite having stringent provisions under the Andhra Pradesh Schedule Areas Land Transfer Regulation to protect the lands of the tribals in the Scheduled Areas, the tribal lands are increasingly alienated. The Naxalites have used this issue as a plank to drum up support amount the tribal population. Responding to the question whether land alienation or loss of control over land is a factor behind extremism, majority 71.4 per cent of the experts said that it is one of the important factors. 20 per cent identified it as “the most important factor”. Among the security forces, 40 per cent identified land alienation as one of the important factors, where as 20 per cent said it is the most important factor.

2. **Chhattisgarh**: Majority 66 per cent of the 50 experts said that land alienation is one of the important factors. Only 26 per cent who responded to this question identified it as
“the most important factor”. Four experts including a lone security force personnel said that it is not an important factor.

3. Jharkhand: Majority 54 per cent of the experts said that it is one of the important factors. Another 30 per cent identified it as “the most important factor”. While more than 58 per cent security officials identified land alienation as one of the important factors, 25 per cent indicated that it is the most important factor.

Failure to bring Land Reforms as a factor behind Left Wing Extremism (Common People, Experts and Security force personnel)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Common People</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experts</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Force</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Andhra Pradesh: Land alienation in tribal areas is remarkably high in Andhra Pradesh. According to a Committee set up by the Andhra Pradesh government in 2004, “to assess the overall implementation of land distribution programmes of the government and suggest measures for more effective implementation”, in tribal areas “non-tribal population holds as much as 48 per cent of the lands. Every year, more and more lands are passing into the hands of non-tribals and if it is not checked with a strong executive action, very soon the tribals may not have lands at all.”\textsuperscript{57} 166 of the 199 common people confirmed the fact that failure of the government to bring about land reforms is a factor

behind the Maoist growth in Andhra Pradesh. Among the experts, 43 of the 50 respondents too agreed with the opinion. Among the security force personnel, whose responses were analysed separately, 60 per cent said that failure to bring in land reforms is pushing the tribal population into the fold of the Maoists.

2. Chhattisgarh: In the opinion of the majority common people, however, the failure of the government to bring about land reforms is a factor behind the Maoists’ growth. Over 74 per cent (149 respondents) belonging to the common people, 92 of whom were from the rural setting, agreed with this statement. The experts too agreed with the opinion of the common people. 74 per cent in the experts’ category (37 respondents) which included six of the nine security force personnel said that failure to bring in land reforms is pushing the tribal population into the fold of the Maoists.

3. Jharkhand: Incidentally, undivided Bihar was the first state to introduce Land Reform Act in India way back in 1950. However, implementation of the Act was done in a haphazard manner. Even the Land Ceiling Act 1961 was not properly implemented in the state. “Though the Act fixes for holding 15 acres of class I land and 45 acres of class VI land, there are number of landlords who own more than 150-200 acres of the land even today, increasing the number of the landless.” 58 After the bifurcation of the state, land became one of the complex issues for the newly formed state of Jharkhand. Analysts opine that tribal land alienation is on the rise in the state. “A total of 2,608 cases of tribal land alienation were registered under the Special Area Regulation Court in 2003-04, 2,657 cases in 2004-05 and 3,230 cases in 2005-2006. According to the 2004-05 Annual Report of Ministry of Rural Development of the Government of India, Jharkhand topped the list of tribal land alienation in India with 86,291 cases involving 10,48,93 acres of land.” 59 Majority common people confirmed the fact that failure of the government to bring about land reforms is a factor behind the Maoist growth in Jharkhand. 141 of the 200 common people including over 94 per cent of the persons interviewed in the rural areas agreed with this statement. Over 70 per cent of the experts too agreed with the

59 ibid.
opinion of the common people. Among the security force personnel, whose responses were analysed separately, 66.7 per cent said that failure to bring in land reforms is pushing the tribal population into the fold of the Maoists.

Closely linked with the question of land alienation is the issue of the impact of economic liberalisation on the tribal population. Apart from the fact that the link between forests and the tribals have suddenly been disrupted by the state governments which has more or less usurped the traditional rights over forest produce from the tribals, the entry of the big multinationals into the tribal areas in search of iron ore and coal is threatening the existence of the tribal population. It has disrupted the tribal way of life, their right over forest produce and most importantly, they are being disposed of their land. This has given rise to a conflict of interests between the State and the tribals. Maoists have clearly taken advantage of the situation. They have mobilised the tribals against the State painting the latter as an agency that furthers the interest of the MNCs. This phenomenon has been most visible in mineral rich states like Jharkhand, Orissa and Chhattisgarh. The experts including the security force personnel were asked whether economic liberalization and globalization have intensified extremism in India.

**Economic Liberalisation and Globalisation behind intensification of extremism**

*(Experts & Security Force Personnel)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experts</th>
<th>Security force personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes: 71%</td>
<td>Yes: 63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No: 29%</td>
<td>No: 37%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![Pie charts showing responses of experts and security force personnel regarding economic liberalisation and globalization and extremism.](chart.png)
1. **Andhra Pradesh:** Out of the 50 experts who participated in the Survey, 25 felt that economic liberalisation and globalisation have played significant catalytic role in the intensification of extremism in India. Another 25 experts did not feel the same. Majority 80 per cent of the security forces, responses of whom were analysed separately, did not feel that intensification of extremism in the country can be ascribed to economic liberalization and globalization. Majority among the experts including security force personnel who supported the assumption maintained that globalisation has also benefited the extremist movements in terms of making movement of weapons has become less cumbersome.

2. **Chhattisgarh:** 78 per cent among the experts including security force personnel felt that economic liberalisation and globalisation have played significant catalytic role in the intensification of extremism in India. Among the security officials alone, responses of whom were analysed separately, 77.8 per cent subscribed to this theory. Majority of the experts that include security force personnel who supported the assumption maintained that economic liberalisation has created job insecurity. It has allowed exploitation of the local resources by foreign companies without any benefit to the local population.

3. **Jharkhand:** 84 per cent among the experts including security force personnel felt that economic liberalisation and globalisation have played significant catalytic role in the intensification of extremism in India. Among the security officials alone, responses of whom were analysed separately, over 91 per cent agreed with this assumption.

**C. Terrorists or the saviours of the tribals**

There are two ways of looking at the ongoing Maoist uprising—whether it is a genuine uprising by the tribal population themselves or whether this armed movement has been propped up by the outsiders. Views of the analysts differ on the claims of the Maoists that they are the true representatives of the people. A Human Rights activist in Andhra Pradesh said during the interview conducted for the Study, “Extremists raised burning problems of tribals, dalits and rural poor. Government and leaders hardly had time for
people’s problems. [There is complete] lack of seriousness in government in executing social welfare and tribal welfare measures.” Another writer contradicts this claim by saying, “The Naxalite movement is not a movement of landless peasants and tribals seeking to overthrow state power. It is a project defined as such by those who are neither peasants nor workers nor tribals, but who claim to represent their interests.”

The Naxalite movement in its earliest avatar was a movement of the landless peasants against the oppressive landlords. In its present day form, Maoists claim to be fighting on behalf of the tribals and the down trodden. Critics, however, dismiss such claims as farcical. An inspector with the Andhra Pradesh Crime Investigation Department (Naxal Intelligence) told during the survey, “The extremists have a way with people in their approach and also their sharing woes of the poor. They do it slowly like a slow poison to win them over and later use the disgruntled poor as their eyes and ears.” Such official versions have been supported even by tribal intellectuals. Tribal ideologue in Jharkhand Ram Dayal Munda, who is also a member of the Rajya Sabha, said that Maoists were by no means representatives of tribals. “I do not see any tribal leading the CPI-Maoist except Kundan Pahan. The rest are either from Andhra Pradesh or Bengal. In Garhwa and Jehanabad (Bihar), there are no tribals. And yet, the districts are under the grip of Left Wing Extremism. Extremism only thrives on poverty and unemployment.”

Fact also remains that the Maoists have themselves turned the gun on the very people they claim to be fighting for. According to a report prepared by the Jharkhand Police, 70 per cent of the people killed by Maoists belong to tribal and Dalit communities. A tribal activist said in his article, “Factors like levy collection on government works, from contractors or from private companies, have alienated the Naxalites from the people. This cult (sic) of the present day so-called Naxalites has reduced them into a bunch no better than thieves and extortionists.”

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The respondents were asked how they would like to describe the Maoist groups in their own states. They were given the options of describing them as ‘liberators’, ‘terrorists’ and ‘other’. The option ‘other’ provided the respondents the freedom to use their own terminologies which they thought best described the cadres of these multiple outfits.

**How will you describe the Maoist groups in your state? (Common people)**

![Graph showing the distribution of responses (Liberators: 26.7%, Terrorist: 51%, Others: 22.3%)](#)

1. **Andhra Pradesh:** The responses revealed significant support for the Maoists. Although over 21 per cent of the 158 common people who answered the question described the naxalites as ‘terrorists’, over 27 per cent preferred to call them ‘liberators’. This indicated a faith in the ideology of the Naxalites and a conviction that the struggle by the Naxalites against the Indian State is guided by noble motives. While sizeable number of respondents appeared to reject the violent activities of the Maoists, a significant number of respondents demonstrated believe and sympathy in the ideology and political programmes of the Maoists. The victory of the State against the Maoists, notwithstanding, the CPI-Maoist appeared to generate significant support among the civilian population in Andhra Pradesh.

2. **Chhattisgarh:** The opinions expressed were found to be overwhelmingly critical of the Maoist violence. 169 common people respondents of the 200 interviewed during the survey were of the opinion that the extremists need to be labelled as terrorists. Explaining their response, 130 common people blamed the Maoists of targeting innocent civilians.
Another 21 respondents maintained that their indulgence in mindless violence makes them fit candidates for being termed ‘terrorists’.

3. Jharkhand: The common people were found to be divided in their responses. While a majority of the respondents (52.5 per cent, 105 respondents) described the Maoists as ‘liberators’, another 47 per cent (94 respondents) said that the extremists are fit to be called terrorists. Explaining their response, 59 common people said that the Maoists follow certain ideology and hence cannot be called terrorists. Whereas 21 persons indicated that there is a difference between the activity of the Maoists and that of the terrorists, 18 persons believed that the Maoists are working for the rights and interests of the people. Arguing in favour of terming the Maoists as terrorists, 38 persons said that just like the terrorists, Maoists are indulging in violence. Eleven others added that the Maoists are simply after easy money and do not subscribe to any ideology. The responses were indicative of popular belief in the fact that the Maoists follow certain ideology. Indulgence in large-scale violence has not deterred a large section of the people from believing that Maoists are essentially working towards the betterment of the tribal population.

Maoists claim the sense of alienation among the tribals has grown with the Government and the MNCs trying to grab their land and dislodge them from their only source of livelihood. In the words of the former Maoist spokesperson Azad, “There need be hardly any doubt that the poor adivasis were a happier lot before the civilized [corporate] goons set their foot on their soil. The development model pursued by [the rulers] displaced them and made them aliens in their own land.” On the other hand, Maoist “counter-violence” did not result in any displacement except for the fact that “only a handful of anti-people exploiters, tribal heads and landed gentry fled the villages in the course of the class struggle.” Maoists reiterate the fact that they stand for the welfare of the tribal population in the country.

65 ibid.
The respondents in the common people category were asked whether they are aware that Maoists claim to represent their community or ethnic group.

**Do Maoists claim to represent your community/ethnic group? (Common people)**

![Pie chart showing 93% No and 7% Yes]

1. **Andhra Pradesh**: Barely 5.4 per cent of the 168 respondents who answered the question answered in the affirmative. The rest, 94.6 per cent respondents indicated that they are not even aware that the extremists are claiming to represent the community or the ethnic groups. Thus, while the common people were willing to believe that the Maoists are pursuing an ideology, most of them appeared less convinced in the ability of the extremists in representing their interests.

2. **Chhattisgarh**: 92 per cent of the 198 respondents who answered the question rejected the Maoist claim. They indicated that they are not even aware that the extremists are claiming to represent the community or the ethnic groups. This was a significant finding and a total repudiation of the claims of the Maoists. It is, in a way, indicative of the failure of the Maoists in convincing their potential constituents that they actually stand for their welfare.
3. **Jharkhand:** Barely 12 per cent of the 200 respondents who answered the question answered in the affirmative. Thus, while the common people were ready to give credit to the Maoists for following an ideology, most of them appeared less convinced in the ability of the extremists in representing their interests.

In a related question, the respondents in the common people category were asked whether the Maoist groups operating in their state enjoy support in their community/locality.

**Do Maoist groups enjoy support in your community/locality? (Common people)**

![Pie chart showing 20% Yes and 80% No]

1. **Andhra Pradesh:** Contrary to the popular perceptions that such support is extended to the Maoists either voluntarily or out of fear, 92.5 per cent (185 respondents) in the common people category maintained that the Maoists do not enjoy support from the community/locality. The responses indicated that even though people believe the Maoists to be pursuing an ideology, such belief has not translated into support for the extremists.

2. **Chhattisgarh:** Contrary to the popular perceptions that such support is extended to the Maoists either voluntarily or out of fear, 71.5 per cent (143 respondents) in the common people category maintained that the Maoists do not enjoy support from the community/locality. Out of the 57 persons who said that such support is usually provided, 46 respondents (90.2 per cent) indicated that the support is generated through fear. This
further indicated that the talk of popular support behind the Maoist insurgency in Chhattisgarh is a myth. Whatever support exists today is primarily because of a regime fear. A doctor in Raipur, however, added, “Since the villagers in the affected areas are scared, they are silent on most of the occasions as they long to see someone (the police or the Naxals) as protector for them and their interests. Though it might be true that the people in general are not supporting, they are not opposing the extremists either.”

3. Jharkhand: Contrary to the popular perceptions that such support is extended to the Maoists either voluntarily or out of fear, 76.5 per cent (153 respondents) in the common people category maintained that the Maoists do not enjoy support from the community/locality. Out of the 47 persons who said that such support is usually provided, 42 respondents (89.4 per cent) indicated that the support is generated through fear. This further indicated that even though people believe the Maoists to be pursuing an ideology, such belief has not translated into support for the extremists. A big gap continues to exist between the Maoists and their constituency. The irony remains that such a gap has not been used by the state to its advantage or not being used effectively by the state to its advantage.

The subsequent question asked the respondents in the experts’ category whether they perceive the Maoists to be representatives of popular interests/aspirations.

**Do the Maoists today represent the interests/ aspirations of the people? (Experts)**

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66 Interview with Dr A R Dalla, Senior Surgeon, former Chairman of Chhattisgarh Red Cross Society and President of Chhattisgarh Doctors Association, held at Raipur on December 20, 2009.
1. **Andhra Pradesh**: Over 82 per cent experts answered in the negative. Only seven respondents said that the Maoists represent the popular aspirations.

2. **Chhattisgarh**: 88 per cent experts (44 respondents) answered in the negative. Only four respondents said that the Maoists represent the popular aspirations. The views of the security force personnel, who are included in the experts category, were analysed separately. All the nine security force personnel indicated that Maoists are not the true representatives of popular interests.

3. **Jharkhand**: Close to 88 per cent experts answered in the negative. Only six respondents said that the Maoists represent the popular aspirations. Barring a lone security force personnel, the rest eleven indicated that Maoists today do not represent popular interests.

**Do you think that Naxalites want political power, not development?**

* (Common People, Experts & Security force personnel)
1. **Andhra Pradesh:** Close to 56 per cent of the common people were convinced that the Maoists want political power and not necessarily development of the people and areas they claim to represent. At the same time, close to 40 per cent common people were of the opinion that Maoists stand for development and not necessarily political power. Among the experts, however, 90 per cent respondents agreed that political power and not development is the real objective of the Maoists. 100 per cent among the security forces, whose responses were analysed separately, too agreed.

2. **Chhattisgarh:** 92 per cent of the common people were convinced that the Maoists want political power and not necessarily development of the people and areas they claim to represent. Similarly, among the experts, 88 per cent (44 respondents) experts including all the nine security force personnel also agreed that political power and not development is the real objective of the Maoists. Explaining their responses, 12 experts argued that the Maoists have a lust for political power and they wish to establish an alternate form of government in the country.

3. **Jharkhand:** Over 76 per cent (151 respondents) of the common people were convinced that the Maoists want political power and not necessarily development of the people and areas they claim to represent. The fact that in Jharkhand, former Naxalites have participated in elections appeared to have influenced the opinion of the common people respondents. In the December 2009 Assembly elections, nine Naxal leaders
including a former central committee member Madanjee contested on tickets of various political parties including the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM) and the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD).\textsuperscript{67} Previously in May 2009, former Naxal leader Kameshwar Baitha contested the Lok Sabha election on JMM ticket while being lodged in jail and won. He is now a Member of Parliament. Baitha’s supporters had hailed his win as “the first success of our resolve to bring the Naxalites into the mainstream”.\textsuperscript{68} The experts and security forces, however, appeared less convinced about the political aspirations of the Maoists. Among the experts, 60 per cent (30 respondents) agreed that political power and not development is the real objective of the Maoists. Over 58 per cent security personnel, whose responses were analysed separately, agreed.

However, it needs to be mentioned that Maoists are, in general, not in support of contesting elections and they have also refused to participate in the electoral process of the country. And whenever they have contested the elections, they have faced defeat most of the times.

\textbf{D. Violence, a key tool:}

Mao Tse Tung had written, “Every Communist must grasp the truth, Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.”\textsuperscript{69} Mao also wrote, “The seizure of power by armed force, the settlement of the issue by war, is the central task and the highest form of revolution.”\textsuperscript{70} However, who started it the violence first- the State or the Maoists continues to be a matter of debate. According to the Maoists and their supporters, their violence is merely a response to State violence, while the Government maintains that it is merely trying to minimise the violence potential of the Maoists. In the specific instance of the Maoist uprising in West Bengal’s Lalgarh area, the Maoist spokesperson claimed that Lalgarh’s ‘peaceful mass movement’ against police atrocities turned into a revolutionary armed struggle due to brutal suppression by the State. However, the fact

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{68} Manoj Prasad, “Meet new Palamau MP: ex-Naxalite commander in jail”, \textit{Indian Express}, May 18, 2009.
\item \textsuperscript{69} Mao Tse Tung, “Problems of War and Strategy”, November 6, 1938, Selected Works, vol. II, p.224.
\item \textsuperscript{70} ibid., p. 219.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
remains that the non-violent uprising organised by the People’s Committee against Police Atrocities (PCPA), a mass organisation including Maoists but not confined to them, was undermined when the Maoists started beating and killing tribals who failed to comply with their orders. It was only when the Maoists sidelined the PCPA and announced that they had taken over the area that the State government, which had been kept at bay for several months, moved in.\(^{71}\)

In 1969, the CPI-ML in Bihar had initiated its activities with an agenda to annihilate the landlords. They considered mass movements to be a redundant form of struggle.\(^{72}\) Since then the image of the Naxalite movement has tended to focus on its armed activities. Although the CPI-Maoist underlines the need to build mass movements before orchestration of its armed campaign, violence remains a key tool for the outfit. On occasions, such violence has also assumed a gory character. On 30 September 2009, CPI-Maoist cadres abducted Jharkhand police inspector Francis Induwar from Hembrom Bazaar in Khunti district, demanding the release of three of their arrested leaders, including central committee member Kobad Ghandy, in exchange for him. A week later, on 6 October, Induwar’s body, along with the severed head, was found near Raisha Ghati under the Namkom police station area in the same district.\(^{73}\) Later, Maoist senior leader Kishenji admitted to the killing and said, “If there are more such policemen infiltrating the Naxal ranks, they too will be killed”.\(^{74}\) Induwar was the 339th policeman to be killed in Naxal violence in Jharkhand between January 2003 and October 2009.\(^{75}\)

Maoist protagonists, however, have juxtaposed the extremist violence as a reaction to state or feudal repression. The Maoist ideologue in Varavara Rao claimed in an interview during the survey, “In Andhra Pradesh extreme and excess repression by the feudal Reddy land lords, Nizam Government and the Congress rule had led to this situation.


\(^{73}\) “Maoists behead Jharkhand police officer”, Hindu, October 7, 2009.


\(^{75}\) “Maoists behead cop kidnapped to secure Ghandy’s release”, Indian Express, October 6, 2010.
There has never been a peace in rural Andhra, ever in the last 100 years of repression and the farmers and rural poor live in abject poverty, starvation and bondage in some pockets even today.” The retired Director General of Police (DGP) M V Bhaskar Rao too agreed. “It is not just neglect but also apathy of State towards the downtrodden, weak, dalit and tribal. Peaceful protests during Nizam period were trampled with brutal punishment and during the post-Independence by feudals in Telangana.”

The Study sought answers of the respondents in the common people and experts’ category regarding the objective of Maoists in orchestrating violence. The respondents were asked to answer ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ to four pre-determined options which explained such a phenomenon.

Why Maoist groups are using violence to express their anger?
(Common People & Experts)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Common people</th>
<th>Experts</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>77.3%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>76.7%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>74.3%</td>
<td>89.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>75.2%</td>
<td>73.3%</td>
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A = The authorities do not listen to peaceful protests by the people;
B = Easy availability of weapons and lure of easy money by demonstration of force;
C = To send out a message to the authorities to take the group seriously;
D = To keep the masses, who are the main support base of the extremists, under control through the element of fear.
1. Andhra Pradesh: While over 55 per cent common people said that orchestration of violence by extremist groups becomes essential as peaceful protests do not attract the attention of the authorities, only 42 per cent experts agreed with this view. 60 per cent security forces agreed with this assertion. While minority 41.5 per cent of the 200 common people also appeared to support the conclusion that easy availability of weapons is the reason behind the indulgence of violence by the Maoists, a majority 64 per cent experts and 60 per cent security force personnel agreed with this viewpoint. Similarly, while only 36 per cent common people said that orchestration of violence sends a message to the authorities to take the group seriously, among the experts 82 per cent experts and 80 per cent security force personnel agreed.

2. Chhattisgarh: Over 91 per cent common people and 80 per cent experts appear to reiterate CPI-Maoist General Secretary Ganapathy’s assertion that violence is a tool to be heard at the right forum. Peaceful protests do not attract the attention of the authorities. Majority among the security forces (over 66 per cent) agreed with this assertion. Over 97 per cent of the 200 common people also appeared to support the conclusion that easy availability of weapons is the reason behind the indulgence of violence by the Maoists. 88 per cent experts including all the nine security force personnel agreed with this viewpoint. Similarly, 97.5 per cent common people and 100 per cent experts said that orchestration of violence sends a message to the authorities to take the group seriously. Over 98 per cent common people and 90 per cent experts including all the security force personnel also said that violence by the Maoists is used to keep the masses, who are the main support base of the Maoists, under control.

3. Jharkhand: Over 85 per cent common people and 76 per cent experts said that orchestration of violence by extremist groups becomes essential as peaceful protests do not attract the attention of the authorities. Over 83 per cent security personnel agreed with this assertion. 91 per cent of the 200 common people also appeared to support the conclusion that easy availability of weapons is the reason behind the indulgence in
violence by the Maoists. 88 per cent experts including all the 12 security force personnel agreed with this view point. Similarly, 89.5 per cent common people and 86.4 per cent experts (which included all the 12 security force personnel) said that orchestration of violence sends a message to the authorities to take the group seriously. Over 90 per cent common people and 88 per cent experts including all the security force personnel also said that violence by the Maoists is used to subdue the masses.

E. Terror Funding

The CPI-Maoist constitution in its Article 60 lists ‘membership fees, levies, donations, taxes, penalties and wealth confiscated from enemies’ as principal sources of revenue.\textsuperscript{76} While the outfit managed to collect Rupees 1,000 crore in 2007 and it had set a target of Rupees 1,125 crore for 2008 from all the states under their domination.\textsuperscript{77} The share of Andhra Pradesh in the total collection in 2007 was a mere Rupees 100 crore, which is indicative of the dwindling fortunes of the outfit in the State. However, it has little impact on the overall activity of the outfit, as CPI-Maoist’s expenditure is incurred from a common country-wide fund. Collection of extortion amount from other states like Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh has gone up significantly in recent years.

Misir Besra, the CPI-Maoist politburo member who was arrested in September 2007 but was snatched away to freedom less than two years later by his colleagues from the Lakhisarai court premises in Bihar, had revealed to his interrogators that the outfit had a budget of Rupees 60 crore for 2007-09. Of this, Rupees 42 crore was earmarked for arms, ammunition and explosives; Rupees 2 crore for intelligence gathering; and the remaining Rupees 16 crore for transportation, computer training, propaganda and documentation.\textsuperscript{78}

Jharkhand police documents suggest that a section of contractors, transporters and businessmen involved in illegal mining pay over Rupees 40 crores annually as ‘levy’ to

\textsuperscript{77} ibid.
the CPI-Maoist. Major sources of income for the Maoists were road contractors, contractors for forest produce like *tendu* leaves (for making *beedi*), bamboo and wood. They have reportedly made deals with poachers, smugglers and liquor and timber runners in the forests. In the areas under their control, including district towns, Maoists levy a tax on small enterprises like spinning mills, *beedi* units, rice and flour mills, kirana, medical, cigarette, liquor shops and private doctors. All illegal operators, including private schools operating in villages and district towns, are coerced to pay.

The experts and security force personnel were asked to respond to four pre-identified sources for Maoist extortion.

**Primary source of funding for extremists (Experts and security force personnel)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experts</th>
<th>security force personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A 95.3%</td>
<td>A 93.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B 89%</td>
<td>B 78.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C 80%</td>
<td>C 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D 52.7%</td>
<td>D 63.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A = Extortion from business community/industrial houses; B = Contribution by the politicians; C = Leakage of development funds; D = Extortion from common people
1. Andhra Pradesh: 47 of the 50 experts who answered the question believed that business community and industrial houses have contributed significantly to the coffers of the Maoists. Similarly 46 experts including four of the five security force personnel said that politicians too have contributed to the Maoists. While only 50 per cent experts said that leakage of development funds constitute a major source for Maoists finance, all security force personnel confirmed that leakage from developmental funds is a major source of finance for the Maoists.

2. Chhattisgarh: Majority of the experts confirmed the pre-determined options regarding the sources of finance for the Maoists. 92 per cent of the 50 experts who answered the question believed that business community and industrial houses have contributed significantly to the coffers of the Maoists. The opinion was supported by all the nine security force personnel. While 82 per cent of the experts believed that politicians too have contributed to the Maoists, a much less 55.6 per cent security forces (views of whom were analysed separately) confirmed this. 98 per cent experts and 100 per cent security force personnel said that leakage of development funds constitute a major source for Maoists’ finance. Whereas 62 per cent of the experts said that Maoists collect substantial funds from the common people as well, among the security officials 66.7 per cent supported the view.

3. Jharkhand: All the 50 experts who answered the question believed that business community and industrial houses have contributed significantly to the coffers of the Maoists. Similarly 94 per cent of the experts including all the 12 security force personnel said that politicians too have contributed to the Maoists. 92 per cent experts including 100 per cent security force personnel said that leakage of development funds constitute a major source for Maoists’ finance. Whereas 68 per cent of the experts said that Maoists collect substantial funds from the common people as well, among the security officials 83.3 per cent agreed.

F. Foreign Backing and Support Base
Although ideology connects the CPI-Maoist with the Maoist organisations in South Asia, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) rules out any tactical understanding between these outfits. In 2001, the People’s War Group (PWG), which later merged with the MCC to form the CPI-Maoist, formed the Co-ordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organisations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA).\textsuperscript{79} Aimed at establishing fraternal ties with revolutionary groups outside India, the CCOMPOSA had Maoists from Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka as its members. However, CCOMPOSA met only occasionally and its activities never progressed beyond declarations to carry forward revolutionary activities in South Asia. On 11 August 2010, Union Home Minister P Chidambaram speaking in Rajya Sabha gave a clean chit to the CPI-Maoist on the question of nexus with foreign agencies/ outfits. He said, “There is no evidence that the CPI-Maoist gets any work support internationally or from any military organisation. There have been some inputs linking the CPI-Maoist with organisations in Nepal but they are not confirmed.”\textsuperscript{80}

**Foreign hand behind the growth and sustenance of Left Wing Extremism (Common people)**

1. **Andhra Pradesh**: Responses of the common people regarding foreign assistance behind the growth of Left Wing Extremism in Andhra Pradesh indicated a belief that the Maoists, just like the extremists in other conflict theatres are being backed up by foreign countries. Over 58 per cent of the 155 respondents who answered the query confirmed the ‘foreign hand’ theory behind extremism in the State.

2. **Chhattisgarh**: Responses of the common people regarding foreign assistance behind the growth of Left Wing Extremism in Chhattisgarh were divided. While 37 per cent (74 respondents) confirmed the ‘foreign hand’ theory behind extremism in the state, 27.5 per cent (55 respondents) answered in the negative. Another 35.5 per cent (71 respondents) pleaded ignorance.

3. **Jharkhand**: Responses of the common people regarding foreign assistance behind the growth of Left Wing Extremism in Jharkhand, however, indicated a firm belief that the Maoists, just like the extremists in other conflict theatres are being backed up by foreign countries. 72 per cent (144 respondents) confirmed the ‘foreign hand’ theory behind extremism in the state. A little over 23 per cent (47 respondents) replied in the negative.

The experts and security force personnel were asked to point out the different factors that are keeping Maoist extremism alive in their respective states.

**Factors keeping Left Wing Extremism alive (Experts and Security force personnel)**
1. **Andhra Pradesh:** While 92 per cent experts and 80 per cent security force personnel identified hostile terrain as a factor that is keeping extremism alive, 82 per cent experts believed open borders with neighbouring states is a crucial factor. However, only 40 per cent security forces said that open borders is a problem as far as neutralising the Maoists are concerned. Opinion on the factor ‘support from the people’ was equally divided with 50 per cent experts replying in the affirmative and the rest in negative. Unlike majority of the common people who believed in the ‘foreign hand behind the extremism’ theory, only 38 per cent experts and 20 per cent security forces indicated that support from the foreign powers could be a crucial factor. 80 per cent security forces believed that nexus with the politicians is a primary factor behind the survivability of the extremists.

2. **Chhattisgarh:** Majority of the experts (64 per cent), contrary to the opinion expressed earlier by the common people, said that support from the people is keeping Left Wing Extremism alive in Chhattisgarh. Close to 89 per cent security forces, however, ruled out popular support as a factor behind the growth of Left Wing Extremism. Similar difference of opinion was noted between the experts and the security force personnel on the issue of foreign support. Whereas majority 58 per cent experts ruled out foreign
support behind Maoists, over 55 per cent security force personnel thought it to be a crucial factor. 94 per cent experts including all the nine security force personnel indicated that hostile terrain with which the Maoists are familiar and the security forces are not, is a crucial factor behind the growth of the extremists. 78 per cent experts indicated that the nexus between the Maoists and the politicians is also contributing the growth of the former. This assertion was supported by a much less 55.6 per cent security force personnel. Open borders with neighbouring states like Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra was considered to be another force multiplier for the Maoists by 94 per cent experts and 100 per cent security force personnel.

3. Jharkhand: The alleged nexus the Maoists have with the politicians was identified by 94 per cent experts as the prime factor behind the thriving Maoist extremism in the state. Close to 92 per cent security force personnel also had similar opinion. Hostile terrain ranked second among the factors that acts as a force multiplier for the Maoists. Almost 90 per cent experts, including all the 12 security force personnel, said winning a war against the Maoists is difficult as long as they continue to enjoy the advantage of a hostile terrain. The ease with which the Maoists have travelled between the states without any hindrance has certainly assisted them in waging a war against the state. 88 per cent experts including all the security officials identified open borders with neighbouring states as a critical factor behind their invincibility. Support from common people as a factor that is keeping Left Wing Extremism alive was identified by 60 per cent experts. 75 per cent security force personnel supported this argument. Barely 58 per cent experts pointed a finger at the foreign powers for keeping extremism alive in Jharkhand. Over 83 per cent security officials, on the contrary, appeared convinced that such support from anti-India entities outside the country exists.

G. Are the Media and Intelligentsia hand in gloves with the Maoists?
In February 2010, Union Home Minister P Chidambaram indicated that intellectual support to Maoists made the task of tackling them “very difficult”.

He also alleged that “The Maoists seduced the media as they unleashed false charges in courts and pulled all strings to activate their frontal organisations, including the unsuspecting non-government organisations, to widen their circle of influence for support.”

Subsequently, in May 2010, a Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) press release said, “It has come to the notice of the government that some Maoist leaders have been directly contacting certain NGOs and intellectuals to propagate their ideology and persuade them to take steps as would provide support to the CPI (Maoist) ideology.”

The MHA warned that under Section 39 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, “any person who commits the offence of supporting such a terrorist organisation with *inter alia* intention to further the activities of such groups would be liable to be punished with imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years or with fine or with both.”

In the same month, another MHA circular said that the CPI-Maoist has 57 “front bodies” of peasants, labourers, women, students, tribals and trade unions who have helped the banned outfit raise the level of its tactical warfare, including winning court battles and getting their arrested leaders released.

Andhra Pradesh’s victory against the Maoists is said to have been achieved in spite of a “dissenting intellectuals and obtrusive media.” While nexus between the media and the Maoists remains an unverifiable aspect of the Maoist operations in the state, the outfit continues to receive support from a section of the intellectuals. Two prominent intellectuals- revolutionary writer Varavara Rao and folk artist Gummadi Vittal Rao alias Gaddar- remain the public face of the Maoists. Both participated on behalf of the Maoists

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84 The MHA statement was criticised by a group of intellectuals who in an open letter said, “By denying a section of society the right to even voice their opinion, even if it is in support of Maoists, you are striving to polarise the debate and reduce the whole issue to a simplistic good versus evil situation in which you and the government appear to firmly stand on the side of the good.” Open Letter to the Home Minister protestating against MHA’s attempt to silence dissent, http://sanhati.com/articles/2380/
in the failed peace talks with the State government in 2004. Apart from these two personalities, several Maoist fronts operate in Andhra Pradesh, generating support for the outfit as well as justifying its actions. The State government continues to proscribe the CPI-Maoist and six of its front organisations. These front organisations include- All India Revolutionary Students Federation (AIRSF), Viplava Karmika Samakhya (VIKASA), Radical Students Union (RSU), Singareni Karmika Samakhya (SIKASA), Rytu Coolie Sangham (RCS) and Radical Youth League (RYL).87

**Role of media in extremism affected state (Experts and Security force personnel)**

1. **Andhra Pradesh**: 88 per cent experts and 80 per cent security force personnel rejected the assumption that the media is in cahoots with the Maoists in the state. However, while 74 per cent experts affirmed that the media has played an independent and non-partisan role, among the security force personnel only 40 per cent thought so. Majority of both the experts and the security forces (62 per cent experts and 60 per cent security force personnel) were of the opinion that the both the State and the extremists have not tried

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exploiting the media. 52 per cent experts and 60 per cent security force personnel said that the media does not support the ideology of the extremists. While 58 per cent experts indicated that local media and intelligentsia tend to highlight the atrocities committed by the security forces more than those by the extremists, only 20 per cent security forces agreed with the view.

2. Chhattisgarh: 98 per cent experts which included all the nine security force personnel rejected the assumption that the media is in cahoots with the Maoists in the state. 90 per cent experts and 88.9 security forces affirmed that the media has played an independent and non-partisan role. Whereas only 34 per cent experts indicated that media has been subjected to frequent attacks by the Maoists in the state, the security officials differed. Over 66 per cent security force personnel interviewed indicated that media personnel have been attacked by the Maoists on several occasions. Majority of both the experts and the security officials were of the opinion that both the state and the extremists have tried exploiting the media. Similarly, 94 per cent experts and 100 per cent security personnel said that the media does not support the ideology of the extremists.

3. Jharkhand: Opinion of the experts endorsed the independent role played by media in Jharkhand. Responses of the security force personnel component within the experts’ category, whose responses were analysed separately, however, were divided and presented a rather confusing scenario. 74 per cent experts rejected the assumption that the media is in cahoots with the Maoists in the state. 90 per cent experts affirmed that the media has played an independent and non-partisan role. All the 12 security officials agreed with this statement. Whereas only 40 per cent experts indicated that media has been subjected to frequent attacks by the Maoists in the state, 50 per cent of the security officials subscribed to this view. 60 per cent experts and 75 per cent security officials were of the opinion that both the state and the extremists have tried exploiting the media. 72 per cent experts said that the media does not support the ideology of the extremists.

Support from local media and intelligentsia for extremist groups (Common people)
1. **Andhra Pradesh**: Among the 200 respondents who participated in the survey, 55.5 per cent (111 respondents) said that the local media and intelligentsia provide support and sympathy to the extremist groups. Over 54 per cent of these 111 respondents indicated that the local media provide a platform to the Maoists to espouse their cause. Similarly, 85.6 per cent believed that local media and intelligentsia tend to highlight the atrocities committed by the state more than those committed by the Maoists. However, only 46.8 per cent answered in the affirmative to the question whether the intelligentsia and the media support the ideology propagated by the Maoists. The responses indicated that in spite of the lack of belief in the ideology of the Maoists, the media and intelligentsia in Andhra Pradesh has supported the extremists in some manner.

2. **Chhattisgarh**: Only 29 per cent (58 respondents) of the 200 common people surveyed said that the local media and intelligentsia provide support and sympathy to the extremist groups. Interestingly, 50 of these 58 persons were from the rural setting which indicated that the nexus between the media/intelligentsia and the Maoists is more of a rural phenomenon. The lack of security and prevalence of a regime of fear could be the reason behind the extension of such support to the Maoists. These 58 respondents were then asked about the way the media and intelligentsia extends support to the Maoists. Close to
93 per cent of these 58 respondents indicated that the local media provide a platform to the Maoists to espouse their cause.

3. Jharkhand: Although majority of the 200 respondents who participated in the survey affirmed the neutral role of the media and the intelligentsia, a sizeable 43.5 per cent (87 respondents) said that the local media and intelligentsia provide support and sympathy to the extremist groups. These 87 respondents were then asked about the way the media and intelligentsia extends support to the Maoists. Over 79 per cent of these 87 respondents indicated that the local media provide a platform to the Maoists to espouse their cause. On the question whether the intelligentsia and the media support the ideology propagated by the Maoists, over 80 per cent (70 respondents) answered in the affirmative. Similarly, 83.9 per cent (73 respondents) believed that local media and intelligentsia tend to highlight the atrocities committed by the state more than those committed by the Maoists.

Key Findings of the Survey:

A. Northeast

- Unemployment and prevailing insecurity in the region were described by the respondents (Common People – 89.4%, Professionals – 88.4%) as important factors behind the growth of extremism in the Northeast. In Assam, the problem of illegal migration (Common People – 75%, Professionals – 76%) was additionally cited as a crucial factor behind emergence of the extremist movements.

- Respondents (Common People – 60.9%, Professionals – 62.4%) termed ‘neglect by the Central government’ as a critical factor for the growth of extremism in the region. They appeared not to have taken into account a definite change in the perception of New Delhi, availability of adequate developmental funds and formulation of projects. It’s a different matter altogether that the implementation
of these schemes, a responsibility of the State governments in most cases, is found wanting.

- Contrary to what the extremists claim, majority of the respondents (Common People – 78.6%, Professionals – 84.8%) claimed that extremists do not represent the interests and aspirations of the people. This finding was encouraging as it was reiterated both in Tripura where the insurgency has been considerably weakened as well as Manipur where it is still thriving.

- Leakage of developmental funds and extortion continues to be the major source of terror funding in the region according to the security officials and the professionals. (Professionals – 70%, Security Officials – 68.4%)

- Respondents indicated that peaceful protests are never noticed in the corridors of power (Common People – 66.2%, Professionals – 55.1%). The open source literature survey had indicated that there is a tendency by the government to ignore emerging movements until a threshold is broken.

- Majority of the respondents (Professionals – 64.4%, Security Officials – 67.1%) believed that the support received by the extremist outfits from foreign elements helped sustain armed violence in the Northeast. Examples of assistance provided to the extremist outfits from foreign sources in the form training, arms, funds as well as provision of safe havens are often cited to back up the claim.

- Political patronage received by the extremists was described as a crucial reason behind the persistence of extremism (Professionals – 81.6%, Security Officials – 85.1%).

- Majority of the respondents (Common People – 69.9%, Professionals – 58.2%) indicated that local media and intelligentsia have played an independent and non-partisan role in Northeast. Open source literature survey, however, indicates the
challenges an independent media faces in conflict theatres and the pressures it is generally subjected to both by the State and the extremists. The same holds true for the intelligentsia as well.

B. Left Wing Extremism Affected States

- ‘Unemployment and social insecurity’ (Common People – 96%, Professionals – 95.3%), ‘failure to bring about land reforms’ (Common People – 75.8%, Professionals – 77%) and ‘economic backwardness of the state’ (Common People – 87.8%, Professionals – 90%) were identified by majority of the respondents as major reasons for growth of Left Wing Extremism.

- Majority of the respondents (Common People – 84%, Professionals – 90%) opined that Naxalites do not represent the interests and aspirations of the civilian population. Although the percentage of common people who believed that the Naxalites still represent the interests and aspirations of the people was higher in Andhra Pradesh (23%) compared to Chhattisgarh (10%) and Jharkhand (15%), the survey noted an overall rejection by the people of the notion that Naxals represent the tribal community.

- The image and ideology of the Naxalites, however, continue to be somewhat positive compared to the terrorists. A large section of respondents (49%) opined that the Naxalites cannot be construed as terrorists. Since the Naxalites do not pursue a secessionist goal and do not act as vehicles for external powers’ agenda, even New Delhi refrains from equating them with terrorists.

- It is believed by majority of the respondents (Common People – 77.3%, Professionals – 66%) that orchestration of violence by the Naxalite groups is largely a result of the ineffectiveness of peaceful methods of protest. In the opinion of experts, however, violence remains a key tool for attainment of the Naxalite objective of capturing the state power.
• Majority of the respondents, in all three surveyed states, believed that Naxalites want political power and not development (Common People – 74.6%, Professionals – 79.3%). This finding is in conformity with the objective of the CPI-Maoist to capture state power by 2050.

• Although majority of the respondents (Common People – 61%, Professionals – 78.7%) indicated that the media and intelligentsia have played an independent and impartial role, a sizeable section did indicate that a nexus exists between the Naxalites on one hand and the media and intelligentsia on the other.
CHAPTER-III: COST OF THE CONFLICT

Section A- NORTHEASTERN STATES

A. Personal Experience

Personal experiences of individuals with extremists have been varied. The questionnaire attempted to list such individual experiences. It, however, needs to be kept in mind that in a conflict theatre, unconstrained answers to such questions are never forthcoming. Thus, the responses are only indicative of the prevalent dynamics of extremism in the area. Lack of personal experience should not be construed as the lack of extremism altogether.

Extensive literature survey had led to a short listing of possible modes of experience. Responses were elicited on those. In addition, the respondents were encouraged to add any other experience they might have undergone with the extremists.

Do you have any personal experience of extremism? (Common people)

![Graph showing personal experiences of extremism]

A = I have been forced to pay tax to the extremists;
B = I have been forced to provide food and shelter to the extremists;
C = I have been attacked by the extremists;
D = My close relatives have been attacked/killed by the extremists;
E. = I have no such experience
1. Assam: Only nine per cent of the respondents had the experience of conceding to the extortion demands of the extremists. Similarly, 30 respondents, of whom 22 were from the rural areas, had provided food and shelter to the extremists. Only 10 respondents had been attacked by the extremists of whom seven were from the rural settings. Significantly, close relatives of 36 respondents belonging to the common people category had been attacked or killed by the extremists. 21 of them were from the rural areas. While 57.5 per cent of the respondents (common people) maintained that they have some sort of direct experience of extremism, 42.5 per cent said that they have had no such experience.

2. Manipur: Only 30.7 per cent (46 respondents) of the 150 respondents had the experience of conceding to the extortion demands of the extremists. Twenty-four of them were from rural areas. Similarly, 36 respondents, 23 of whom were from rural settings had provided food and shelter to the extremists. While 34 respondents had been attacked by the extremists, 48 of the 150 respondents had their close relatives attacked or killed by the extremists. Ninety of the 150 interviewed maintained that they had no direct experience of extremism. These responses indicated that people residing in the rural and remote areas had been targeted by the extremists more compared to the ones living in urban or semi-urban areas.

3. Meghalaya: Only 11 of the 100 common people respondents maintained that they have experience of extremism. Only eight per cent of the respondents had the experience of conceding to the extortion demands of the extremists. Similarly, only seven respondents, six of whom were from rural areas, had provided food and shelter to the extremists. Instances of physical attacks were even less. Only four respondents had been attacked by the extremists and only 11 of the 100 respondents had their close relatives attacked or killed by the extremists.

4. Nagaland: Although only 40.9 per cent (61 respondents) of the 149 respondents said that they had direct experience of extremism, this number compared with other states of the Northeast was quite high. This probably has to do both with the spatial spread and
longevity of the conflict in the state. Forty seven per cent of the respondents had the experience of conceding to the extortion demands of the extremists. Similarly, 23.5 per cent (35 respondents) had provided food and shelter to the extremists. While only 13.4 per cent (20 respondents) had been attacked by the extremists and 64 of the 149 respondents had their close relatives attacked or killed by the extremists. These responses indicated that people, irrespective of their rural, semi-urban or urban locations, had been targeted by the extremists.

5. Tripura: Only two per cent of the respondents had the experience of conceding to the extortion demands of the extremists. Similarly, only two respondents, one each derived from rural and semi-urban settings had provided food and shelter to the extremists. Only two respondents had been attacked by the extremists and only five of the 100 respondents had their close relatives attacked or killed by the extremists. Barring nine respondents, of the 100 interviewed, the rest maintained that they had no direct experience of extremism.

The wide spread of extremism in the Northeast initiated deployment of Army and central para-military personnel in addition to the state police forces who carried out counter-insurgency operations in vast areas of the region. The earliest deployment of central forces was in Nagaland on 27 August 1955 “in aid of civil power under the Assam Disturbed Areas Act”88 and since then has stayed put there. Since then, almost all the states of the region have witnessed similar deployment. In Meghalaya, the counter-insurgency operations of the state police were duly assisted by the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF). Meghalaya, which shares 443 kilometres of international border with Bangladesh, was also served by the Border Security Force (BSF). Apart from guarding the borders, the BSF men also take part in counter-insurgency operations. According to available open source information, in year 2000 when the insurgency had peaked, 15 battalions of the CRPF had been deployed in the state besides four battalions of Assam Rifles. In addition, nine battalions of the BSF were deployed in the border areas and they

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could be diverted elsewhere at a short notice.\textsuperscript{89} By 2005, the strength of the para-military forces had increased to 12 battalions of BSF and 10 battalions of Tripura State Rifles (TSR) which included five battalions of India Reserve Battalion (IRB).\textsuperscript{90} As a result, the face of the security forces, whether belonging to the state police forces, the central para-military forces or the army is quite familiar to the average resident of the region. The questionnaire asked the respondents in the common people category about their experience with the counter-insurgency operations.

**Extremism resulting in high presence of army / paramilitary forces**

*(Experts and Security force personnel)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experts</th>
<th>Security force personnel</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>72%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>28%</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31%</td>
<td>No</td>
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1. **Assam:** It has been the accusation of the human rights groups that the government is militarising the societies in the Northeast on the pretext of countering extremism. They allege that the number of boots on the ground is far too high compared to the intensity of conflict. The experts, that include security force personnel, too, in their opinion appeared to express that extremism in resulting in the high presence of army and paramilitary


\textsuperscript{90} “Speech for the Chief Minister’s Conference”, April 15, 2005, http://tripura.nic.in/SpeechesforCMConference.htm
forces in the state. As many as 96 per cent experts and 94.1 per cent security force personnel subscribed to this statement.

2. Manipur: Writing in the context of deployment of central forces in Manipur, former Director General of Border Security Force (BSF), E N Rammohan, who also served as the security advisor to the Governor of Manipur says, “Heavy deployment of army or paramilitary forces is bound to cause excesses. This is unavoidable. And when this happens, without redressing the conditions of the population, which has in the first place led to the resort to arms by a section of the population, they are bound to get further alienated.”

The experts’ category that includes security force personnel, too, in their opinion appeared to express that high presence of army and paramilitary forces in the state was a result of extremism. As many as 98 per cent experts (which include security force officials) subscribed to this statement. All the 21 security force personnel who participated in the survey and whose responses were analysed separately, agreed with this view.

3. Meghalaya: The experts’ category that includes security force personnel said that extremism in the state has not resulted in the high presence of army and paramilitary forces. As many as 77.6 per cent experts (which include security force officials) subscribed to this statement. Among the security force personnel alone, a shade less, yet significant 76.9 per cent agreed with this view.

4. Nagaland: The experts’ category felt that high presence of army and paramilitary forces in the state was a result of extremism. More than 73 per cent of the 45 experts (which include security force officials) who answered the query subscribed to this statement.

5. Tripura: The experts’ category that includes security force personnel, too, in their opinion appeared to express that high presence of army and paramilitary forces in the state was a result of extremism. More than 73 per cent of the 45 experts (which include security force officials) who answered the query subscribed to this statement.

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state was a result of extremism. As much as 71 per cent of the experts (which include security force officials) subscribed to this statement. Among the security force personnel alone, a shade less, yet significant 62.5 per cent agreed with this view.

**Has your village/area ever seen any police/ military operation against extremism?**

(Common people)

![Pie chart showing 53% Yes and 47% No](chart.png)

1. **Assam:** 110 respondents out of the 200 common people who participated in the survey said that their village/area have been a scene of counter-insurgency operations. However, only 34.5 per cent of these people (38 respondents) said that their own houses have been raided by the security forces. The sensitivities of the people and their concept of personal space are often violated by such raids by the security forces. Entry of the forces into the houses is disliked and the misbehaviour of the security forces with the family members (in some cases with the women) and destruction of property has been an issue of constant irritation for the common people. The questionnaire asked the 38 respondents who had experience of raids on their houses whether the security forces misbehaved with any member of the family or destroyed their personal property. 22 respondents, of whom 18 belonged to the rural areas, answered in the affirmative.

2. **Manipur:** 110 respondents out of the 150 common people who participated in the survey said that their village/area have been a scene of counter-insurgency operations.
Fifty-eight of these participants were from the rural areas. 60 respondents (54.5 per cent) of these 110, however, had undergone the experience of their own houses being raided by the security forces. The sensitivities of the people and their concept of personal space are often violated by such raids by the security forces. Although difficult to verify, human rights organisations and civil society outfits in Manipur often allege that such violations are rampant. The survey too found that experiences of common people with such harassment to be on the higher side. Over 37 per cent (22 participants) of the 60 respondents, whose houses had been raided by the forces maintained that the security personnel had misbehaved with some member of the family or had destroyed their personal property. It indicated that one in every three cases of entry of security forces into civilian houses results in misbehaviour with family members or destruction of property.

3. Meghalaya: Forty-three respondents out of the 100 common people who participated in the survey said that their village/area have been a scene of counter-insurgency operations. Only 13 respondents of these 43, however, had undergone the experience of their own houses being raided by the security forces. In Meghalaya, the security forces appeared to have demonstrated some sensitivity during the operations. Only six respondents, whose house had been raided by the forces, maintained that the security forces had misbehaved with any member of the family or had destroyed their personal property.

4. Nagaland: 70 respondents out of the 150 common people who participated in the survey said that their village/area have been a scene of counter-insurgency operations. Of these 70 participants, 33 respondents (47.1 per cent) had experienced their own houses being raided by the security forces. The survey found that experiences of common people

92 For example, a book titled ‘Meira Paibee’ published by the National Research Centre, Imphal in 1999 detailed the sexual harassment, destruction of life and property, massacres, tortures and atrocities perpetrated by the army and paramilitary forces on the civilian population. The Book noted, “even after Manipur is besieged with a huge army at the rate of one army person per ten Manipuri heads, there is continuing unrestrained extra-judicial beating and abuse, killings, custodial deaths, disappearances, sexual harassment, massacring and various forms of atrocities.” See Malem Ningthouja, “The Women’s Movement in Manipur: As Reflected in the Text ‘Meira Paibee”, http://www.revolutionarydemocracy.org/rdv9n2/women.htm
with harassment at the hand of the security forces during these raids are rather common. A little over 23 per cent (eight participants) of the 33 respondents, whose house had been raided by the forces maintained that the security forces had either misbehaved with any member of the family or had destroyed their personal property. It indicated that one in every four cases of entry of security forces into civilian houses ends up in misbehaviour with family members or destruction of property.

5. Tripura: Forty-eight respondents out of the 100 common people who participated in the survey said that their village/area have been a scene of counter-insurgency operations. Only 41 per cent (20 respondents) of these 48, however, had undergone the experience of their own houses being raided by the security forces. In Tripura, the security forces appeared to have demonstrated some sensitivity during the operations. Only 10 per cent (two respondents) of the total 20, whose house had been raided by the forces maintained that the security forces had misbehaved with any member of the family or had destroyed their personal property.

B. On Society & Culture

Level Impact of extremist violence (Experts and Security force personnel)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Experts</th>
<th>Security force personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Varies from place to place</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3% 32% 13% 11% 41% High Very High Moderate Low Varies from place to place

Experts

Security force personnel
1. Assam: With close to 400 fatalities recorded in both 2008 and 2009 in extremism related violence in Assam, majority 46 per cent of the experts and 52.9 per cent security force personnel were of the opinion that extremism in the state can be categorised as ‘high’. Only 26 per cent experts and 17.6 per cent security force personnel believed that it can be levelled as ‘very high’. Another 22 per cent experts believed that it is only ‘moderate’.

2. Manipur: Extremist violence continues to impact every walks of human life in Manipur, in its valley as well the hills. Unlike many other conflict theatres where the state governments have been able to keep the state capital and some other major urban concentrations free from extremist activity, Manipur’s capital Imphal continues to be rocked by intermittent extremist violence. There was no ambiguity in the opinion of the experts about the nature of extremist violence in Manipur. Out of the 47 experts (including security force personnel) who responded to the query to define the level of impact of extremist violence, 46 defined it as either ‘high’ or ‘very high’.

3. Meghalaya: Twenty-seven of the 50 experts (which included security force personnel) said that the impact has been ‘moderate’. Sixteen others maintained that it has been ‘low’. Only four experts said that the impact has been ‘very high’, whereas two others said that it has been ‘high’. Among the security force personnel alone, nine of the 13 who participated in the survey termed the impact as ‘moderate’.

4. Nagaland: In the pre-ceasefire period, every walk of human life in Nagaland was severely impacted by extremist violence. The signing of the individual ceasefire agreements between the government and the extremist outfits lessened the number of encounter between the forces and the extremists, but activities like internecine clashes, extortion, abduction and odd killings continued. While places like Dimapur and Kohima were witnesses to the factional clashes, other districts were theatres of extortion and abductions carried out by the outfits. Out of the 49 experts (including security for
personnel) who responded to the query to define the level of impact of extremist violence, 35 labelled it as ‘moderate’. Six of the eight security officials also defined the impact as ‘moderate’.

5. Tripura: During its heyday, extremist violence left its impact on every walk of life in Tripura. Although state capital Agartala was more or less secure, vast stretches of the state’s territory was dominated by the marauding extremists who carried out killings, abductions and attacks at their will. It took sustained and calculated efforts of the state to turn the tide. The near victory of the state secured over the extremists notwithstanding, opinion of the experts which included security force personnel were divided on the level of impact of extremist violence in the state. Only 33 per cent of the experts (14 respondents that included security officials) maintained that the impact has been low, whereas over 42 and 16 per cent categorised it as moderate and high respectively. Among the security force personnel alone, over 62 per cent termed the impact as low whereas 25 per cent said it is moderate. Only 12.5 per cent maintained that it varied from place to place.

The questionnaire asked the respondents to respond, in general terms, whether the impact of extremism on society has been positive or negative.
Impact of extremism on society (Common people)

1. Assam: An overwhelming 90 per cent (180 respondents) felt that the society has been negatively affected. Of the 88 respondents from the rural areas who responded to the query, 82 had a similar opinion. The negative impact of extremism was thus widely felt and cut across rural-urban divide. While 13 respondents said that extremism has a positive contribution for the society, four other said there has been both positive and negative impact.

2. Manipur: A majority 62.5 per cent (90 respondents) felt that the society has been negatively affected. Significantly, however, 40 respondents described the impact as positive, while ten respondents said that the impact has been both positive and negative. The nature of response did indicate some level of support extremism enjoys in Manipur from common people. Of the respondents who described the impact as positive, over 69 per cent maintained that the extremism has prevented the exploitation of resources in their villages/areas by others. On the other hand, of the respondents who had described the impact as negative, over 71 per cent said that extremism has only paved the way for more corruption in society, primarily forcing people to indulge in corruption to meet the demand of extremists. In addition, over 77 per cent respondents said that extremism has made the community unstable or insecure.
3. Meghalaya: An overwhelming 85 per cent (85 respondents) felt that the society has been negatively affected. Close to 90 per cent felt that the extortion demands by the extremists have paved the way for more corruption in society to meet the demand of the extremists. Another 89.7 per cent said that extremism has made the community unstable or insecure.

4. Nagaland: A majority 63.3 per cent (95 respondents) felt that the society has been negatively affected. A little over nine per cent (14 respondents) described the impact as positive, while a sizeable 24.7 per cent (37 respondents) said that the impact has been both positive and negative. The nature of response was an indication of the support extremist outfits continues to generate among the civilian population. Over 91 per cent of the respondents who described the impact as negative said that extremism has only paved the way for more corruption in society to meet the demand of extremists. Over 80 per cent respondents said that extremism has made the community unstable or insecure. Over 58 per cent of these respondents said that presence of extremism has degraded the social status of the village/community.

5. Tripura: An overwhelming 99 per cent (99 respondents) felt that the society has been negatively affected. Of the 71 respondents from the rural areas who responded to the query, 70 had a similar opinion. The negative impact of extremism was thus universally acknowledged and cut across the rural-urban divide. 95 per cent of the respondents felt that the extremists themselves have exploited the resources such as forests, paddy fields and rivers. More than 88 per cent felt that the extortion demands by the extremists have paved the way for more corruption in society to meet the demand of the extremists. Similarly, over 71 per cent felt that extremism has not led to degradation in the social status of the villages/community and areas.
Sectors impacted most by extremism (Experts and Security force personnel)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experts</th>
<th>security force personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>6.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All of the above</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. **Assam**: The experts and security force personnel were categorical that extremism has impacted equally on politics, economy and security of the state. Being asked to choose between these three sectors, 52 per cent of the experts and 52.9 per cent security force personnel chose all three sectors. Among individual sectors, 16 per cent experts thought that economy of the state has been worst hit by extremism. Similarly, 17.6 per cent security force personnel believed that both economy and security have been worst affected.

2. **Manipur**: In the opinion of the experts and security force personnel, extremism has impacted maximum on all the three sectors. 84 per cent of the experts (42 of the 50 experts) opted for ‘all of the above’ option. Similarly, among the 21 security force personnel whose responses were analysed separately, 18 chose the ‘all of the above’ option. These responses were indicative of the sweeping impact of extremism in Manipur.

3. **Meghalaya**: Majority 66 per cent of the experts were of the opinion that all the three have been equally affected. The responses of the security force personnel when analysed
separately also led to a similar finding. Sixty-nine per cent (9 respondents) said all the three sectors have been equally affected.

4. Nagaland: The experts and security force personnel were categorical that extremism has impacted maximum on all these sectors. 67.3 per cent of the experts (33 of the 49 experts) chose the ‘all of the above’ option. Similarly, among the eight security force personnel whose responses were analysed separately, five chose the ‘all of the above’ option. These responses were indicative of the sweeping impact of extremism on Nagaland. Among the individual sectors, economy was identified as most impacted by extremism both by the experts and the security force component among the experts.

5. Tripura: 32.7 per cent of the experts (which included the security force personnel) said that education has been the hardest hit. Over 22 per cent (11 respondents) experts felt that impact on politics has been the maximum. Only 20 per cent (10 respondents) felt that all three sectors—politics, economy and security—have been affected. Among the security forces alone, 37.5 per cent said that all the three sectors have been affected to the maximum. Whereas according to 25 per cent respondents, education has suffered the most, only 12.5 per cent said that politics of the state has been impacted severely. Another 25 per cent said that economy, education and security combined together have been the worst affected.

Experts were asked to provide their opinion on the impact of extremism on the cultural values.
Impact on cultural values (Experts and Security force personnel)

| A = Extremism has increased distrust; | A = Extremism has increased distrust; |
| B = Extremism has decreased mutual tolerance; | B = Extremism has decreased mutual tolerance; |
| C = Extremism has increased anxiety; | C = Extremism has increased anxiety; |
| D = Extremism has affected cultural harmony; | D = Extremism has affected cultural harmony; |

1. Assam: A majority 80 per cent believed that cultural values in extremist affected areas have been seriously affected. Among the security force personnel, 58.8 per cent subscribed to this view. Elaborating their response, 90 per cent experts and 80 per cent security force personnel who replied in the affirmative maintained that prevalence of extremism has led to mistrust, has decreased mutual tolerance and has increased anxiety. A marginally less 82.5 per cent experts and 70 per cent security force personnel said that extremism has also affected communal harmony. Internecine clashes between two outfits claiming to represent different ethnic groups naturally leads to disharmony between the communities as well. For example, in Karbi Anglong district, clashes between the UPDS and the Kuki Revolutionary Army (KRA) in 2004 led to a divide between the Kukis and Karbis. In the neighbouring district, N C Hills, clashes between the DHD and the NSCN-IM in 2009, led to difference of opinion between the Nagas and the Dimasas.

2. Manipur: A majority 87.8 per cent experts said that cultural values in extremist affected areas have been seriously affected. Among the 21 security force personnel, 19 subscribed to this view. Elaborating their response, 100 per cent experts including
security force personnel who replied in the affirmative maintained that prevalence of extremism has decreased mutual tolerance and has increased anxiety. Similarly, 95.3 per cent experts said that extremism increased distrust and has, as a result, affected communal harmony. There exists a schism between the valley and hill areas of Manipur. Extremism has only accentuated the divide.

3. Meghalaya: A majority 72 per cent (36 respondents), which included a lone security force personnel, believed that cultural values in extremist affected areas have not been seriously affected. This indicated the rather moderate scale of extremism in the state. The effectiveness of the extremist diktats never reached the scale witnessed in the neighbouring states of Manipur and Nagaland.

4. Nagaland: In ancient times, the Naga ethnic stock, consisting of over 30 different tribes, were known for their head hunting expeditions that mostly indicated the bitter animosity among the warring tribes. Even as the extremist outfits tried to bring about unity by projecting the Nagas as a unified whole with a common aspiration, the division in the parent NSCN in the late 1980s shattered the myth. The split into IM and K factions were primarily along tribal lines. Even today, the Tangkhuls are primarily known to be IM supporters, whereas the Aos are generally supporters of the Khaplang group. A bulk of the Angamis has remained loyal to the old NNC, which too has split into several factions. The biter rivalry among the extremist outfits continues to vitiate inter-tribal relations and has only widened the divide between the tribes. A majority 61.2 per cent (30 respondent out of 9), which included the security officials believed that cultural values in extremist affected areas have been seriously affected. Elaborating their response, 96.8 per cent experts who included all the security force personnel said that extremism increased distrust among the tribes. 90.3 per cent experts including all the security force personnel who replied in the affirmative maintained that prevalence of extremism has decreased mutual tolerance. 96.8 per cent experts including all the security force personnel said that extremism has led to an increase in anxiety. Similarly, 93.5 per cent experts including all the security force personnel said that extremism has affected cultural harmony.
5. Tripura: Extremists who were considered to be representatives of and who derived their strength and support base within the tribal community intensified the divide between the Bengalis and the tribals. Tripura had witnessed the worst ethnic riots between the tribals and the Bengalis in 1980. Over a thousand Bengali immigrants were killed, nearly 20,000 of their houses torched, and properties looted by the tribal extremists. In the subsequent years, both the NLFT and the ATTF carried out a number of killings of non-tribals in a bid to force the movement of the latter from what they considered to be tribal lands. In the 1970s, attacks by the tribal militants on the Bengali population had led to the formation of the outfit Amra Bangali (We are Bengalis). Consequently, violent communal clashes broke out in several parts of the State in which about 1,800 people lost their lives and over 3,600 dwellings were burnt. In the year 2000, another Bengali outfit, United Bengali Liberation Front (UBLF) operated briefly in the hilly areas of South and West Tripura and carried out a number of armed operations against the tribal people. A majority 86 per cent, which included the security forces, believed that cultural values in extremist affected areas have been seriously affected. The entire lot of security force personnel interviewed subscribed to this view. Elaborating on their response, close to 70 per cent experts and over 62 per cent security force personnel who replied in the affirmative maintained that prevalence of extremism has led to mistrust, has decreased mutual tolerance and has increased anxiety. As many as 81.4 per cent experts and 87.5 per cent security force personnel said that extremism has also affected communal harmony.

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C. Impact on Daily Chores

Impact on people’s lives (Experts and Security force personnel)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Experts</th>
<th>Security force personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Varies from place to place</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Assam: Thirty-eight per cent of the experts and 47.1 per cent security force personnel categorised the impact of extremism on the lives of the people as ‘high’, while a shade less 34 per cent experts and 35.3 per cent security force personnel believed that it should be categorised as ‘very high’. Only ten experts who include two security force personnel thought that the impact was only ‘moderate’. Three experts including a lone security force personnel said it belongs to ‘low’ category. Over 67 per cent experts and 70 per cent security force personnel said that the general movement of the people has been affected. Only 40.8 per cent experts and 41.2 per cent security force personnel believed that movement of women is affected. Over 73 per cent experts and 70.6 per cent security force personnel believed that movement after dark has been restricted. Although several explosions in market places have claimed lives in many of Assam’s cities, 42.9 per cent of the experts believed that extremism has no impact on going to markets.
2. **Manipur:** 74.5 per cent of the 47 experts who chose to answer the question termed the impact as ‘high’. The remaining 12 respondents said that the impact is ‘very high’. Responses of the security force personnel, who were a part of the experts, were analysed separately and the trend was found to be similar. Over 90 per cent security force personnel (19 respondents) said that the impact is high and while the remaining two said it is ‘very high’. Close to 94 cent experts and over 95 per cent security force personnel said that the general movement of the people has been affected. Similarly nearly 92 per cent experts and 100 per cent security force personnel said that the impact extremism is severe on activities like people’s going out to their workplaces. Another 91.8 per cent experts and 95.2 per cent security force personnel said that a routine activity like sending children to school has also been affected. Extremists in the Northeast usually refrain from targeting women. However, prevalence of conflict situation in which encounters and crossfire have become a part of life appeared to have impacted on the movement of women folk as well. 77.6 per cent experts and 85.7 security force personnel said that movement of women too has been affected. 91.8 per cent experts also believed that extremism has restricted movement after dark. This view was supported by 100 per cent security force personnel. Similarly, 81.6 per cent experts and 90.5 per cent security forces believed that extremism has affected going to markets.

3. **Meghalaya:** The prevalence of normalcy played high on the minds of the respondents as they responded to the query regarding the impact of extremism on the lives of people. Only seven of the experts, which included a lone security force personnel, defined the impact of extremism on the people’s lives as either ‘very high’ or ‘high’. While 19 experts termed it as ‘moderate’, another 23 said it is only ‘low’. Among the security force personnel, responses of whom were analysed separately, six respondents each defined the impact as ‘moderate’ and ‘low’. Barring the 81 per cent of the experts who maintained that movement after dark has been affected due to extremism in the state, majority of the respondents dismissed the impact on other parameters. Majority of the experts said that general movement of the people, movement of women, going to work place, sending children to school and going to market has not been affected.
4. **Nagaland**: 82.9 per cent (29 respondents) of the 35 experts who chose to answer the question, termed the impact as ‘moderate’. While four respondents termed it as ‘high’, two others said that it is ‘low’. Of the six security force personnel who answered the question, five said that the impact is moderate. 85.7 per cent experts and 75 per cent security force personnel said that the movement of the people after dark has been affected, only 30.6 per cent experts thought that the movement of people in general has been affected by extremism.

5. **Tripura**: The prevalence of normalcy played high on the minds of the respondents as they responded to the query regarding the impact of extremism on the lives of people. Only 19.5 per cent of the experts (which included the security forces) and 28.6 per cent security force personnel categorised the impact of extremism on the lives of the people as ‘high’. Over 46.5 per cent experts including the security forces and 28.6 per cent security forces alone thought that the impact was only ‘moderate’. Over 69 per cent experts and 75 per cent security force personnel said that the general movement of the people has been affected, although opinion was divided on the impact extremism had on people’s going out to their workplaces. 57 per cent experts and 50 per cent security force personnel said that this has not been affected. Similarly, over 65 per cent experts and 62 per cent security force personnel said that sending children to school has also not been affected. Extremism appeared to have lesser impact on movement of women. Similarly, close to 70 per cent experts and 50 per cent security forces believed that extremism has no impact on going to markets.

**D. Impact on civilians**

Young men and children have been specifically targeted by the extremist outfits for recruitment. The other dynamics of extremism—extortion, abduction and recruitment of the youth by the outfits continue. Reports indicate that taking advantage of the ceasefire
agreement, the NSCN-IM has increased its cadre strength to about 2,500. In 2004, the outfit had published advertisements in local newspapers in Nagaland for recruitment to a few posts under its ‘Naga Army’ in the ranks of Under Secretary, Section Officer, Assistant Section Officer, Office Assistant I and Office Assistant II. In addition to such ‘official positions’, the outfit continues to recruit youths from Nagaland and also the neighbouring states to join its armed wing. The NSCN-K too recruits in Nagaland and the Tirap and Changlang districts of neighbouring Arunachal Pradesh. Lt. Col. (Retd.) R.K. Rajendra, Member, Manipur Human Rights Commission, said during the survey, “Central Government feels that all the youths are sympathisers of the extremists and the educated persons are leaders of the extremist. Central Government looks upon the people of the land as disloyal citizens of India.” On the other hand, a police official maintained, “The people of the state, in particular the youths, lack work culture and usually resort to easy means to power and resource. Extremist groups take advantage of it.” S B Kakaty, Director General of Meghalaya Police said, “Initially, the youngsters who joined the extremist movement were idealistic and wanted to do something for their community or their region. At a later period they have become opportunist and are mainly there to make money and other coercive power.” Several factors like unemployment and lack of societal guidance have made extremism a viable career option for the youth. “The Robinhood image of an extremist in the countryside and regular emoluments given to such youths by extremist outfits have contributed to the continuance of cadre recruitment”, said IGP Pallab Bhattacharya. There also have been instances, when outfits like the ULFA have used young men and school children as couriers to deliver extortion demands and even to plant explosives. Thus, it was important to judge the perception of the common people on the vulnerability of the youth.

98 Interview with K Meghachandra Singh, SDPO Lamlai, Imphal East, held at Lamlai on October 24, 2009.
99 Interview with S B Kakaty, Director General of Police, Meghalaya, at Shillong on October 14, 2009.
100 Interview with Pallab Bhattacharya, Inspector General of Police, Central Western Range, Assam, Interview held on 14 November 2009 at Guwahati.
101 Some of the principal tactical shifts ULFA undertook in 2007-08 included hiring youths, even students, who do not have any criminal records or do not figure in the scan list of the security forces, to lob grenades or plant IEDs at public places. These ‘stealth attacks’ constitute a zero risk to the rebel group in terms of
1. Assam: 166 respondents out of the 200 in the common people category, 48 experts out of 50, that includes all the 17 security force personnel who participated in the survey, maintained that the youth is indeed the most vulnerable category of people in areas affected by extremist violence. The questionnaire sought further clarifications from these respondents on three pre-determined types of impact on the youth. While 164 common people maintained that youth are targeted for recruitment by the extremist groups, all the 48 experts and 17 security force personnel supported this view. 162 common people, 45 experts, of whom 15 were security force personnel, maintained that even the security forces suspect the youth to be potential extremists and are often singled out for interrogation. This confirmation by the security force personnel, in a way, highlights the predicament of the youth in Assam. Over 77 per cent common people, 91.7 per cent experts and 94.1 per cent security force personnel said that youth is generally vulnerable to easy money culture and extortion.

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102 Being asked to explain why the extremist groups are recruiting youths as cadres, a prominent youth leader of the AJYCP, Dilip Patgiri maintained, “An empty belly never can think what is right or what is wrong. It needs only food.” Interview held at Guwahati on June 22, 2009.
2. Manipur: Responses of the common people as well as the experts underlined in clear terms the vulnerability of the youth in Manipur. Whereas 94 per cent (141 respondents) common people were categorical in saying that youths are the most vulnerable category of people in an area hit by extremist violence, this opinion was supported by 100 per cent experts. 138 of the 141 respondents in the common people category and 48 of the 50 expert respondents said that youths are targeted for recruitment by the extremist groups. Whereas 95 per cent common people maintained that even the security forces suspect the youth to be potential extremists and are often singled out for interrogation, this view was supported by 98 per cent experts including all the security force personnel. While 96 per cent experts including all the security force personnel indicated that youth in Manipur has become vulnerable to easy money culture and extortion, this view found support among a much lesser 68.1 per cent common people.

3. Meghalaya: Both the common people and the experts, who included personnel of the security forces, agreed that the youth has been the most vulnerable category of people in an area hit by extremist violence. Ninety-two per cent common people, 88 per cent experts and a slightly less 69.2 per cent security force personnel interviewed confirmed this. Out of the 92 respondents in the common people category, 87 persons maintained that youth are targeted for recruitment by the extremist groups. This found support among 43 experts (out of 44) and all the nine security force personnel. Whereas 68 per cent experts maintained that even the security forces suspect the youth to be potential extremists and are often singled out for interrogation, only 55.6 per cent security force personnel supported this assertion. However, 72 per cent respondents in the common people category confirmed this trend. As many as 96.7 per cent common people, 100 per cent experts and security force personnel said that youth is generally vulnerable to easy money culture and extortion. Additionally, a respondent in the common people category maintained, “It is easy to feed the minds of youths on extremist ideology.”

4. Nagaland: Whereas 96 per cent (144 respondents) common people were categorical in saying that youths are the most vulnerable category of people in an area hit by extremist
violence, this opinion was supported by 98 per cent experts including all the security force personnel. 122 of the 144 respondents in the common people category and 40 of the 49 expert respondents said that youths are targeted for recruitment by the extremist groups. Whereas 139 common people respondents maintained that even the security forces suspect the youth to be potential extremists and are often singled out for interrogation, this view was supported by 47 experts including seven security force personnel. While 98 per cent experts including all the security force personnel indicated that youth in Nagaland has become vulnerable to easy money culture and extortion, this view found support among 93.1 per cent common people.

5. Tripura: Experts were much more categorical than the common people in asserting the vulnerability of the youth. Whereas only 31 respondents (31 per cent) out of the 100 in the common people category maintained that youth is the most vulnerable category of people in areas affected by extremist violence, 42 experts out of 50 (84 per cent), that includes all but one of the eight security force personnel who participated in the survey, firmly believed in the intensified vulnerability of the youth. The questionnaire sought further clarifications from these respondents who had replied in the affirmative on three pre-determined types of impact on the youth. Out of those 31 respondents in the common people category, all maintained that youth are targeted for recruitment by the extremist groups. This found support among 35 experts and seven security force personnel. Whereas 69 per cent experts, which included five security force personnel, maintained that even the security forces suspect the youth to be potential extremists and are often singled out for interrogation, respondents in the common people category differed with the opinion. Only 48 per cent supported this view point. This confirmation by the security force personnel, in a way, highlighted the predicament of the tribal youth in Tripura. Hundred per cent common people, 66 per cent experts and 71 per cent security force personnel said that youth is generally vulnerable to easy money culture and extortion. Additional notable responses from the experts were: “it is easy to brainwash the minds of the youth”, “youth don’t want to earn their livelihood through hard work” and “they have no respect for human life”.

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The respondents in the common people category were asked to identify the category of people (men, women and children) who have been worst affected by extremism in the state. Respondents were asked to mark ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ against each category.

**Category of people most affected by extremism? (Common people)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Common People Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>89.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>64.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>62.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. **Assam:** While close to 82 per cent respondents maintained that men and children have been worst affected, a slightly less 78.5 per cent said that women have been worst affected. Open ended explanations to the above questions elicited critical responses. 41 respondents maintained that the entire family gets affected, even when only one member bears the brunt of extremism. 46 respondents said that the conflict environment leaves none unaffected. 28 participants said that extremists barely discriminate between their victims. An equal number answered that men, being the bread earners for the family, are generally more exposed and hence, are targeted.

2. **Manipur:** Close to 96 per cent (140 respondents) maintained that men have been worst affected. While 62.3 per cent (91 respondents) said that women have been worst affected, marginally less 61.6 per cent (90 respondents) maintained that children have been the most affected. 58.2 per cent (85 respondents) of the people surveyed opted for all three indicating that extremists have barely distinguished between their targets. The
pattern of the responses revealed that while men have been the primary target of extremism, the other categories too have rarely been spared.

3. **Meghalaya**: 93 per cent respondents maintained that men have been worst affected. While 48 per cent said that women have been worst affected, a little less, 47 per cent, maintained that children have been the most affected. Forty-seven per cent people opted for all three, indicating that extremists have barely distinguished between their targets. Thus, the responses indicated that the extremists primarily targeted men and spared, to an extent, the women and children.

4. **Nagaland**: Over 92 per cent (137 respondents) maintained that men have been worst affected. While 73 per cent (108 respondents) said that women have been worst affected, 64.9 per cent (96 respondents) maintained that children have been the most affected. 59.5 per cent (88 respondents) people opted for all three, indicating that extremists have barely distinguished between their targets. The pattern of the responses revealed that while men have been the primary target of extremism, the other categories too have rarely been left alone.

5. **Tripura**: Close to 84 per cent respondents maintained that men have been worst affected. While 68 per cent said that women have been worst affected, a little less, 66 per cent, maintained that children have been the most affected. Seventy-eight per cent people said men, women and children have been equally affected, indicating that extremists have barely distinguished between their targets. It is indeed the case that the extremists rarely spared anyone while carrying out the brutal massacres.
1. Assam: All the experts, including the security force personnel, were categorical in their opinion that extremism has both direct and indirect impact on the lives of women and children in the state. All the experts (including the security force personnel) maintained that women and children are impacted by social insecurity and also undergo serious trauma due to the incidents of extremism. Ninety-six per cent experts (who include security officials) and 94.1 per cent security force personnel (calculated separately from among the experts interviewed) said that loss of family members can bring about a serious impact on the lives of the survivors of violence. Another 94 per cent experts and 88.2 per cent security force personnel said that widows of violence struggle for livelihood as well as in bringing up their children. Eighty-six per cent experts and 100 per cent security force personnel said that the women face difficulty in providing education to their children.

2. Manipur: Extremism in Manipur, like any other conflict theatre, has affected women in different ways. The most infamous incident is that of the killing of Thangjam Manorama, whom the security forces described as a PLA extremist on 11 July 2004. The 32-year-old was arrested from her home by the para-military Assam Rifles personnel.
Her bullet-ridden body was left in a field not far from her home where it was discovered by villagers. The Assam Rifles claimed she had been shot dead while trying to escape.¹⁰³ All the experts (50 out of 50), including 21 security force personnel, were categorical in their opinion that extremism has both direct and indirect impact on the lives of women and children in the state. All the experts (including the security force personnel) maintained that loss of family members can bring about a serious impact on the lives of the survivors of violence. All of them further agreed with the statement that widows of violence struggle for livelihood as well as in bringing up their children. 98 per cent experts and 100 per cent security officials interviewed said that women and children are impacted by social insecurity and face difficulty in providing education to their children. They also agreed that unending violence leaves behind trauma and permanent scar in the minds of women and children.

3. **Meghalaya:** A majority of the experts (36 out of 50), including the security force personnel, were categorical in their opinion that extremism has both direct and indirect impact on the lives of women and children in the state. Among the security force personnel alone, 76.9 per cent had a similar viewpoint. The entire lot of experts (including the security force personnel) maintained that loss of family members can bring about a serious impact on the lives of the survivors of violence. The entire lot further said that widows of violence struggle for livelihood as well as in bringing up their children. Ninety-four per cent experts and 90 per cent security forces said that women and children are impacted by social insecurity. Similarly, 91.7 per cent experts (who include security officials) and 90 per cent security force personnel agreed to the statement that extremism leads to difficulty in education of children. The fact that unending violence leaves behind trauma and permanent scar in the minds of women and children was accepted by slightly less 67.6 per cent experts and 70 per cent security force personnel.

4. **Nagaland:** All the experts (50 out of 50), including eight security force personnel, were categorical in their opinion that extremism has both direct and indirect impact on

the lives of women and children in the state. All the experts (including the security force personnel) maintained that loss of family members can bring about a serious impact on the lives of the survivors of violence. 94 per cent of the experts including all the security force personnel further agreed with the statement that widows of violence struggle for livelihood as well as in bringing up their children. 96 per cent experts and 100 per cent security forces said that women and children are impacted by social insecurity, and face difficulty in providing education to their children. 98 per cent experts including all the security force personnel also agreed that unending violence leaves behind trauma and permanent scar in the minds of women and children.

5. Tripura: A majority of the experts (48 out of 50), including the security force personnel, were categorical in their opinion that extremism has both direct and indirect impact on the lives of women and children in the state. All security force personnel who participated in the survey had a similar viewpoint. Close to 90 per cent of the experts (including the security force personnel) maintained that loss of family members can bring about a serious impact on the lives of the survivors of violence. All the security force personnel subscribed to this point of view. Over 91 per cent experts and 87 per cent security force personnel were of the opinion that widows of violence struggle for livelihood as well as in bringing up their children. Over 81 per cent experts and 100 per cent security personnel said that women and children are impacted by social insecurity. 91 per cent experts (who include security officials) and 100 per cent security force personnel agreed to the statement that extremism leads to difficulty in education of children. The fact that unending violence leaves behind trauma and permanent scar in the minds of women and children was accepted by a slightly less 74.5 per cent experts and 87.5 per cent security force personnel.

Bomb explosions, which include lobbing of grenades as well as planting of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), have been the primary mode of attack by the extremist groups. In recent times, Assam has witnessed serial explosions, orchestrated by the NDFB that killed close to 100 people in four Assam districts including capital Guwahati. According to one count, in five years before the 30 October 2008 explosion, the Ganeshguri flyover
alone—in the proximity of the State Legislative Assembly and the Secretariat in Guwahati—has been the scene of at least 30 explosions. Assam’s hill districts have also witnessed similar attacks. Bomb or IED explosions have taken place regularly in Maniour, although the tactic of insurgents in states like Nagaland, Meghalaya and Tripura has been different. These states have not seen much of explosions, barring few.

**Whether extremist groups resort to random explosions**
*(Common people, Experts & Security force personnel)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Common People</th>
<th>Experts</th>
<th>Security Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><img src="chart1.png" alt="Pie Chart" /> Yes 54% No 46%</td>
<td><img src="chart2.png" alt="Pie Chart" /> Yes 43% No 57%</td>
<td><img src="chart3.png" alt="Pie Chart" /> Yes 63% No 37%</td>
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</table>

1. **Assam:** In response to the question, whether extremist groups have resorted to random explosions in their district/state, 96.5 per cent (193 of the 200 respondents) in the common people category and 100 per cent of both the experts, including the security force personnel, replied in the affirmative.

2. **Manipur:** Explosion of grenades and crude improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have been the primary mode of attack by the extremists in Manipur. Such attacks have frequently taken place in capital Imphal and have killed and injured many. This was apparent in the responses of the common people as a majority 76 per cent (114 out of 150 respondents) maintained that random explosions have been the mode of extremist attack.

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in the state. Similarly 87.8 per cent experts (43 respondents of the 49 who answered the query) which included all the 21 security forces had a similar view point.

3. Meghalaya: On 10 February 2010 a person was wounded when unidentified militants hurled a petrol bomb at the office of a vernacular Khasi newspaper *Nongsain Hima* in Shillong city. The office building, two computer sets and a scanner were damaged in the explosion. This, however, indicated a new trend in extremism in Meghalaya. Explosions of landmines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have not been a primary mode of operation for the extremists in Meghalaya whose modus operandi centred on the objective of extortion. This was apparent in the responses of the common people as a majority 93 per cent (93 out of 100 respondents) maintained that random explosions have not been the mode of extremist attack in the state. Similarly, 86 per cent experts which included security force personnel had a similar view point. The security force personnel, however, differed. Over 84.6 per cent security officials, whose responses were analysed separately, maintained the extremists do resort to random explosions in the state.

4. Nagaland: Explosions have been rarely resorted to by the NSCN factions who primarily depended upon ambush on the security forces in hit and run type of attacks. In an apparent bid to avoid civilian casualties, both NSCN-IM and the NSCN-K have largely refrained from planting explosives in public places and also lobbing grenades on their potential targets. This was apparent in the responses of the common people as a majority 83.8 per cent (124 out of 148 respondents) maintained that random explosions have not been the mode of extremist attack in the state. Similarly 91.7 per cent experts (44 respondents of the 48 who answered the query) which included seven of the eight security forces had a similar view point.

5. Tripura: On 1 October 2008, five low intensity bomb blasts rocked Agartala, state capital of Tripura, injuring 20 people. The blasts occurred at a bus stand and other market

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places including Radha Nagar, Colonel Chamani area, Gul Bazaar and Gol Market.\textsuperscript{106} The ATTF extremists behind the explosions were subsequently captured. However, explosions of landmines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have never been a primary mode of operation for the extremists in Tripura who indulge in hit and run type of ambushes. This was apparent in the responses of the common people as a majority 71 per cent (71 out of 100 respondents) maintained that random explosions have not been the mode of extremist attack in the state. Similarly 95.6 per cent experts which included security forces had a similar view point. Among the security forces alone, 87.5 per cent refuted the assumption that the extremists resort to random explosions in the state.

\textbf{E. On Education and Employment:}

Impact of extremism on the education and employment scene in the Northeast has been significant. Prevalence of conflict situation has affected the normal functioning of educational institutions in the affected areas. Since the 1990s, till police were able to script a success story against the outfits, the extremist domination in the remote parts of Tripura kept teachers and children away from the schools. Fearing the gun-totting extremists, teachers fled from the villages. In 1999, the students of 29 out of 181 middle schools in the tribal dominated areas were unable to write any examination. Tripura which was famous for its early movement for education, the Jana Siksha Andolan, saw almost a generation unable to go to school.\textsuperscript{107} The teachers were also frequently targeted for abduction and killing.

In extremist affected Manipur, \textit{bandhs} (general shutdowns) are a common feature, which affects the educational institutions as well. In 2009, schools and colleges in Imphal valley shut down for four months, as several organisations agitated against the fake encounter killing of a youth. These institutions opened in January 2010 following an agreement

between the state government and the protesting groups.\textsuperscript{108} Another example of intrusion of extremists into educational sphere was the launch of ‘Operation New Kangleipak’ by the extremist outfit KYKL. The outfit maintains that the operation is to cleanse what it called the “rot” in the state’s education system. As part of the operation, it has carried out attacks on teachers and students. The outfit alleged that the teachers and the students are involved in malpractices.\textsuperscript{109} Although with the relative marginalization of ULFA, such impact has lessened in many districts of Assam, the state of affairs in the hill districts affected by peripheral extremist groups remains grim.

Similarly, there exists a direct correlation between the unemployment rate in the Northeast and the growth of extremism. In Manipur, as per available official data for 2004, “a high rate of unemployment exists in Manipur, particularly among the educated youth. There are more than 4 lakh unemployed persons as per the live register of the Employment Exchanges.\textsuperscript{110} A media report in 2009 quoting Chief Minister Okram Ibobi Singh indicated that the number of unemployed youth could be as high as six lakh, a quarter of Manipur’s population.\textsuperscript{111} The same report indicated that in Manipur, the scarcity of employment opportunities is forcing even graduates to opt for a rickshaw puller’s job. As per the census report of 2001, Nagaland has a literacy rate of 67.11 per cent against the national average of 54.16 per cent. However, according to conservative reports, this small state has at least 50,000 educated unemployed youth.\textsuperscript{112} The incidence of unemployment, measured as a percentage of the labour force, is increasing in Assam. Unemployment rates in Assam in 1983 were 2.2 per cent, as compared to 2.0 per cent for the country. By 1999-2000, the country’s unemployment rate had risen marginally to 2.3 per cent, while Assam’s unemployment rate had risen substantially, to 4.6 per cent.\textsuperscript{113} The

\textsuperscript{108} “Manipur schools, colleges to open after four months”, January 8, 2010, http://www.indiaedunews.net/Manipur/Manipur_schools,_colleges_to_open_after_four_months_10181/
\textsuperscript{109} “Manipur rebel leader held in Siliguri”, Telegraph, March 15, 2010.
\textsuperscript{110} “Invest in Manipur: Unemployment”, http://investinmanipur.nic.in/gp_unemp.htm
\textsuperscript{111} “At least 600,000 educated, young people are jobless”, November 24, 2009, http://www.livemint.com/2009/11/24211229/Manipur--8216At-least-600.html
unemployed youth have acted as a fodder for the extremist outfits which have targeted them continuously for recruitment. Underdevelopment and lack of employment opportunities facilitates breeding of militants.

The Assam government has noted that certain areas in the state have contributed the maximum number of youth to the extremist organizations. Accordingly, 1152 underdeveloped villages located in the remote areas in 20 districts have been identified. These villages are located in riverine or remote areas along the inter-state and international borders of Assam and are without basic infrastructure of roads, water supply, electricity etc. There is a feeling of neglect and alienation among the youth of these villages. Therefore, in addition to the counter terrorism measures, the State Government is giving special attention to the development of these remote villages and also employment of the youth of these villages to wean away these youth from joining the militant organizations.114

Respondents in all the categories were asked whether extremism in the state has impacted on the level of education.

**Impact of extremism on the level of education**

(Common people, Experts and Security force personnel)

114 Speech of Tarun Gogoi, Chief Minister of Assam at the Conference of Chief Ministers on Internal Security, New Delhi, August 17, 2009, http://assamgovt.nic.in/speech.asp
1. Assam: 81 per cent of the common people, 78 per cent experts and 76.5 per cent security force personnel replied in the affirmative. The responses were uniform across rural, urban and semi-urban settings.

2. Manipur: 76.7 per cent of the common people and 87.8 per cent experts replied in the affirmative. The responses were uniform across rural, urban and semi-urban settings. Among the experts’ category, of which the security force personnel were a part, 20 of the 21 participants opined in the affirmative.

3. Meghalaya: Only 34 per cent each in the common people and experts category replied in the affirmative. The percentage of respondents confirming the impact of extremism on education was even lesser among the security forces alone. A little over 15 per cent in this category said that such an impact has been noticed.

4. Nagaland: Whereas 64.3 per cent of the common people replied in the negative, 66 per cent experts too toed a similar line. The responses were uniform across rural, urban and semi-urban settings. Among the experts’ category of which the security force personnel were a part, six of the eight participants opined in the negative.

5. Tripura: 71 per cent of the common people and 100 per cent security force personnel replied in the affirmative. Among the experts’ category of which the security force personnel were a part, opinion was equally divided. Fifty per cent each of the respondents replied for and against the assumption.

These respondents were asked to register their views on four categories of probable impact of extremism on education in the state.
Types of Impact on education  
(Common people, Experts and Security force personnel)

1. Assam: Over 80 per cent common people and 61.5 per cent experts believed that extremism has led to a high dropout rate among the students. In comparison, only 46.2 per cent of the personnel security force personnel (who are part of the people interviewed in the expert category) supported this view. Over 56 per cent common people said that extremism has resulted in teachers’ absenteeism. However, only 46.2 per cent of the experts including the security force personnel category supported this view. 45.7 per cent of the common people said that normal school functioning has been affected as security forces have occupied the school buildings. Fifty-nine per cent of the experts and 69.2 per cent security force personnel (calculated separately from among the experts), however, maintained that normal school functioning has been affected as security forces have occupied the school buildings.

2. Manipur: Only 20 per cent common people respondents and 36.4 per cent experts believed that extremism has led to teachers’ absenteeism. The opinion was supported by
40 per cent respondents in the security force personnel category alone (who are part of the people interviewed in the expert category). Similarly, only 39.1 per cent common people and 41.9 per cent experts said that extremism has resulted in a high drop out rate in the state. Over 36 per cent security forces supported this point of view. While only 32.2 per cent common people said schools have indeed been shut down after being targeted by the extremists, more than 86 per cent experts indicated that this indeed has happened. This was supported by 80 per cent security force personnel. More than 66 per cent common people, however, agreed that schools in Manipur have been closed after being occupied by the security forces. This was supported by more than 68 per cent experts. Only 45 per cent security forces agreed with the claim.

3. Meghalaya: Close to 53 per cent experts and 62 per cent common people believed that extremism has led to teachers’ absenteeism. The opinion was supported by both the respondents in the security force personnel category, whose responses were analysed separately. Over 94 per cent experts and 100 per cent common people said that extremism has resulted in a high drop out rate in the state. The security forces supported this point of view. Nearly 53 per cent common people and 50 per cent experts said that normal school functioning has been affected as security forces have occupied the school buildings.

4. Nagaland: High drop out rate among the students was categorised as the most severe impact of extremism on the education sector. Among the common people, 84.6 per cent said that the high drop out rate is a result of the extremism-induced volatile situation in the state. While 77.8 per cent experts supported such an assertion, only 50 per cent security force personnel replied in the affirmative. Whereas close to 55 per cent common people and 50 per cent security forces termed teachers’ absenteeism as a direct fallout of prevalent extremism, it was supported by a minority 33.3 per cent experts. The pattern of responses indicated marginal impact of extremism on the educational sector.

5. Tripura: Over 88 per cent experts and 100 per cent common people believed that extremism has led to teachers’ absenteeism. The opinion was supported by over 87 per
cent respondents in the security force personnel category alone. Over 66 per cent common people and 70 per cent experts said that extremism has resulted in a high drop out rate in the state. Over 87 per cent security personnel supported this point of view. A very high 88 per cent common people and lesser 74 per cent experts said that extremism has led to schools being shut down. A high 85.9 per cent common people said that normal school functioning has been affected as security forces have occupied the school buildings. This view found support only among 50 per cent of the experts in which category security force personnel were included. Over 62 per cent security personnel did not agree with the presumption that schools have been shut as these have been made into temporary camps by the security forces.

Impact on employment sector (Common people and experts)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Common People</th>
<th>Experts</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A</strong></td>
<td><strong>B</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32.8%</td>
<td>42.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51.2%</td>
<td>65.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54.8%</td>
<td>65.8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>20.9%</td>
<td>13%</td>
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A = Fear of extremism has led to job losses;
B = Extremism in rural areas has led the youths migrate to urban areas;
C = Rise in the demand for security guards’ positions;
D = There is no impact

1. Assam: Expressing their opinion on the impact of extremism on the employment sector, 93 per cent of the 200 respondents in the common people category, 94 per cent in the experts’ category (that includes the security force personnel) and 88.2 per cent of the security force personnel (calculated separately from among the experts) were categorical that such an impact exists. Over 73 per cent common people observed that fear of
extremism has led to job losses. Experts were comparatively less categorical with 60 per cent supporting this view. A little over 47 per cent of the security force personnel believed the statement to be true. Sixty per cent common people, 72 per cent experts and 70.6 per cent security force personnel said that extremism in rural areas has led to migration of youths to the urban areas. Similarly, 72 per cent each in common people and experts’ categories said that there has been a rise in the demand for security guards’ positions. Among the security force personnel, 64.7 per cent supported this view.

2. Manipur: 80.7 per cent of the 150 respondents in the common people category, 95.7 per cent in the experts’ category (that includes the security force personnel) and 100 per cent of the security force personnel (calculated separately from among the experts) were categorical that such an impact exists. Interestingly, however, only 20.7 per cent of the common people observed that fear of extremism have led to job losses. Experts were comparatively more emphatic with 44.7 per cent supporting this view. While 63.8 per cent experts and 71.4 per cent security force personnel said that extremism in rural areas has led to migration of youths to the urban areas, only 50.3 per cent common people subscribed to this assumption. A majority 80.9 per cent experts and 85.7 per cent security force personnel, however, felt that there is indeed a rising demand for security guards’ position.

3. Meghalaya: 74 per cent of the 100 respondents in the common people category, 84 per cent in the experts’ category and 69.2 per cent of the security force personnel (calculated separately from among the experts) were categorical that such an impact exists. While 68 per cent experts and 65 per cent common people said that extremism in rural areas has led to migration of youths to the urban areas, a higher percentage (76.9 per cent) among the security forces subscribed to this assumption. Incidents of extremism/terrorism and the lack of confidence in normal policing activities have led the urban population worldwide to depend on private security. Sixty per cent experts and 56 per cent common people maintained that extremism has led to a demand for security guards’ position. Over 69 per cent security force personnel confirmed this trend.
4. Nagaland: Respondents in all categories indicated that extremism has only marginal impact on the employment sector. A little over 16 per cent common people, 12.5 per cent each among the civilian experts and the security force personnel, acknowledged such an impact. Demand for security guards’ position, a direct corollary of an atmosphere of fear, appeared to be the only direct impact of extremism on the employment scene in Nagaland. More than 58 per cent common people (87 respondents), 66 per cent experts and 50 per cent security force personnel said that there has been a rise in demand for security guards’ positions. However, majority of the respondents did not correlate the impact of extremism either with job losses or migration of rural youth to urban areas. Minority 35.6 per cent common people, 28 per cent experts and 25 per cent security force personnel (calculated separately from among the experts) observed that fear of extremism have led to job losses.

5. Tripura: Expressing their opinion on the impact of extremism on the employment sector, 64 per cent of the 100 respondents in the common people category, 74 per cent in the experts’ category and 100 per cent of the security force personnel were categorical that such an impact exists. Interestingly, however, only nine per cent of the common people observed that fear of extremism have led to job losses. Experts were comparatively more emphatic, with 50 per cent supporting this view. A little over 37 per cent of the security force personnel believed the statement to be true. While 88 per cent experts and 100 per cent security force personnel said that extremism in rural areas has led to migration of youths to the urban areas, only 51 per cent common people subscribed to this assumption.

F. On Politics and Government:

“All political parties and extremist groups are linked”, said a prominent youth leader in Assam during an interview. Similarly in Manipur, Moirangthem Rajen, Additional Superintendent of Police in Imphal East district commented during the survey, “Extremist groups have directly or indirectly influenced almost every politician in the state. There

115 Interview with Dilip Patgiri, Member (AJYCP), held at Guwahati on June 22, 2009.
seems to be a nexus between extremists and some of the politicians in the state. Politicians may win or lose elections depending on favour or disfavour of particular extremist groups.” There is a long list of politicians, including Chief Ministers, who have been accused of buying peace with the extremists. In the late 1980s, the then Manipur Governor, General K.V. Krishna Rao, accused then Chief Minister Rishang Keishing of contributing Rs. 30 lakhs to the coffers of the then undivided National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN). Keishing’s linkages with the Naga militants found mention in another state Governor's report, when Lieutenant General V.K. Nayyar accused him as well as another senior state politician, R.K. Dorendro, of financing the NSCN. Keishing, during another stint as Chief Minister in the mid 1990s, was accused of supplying uniforms to the Isak-Muivah faction of the NSCN (NSCN-IM).\textsuperscript{116}

In Assam, in the mid 1980s and later years, the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) was widely believed to have courted the ULFA, which ran a parallel government, forcing the Government in New Delhi to impose President’s rule in Assam (November 1990). Even when the outfit was forced out of the state into Bangladesh, it remained politically significant in its strongholds and was a key actor during elections. According to analysts, even today, in the eastern Assam districts, it was almost impossible for any candidate to secure victory without the outfit’s blessings. Elaborating this, former ULFA leader Prabal Neog said, “The nexus is at two levels. One at the party-to-party level and the other is at the leader-to-leader level. The party-to-party nexus is only during certain periods such as during elections or on some issues. It is not very much common. The leader-to-leader level of nexus is quite common. Many political party leaders have links with the extremist groups or its leaders.”\textsuperscript{117} A police officer, however, differed. He said, “It is low. The nexus is in the level of ideas and opportunities. This is neither in the individual level nor in the party level.”\textsuperscript{118}

\textsuperscript{117} Interview with Prabal Neog, held at Tinsukia, November 7, 2009.
\textsuperscript{118} Interview with B J Mahanta, IGP (Law and Order), Assam, conducted on 18 October 2009.
In the hill districts of southern Assam such as Karbi Anglong and North Cachar Hills, the UPDS/KLNLF and DHD/BW respectively have exercised significant influence over local politics and government, which effectively means retreat or below normal functioning of the government agencies. The dominance of such fringe outfits has often suspended normal running of transport including trains through the area. It also managed to bring national infrastructural projects either to a halt or have slowed them down considerably. In the words of the Chief Minister, in view of the violent activities of the DHD (J) or Black Widows, “works of four laning of NH-53 taken up by the National Highway Authority of India has not progressed. Similarly, the progress of works of gauge conversion of the railways is also slow even though all the necessary security has been provided by the Government.”

The nexus between politicians and the extremists was a “marriage of convenience”, said IGP Pallab Bhattacharya. There have been instances when politicians have been killed by the extremists over differences. In the N C Hills district, politicians of the ruling Congress Party Purnendu Langthasa and his colleague Nindu Langthasa were killed by DHD militants while negotiating to bring down the demanded ransom amount. On 1 June 2009, the MHA assigned the newly constituted National Investigative Agency (NIA) the task of determining the extent of politician-militant nexus in the N C hills district. The decision was taken after chief executive member (CEM) of North Cachar Hills Autonomous Council (NCHAC) Mohet Hojai and a state government official were arrested on 30 May 2009 on charges of their alleged involvement in cases of funding a militant outfit to procure arms.

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119 Speech of Tarun Gogoi, Chief Minister of Assam at the Conference of Chief Ministers on Internal Security, New Delhi, August 17, 2009, http://assamgovt.nic.in/speech.asp
120 Interview with Pallab Bhattacharya, Inspector General of Police, Central Western Range, Assam, Interview held on 14 November 2009 at Guwahati.
In Nagaland, where the extremists have been able to set up a parallel regime, it becomes almost impossible to imagine the state government being run without some level of nexus with the extremist outfits. In the absence if it, the politicians became targets of the outfits. Former Chief Minister S C Jamir, the author of the controversial ‘Bedrock of Naga society’,\(^{123}\) which contested the Naga homeland claims of the NSCN-IM was attacked on multiple occasions by the outfit.\(^{124}\) The current Democratic Alliance of Nagaland (DAN) coalition government in Nagaland under Chief Minister Neiphieu Rio is alleged to have close links with the NSCN-IM. On many occasions, the Chief Minister's statements appear to be endorsements of the outfit’s activities and demands.

Extremism in Tripura– with its disproportionate emphasis on criminal activities such as abduction and extortion – was substantially supported and sustained by political patronage. It was of common belief that the ATTF was courted by the Left parties in the state with an objective of neutralising the NLFT which was allegedly in nexus with the Congress party. Among the tribal parties, the Indigenous Nationalist Party of Tripura (INPT) was known to be soft towards the NLFT.

It was necessary, thus, to ascertain the level of impact of extremism on politics in the region. The respondents in the common people category were asked four questions in this regard. Their response confirmed the hypotheses not only about the impact of extremism over politics, but also the illicit nexus between the two.

\(^{123}\) The ‘Bedrock of Naga Society’, a 2003 release of the Nagaland Pradesh Congress Committee argues that “the Nagaland state, whose formation was paved by the 16-point agreement, is the bedrock of Naga society.” Sovereignty is, therefore, “a myth” and the need for unification of Naga areas would not hold water either. For a text of ‘Bedrock of Naga Society’ see http://www.nenanews.com/ng10.htm

\(^{124}\) In one such attack on 29 November 1999, Jamir's seven-vehicle convoy came under heavy firing at a place 35 kilometres from capital Kohima. Jamir escaped unhurt, but two of his 14 security guards were killed in the ambush. Jamir later told, “I have no doubt about that. NSCN(I-M) extremists have been trying to eliminate me for several years. This time they had made massive preparations. They set off a series of explosions and fired at my convoy from three sides. They were armed with automatic weapons. They had a camp on top of the hill, below which the ambush was made.” Prior to that the outfit had carried out three attacks on Jamir. See Kalyan Chaudhuri, “In no mood for peace”, *Frontline*, vol. 16, no. 27, December 25 1999 – January 07, 2000.
Is there any impact of extremism on politics in your state?
(Common people and Experts)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Common People</th>
<th>Experts</th>
<th>Security Force</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><img src="chart1.png" alt="Pie Chart" /></td>
<td><img src="chart2.png" alt="Pie Chart" /></td>
<td><img src="chart3.png" alt="Pie Chart" /></td>
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</table>

1. **Assam**: Over 86 per cent respondents in the common people category, 92 per cent experts (including security personnel) and 88.2 per cent security force personnel (calculated separately from among the experts interviewed) replied in the affirmative to the question whether there is an impact of extremism on politics in the state. Patterns of responses were uniform across rural, semi-urban as well as urban settings.

2. **Manipur**: More than 88 per cent respondents (133 respondents) in the common people category replied in the affirmative. This was supported by 93.8 per cent of the 48 experts who answered the query. Among the security personnel, 90 per cent of the 20 who responded to the question, replied in the affirmative.

3. **Meghalaya**: Sixty-three respondents out of 100 common people who participated in the survey confirmed the impact of extremism on politics in the state. Seventy-four per cent experts and marginally less 69 per cent security forces too agreed with this proposition.

4. **Nagaland**: No ambiguity was recorded in the opinion of either the common people or the experts regarding the impact of extremism on politics in the state. 87 per cent
respondents (127 respondents) in the common people category replied in the affirmative. This was supported by 97.9 per cent of the 47 experts who answered the query. Among the security personnel, 100 cent of the eight respondents, replied in the affirmative.

5. Tripura: Opinion was divided among the common people regarding the impact of extremism on politics in the state. While half of the respondents (50 respondents) in the common people category replied in the affirmative to the question whether there is an impact of extremism on politics in the state, another half did not believe so. Among the experts (including security personnel), however, more than 65 per cent thought that extremism has an impact on politics. Among the security personnel alone, however, only 37.5 per cent confirmed the impact, while 25 per cent said it does not exist.

The survey elicited responses from the participants from both categories if nexus between the politicians and the extremists is of common occurrence in the Northeast.

**Is it common to find a nexus between politicians and extremists in your state?**

(Common people, Experts and Security force personnel)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Common People</th>
<th>Experts</th>
<th>Security Force</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can't say</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Assam: Out of the 200 participants in the common people category, 158 said ‘Yes’, 31 replied in the negative and 11 opted for the ‘Cannot Say’ option. Among the experts, 38
out of 50 replied in the affirmative. The security force personnel from among the experts were, however, divided in their response. The statement was supported by only 52.9 per cent of the security force personnel.

2. Manipur: Of the 150 participants in the common people category, an overwhelming 86 per cent (129 respondents) replied in the affirmative. The experts, however, were comparatively less categorical as 71.7 per cent. Surprisingly, among the security force personnel, only 68.4 per cent endorsed such a view point. The response indicated that politician-extremist nexus in the state is more common in popular belief, compared to the perception among the experts.

3. Meghalaya: Out of the 100 participants in the common people category, 72 said ‘Yes’, 18 replied in the negative and 10 opted for the ‘Cannot Say’ option. Twenty-seven of the participants who said ‘Yes’ were from the rural areas and the rest 45 from urban/semi-urban areas. Among the experts, only 38 out of 50 replied in the affirmative and 10 in the negative. Two experts chose the ‘Cannot Say’ option. Eleven of the 13 security force personnel (84.6 per cent) from among the experts confirmed the nexus between the politicians and the extremists. Only two security force personnel opposed it. The response indicated that politician-extremist nexus in Meghalaya is rather common.

4. Nagaland: Out of the 139 participants in the common people category who answered the query, an overwhelming 92.1 per cent (128 respondents) replied in the affirmative. While eight respondents replied in the negative, only three opted for the ‘Cannot Say’ option. The experts appeared to be even more categorical in confirming the existence of politician-extremist nexus. Close to 94 per cent of the 49 experts who answered the question confirmed this trend. Among the security force personnel, seven of the eight respondents endorsed such a view point.

5. Tripura: Out of the 100 participants in the common people category, 49 said ‘Yes’, 41 replied in the negative and 10 opted for the ‘Cannot Say’ option. Among the experts, only
17 out of 50 replied in the affirmative and 24 in the negative. The response indicated that politician-extremist nexus in the state is rather uncommon.

**Whether politicians/ political parties take help of extremists during elections?**  
(Common people, Experts and Security force personnel)

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<th></th>
<th>Common People</th>
<th>Experts</th>
<th>Security Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can't say</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. **Assam:** The respondents were unequivocal in stating that the politicians/political parties take the help of extremist groups during elections to influence voting. Nearly 90 per cent in both the common people and experts’ category answered in the affirmative. A shade less 82.4 per cent security force personnel supported the statement. This is an indication of the popular perception of the politicians in the state and does not augur well for political activity in the state. This further indicates, the electoral processes are hardly perceived to be neutral and free from the influence of the extremists.

2. **Manipur:** Ninety-two per cent of the 150 common people respondents said that politicians/political parties take the help of extremists during elections to influence voting. Of the 44 experts who answered the query, 95.5 per cent said that the politicians/political parties take the help of the extremists. The crucial role played by the extremists in Manipur elections is a clear pointer at the influence they enjoy in the conduct of politics and governance in the state.
3. Meghalaya: Meghalaya Director General of Police S B Kakaty said, “Individual politicians may have links with a particular extremist (group) for the purpose of his own safety but the question of political patronage cannot be generalised.”125 Similarly, former Meghalaya Home Minister R G Lyngdoh said, “This nexus is more in terms of individuals rather than any political party.”126 The respondents were unequivocal in stating that the politicians/political parties take the help of extremist groups to influence voting. A majority 63 per cent common people and 88 per cent experts answered in the affirmative. Significantly, the 44 experts who confirmed the trend included all the 13 security officials who participated in the survey. This further underlined that in politically unstable Meghalaya, the extremists have played a crucial role in garnering support for some of the politicians.

4. Nagaland: More than 94 per cent of the 147 respondents said that they believe such phenomenon is a reality. Both the experts and the security force personnel, too endorsed the belief of the common people. Of the 49 experts who answered the query, 47 said that the politicians/ political parties take the help of the extremists. All eight security forces who answered the query endorsed the phenomenon. Quite naturally, the crucial role played by the extremists in Nagaland elections translates to a submission by the political class to the extremist activities at a later stage.

5. Tripura: The respondents were unequivocal in stating that the politicians/political parties take the help of extremist groups to influence voting. A majority 64 per cent common people and more than 77 per cent experts answered in the affirmative.

Is violence a stepping stone to politics? It is certainly the case in Mizoram, where the former guerrillas of the Mizo National Front (MNF) have successfully transformed themselves into politicians. In Manipur, founder chairman of PLA Nameirakpam Biseshwar after being arrested from Tekcham in Thoubal district in 1980 went on to

125 Interview with S B Kakaty, Director General of Police, Meghalaya, held at Shillong on October 14, 2009
126 Interview with R.G. Lyngdoh, Former Home Minister, Government of Meghalaya, held at Shillong on November 25, 2009
contest elections from jail and won from the Singjamei legislative Assembly constituency.\(^{127}\) The leaders of the Assam Agitation formed the AGP which became the ruling party in the state. The transformation of student or youth leaders into politicians is common. However, such a trend has been rather infrequent among the extremists. Barring the leaders of the Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT) who—following the signing of the tripartite Bodo Accord in February 10, 2003\(^{128}\)—formed a political party which is in charge of the Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC)\(^ {129}\), hardly any extremist leader has ever joined the political turf in Assam. Possibly, the unresolved status of extremist movements in the state is a reason for the absence of such a trend.

**Whether extremists use armed movement as a stepping stone to mainstream politics?**

(Common people, Experts and Security force personnel)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Common People</th>
<th>Experts</th>
<th>Security Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(\text{Yes}) 38% (\text{No}) 62% (\text{Can't say}) 0%</td>
<td>(\text{Yes}) 31% (\text{No}) 69% (\text{Can't say}) 0%</td>
<td>(\text{Yes}) 40% (\text{No}) 60% (\text{Can't say}) 0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. **Assam:** Over 63 per cent (127 respondents) of the common people appeared to believe that the ultimate goal of the extremist leaders is to join politics, and armed movement is an instrument for achieving such an objective. Such a belief was prevalent more in the

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\(^{127}\) “How to defeat global strategic irregular warfare”, http://www.archive.org/stream/HowToDefeatGlobalStrategicIrregularWarfare/HowToDefeatGlobalStrategicIrregularWarfare_djvu.txt

\(^{128}\) For the text of the Memorandum of Settlement on Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC), see http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/assam/documents/papers/memorandum_feb02.htm

\(^{129}\) Details regarding the BTC can be found at its website http://www.bodolandcouncil.org/
urban and semi-urban settings compared to the rural areas. Out of the 70 people who replied in the negative, 33 were from the rural areas. The experts, however, were more categorical. As many as 80 per cent of this category said the ultimate goal of extremists is a place in the state politics. Among the security force personnel, 76.5 per cent supported the view.

2. Manipur: Over 60 per cent (91 respondents) of the common people said that politics is the ultimate goal of the extremist leaders. The experts appeared to be little less convinced about the political objectives of the extremists. Of the 39 experts who answered the query, 22 believed that extremists will ultimately join politics. Sixteen security force personnel answered the query and out of them nine said the extremists could be pursuing a political career.

3. Meghalaya: The respondents in all the categories suspected that like other states of the Northeast, extremists in Meghalaya are using violence only as a stepping stone to politics. While the belief was rather low (54 per cent) among the common people, 64 per cent experts (32 respondents) confirmed this. Among 13 security force personnel who participated in the survey as part of the experts’ category, seven confirmed this while six others replied in the negative.

4. Nagaland: No insurgent leader has yet joined politics in the state, opinions among the common people were clearly divided on the political aspirations of the extremist leaders. While 68 of the 147 respondents said that extremists do use their career in extremism as a stepping stone to politics, 69 respondents replied in negative. Among the experts, 62.5 per cent said that political positions are not an objective of the extremist leaders. Only 37.5 per cent answered in the opposite.

5. Tripura: Sixty-four per cent (64 respondents) of the common people appeared to believe that the ultimate goal of the extremist leaders is to join politics, and armed movement is an instrument for achieving such an objective. Such a belief was prevalent across rural, urban and semi-urban settings. The experts too had a similar opinion. Close
to 70 per cent respondents in this category which included security personnel said the ultimate goal of the extremists is a place in state politics.

**G. On Economy & Development:**

The linkages between insurgency, or indeed any kind of civil unrest, and its adverse impact on economic development are generally taken for granted and have almost become a given in the conflict theatres of the country. In Manipur, speaking on 23 April 2006, Manipur Chief Minister Okram Ibobi Singh said, “All development projects have been stalled for interference by militant outfits. The construction of a flyover in Imphal is delayed because the militant outfits are demanding a certain percentage of the project fund. The construction of the Assembly complex has also been similarly stalled. Militants are extorting money from each and ever one, including barbers, small-time traders and low-ranking Government employees. This has become unbearable for the people. Militant groups have sprung up as cooperative societies in Manipur.”

Similarly in Meghalaya, replying to a question in the State Legislative Assembly on 26 March 2001 on the impact of extremism on the economy of the state, the then Finance Minister A H Scott Lyngdoh said that “Extremist activities have resulted in the flight of capital and discouraged investors from investment in the state.”

Prevalence of extremism made night travel on national highway number 44 connecting Tripura with Assam and beyond difficult. Since 1993, vehicles were not allowed to ply without security escorts on 70 kilometres of this highway between Chakmaghat in West district and Manu in Dhalai district due to extremist activities. The delay and difficulty in travelling not only caused immense difficulty to passenger traffic, but caused enormous delays in supply of essential goods to the state. Only in September 2009, with the security situation improving and extremism showing signs of abating, the Tripura

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Government scrapped the convoy escort system along the 70 kilometre stretch. The extremists also caused delay to the railway projects in Tripura. In the past, both the NLFT and the ATTF used to attack the workers employed in the laying of railway tracks. However, such attacks have been reduced after police started providing security to such projects. In February 2007, State Transport Minister Manik Dey said that the State government has spent Rupees 40 crores for providing necessary security to railway line construction workers from Manu to Agartala.

According to the Assam Human Development Report 2003, prepared by the Planning and Development Department, Government of Assam, this situation has been further exacerbated by “two issues that have certainly been exceptional in the duration of their existence, the intensity of their occurrence and the extent of their impact.” One of these, not particularly exceptional to Assam, for the complaint is made routinely by most of the states, is the “severe fiscal stress, ... the mismatch between the resources needed to provide basic services, maintain assets, promote growth and development and create infrastructure and the resources available to the State.” An even more important challenge, given a higher priority in the Report than the “severe fiscal stress”, is posed by “decades of unrest, agitation, and at a later state, insurgency. Inequities, lack of development, perceived discrimination and lack of opportunities for employment have contributed to discord and strife. Such situations are rarely, if ever, conducive to development.”

No major private investment has come to Nagaland in recent years, in spite of attempts by the state government to project its potential in various forums. The Government of India’s proposal to set up two Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in the state is yet to

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take off. And for this state of stagnancy in the economic sector, the attitude of the extremist outfit NSCN-IM is primarily to be blamed. The NSCN-IM insists that economic development of Nagaland, before its political issues are settled, is nothing but exploitation and hence should be resisted. It said in a statement in 2007, “Politics and economics are two subjects very dear to the Nagas and these two cannot be separated. Political development when not moving ahead at the expected speed should not be preceded by exploitation of the mineral resources under the pretext of economic development.”

Impact on economy and development (Experts and Security force personnel)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experts</th>
<th>Security force</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>91.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Negative</td>
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<tr>
<td>25%</td>
<td>75%</td>
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1. Assam: There was no ambiguity in the response of the experts and the security force personnel as all the respondents in both categories said that the impact has been negative. Explaining their response, 84 per cent experts (includes security personnel) and 82.4 per cent security force personnel (calculated separately from among the security personnel included under the experts category) said that the extremist groups have exploited local resources to generate funds and buy weapons. Further, 90 per cent of the experts and 88.2 per cent security force personnel said extremism has retarded development initiatives and

activities in backward regions. A larger 84 per cent experts and 100 per cent security force personnel supported the assumption that extremism has reduced the motivation of agencies/officials towards public service on ground of security.

2. Manipur: Over 93 per cent (44 respondents) experts said that the impact has been negative. Explaining their response, 84.1 per cent experts said that the extremist groups have exploited local resources to generate funds and buy weapons. Further, 95.5 per cent of the experts said extremism has retarded development initiatives and activities in backward regions. Similarly, 95.5 per cent experts supported the assumption that extremism has reduced the motivation of agencies/officials towards public service on ground of security.

3. Meghalaya: 94 per cent experts and 92 per cent security force personnel said that the impact has been negative. These experts and security force personnel were then asked to explain the negative impact of extremism on economy and development. Explaining their response, 68.1 per cent experts and 66.7 per cent security force personnel said that the extremist groups have exploited local resources to generate funds and buy weapons. Further, 87.2 per cent of the experts and 91.7 per cent security force personnel said extremism has retarded development initiatives and activities in backward regions. While 53.2 per cent experts disagreed with the proposition that extremism has reduced the motivation of agencies/officials towards public service on ground of security, 58.3 per cent security force personnel supported the assumption.

4. Nagaland: Eighty per cent experts, who includes security personnel and 87.5 per cent security officials said that the impact has been negative. Explaining their response, 59.1 per cent experts said that the extremist groups have exploited local resources to generate funds and buy weapons. Further, 93.2 per cent of the experts and 100 per cent security force personnel said extremism has retarded development initiatives and activities in backward regions. Similarly, 95.5 per cent experts and 100 per cent security force personnel supported the assumption that extremism has reduced the motivation of agencies/officials towards public service on ground of security.
5. **Tripura**: 74 per cent experts and 100 per cent security forces said that the impact has been negative. Explaining their response, 73 per cent experts and 87.5 per cent security force personnel said that the extremist groups have exploited local resources to generate funds and buy weapons. Further, 86.5 per cent of the experts and 100 per cent security force personnel said extremism has retarded development initiatives and activities in backward regions. A lesser 67.6 per cent experts and 75 per cent security force personnel supported the assumption that extremism has reduced the motivation of agencies/officials towards public service on ground of security.

Extremism and steps on part of the state to counter it has led to an atmosphere of insecurity, chaos and uncertainty. *Bandh* called by the extremists, and security force operations paralyses normal civilian life in the affected areas. It affects, as indicated by the earlier responses, movement of civilians. It also affects the movement of goods. The locational disadvantage of the Northeast, joined with mainland India by the tenuous Siliguri corridor, further complicates the problem of transport of essential commodities, thereby adding to their already exorbitant costs. Situation in states in Manipur is even worse. The state caught between raging extremism and hostile geography is often held to ransom by obscure groups. And for years, a secure supply line has not been put in place for the state. As a result, for several days every year, extremists operating in the valley areas of the state and also in neighbouring Nagaland prevent the trucks carrying essential commodities from reaching Imphal.
## Impact on availability of essential commodities (Experts and Security force personnel)

<table>
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<th>Experts</th>
<th></th>
<th>security force personnel</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A</strong></td>
<td>74%</td>
<td><strong>A</strong></td>
<td>75.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B</strong></td>
<td>58.8%</td>
<td></td>
<td>58%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C</strong></td>
<td>61.6%</td>
<td></td>
<td>55.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>D</strong></td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td></td>
<td>15.8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A = Rise in the price of essential commodities  
B = Supply of essential commodity due to bandhs announced by extremists  
C = Shops remain closed due to extortion demands by the extremist  
D = There is no impact

### 1. Assam:
Ninety-four per cent of experts were of the opinion that extremism has an impact on the availability of essential commodities. Explaining their response further, 76 per cent experts and 82.4 per cent security force personnel said that extremism has an adverse impact on the price of such commodities. Eighty-two per cent experts and 88.2 per cent security force personnel said essential commodities get into short supply mode due to the bandhs called by the extremists. Sixty-four per cent experts and 58.8 per cent security force personnel said that shops and other business establishments remain shut due to the extortion demands by the extremists.

### 2. Manipur:
The entire lot of 49 experts who answered the query regarding the impact of extremism on the availability of essential commodities in Manipur said that such an impact is felt regularly. 91.8 per cent experts and 95.2 per cent security force personnel felt that extremism has an adverse impact on the price of such commodities. Similarly,
95.9 per cent experts and 95.2 per cent security force personnel said essential commodities get into short supply mode due to the bandhs called by the extremists. 93.9 per cent experts and 95.2 per cent security force personnel said that shops and other business establishments remain shut due to the extortion demands by the extremists.

3. Meghalaya: Over 63 per cent experts said that extremism impacts on the availability of essential commodities in Meghalaya in some manner. However, only 50 per cent experts supported the proposition that extremism has an adverse impact on the price of essential commodities. Among the security officials, over 61 per cent were of the opinion that the prices of essential commodities are adversely affected. A police official maintained that businessmen who pay extortion money to the extremists make it up by charging extra from the common buyers. This resulted in the rise of prices of essential commodities.137 While 56 per cent experts (28 respondents) said that extremism results in the short supply of essential commodities due to bandhs called by the extremist groups, over 69 per cent security force personnel supported this. Over 61 per cent security officials said that shops do shut down due to extortion demands of the extremists.

4. Nagaland: Forty-seven of the 50 experts who answered the query regarding the impact of extremism on the availability of essential commodities in Nagaland said that such an impact is felt regularly. Eighty-four per cent experts and 75 per cent security force personnel felt that extremism has an adverse impact on the price of such commodities. Bandhs called by the extremists is not a common phenomenon in Nagaland. This was reflected in the answer provided by majority of the experts. Only 22 per cent experts and 25 per cent security force personnel said essential commodities get into short supply mode due to the bandhs called by the extremists. Sixty-two per cent experts and 62.5 per cent security force personnel said that shops and other business establishments remain shut due to the extortion demands by the extremists.

5. Tripura: While over 71 per cent experts and 62 per cent security force personnel were of the opinion that extremism has an impact on the availability of essential commodities

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137 Interview with Claudia Anne Lyngwa, Superintendent of Police, East Khasi Hills, at Shillong.
in the state, varied opinions were expressed on the nitty-gritty of such impact. Sixty-eight per cent experts and 62.5 per cent security force personnel felt that extremism has an adverse impact on the price of such commodities. However, only 38 per cent experts and 12.5 per cent security force personnel said essential commodities get into short supply mode due to the bandhs called by the extremists. Minority 46 per cent experts said that shops and other business establishments remain shut due to the extortion demands by the extremists.

**Impact on private economic investment (Experts and Security force personnel)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experts</th>
<th>security force personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A</strong> 93.6%</td>
<td>94.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B</strong> 88.4%</td>
<td>90.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C</strong> 63.1%</td>
<td>67.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>D</strong> 85.5%</td>
<td>92.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A = Investors are afraid of investing in the state  
B = Extremists try to extort money from the business houses  
C = Frequent attacks have taken place on business establishment  
D = Extremists have abducted/ killed businessmen and/ or their associates

1. **Assam**: For a number of years, Assam’s economy suffered due to complete lack of private economic investment in the state and extremism had a major role behind such a scenario. Extremists, in their areas of dominance, extorted the business houses and when the demanded sum was not paid, abducted and killed persons associated with those
As a result, although consumerism and real sector boom became apparent in cities like Guwahati in the beginning of the 21st century, the state continued to miss any worthwhile job creating investment. Responding to queries on the impact of extremism on private economic investment, 96 per cent experts and 94.1 per cent security force personnel said that the investors are afraid of investing in the state. Ninety per cent experts and 88.2 per cent security force personnel also said that the extremists try to extort money from the business houses. 92 per cent experts and 88.2 per cent security force personnel confirmed that extremists have abducted or killed businessmen and their associates on a number of occasions.

2. Manipur: All the 47 experts who responded to the query said that the investors are afraid of investing in the state. 97.9 per cent experts and 100 per cent security force personnel also said that the extremists try to extort money from the business houses. Similarly, 95.7 per cent experts and 100 per cent security forces (calculated separately) confirmed that frequent attacks have taken place on business establishments. Another 95.7 per cent experts and 100 per cent security force personnel confirmed the abduction or killing of businessmen and their associates by the extremists.

3. Meghalaya: Meghalaya is rich in mineral deposits and raw materials, which ideally should be an attraction for investors planning to set up industries in the state. However, the atmosphere of insecurity produced a hostile environment for private investment. Former Meghalaya Home Minister R G Lungdoh added, “Entrepreneurs with the potential to create employment opportunities curtail their growth in order not to attract

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138 For example, on 9 May 1990, ULFA cadres killed Surendra Paul, chief of the Kolkata-based Apeejay Group and a leading industrialist of the country at Doom Dooma in Tinsukia district. He was targeted while on a visit to the tea estates of Assam Frontier Tea, a Group company. Earlier, on 15 October 1988, Giridharlal Harlalka, former president of Kamrup Chamber of Commerce was assassinated by ULFA cadres in Guwahati. See http://cdpsindia.org/assam_incident.asp

139 A 2002 survey by Federation of North East Industries and Commerce (FINER) on Guwahati's spending habits had the following findings. (i) A 500 per cent jump in sales of refrigerators, colour TVs and washing machines in the past five years; (ii) Over 700 new multi-storeyed apartment buildings constructed in the past three years; (iii) Over 80 new restaurants opened in the past two years. Guwahatians spend over Rs 1.5 crore a month in eating out; and (iv) 2,000 new vehicles arrive on the city's roads every month. See Nitin A. Gokhale, “Shine On, Crazy Diamond”, Outlook, February 11, 2002, http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?214525
Responding to queries on the impact of extremism on private economic investment, 94 per cent experts and 92.3 per cent security force personnel said that the investors are afraid of investing in the state. Ninety-eight per cent experts also said that the extremists try to extort money from the business houses.

4. Nagaland: 96 per cent of the 50 experts including all the eight security force personnel said that the investors are afraid of investing in the state. Another 96 per cent experts and 100 per cent security force personnel also said that the extremists try to extort money from the business houses. Similarly, a lesser 64 per cent experts and 75 per cent security forces confirmed that frequent attacks have taken place on business establishments. Another 90 per cent experts and 100 per cent security force personnel confirmed that extremists have abducted or killed businessmen and their associates on a number of occasions.

5. Tripura: 82 per cent experts and 87.5 per cent security force personnel said that the investors are afraid of investing in the state. 54 per cent experts and 62.5 per cent security force personnel also said that the extremists try to extort money from the business houses. The near absence of the extremist activities in state capital Tripura and other district headquarters, where most business establishments are based, probably was the reason for this low percentage of confirmation. The same reason probably induced only 48 per cent experts and 50 per cent security personnel (calculated separately) to confirm that frequent attacks have taken place on business establishments. However, 75 per cent security force personnel confirmed that extremists have abducted or killed businessmen and their associates on a number of occasions. This was supported by 58 per cent of the experts.

Extremists in the Northeast targeted businessmen and also government officials, often due to non-payment of ransom amount. Such trend is rather common in Nagaland. In 2008, more than 20 businessmen/traders were killed and over 100 non-Naga traders abducted and released after payment of ransom. The spate of attacks led to affluent

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140 Interview with R.G. Lyngdoh, Former Home Minister, Government of Meghalaya, held at Shillong on November 25, 2009.
businessmen fleeing Dimapur, the commercial hub of Nagaland. Extremist groups in Tripura carried out large scale abduction of government officials and businessmen. As per available data, between April 1993 and August 1998, 1,199 people, including politicians, officials, traders, students and teachers in the hill areas, were kidnapped. Many hostages were killed while others were released after the payment of huge ransoms. A number of businessmen who did not respond to the extortion notices of the extremists too were killed in Meghalaya. Responding to the state of affairs in 2001, a distraught trader was quoted having said, “It is difficult to sleep well. Once the notices come, you just have to pay.” In February 2009, NSCN-IM cadres abducted and killed the sub-divisional officer of Ukhrul and his two associates. The bodies of Thingnam Kishan, his driver and a staff of his department, who were allegedly kidnapped on February 13, were found in the Senapati district. Businessmen have either paid up the extortion demanded by the extremists or have borne the brunt of extremist attacks. Particular reference can be made to the telecom sector. Since the introduction of private telecom services in the state, extremists have targeted officials of companies like Tata Tele services, Aircel and Airtel for extortion. In August 2009, militants damaged 17 towers of the Tata Tele services. In October that year two Aircel towers situated at Yourabung Khunou and Khurai Leikai in Imphal were also attacked due to failure of the telecom service provider to meet the extortion demands of the militants. In December 2009, an Airtel Company Manager and company’s field sales executive were abducted for ransom.

In Assam, ULFA in its initial days killed a number of marwari businessmen in the state. It also abducted engineers and government officials, many of whom were released on payment of ransom. In other districts, whether affected by Bodo extremism or other

fringe movements, similar mode of attacks have been carried out. Concurrently, a possible end to the problem of militancy, especially in the aftermath of the weakening of the ULFA as well as the BW, is being described as a positive development as far as Assam’s industrial scene in concerned. Although Assam never prominently figured in the industrial map of the country, industry captains feel that this could set the stage for private sector investments. “Any solution to insurgency in Assam and Northeast will attract the private sector”, said R S Joshi, president of Federation of Industry and Commerce of North Eastern Region (FINER), the premier trade and industry body of North-East. Not strangely enough, the decrease in the level of militancy has led to a revival of sorts in the industry sector in the state. While in 2008, barring a few sundry investments in the cement sector, like the Rs 500 crore investment by Vinay Cements, Assam failed to attract much private investments, 2009 started on a positive note with FMCG major Emami inaugurating its biggest production unit near Guwahati. Spread over nearly 50,000 square metres, the plant has an installed capacity to produce 5,400 tonnes of creams, lotions and ointments.

Killing/ abduction of government officials/ business people
(Common people, Experts and Security force personnel)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Common People</th>
<th>Experts</th>
<th>Security Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>83% Yes</td>
<td>94% Yes</td>
<td>94% Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17% No</td>
<td>6% No</td>
<td>6% No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Assam: Out of the 200 common people who responded to the questionnaire, 199 persons confirmed such a trend. The entire lot of 50 experts that includes 17 security force personnel who participated in the survey too confirmed the trend.

2. Manipur: Out of the 150 common people who responded to the questionnaire, 110 persons said that such attacks are common place. Among the 40 persons who replied in the negative, 27 were from the rural areas. This indicated that attacks on government official and businessmen are mostly an urban phenomenon. Among the 49 experts who answered the query, 48 confirmed the trend. All the 21 security force personnel who were interviewed separately too agreed with this view.

3. Meghalaya: Out of the 100 common people, 78 persons confirmed that killing/kidnapping of government officials/businessmen by extremist groups have taken place in Meghalaya. Among the 50 experts, 41 confirmed the trend. Eleven out of the 13 security force personnel too agreed.

4. Nagaland: Out of the 150 common people who responded to the questionnaire, 134 persons confirmed such a trend. Only 13 persons replied in the negative. Out of the 48 experts who answered the query, 46 including all the eight security force personnel confirmed the trend.

5. Tripura: Out of the 100 common people who responded to the questionnaire, 72 persons confirmed such a trend. Among the 50 experts which included security force personnel, 46 confirmed the trend, which was supported by 87.5 per cent of the security force personnel.
H. Perception of the Government:

Has extremism made the government look at the area differently? (Experts and Security force personnel)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Experts</th>
<th>Security Force Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Assam: Seventy-eight per cent experts and 64.7 per cent security force personnel were of the opinion that prevalence of extremism in areas has made both the state government and the Centre look at it differently. Noting the positive as well as negative connotations of such a phenomenon, the respondents maintained that such affected regions have come to be described as troubled areas. As a result, where as on the one hand, government is trying to expedite development in those areas to lure the extremists, on the other hand, it is focusing on security force operations. Extremism, for some experts, is also giving the government a pretext for not carrying out development and blaming it on the extremists. Experts brought to attention the rising security expenditure. According to an estimate, expenditure on police and maintenance of law and order in Assam has gone up from Rupees 99 crore in 1986-87 to Rs. 724.99 crore in 2001-02. This is mainly due to insurgency and worsening law and order.  

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2. Manipur: Thirty-nine of the 50 experts chose to answer the question, whether extremism made the government look at the area differently. 71.8 per cent experts (28 respondents) and much lesser 57.1 per cent (eight respondents) security force personnel were of the opinion that prevalence of extremism in areas has made both the state government and the Centre look at it differently.

3. Meghalaya: Only 34 per cent experts and 23.1 per cent security force personnel supported the opinion that prevalence of extremism in areas has made both the state government and the Centre look at it differently. Majority complained that besides looking at the area as a troubled spot, the governments have done nothing for the state.

4. Nagaland: More than 59 per cent of the 49 experts who answered the question, ‘whether extremism made the government look at the area differently’ believed that no such perceptional changes have occurred on the approach of the government as a result of extremism. More than 62 per cent of the security forces too shared similar opinion. Noting the positive as well as negative connotations of such a phenomenon, the respondents maintained that extremism has made the state more dependent on the Centre. Some respondents said that the availability of developmental funds for Nagaland is primarily due to extremism, as the Centre is trying to lure the extremists away from the violent activities.

5. Tripura: Sixty-two per cent experts and 87.5 per cent security force personnel were of the opinion that prevalence of extremism in areas has made both the state government and the Centre look at it differently. Noting the positive as well as negative connotations of such a phenomenon, the respondents maintained that the government is prioritising the developmental efforts to lure the extremists to the mainstream. While number of security forces has increased over the years, extremism has forced New Delhi to take Tripura’s situation seriously.
## Northeast: Security Related Expenditure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Assam</th>
<th>Manipur</th>
<th>Meghalaya</th>
<th>Nagaland</th>
<th>Tripura</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000-01</td>
<td>63.97</td>
<td>14.18</td>
<td>3.21</td>
<td>7.50</td>
<td>15.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-02</td>
<td>92.86</td>
<td>7.75</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>12.71</td>
<td>27.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-03</td>
<td>68.01</td>
<td>7.64</td>
<td>8.35</td>
<td>22.42</td>
<td>29.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003-04</td>
<td>50.80</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>19.17</td>
<td>34.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-05</td>
<td>75.40</td>
<td>9.44</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>26.49</td>
<td>36.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-06</td>
<td>63.91</td>
<td>33.65</td>
<td>13.17</td>
<td>24.83</td>
<td>27.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-07</td>
<td>90.86</td>
<td>13.60</td>
<td>3.91</td>
<td>25.55</td>
<td>18.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-08</td>
<td>75.61</td>
<td>5.16</td>
<td>5.88</td>
<td>7.60</td>
<td>16.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-09</td>
<td>108.60</td>
<td>21.58</td>
<td>5.45</td>
<td>33.13</td>
<td>45.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009-10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7.93</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30.89</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL (including amount released from 2001 onwards)</td>
<td>690.02</td>
<td>157.09</td>
<td>44.84</td>
<td>278.15</td>
<td>249.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Section B- NAXALITE AFFECTED STATES

A. State of Extremism & Its overall Impact

Level Impact of Maoist violence (Experts and Security force personnel)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Experts</th>
<th>Security force personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Varies from place to place</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Andhra Pradesh: The reality of Maoist retreat from Andhra Pradesh was apparent in the responses of the experts. Out of the 35 experts (including security for personnel) who responded to the query to define the level of impact of Maoist violence, 17 labelled it ‘moderate’. Only four experts, including none of the security force personnel, defined the state of extremism as ‘high’ or ‘very high’. More than 17 per cent experts said that the impact is ‘low’ and close to 23 per cent indicated that the impact varies from place to place.

2. Chhattisgarh: Out of the 49 experts 24 labelled the impact as ‘moderate’. Two of the nine security officials also defined the impact as ‘moderate’. Only 12 experts including four security force personnel defined it as ‘high’ or ‘very high’. Thirteen experts
including three security force personnel said that the impact of violence varies from place to place. Indeed in Chhattisgarh, there are districts which remain completely free from Maoist dominance, where as the rest firmly under the grip of the extremists. Significantly, none of the respondents described the impact as ‘low’.

3. **Jharkhand**: Out of the 49 experts 21 labelled the level of impact of Maoist violence ‘high’. This included seven security force personnel. Another 10 experts including a lone security force personnel described it as ‘very high’. Thus, in the opinion of over 63 per cent of the respondents in the experts’ category (including 66 per cent in the security forces category), the level of impact of Maoist violence was of high or very high intensity. While over 26 per cent experts said that the impact is low, a little over eight per cent indicated that the impact varies from place to place.

The questionnaire asked respondents in the common people category to respond, in general terms, whether the impact of extremism on society has been positive or negative.

**Impact of extremism on society (Common people)**

1. **Andhra Pradesh**: A total of 195 respondents answered the query. A majority 70.8 per cent (138 respondents) felt that the society has been negatively affected. At the same time
43 respondents amounting to over 22 per cent of the total described the impact as positive. 13 others said that the impact has been both positive and negative. In spite of the fact that the impact was described as negative, the intensity of such impact was, however, found to be rather weak. While 53 per cent of these respondents said that presence of extremism has prevented the government to be attentive towards the problem of their villages or areas, close to 60 per cent respondents extremists themselves have exploited the resources including forests, paddy fields and rivers. Only 50 per cent respondents claimed that presence of extremism has made their communities unstable and insecure. Majority of the respondents, however, said extremism has neither paved the way for more corruption to meet the demand of extremists nor has it degraded the social status of their villages. It was clear that extremism today is present only in select areas and has ceased to have the kind of impact it had on people’s lives in earlier years.

2. Chhattisgarh: A majority 88 per cent (176 respondents) felt that the society has been negatively affected. Detailing the negative impact of extremism on society, over 93 per cent said that Maoist insurgency has only paved the way for more corruption in society to meet the demand of Maoist cadres. Over 94 per cent respondents said that Maoist insurgency has made the community unstable or insecure. Over 90 per cent of these respondents said that presence of Maoists has degraded the social status of the village/community. Significantly, 93 per cent of these respondents agreed that the extremists themselves have exploited the natural resources like forests, paddy fields and rivers. Similarly, over 89 per cent believed that prevalent extremism has prevented the government from paying attention to the problems of the villages/areas. In all, Maoists were blamed for the overall underdevelopment of the region.

3. Jharkhand: A majority 95.5 per cent (191 respondents) felt that the society has been negatively affected by extremism. Majority of the respondents who described the impact as negative were categorical in their response that extremism has affected the society in the widest possible range. Five pre-identified assumptions regarding such impact attracted over 90 per cent confirmation by the respondents. Close to 95 per cent said that Maoist insurgency has only paved the way for more corruption in society. Over 91 per
172

cent respondents said that Maoist insurgency has made the community unstable or insecure. 92.7 per cent of these respondents said that presence of Maoists has degraded the social status of the village/community and has also prevented the government from paying attention to the problems of the villages/areas. Over 92.1 per cent of these respondents agreed that the extremists themselves have exploited the natural resources like forests, paddy fields and rivers.

Experts and security forces were asked to chose between pre-determined sectors (politics, economy, security & education), which have been the affected due to Maoist extremism.

**Sectors impacted most by extremism (Experts and Security force personnel)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experts</th>
<th>security force personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Politics:</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy:</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security:</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education:</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All of the above:</td>
<td>63.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. **Andhra Pradesh:** Majority 34 per cent of the experts (17 respondents) were categorical that extremism has impacted maximum on all these sectors. Among individual sectors, 22 per cent identified ‘politics’ as having borne the maximum impact of extremism, where as 20 per cent identified ‘security’ as the most affected. The responses were again indicative of the improved security situation and declining hold of the Maoists in Andhra Pradesh.
2. Chhattisgarh: The experts and security force personnel were categorical that extremism has impacted maximum on all these sectors. 88 per cent of the experts (44 respondents) chose the ‘all of the above’ option. Similarly, among the nine security force personnel whose responses were analysed separately, eight chose the ‘all of the above’ option. These responses were indicative of the sweeping impact of extremism on Chhattisgarh. Among the individual sectors, education was identified as most impacted by extremism both by the experts and the security force component among the experts.

3. Jharkhand: Experts and security force personnel indicated that extremism has impacted maximum on all these sectors. 68 per cent of the experts (34 respondents) choose the ‘all of the above’ option. Similarly, among the 12 security force personnel whose responses were analysed separately, nine choose the ‘all of the above’ option. These responses were indicative of the sweeping impact of extremism on Jharkhand. Among the individual sectors, economy and security were identified by the experts as most impacted by extremism.

B. Militarization of Tribal Society

The rampant Maoist activities in Chhattisgarh have necessitated deployment of security forces. In addition to the state police forces, the MHA has deployed 58 battalions of central para-military forces (CPMFs) in various Maoist affected states\(^\text{150}\) to restore order and rule of law. The call for deployment of the Army has been resisted so far. However, the fact remains that number of security personnel present today in Chhattisgarh is far less than the required strength to put up even a decent fight against the Maoists. For example Director General of Police in Chhattisgarh Vishwaranjan laments, “I have 16 battalions of CPMFs, the CRPF, 2 to 3 battalions of SSB (Shashatra Seema Bal) and 6 of our own (state security force) and whatever civil police is there. That is the basic force.”

Similarly, in January 2010, the MHA sent 1,200 personnel belonging to the CRPF to Ranchi bringing the total number of central paramilitary personnel in Jharkhand to over

7,000.\textsuperscript{151} In the subsequent months, media reports have indicated that “six battalions of the specialised anti-Naxal force of the CRPF - Special Action Force” have been deployed in various states including West Bengal, Chhattisgarh, Orissa and Jharkhand.\textsuperscript{152} However, by no means such deployment is adequate. The Jharkhand state has constantly demanded additional deployment of para-military forces. In addition, to meet with the shortfall of required security force personnel, Jharkhand also is in the process of recruiting 900 sub-inspectors and 6,700 constables would be recruited over the following three months, beginning 20 August 2010.\textsuperscript{153}

Deployment of security forces- State police and the para-military- against the Naxalites has been criticised by the human rights activists, who term this as a war waged against the innocent tribals by the Indian State. Human rights activist have repeatedly questioned the legality of deploying the security forces to fight the internal wars.\textsuperscript{154} However, response of the State towards forces of destabilisation is never influenced by such romanticised thoughts. As the extremists mount a violent campaign against the symbols of the State authority, it becomes almost obligatory on part of the State to meet these challenges and neutralise the military capacities of the extremists.

In addition to its own police force, anti-Naxal Greyhounds commandos, central-para military forces were deployed to fight the Maoists in Andhra Pradesh. The normalisation of the situation and capacities of the Greyhounds personnel to take on the Maoists all alone has allowed the MHA to shift para-military battalions out of the State. Four battalions of the CRPF are currently deployed in Khammam, Adilabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayanagaram districts.\textsuperscript{155}

\textsuperscript{151} Tapan Chakravorti, “CRPF battalion reaches Jharkhand for Operation Green Hunt”, \textit{Business Standard}, February 1, 2010.
\textsuperscript{153} “Jharkhand Police plan mass recruitment”, \textit{Hindu}, July 23, 2010.
The respondents in the experts’ category were asked to establish a link between the high presence of security forces in their respective states with the rising level of Maoist activities.

### Extremism resulting in high presence of security forces
**(Experts and Security force personnel)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experts</th>
<th>Security force personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>77% Yes</td>
<td>70% Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23% No</td>
<td>30% No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. **Andhra Pradesh**: The experts’ category that includes security force personnel, only by a bare majority, said that extremism in resulting in high presence of security forces in Andhra Pradesh. Out of the 42 experts who answered the query 22 subscribed to this statement. The responses were indicative of the reduction in the size of forces in the State. The current state of deployment of forces, by no means, can be termed as ‘high’.

2. **Chhattisgarh**: The experts indicated that high presence of army and paramilitary forces in the state was a result of the present phase of Maoist extremism. 96 per cent of the 50 experts (which include security force officials) who answered the query subscribed to this statement. Eight of the nine security force personnel who participated in the survey and whose responses were analysed separately, also agreed with this view.
3. **Jharkhand**: The experts’ category that includes security force personnel, in their opinion indicated that high presence of army and paramilitary forces in the state was a result of the present phase of Maoist extremism. Over 82 per cent of the 46 experts (which include security force officials) who answered the query subscribed to this statement. Nine of the 11 security force personnel too subscribed to this view.

**Has your village/area ever seen any police/ military operation against extremism?**

(Common people)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>53%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. **Andhra Pradesh**: A little over 49 per cent (99 respondents) out of the 200 common people who participated in the survey said that their village/area have been a scene of counter-insurgency operations. Of these 99 participants, 17 respondents had experienced their house being raided by the security forces. Among those respondents who houses had been raided, six respondents amounting to little over 35 per cent complained of the security forces misbehaving with the family members or destroying the property of the house owners. The size of the people expressing their unhappiness over the behaviour of the forces during the raids was, thus, significantly high.

2. **Chhattisgarh**: 81 respondents out of the 200 common people who participated in the survey said that their village/area have been a scene of counter-insurgency operations. 41 of these respondents were from the rural areas. Of these 81 participants, only one respondent had experienced his house being raided by the security forces. Contrary to the
allegations of the civil society and human rights organisations that security forces usually misbehave with the house members during such raids and destroy personal property\textsuperscript{156}, this lone respondent denied having undergone any such experience. The response indicated that entry of security forces into civilian homes are a rarity and whenever it occurs, the sensitivities of the members of the family are taken care of.

3. Jharkhand: Marginally over 50 per cent (101 respondents) out of the 200 common people who participated in the survey said that their village/area have been a scene of counter-insurgency operations. Of these 101 participants, only four respondents had experienced their houses being raided by the security forces. Among those respondents who houses had been raided, over 37 per cent complained of the security forces misbehaving with the family members or destroying the property of the house owners.

C. Impact on Civilian Life

Impact on people’s lives (Experts and Security force personnel)

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Experts} & \textbf{Security force personnel} \\
\hline
\textbf{High} & \textbf{High} \\
\textbf{Very High} & \textbf{Moderate} \\
\textbf{Moderate} & \textbf{Low} \\
\textbf{Low} & \textbf{Varies from place to place} \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{156} NGO activist Himanshu Kumar said during an interview, “People in affected areas flee away from the security forces owing to bad reputation these forces have earned so far. The forces do not behave in friendly manner and harass poor villagers. But irony is one will not find evidence that same people behave in the similar way with the naxalites.” Interview held at Dantewada on December 15, 2009.
1. **Andhra Pradesh:** Responding to the query to define the impact of extremism on the lives of people, 63.3 per cent termed the impact as ‘moderate’. While 23.3 per cent respondents described the impact as ‘low’, only 6.7 per cent respondents termed it as ‘high’. Another 6.7 per cent experts indicated that it varies from place to place. Responses of the security force personnel, who were a part of the experts, were analysed separately. While 66.7 per cent described the impact is ‘moderate’, the rest 33.7 per cent said it is ‘low’. Response by experts and security force personnel to pre-determined modes in which Maoist extremism has affected lives of common people revealed only moderate impact on the daily chores of the civilians. The maximum impact of extremism appeared to be on the movement of women. 60 per cent experts and 80 per cent security force personnel said that extremism has restricted movement of women. Another 58 per cent experts said that the movement of the people after dark has been affected. This view was, however, supported by only 40 per cent security force personnel. Another 58 per cent experts and 80 per cent security force personnel said that impact extremism is severe on activities like people’s going to markets. Extremism appears to have affected a routine activity like sending children to school in a slightly lesser degree. 56 per cent experts said that such an activity has been affected. However, among the security forces, the impact was considered to be much higher. 80 per cent security forces said that activity like sending children to school in Maoist affected areas has been affected. Only 46 per cent experts said that general movement of people has been affected while a lesser 42 per cent said that activities like going to work places have also been affected. Among the security forces, 60 per cent said that the general movement of people has been affected while 40 per cent indicated that going to work places too has been affected.

2. **Chhattisgarh:** Responding to the query to define the impact of extremism on the lives of people, 53.1 per cent (26 respondents) of the 49 experts who chose to answer the question, termed the impact as ‘moderate’. While seven respondents termed it as ‘high’, one each termed it as ‘very high’ and ‘low’. Of the nine security force personnel, five said that the impact is ‘high’, while two others indicated it is ‘moderate’. Response by experts and security force personnel to pre-determined modes in which Maoist extremism
has affected lives of common people revealed interesting inputs. Extremism was described to have serious impact on the daily chores of the civilians by the experts as well as the security officials. While 96 per cent experts including all the nine security force personnel said that the movement of the people after dark has been affected, 88 per cent experts thought that the movement of people in general has been affected by extremism. Close to 89 per cent security forces said that general movement has also been affected. While 86 per cent experts said that impact of extremism is severe on activities like people’s going out to their workplaces, among the security forces 88.9 per cent said that such an impact exists. Extremism appears to have affected a routine activity like sending children to school in a lesser degree. 64 per cent experts and 88.9 per cent security force personnel said that such an activity has been affected. Similarly 66 per cent experts felt that extremism has restricted movement of women. However, Left Wing Extremism appeared to have affected a general activity like going to markets considerably. 82 per cent experts and 88.9 security force personnel believed that extremism has affected going to markets.

3. Jharkhand: 46.8 per cent (22 respondents) of the experts termed the impact as ‘high’. While 14 respondents described the impact as ‘low’, five respondents termed it as ‘moderate’. Two respondents said the impact is ‘very high’, while four others indicated that it varies from place to place. Of the 12 security force personnel, seven said that the impact is ‘high’, while two others indicated it is ‘moderate’. Three other security force personnel indicated that the impact is ‘low’. While 88 per cent experts including ten of the 12 security force personnel said that the movement of the people after dark has been affected, 84 per cent experts including all the security force personnel thought that the movement of people in general has been affected by extremism. Similarly, 80 per cent experts including all the 12 security officials felt that extremism has restricted movement of women. While 82 per cent experts said that impact of extremism is severe on activities like people’s going out to their workplaces, all the 12 security officials said that such an impact exists. Extremism appears to have affected a routine activity like sending children to school in a slightly lesser degree. 74 per cent experts said that such an activity has been affected. However, among the security force personnel, the impact was considered to be
much higher. Close to 92 per cent security officials said that activity like sending children to school in Maoist affected areas has been affected. However, Left Wing Extremism appeared to have affected a general activity like going to markets to a lesser degree, according to the experts. 50 per cent experts and 66.7 security force personnel believed that extremism has affected going to markets.

In Chhattisgarh, the Maoists have followed a policy of forcibly recruiting one cadre from each tribal family. Media reports in June 2009 indicated that the Maoists are luring tribal youth in Bihar and Jharkhand with a monthly salary of Rupees 2500 to 3000. The promised amount is comparable to what is paid to some government employees, such as the **nyay mitras** (law aides), **shiksha mitras** and **panchayat** teachers recently recruited by the Bihar government. Earlier, reports also indicated that Maoists are supplying medicines and money to the medically ill tribals to win their heart and enlist their support for the guerrilla warfare. Sometime in 2001, the erstwhile People’s War Group (PWG) launched a parallel people's participation programme in its armed struggle, on the pattern of the government’s **jan bhagidari** (people's participation) policy in the execution of government schemes. Since then young men and girls have been specifically targeted by various Maoist groups including the present day CPI-Maoist. A senior police official accepted, “Unfortunately, they (Maoists) influence the illiterate and unemployed youths. The extremists misguide them and manage to recruit them in areas where the existence of government machinery is minimal.”

An opinion piece on the situation in Andhra Pradesh indicated, “Till a few years ago, Maoists used to frequently come to villages, hold people’s courts and kill people in the name of informers. On the other hand, police forces used to raid villages and torture

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160 Interview with Mr R K Vij, Inspector General of Police Planning and Operation in PHQ and Chhattisgarh State Police Spokesperson, held at Raipur on November 25, 2009.
innocents in the name of Maoist sympathisers.” The target of both the Maoists and the police were mostly the youth. For the Maoists a youth is a potential recruit and this fact makes them suspect in the eyes of the police as well.

Vulnerability of the youth (Common people & Experts)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Common People</th>
<th>Experts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><img src="chart1" alt="Pie Chart for Common People" /></td>
<td><img src="chart2" alt="Pie Chart for Experts" /></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Andhra Pradesh: It was clear from the responses of the common people as well as the experts that the tribal youth in Andhra Pradesh remain extremely vulnerable, being targeted both by the security forces as well as the Maoists. Where as 71 per cent (142 respondents) common people were categorical in saying that youths are the most vulnerable category of people in an areas affected by Maoist violence, this opinion was supported by 86 per cent experts. Majority of the security force personnel (60 per cent), however, disagreed. The questionnaire sought further clarifications from these respondents who had replied in the affirmative on three pre-determined types of impact on the youth. Over 92 per cent common people respondents and over 95 per cent experts said that youths are targeted for recruitment by the Maoist groups. Where as 69.7 per cent (99 respondents) common people respondents maintained that even the security forces suspect the youth to be potential extremists and are often singled out for interrogation,

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this view was supported by 93 per cent (40 respondents) experts including all the security force personnel. While only 53.5 per cent (76 respondents) common people indicated that youth in Andhra Pradesh have become vulnerable to easy money culture and extortion, this view found support among 67.4 per cent (29 respondents) experts.

2. Chhattisgarh: Responses of the common people as well as the experts underlined in unclear terms the vulnerability of the tribal youth in Chhattisgarh. Whereas 96 per cent (192 respondents) common people were categorical in saying that youths are the most vulnerable category of people in an area affected by Maoist violence, this opinion was supported by 96 per cent experts including all the security force personnel. The questionnaire sought further clarifications from these respondents who had replied in the affirmative on three pre-determined types of impact on the youth. 100 per cent respondents in the common people and experts category said that youths are targeted for recruitment by the Maoist groups. Whereas 100 per cent (192 respondents) common people respondents maintained that even the security forces suspect the youth to be potential extremists and are often singled out for interrogation, this view was supported by 97.9 per cent (47 respondents) experts including eight security force personnel. While 95.8 per cent (46 respondents) experts including eight security force personnel indicated that youth in Chhattisgarh have become vulnerable to easy money culture and extortion, this view found support among 96.4 per cent (185 respondents) common people.

3. Jharkhand: Whereas 98 per cent (196 respondents) common people were categorical in saying that youths are the most vulnerable category of people in an areas affected by Maoist violence, this opinion was supported by 98 per cent experts, including all the security force personnel. The questionnaire sought further clarifications from these respondents who had replied in the affirmative on three pre-determined types of impact on the youth. Over 97 per cent common people respondents and 100 per cent experts said that youths are targeted for recruitment by the Maoist groups. Whereas 96.9 per cent (190 respondents) common people respondents maintained that even the security forces suspect the youth to be potential extremists and are often singled out for interrogation, this view was supported by 89.8 per cent (44 respondents) experts including all the 12
security force personnel. While 99.5 per cent (195 respondents) common people indicated that youth in Jharkhand have become vulnerable to easy money culture and extortion, this view found support among 98 per cent (48 respondents) experts including all the 12 security force personnel.

The respondents in the common people category were asked to identify the category of people (men, women and children) who have been worst affected by Maoist extremism in Andhra Pradesh. Respondents were asked to mark ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ against each category.

**Category of people most affected by extremism (Common people)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>97.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>60.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>65.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All of them</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. **Andhra Pradesh**: ‘Men’ as the most affected category were identified by over 95 per cent respondents. While only 38 per cent (76 respondents) said that women have been worst affected, 23 per cent (46 respondents) maintained that children have been the most affected. 21 per cent (42 respondents) people opted for all three indicating that Maoists have barely distinguished between their targets. The pattern of the responses revealed that men have been the primary target of extremism, with women and children experiencing peripheral impact.
2. **Chhattisgarh**: All the experts maintained that men have been worst affected. While 64 per cent (128 respondents) said that women have been worst affected, 97 per cent (194 respondents) maintained that children have been the most affected. Over 62 per cent (125 respondents) people opted for all three indicating that Maoists have barely distinguished between their targets. The pattern of the responses revealed that while men and children have been the primary target of extremism, women too have been largely targeted.

3. **Jharkhand**: Over 97 per cent respondents maintained that men have been worst affected. While 79 per cent (158 respondents) said that women have been worst affected, 76 per cent (152 respondents) maintained that children have been the most affected. Over 75 per cent (151 respondents) people opted for all three indicating that Maoists have barely distinguished between their targets. The pattern of the responses revealed that while men have been the primary target of extremism, women and children have barely escaped the wrath of the extremists.

In all states where the Maoists are active, tribal children have been specifically targeted by them for recruitment. The erstwhile PWG followed a policy of recruiting children between the years eight to 15 with the belief that ‘children could be trained more effectively to resist police interrogation than women.’ 162 For some years, PWG maintained their own children’s corps, known as Bal Sangham. In Chhattisgarh, the CPI-Maoist forces parents in the tribal villages to send their kids to Bal Sangham for which recruitment age starts at six. According to one estimate, in December 2003 there were some 800 children with the Naxalites in Andhra Pradesh. Available reports, however, indicate that the ‘Bal Sangham’ has been disbanded. Maoists, however, claimed that their children’s division was not used in hostilities but that children were used only as messengers and informers. However, they admitted that they were provided with military training to prepare them for any situation. 163 Reports have also indicated that Naxals in

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Jharkhand are “targeting children between 10 to 15 years age group to include them in their fold and use them to keep a watch on police movements.”

On 23 May 2010, Mahesh Gagda, a member of the Chhattisgarh Legislative Assembly from the Bijapur constituency said, “Maoists are forcibly picking up boys and girls from their houses and schools in the interiors to use them as shields in the war against (Security) Forces… Kids in Bijapur are carrying arms, even AK-47s.” Gagda went on to add, “The Maoist menace has reached its flashpoint in Bijapur. They are forcibly recruiting boys and girls in their rank and file and generally girls are also sexually exploited.” Such allegations have been confirmed by reports of independent organisations. For example, the Human Rights Watch in its July 2008 report has indicated,

“Naxalites (Maoists) usually enlist children between ages six and twelve into Bal Sanghams, the village level children's association where children learn Maoist ideology. Most children who are part of Bal Sanghams also work as informers and are trained in the use of non-lethal weapons such as sticks....In some cases, Naxalites approach parents and pressure them to send their children to join the 'people's war'. In other cases, Naxalites visit schools and ask children to join them.”

Women form a major chunk of the Maoist cadres. In the words of Chhattisgarh DGP, “Some 30 percent or 15,000 of a total of 50,000 armed rebels, are female insurgents who actively participate in carrying out major strikes against civilians and police forces.” The CPI-Maoist women’s wing Krantikari Adivasi Mahila Sangh recruits minor girls as its cadres. Chhattisgarh Police had periodically claimed that such recruitment is an ongoing process in various parts of the state. In addition to participating in the Maoist armed campaigns, these women are also known to have been regularly exploited sexually.

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by the Maoist cadres.\textsuperscript{168} In addition to the Maoists, the state supported vigilante programme Salwa Judum (literally meaning purification hunt) is alleged to have victimised scores of tribal women. Human Rights organisations have narrated several cases of rape by Salwa Judum activists targeting tribal women.\textsuperscript{169}

**Impact on women and Children (Experts and Security force personnel)**

1. **Andhra Pradesh:** A majority of 72 per cent of the experts and 60 per cent security force personnel said that Maoist extremism has both direct and indirect impact on the lives of women and children in Andhra Pradesh. These experts and security force personnel who had acknowledged such an impact were then asked to respond on five different categories of possible impacts on women and children. Close to 89 cent experts and 100 per cent security force personnel maintained that loss of family members can bring about a serious impact on the lives of the survivors of violence. Similarly, close to 92 per cent experts and 66.7 per cent security force personnel further agreed with the


statement that widows of violence struggle for livelihood as well as in bringing up their children. 73 per cent experts said that women and children are impacted by social insecurity. Another 77.8 per cent experts and 66.7 per cent security force personnel also agreed that the atmosphere of violence creates difficulty for families in providing education to their children. Similarly, 80.6 per cent experts and 100 per cent security force personnel said that the unending Maoist violence leaves behind trauma and permanent scar in the minds of women and children.

2. Chhattisgarh: An overwhelming 98 per cent of the experts (49 out of 50), including all the nine security force personnel, were categorical in their opinion that Maoist extremism has both direct and indirect impact on the lives of women and children in Chhattisgarh. All the experts (including the security force personnel) maintained that loss of family members can bring about a serious impact on the lives of the survivors of violence. Similarly, all the experts including all the security force personnel further agreed with the statement that widows of violence struggle for livelihood as well as in bringing up their children. 100 per cent experts said that women and children are impacted by social insecurity. 98 per cent experts including all the security force personnel also agreed that the atmosphere of violence creates difficulty for families in providing education to their children.

3. Jharkhand: 98 per cent of the experts (49 out of 50), including all the nine security force personnel, were categorical in their opinion that Maoist extremism has both direct and indirect impact on the lives of women and children in Jharkhand. Close to 94 per cent experts (46 of the 49 experts who chose to answer the question) maintained that loss of family members can bring about a serious impact on the lives of the survivors of violence. Similarly, close to 96 per cent experts (47 respondents) further agreed with the statement that widows of violence struggle for livelihood as well as in bringing up their children. 95.9 per cent experts and 91.7 per cent security officials interviewed said that women and children are impacted by social insecurity. Another 95.9 per cent experts and 100 per cent security force personnel also agreed that the atmosphere of violence creates difficulty for families in providing education to their children. Similarly, 95.7 per cent experts said that
the unending Maoist violence leaves behind trauma and permanent scar in the minds of women and children.

The civilian vigilante programme, Salwa Judum is also accused of recruiting children as volunteers in Chhattisgarh. Human Rights Watch in its report notes the following.

The Naxalites, government security forces, and Salwa Judum members have all recruited and used children to participate in the Chhattisgarh conflict. Naxalites in this region have recruited children into their ranks for at least a decade, using them to gather intelligence, for sentry duty, to make and plant landmines and IEDs, and to engage in hostilities against government forces. Government forces have recruited children as auxiliary police (SPOs), using them as guards, and deploying them in anti-Naxalite operations, including armed encounters. Salwa Judum also engages children in its violent raids against local villages.170

The Sendra and Nagrik Surksha Samiti campaign in Jharkhand are some other examples of private militia. Even though a number of private militia groups operated in the past in Andhra Pradesh as well, no such allegations have been made against them.

**Whether both Maoists and private militias are recruiting children?**

(Common people, Experts & Security force personnel)

[![Yes No](chart)]

[![Yes No](chart)]

[![Yes No](chart)]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Common People</th>
<th>Experts</th>
<th>Security Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>45% Yes</td>
<td>31% Yes</td>
<td>45% Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55% No</td>
<td>69% No</td>
<td>55% No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. **Andhra Pradesh**: In response to the question whether both Maoists and private militia in Andhra Pradesh are recruiting children in their rank and file, 78.2 per cent common people (151 respondents) indicated that no such recruitment of children has been carried out by the private militia. The experts, however, disagreed. 62 per cent experts (31 respondents) confirmed such recruitment process. Among the security forces, however, only 40 per cent respondents acknowledged the recruitment of children by the private militia.

2. **Chhattisgarh**: While 48.5 per cent (97 respondents) common people said that such recruitment does take place, the rest denied it was happening. The experts, on the other hand, were emphatic that such recruitment of children takes place. Eighty-four per cent of experts (42 respondents) including all the nine security force personnel indicated that both Maoists and the private militias recruit children in Chhattisgarh.

3. **Jharkhand**: 62.5 per cent common people and 62 per cent experts indicated that such recruitment of children does take place. The security force personnel, however, disagreed. Only 25 per cent of the 12 security force personnel confirmed such recruitment process.

Explosions of landmines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have been the most preferred mode of attack by the Maoists, in all the states affected by their activities. In Andhra Pradesh, apart from targeting the VIPs, Maoists have regularly carried out such attacks on public places. On 26 March 2008, Maoists blasted the Gumuda railway station in the Vijaynagaram district using a landmine.\(^{171}\) Again on 29 May 2008, Maoists triggered an explosion and opened fire on a police party killing a police constable in the Gudem Kotha Veedhi *mandal* on the Andhra-Orissa border in Visakhapatnam district.\(^{172}\) Such incidents have reduced over the years and the 29 May 2008 incident was possibly the last incident involving a landmine explosion in Andhra Pradesh.

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Chhattisgarh police sources indicate that the Maoists have mined the forested regions of the Bastar area extensively with a bid to prevent the entry of security force personnel. According to an estimate, out of the nearly 40,000 square kilometre area of the Bastar region, up to 25,000 square kilometre area is intensively mined. Senior police officials admit the lack of technology and resources to de-mine these areas. “The big problem is we have no technology and resources to de-mine the massive forested pockets. Without taking out landmines, it is literally impossible to go after them freely in thickly forested areas where Maoists are always ready with a booby trap”, DGP Chhattisgarh Vishwa Ranjan said in an interview.

In Jharkhand, CPI-Maoist cadres have planted landmines on both tarred and non-tarred roads. Landmines on tarred roads are usually planted by alluring workers and contractors or by threatening them. Following a landmine explosion in Bokaro district that killed 15 police personnel in 2007, former Director General of Police of the state J Mahapatra said, “Such incidents in the future cannot be ruled out as the Naxals have planted so many landmines in Jharkhand that even if I use my entire force it will take at least three years to clear the state of landmines.”

Maoists have also perfected the art of assembling such landmines and IEDs and detonating them with sophisticated timers. On occasions, the impact of the explosions has been sufficient enough to damage the landmine-proof vehicles and kill security force personnel travelling inside. For example, on 6 April 2010, 75 CRPF personnel and a lone state policeman were killed in IED explosions in the Dantewada district. Chief Minister Raman Singh later commented that the high intensity of the blast completely damaged the anti-landmine vehicle of the CRPF personnel.

173 “Maoists have massively mined Chhattisgarh forests: Police”, Times of India, May 9 2010.
174 ibid.
175 Quoted in a speech by Shri L.K. Advani at National Workshop on Maoist Insurgency in India, Organised by the Martyrs’ Memorial Research Institute, April 25, 2007, http://www.bjp.org/content/view/422/395/
Whether Maoists resort to random explosions
(Common people, Experts & Security force personnel)

1. Andhra Pradesh: The decrease in such incidents appeared to have influenced responses of the common people and the experts who answered the query regarding use of explosions as a technique of Maoist warfare. Only 47.7 per cent (95 respondents) common people and 38.3 experts (18 respondents) said that Maoists use random explosions. The rest answered in the negative. Among the security forces too, only 40 per cent confirmed the random use of explosions as a part of Maoist warfare.

2. Chhattisgarh: The extensive use of explosions as a technique of warfare was confirmed by the common people as well as the experts. Among the 199 common people who answered the query whether Maoists resort to random explosions in Chhattisgarh, 100 per cent replied in the affirmative. Similarly 93.9 per cent experts (46 respondents of the 49 who answered the query) which included all the nine security forces had a similar view point.
3. Jharkhand: Use of explosions as a technique of warfare, however, found only a reluctant confirmation by the common people. Only 57.5 per cent (115 respondents) did say that Maoists use random explosions. The experts were comparatively more categorical in asserting that explosions have been used by the Maoists in Jharkhand. 70 per cent experts confirmed this. Out of the 12 security force personnel whose responses were analysed separately, nine agreed with this statement.

D. On Education and Employment:

Union Home Minister P Chidamabaram speaking in Parliament revealed that Naxals had destroyed 71 schools buildings in 2009 across the country. In 2010 by March, nine school buildings have been attacked.\textsuperscript{177} Estimates, however, vary. In Chhattisgarh alone, at least 440 school buildings are estimated to have been bombed by the Maoists after the government started to use the buildings as temporary shelters for security force personnel. Officials estimate that Maoist insurgency has denied at least 100,000 children access to primary education since 2005 in Bastar.\textsuperscript{178}

Education, especially in the primary schools, has been a casualty in all Maoist affected states. A teacher based in a small town in Dantewada district was quoted in a media report as saying, “Education and children's life have been severely hit in Bastar's interiors, militancy has virtually destroyed school education in vast areas where schools were either blown up or a majority of teachers refused to attend schools due to risks to their lives.”\textsuperscript{179} Destruction of school buildings has been only one of the ways left-wing extremism has impacted upon primary education in the Maoist affected states. The Maoists justify their attacks on schools on the grounds that all the schools attacked were being used by the government security forces and therefore legitimate military targets. A report of the Human Rights Watch also notes, “Security forces are occupying government school

\textsuperscript{177} Anubhuti Vishnoi, “Security forces should vacate schools, HRD writes to states”, \textit{Indian Express}, July 15, 2010.
\textsuperscript{178} ibid.
\textsuperscript{179} “Maoist militancy takes heavy toll on school education”, February 17, 2010,
http://www.indiaedunews.net/Chhattisgarh/Maoist_militancy_takes_heavy_toll_on_school_education_10668/
buildings as bases for anti-Naxalite operations, sometimes only for few days but often for periods lasting years.”

The report, however, dismissed the claim of the Maoists that they target schools occupied by security forces. The report noted,

“Our investigation found this claim to be false. To the contrary, our research found that the Naxalites have attacked numerous schools that were not occupied by the security forces at the time of the attack. Instead, the Naxalites appeared to be targeting schools because they are normally undefended government structures whose damage or destruction maximizes publicity and spreads terror among the local community.”

In addition, teachers have been attacked and the general situation of violence has deterred parents from sending their children to schools. In Andhra Pradesh, however, such incidents have remained a rarity. Possibly a fallout of the marginalisation of the Maoists, not a single incident involving destruction of school buildings has been reported since 2005.

Respondents in all the categories were asked whether Maoist extremism in their state has impacted on the level of education.

**Impact of Maoist activities on the level of education**

*(Common People, Experts and Security force personnel)*

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1. Andhra Pradesh: Responses indicated very low scale of impact. A minority 47.5 per cent of the common people and much lesser 26 per cent experts indicated that such an impact has been felt. Detailing the exact nature of such impact against four pre-determined options, close to 78 per cent of the common people who had replied in the affirmative, said that Maoist extremism has resulted in high absenteeism among the teachers. Among the experts 80 per cent had similar opinion. Another 74.7 per cent common people, who had replied in the affirmative, linked high drop out rate among the students to prevailing extremism. Among the experts 80 per cent agreed. Majority of the common people respondents, however, said that schools have not been shut in the extremism affected areas after either being attacked by the Maoists or being occupied by the security forces. Majority of the experts, who had replied in the affirmative to the impact of extremism on education sector, however, indicated that schools have been shut due to both of the circumstances.

2. Chhattisgarh: Respondents in all the categories were asked whether Maoist extremism in Chhattisgarh has impacted on the level of education. Majority of the respondents in all categories were, categorical in saying that this indeed is the case. Whereas all the 198 common people respondents who answered the question replied in the affirmative, 96 per cent (48 respondents) experts too toed a similar line. The responses were uniform across rural, urban and semi-urban settings. Among the experts’ category, of which the security force personnel were a part, all the nine participants too opined in the affirmative. The respondents in each of these three categories who had
replied in the affirmative were asked to register their views on four categories of probable impact of Maoist extremism on education in the state. 100 per cent of these respondents said that a number of schools have been shut after being attacked by the Maoists. 97 per cent of these respondents indicated that normal school functioning is affected as security forces occupy the school buildings. Out of the 48 experts who had answered in the affirmative to the previous question, 44 (including all the nine security officials) said that Maoist attacks have led to shut down of schools and 45 experts (including eight of the nine security force personnel) said that occupation of schools by security forces have disrupted their normal functioning. Over 99 per cent common people and close to 94 per cent experts which included all the security force personnel indicated that high drop out rate among the students is another fall out of the Maoist extremism. Whereas close to 99 per cent common people termed teachers’ absenteeism as a direct fallout of prevalent extremism, it was supported by 100 per cent of the experts.

3. Jharkhand: 83.5 per cent of the common people and 92 per cent experts including 11 of the 12 security force personnel replied in affirmative to the query regarding impact of extremism on education. The respondents in each of these three categories (167 common people, 46 experts including 11 security force personnel) who had replied in the affirmative were asked to register their views on four categories of probable impact of Maoist extremism on education in the state. Out of the 167 common people respondents, 164 said that the most severe impact on education has been disruption in the normal functioning of the schools occupied by the security forces. Out of 46 experts, 43 agreed with this. 97 per cent common people, 84.8 per cent experts, including all the 11 security force personnel, said that a number of schools have been shut after being attacked by the Maoists. 94 per cent common people and 80.4 per cent experts which included all the security force personnel indicated that high drop out rate among the students is another fallout of the Maoist extremism. Whereas close to 82 per cent common people termed teachers’ absenteeism as a direct fallout of prevalent extremism, it was supported by 91.3 per cent experts. Providing additional information, 146 common people indicated that overall violence leaves a negative impact on the minds of the young children and 54
common people said that series of bandhs (general shutdown) announced by the Maoists, which results in schools being shut for several days, too affects the educational sector.

Similarly, large scale unemployment in various Maoist affected states, especially among the tribal population, is providing easy fodder for the Maoists. Although data relating to unemployment and growth of Left Wing Extremism is unavailable in public forum, it is virtually unimaginable that both phenomena would not be feeding each other. In addition, police sources in 2008 indicated that in the name of ‘donations to Maoists’, hundreds of youths in Chhattisgarh who had no connection with the Maoist movement extorted up to Rupees 220 million in 2007.182

![Impact on employment sector (Common people and experts)](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Common People</th>
<th>Experts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72.3%</td>
<td>88.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A = Fear of extremism has led to job losses;  
B = Extremism in rural areas has led the youths migrate to urban areas;  
C = Rise in the demand for security guards’ positions;  
D = There is no impact

1. Andhra Pradesh: Respondents in all categories indicated that Maoist violence has only minimum impact on the employment sector in Andhra Pradesh. Respondents answered ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ to four pre-determined impacts of extremism on the

employment sector. Barely 11.5 per cent common people, 38 per cent experts and 20 per cent security force personnel acknowledged such an impact. Migration of the rural youth to more secure urban areas was pointed as the most notable impact of extremism on the employment scene. Over 69 per cent common people and 82 per cent experts indicated that extremism in rural areas has led the youths migrate to urban areas. However, among the security forces, only 40 per cent respondents ascribed the youth migration to extremism. Only 45 per cent common people and 32 per cent experts indicated that prevalent extremism has led to job losses in the affected areas. Sounding a differing note, 80 per cent among the security forces said that such job losses have occurred due to prevalence of extremism. Demand for security guards position, a direct corollary of an atmosphere of fear, has caught up in many of the Maoist affected states. While 60 per cent each in the experts’ and security forces personnel category said that such a trend is visible in Andhra Pradesh as well, among the common people only 38 per cent said that there has been a rise in demand for security guards’ positions.

2. Chhattisgarh: In a similar vein, respondents in all categories indicated that Maoist violence has serious impact on the employment sector in Chhattisgarh. Over 97 per cent common people, and 91.8 per cent experts including all the nine security force personnel acknowledged such an impact. 99 per cent common people and marginally less 90 per cent experts (including all the security force personnel) indicated that prevalent extremism has led to job losses in the affected areas. Almost 100 per cent (199 respondents) common people and 96 per cent experts (including all the security force personnel) indicated that Maoist violence is leading to migration of youth from the more affected rural areas to the relatively safer urban areas of Chhattisgarh. Demand for security guards’ position also appeared to be catching up in a backward state like Chhattisgarh. More than 94 per cent common people (189 respondents), 74 per cent experts and 100 per cent security force personnel said that there has been a rise in demand for security guards’ positions.

3. Jharkhand: Over 80 per cent common people, 84 per cent experts and 75 per cent security force personnel acknowledged such an impact. Migration of the rural youth to
more secure urban areas was pointed as the most notable impact of extremism on unemployment avenues. Over 97 per cent common people and 94 per cent experts including all the security force personnel indicated that extremism in rural areas has led the youths migrate to urban areas. 73 per cent common people, 68 per cent experts and over 83 per cent security force personnel indicated that prevalent extremism has led to job losses in the affected areas. 92 per cent common people (184 respondents), 78 per cent experts (39 respondents) and 100 per cent security force personnel said that there has been a rise in demand for security guards’ positions, a direct corollary of an atmosphere of fear.

E. On Politics and Government:

On a visit to the Maoist-affected states of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, in September 2009, the Union Home Minster said that he was unaware of any politician-Maoist nexus. “I don’t know. But if a politician mixes with Naxalites, I think he will eventually pay a price. If any names are brought to my notice, certainly I will take action,” he said.183 Again during a media interview in July 2010 Home Minister Chidambaram said that “During election time, there were instances of linkages between mainstream political parties and some Naxal elements in order to get candidates elected or defeated.” He however, maintained that “This is based on intelligence, not evidence.”184 A senior police official in Raipur too echoed the Home Minister’s assertion. “At times there have been allegations of such nexus being in existence. But these charges have not been proved so far. It may be existing (sic) at individual level but never at any party level in Chhattisgarh. No way has it had any impact on the democratic set up of the state.”185 A prominent NGO activist too agreed, “At least in Chhattisgarh, there is no such political nexus as reportedly seen in states like Jharkhand.”186

183 “Army not to be used against Maoists: Chidambaram”, Hindu, September 25, 2009.
184 Rohini Singh, “CPI Maoists are the most crafty capitalists in the country: P Chidambaram”, Economic Times, July 22, 2010.
185 Interview with Mr R K Vij, Inspector General of Police Planning and Operation in PHQ and Chhattisgarh State Police Spokesperson, held at Raipur on November 25, 2009.
186 Interview with Himanshu Kumar, Director, Vanvashi Chetna Ashram, held at Dantewada on December 15, 2009.
Nexus between the politicians and the Maoists thrived for several years before the formation of the CPI-Maoist. Former Chief Minister N T Rama Rao had publicly praised the Naxalites as ‘patriots’ and indirectly sought their support when he first contested in the polls to the State Legislature in 1983. The Andhra Pradesh High Court in 1997 appointed an Advocates Committee on Naxalite Terrorism in Andhra Pradesh. Speaking before the Committee, two former Congress Ministers ‘categorically admitted that, at the time of every election, theirs’ as well as those of the Telugu Desam Party (TDP), buy the support of the extremists’. A senior and highly respected Communist leader from the State, Koratala Satyanarayana, was of the opinion that this has been the case for the ‘last 30 to 40 years’.

Retired DGP M V Bhaskar Rao, however, said, “The nexus is both at individual level and also party level, however, was contained to certain pockets only.” Even Naxalites benefited from the links with the politicians. A senior police official told, “We can not call it nexus. But such adjustments are common in rural political space. Even extremists compromise with police and political leaders some times.” Naxalites, also carried out attacks on Ministers and Chief Ministers of the State who were seen as favouring strong action against the extremists. This trend, for obvious reasons, has undergone some change. With the Naxals on the back foot, nexus with them brings in little political mileage. However, it is also believed that some of the local parties are still linked with the extremists. For example, media reports quoting intelligence sources indicated that the Telangana Rashtra Samiti (TRS) fighting for a separate Telangana State is linked with the Maoists. Andhra Pradesh police sources told the media that Maoists have penetrated the Telangana movement through students and other sympathisers.

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188 ibid.
189 Interview with M V Bhaskar Rao, Former DGP, held in Hyderabad.
190 Interview with Ms. Rupinder Virk, Senior Police official (Intelligence Branch), held at Hyderabad.
The Study attempted to elicit perceptions of the respondents regarding level of impact of extremism on politics in Andhra Pradesh. The respondents in the common people and experts’ category were asked four questions in this regard.

**Is there any impact of Maoists on politics in your state?**  
(Common people and Experts)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Common People</th>
<th>Experts</th>
<th>Security Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>75% Yes</td>
<td>75% Yes</td>
<td>71% Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25% No</td>
<td>25% No</td>
<td>29% No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. **Andhra Pradesh:** 72 per cent of the common people (144 respondents) confirmed the impact of Maoist extremism over politics in Andhra Pradesh. The Experts and the security forces were, however, differed. Among the experts only 42 per cent (21 respondents) indicated that such an impact is a reality in Andhra Pradesh. The security forces were even more categorical in stating that such impact does not exist in the State. Only 20 per cent security force personnel could confirm the impact of extremism on politics.

2. **Chhattisgarh:** No ambiguity was recorded in the opinion of either the common people or the experts regarding the impact of Maoist extremism on politics in Chhattisgarh. 91 per cent (182 respondents) in the common people category replied in the affirmative. This was supported by 96 per cent (48 respondents) experts. Among the security personnel, all the nine respondents, replied in the affirmative.
3. Jharkhand: Over 61 per cent of the common people respondents confirmed the impact of Maoist extremism over politics in Jharkhand. Experts and the security force personnel were more categorical. 86 per cent (43 respondents) in the experts’ category and close to 92 per cent among the security officials replied in the affirmative. Patterns of responses were uniform across rural, semi-urban as well as urban settings.

The survey elicited responses from the participants from all categories if nexus between the politicians and the Maoists is of common occurrence in their states.

Is it common to find a nexus between politicians and Maoists in your state?
(Common people, Experts and Security force personnel)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Common People</th>
<th>Experts</th>
<th>Security Force</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><img src="image" alt="Common People" /></td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Experts" /></td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Security Force" /></td>
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</table>

1. Andhra Pradesh: Among the common people, majority 84 per cent replied in the positive. While only 24 respondents replied in the positive, two common people opted for the ‘Cannot Say’ option. Similar to the trend in the previous question, 52.1 per cent experts indicated that politician-extremist nexus is not common in the State. Only 23 of the 48 experts who answered the query said that it is common to find politician and Maoist nexus.

2. Chhattisgarh: Out of the 200 participants in the common people category, majority 65.2 per cent (129 respondents) replied in the negative. While 62 respondents replied in
the positive, only seven common people opted for the ‘Cannot Say’ option. The experts appeared to be comparatively less categorical in denying the recurrence of politician-extremist nexus. Fifty-one per cent (25 respondents) of the 49 experts who answered the question said that it is not common to find politician and Maoist nexus in Chhattisgarh. Among the security force personnel, seven of the nine respondents endorsed such a viewpoint. The response indicated that politician-extremist nexus in the state is fairly uncommon in Chhattisgarh.

3. Jharkhand: Out of the 200 participants in the common people category, majority 89.5 per cent (179 respondents) replied in the positive. The experts appeared to be even more categorical in confirming the recurrence of politician-extremist nexus. 92 per cent (46 respondents) of the 50 experts who participated in the survey said that it is common to find politician and Maoist nexus in Jharkhand. Among the security force personnel, eleven of the 12 respondents endorsed such a viewpoint. The response indicated that politician-extremist nexus is fairly common in Jharkhand.

**Whether politicians/ political parties take help of extremists during elections?**

( Common people, Experts and Security force personnel)
1. **Andhra Pradesh**: Responding to the query ‘whether politicians/ political parties take the help of extremists during elections to influence voting’, overwhelming 82.7 per cent of the common people respondents answered in positive. Both the experts and the security force personnel too endorsed such belief. Of the 49 experts who answered the query, 37 said that the politicians/ political parties take the help of the extremists. Out of the five security forces, four endorsed the phenomenon.

2. **Chhattisgarh**: Close to 67 per cent of the 198 common people respondents said that they believe such a phenomenon is a reality. Both the experts and the security force personnel endorsed such a belief. Of the 50 experts who answered the query, 37 said that the politicians/political parties take the help of the extremists. Out of the nine security officials who answered the query, five had similar opinion.

3. **Jharkhand**: An overwhelming 92 per cent of the 200 common people respondents answered in the positive. The experts, who include the security force personnel, too endorsed such a belief. Of the 50 experts who answered the query, 49 said that the politicians/ political parties take the help of the extremists. Out of the 12 security officials, 11 too agreed with the view.

**Whether extremists use armed movement as a stepping stone to mainstream politics?**

(Common people, Experts and Security force personnel)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Common People</th>
<th>Experts</th>
<th>Security Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>36% Yes</td>
<td>57% Yes</td>
<td>52% Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53% Can't say</td>
<td>43% Can't say</td>
<td>48% Can't say</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11% No</td>
<td>11% No</td>
<td>11% No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. **Andhra Pradesh:** Opinions among the common people were clearly divided on the political aspirations of the Maoist leaders. While 58 respondents said that extremists do use their career in extremism as a stepping stone to politics, 55 respondents replied in negative. 23 respondents chose the ‘can not say’ option. Experts, however, were more emphatic in rejecting the assertion that extremists have any political aspiration. Over 67 per cent (27 respondents) experts including all the security force personnel said that political positions are not the real objective of the Maoist leaders. While the common people appeared were divided on the real intentions of the Maoists, majority of the experts appeared to believe that Maoists are not pursuing a political career.

2. **Chhattisgarh:** While 68 per cent (136 respondents) of the 200 respondents said that extremists do use their career in extremism as a stepping stone to politics, 45 respondents replied in the negative. Nineteen respondents chose the ‘cannot say’ option. In a similar trend, 68 per cent (34 respondents) of the experts, said that political positions are the real objective of the Maoist leaders. Among the security force personnel, 88.9 per cent believed in the same. The response was another expression of the lack of belief on the aims and objectives of the Maoists who say they want to bring about a revolution to change the country’s power structure.

3. **Jharkhand:** While 51 per cent (102 respondents) of the 200 respondents said that extremists do use their career in extremism as a stepping stone to politics, 88 respondents replied in the negative. 72 per cent (144 respondents) experts including 66.7 per cent (eight respondents) security force personnel said that political positions are the real objective of the Maoist leaders. While the common people appeared divided on the real intentions of the Maoists, experts appeared fully convinced that given a chance the Maoists would pursue a political career.
F. On Economy & Development:

Union Home Minister P Chidambaram in a speech in June 2010 said,

“The Naxals are supposed to be pro-poor, I am supposed to be not pro-poor. The pro-poor Naxals in the year 2009 alone blasted 71 school buildings, 23 panchayat bhavans, 7 transmission poles, and 67 telephone and mobile telephone towers. There are 46 instances of damaging railway infrastructure, 2 power plants, 3 mines and 100s of culverts and bridges and long stretches running into 100s of kilometres of roads.”192

The impact of Maoist violence on the resource rich and yet underdeveloped Chhattisgarh is well documented. In the name of providing a better development alternative, Maoists have systematically destroyed the existing infrastructure in the area. In order to keep their support base intact within the poor and backward tribal population, they prevent government’s development initiatives in the region. A senior police official commented, “It (Maoist activity) has certainly affected the state since the Maoists usually had influence in areas rich in natural and mineral resources in Chhattisgarh. Service sector too remained affected. Had the Maoists not being there in the state, the progress would have been by great.”193

The impact of Maoist violence on the mineral rich Jharkhand has been enormous. Alleging that the private and public sector companies would take away the lands of the tribals, exploit them and accentuate their poverty, Maoists have opposed the entry of such companies into the resource rich areas. Tata Steel managing director H M Nerurkar, during a media interaction in August 2010 indicated that political instability and Naxal activities continue to have an adverse impact on industries as well as the growth of Jharkhand. Nerurkar was reported to have told that while Maoist activities impeded the growth of the industrial sector, political instability hampered implementation of long-term policies and schemes. Identifying problems like the suspension of trains passing

193 Interview with Mr SRP Kalluri, Deputy Inspector General of Police (anti-naxal operation), held at Bastar on January 10, 2010.
through Naxal-affected areas at night\textsuperscript{194}, Nerurkar said, could affect investment in the state as it does not have adequate air-connectivity.\textsuperscript{195}

In the coal-rich state of Jharkhand, Maoists are said to control almost the entire illegal mining of coal. They constitute the mining mafia there, where about 700,000 tons of coal is illegally mined annually.\textsuperscript{196} Similarly, they collect protection money from most companies that have set up units in Jharkhand. In the absence of payment, either attacks are carried out on the company personnel or the equipments are damaged. In June 2010, Maoists set afire two payloader equipments belonging to two industrial groups (Adhunik goup and Runta Group of Industries) at Gua in West Singhbhum district. Maoists also beat up some employees of the industries before fleeing from the spot.\textsuperscript{197} Maoist instigated tribal opposition has put on hold steel giant Arcelor Mittal’s $9 billion steel projects in Jharkhand.\textsuperscript{198}

In Andhra Pradesh, in the second half of 2001, the PWG in an apparent change of strategy started targeting industrial establishments. Industries were not on the hit list of these extremists until this point. Units owned by corporate houses and political leaders’ families were singled out for attacks. Within a span of two days, on 29 & 30 November 2001, PWG cadres orchestrated blasts destroying a milk factory owned by the then Chief Minister N.Chandrababu Naidu’s family in Chittoor district, a granite unit of the then Union Minister of State for Defence U.V. Krishnam Raju at Chegunta in Medak district, and a coffee powder factory of the Tata group at Toopran, also in Medak district. The attacks were carried out to mark the first anniversary of the formation of the People’s

\textsuperscript{194} “Several trains cancelled, diverted due to Maoist strike”, Times of India, July 7, 2010.
\textsuperscript{195} “Left Wing Extremism affecting Jharkhand industries, says Tata official”, http://www.myjamshedpur.com/news/Left_Wing_Extremism_affecting_Jharkhand_industries_says_Tata_official
Guerrilla Army (PGA) on 2 December 2000.\textsuperscript{199} The targeting of industries scared away prospective investors and upset the State government’s plans to create an industry-friendly atmosphere in Andhra Pradesh.

While such activity has reduced over the years, Maoist clout in the neighbouring states continues to have an impact on the industries in Andhra Pradesh. For example, in June 2009, the 267-kilometre long Essar pipeline, which carries iron ore slurry from a beneficiation plant at Bailadilla in Chhattisgarh to its pellet plant at Visakhapatnam in Andhra Pradesh was blown up by Naxalites near Chitragonda in Orissa.\textsuperscript{200}

**Impact on economy and development (Experts)**

1. **Andhra Pradesh:** The experts and the security force personnel were categorical on the negative impact of extremism on economy and development in Andhra Pradesh. Out of the 50 experts 42 said that the impact has been negative. These 42 experts were asked to respond to three pre-determined types of impact of Maoist extremism on economy and development. Explaining their response, close to 88 per cent of the experts said extremism has retarded development initiatives and activities in backward regions.


Similarly, close to 95 per cent experts supported the assumption that extremism has reduced the motivation of agencies/officials towards public service on ground of security.

2. Chhattisgarh: All the 50 experts including nine security force personnel said that the impact has been negative. Explaining their response, 90 per cent (45 respondents) experts said that the extremist groups have exploited local resources to generate funds and buy weapons. Barring a lone security force personnel, the rest eight in that category agreed with the statement. Further, 98 per cent of the experts and 100 per cent security force personnel said extremism has retarded development initiatives and activities in backward regions. Similarly, 98 per cent experts and 100 per cent security force personnel supported the assumption that extremism allows agencies/officials to abstain from work citing security reasons.

3. Jharkhand: Out of the 50 experts 42 said that the impact has been negative. Out of the 12 security force personnel whose responses were analysed separately, eight described the impact as negative. Explaining their response, 88.6 per cent experts said that the extremist groups have exploited local resources to generate funds and buy weapons. All the eight security force personnel agreed with the statement. Further, close to 98 per cent of the experts and 100 per cent security force personnel said extremism has retarded development initiatives and activities in backward regions. Similarly, close to 98 per cent experts and 100 per cent security force personnel indicated that prevalence of extremism allows the agencies/officials to cite security reasons for abstaining from duty.

Regular disruption of vehicular traffic has its impact on the supply and availability of essential goods in the remote areas of many Naxal affected states. This was found to be a reality during the Study on Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand. A former Maoist said, “when the Naxalites call bandh (sic), then the losses incurred are immense as most of the activities like business side, development work etc. comes to a standstill.”

For example, on 7 & 8 July 2010, the CPI-Maoist called for a bandh in protest against the alleged fake

201 Interview with Prashant Thakur (Mandeep Singh), a former top naxal commander incharge for Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, held on January 24, 2010.
encounter killing of its senior leader Azad. Although urban areas in Chhattisgarh were not affected, normal life was paralysed and transportation disrupted in interior regions of the state.\textsuperscript{202} Tribal villagers were the worst-affected with the transport services, including buses and auto-rickshaws, remaining off roads in the entire Bastar division, barring the district headquarters. Traffic on national highways 221, 6 and 43 was also affected due to fear of Maoist attacks. Railway authorities also cancelled the lone passenger train plying between Jagdalpur and Kirandul in Dantewada district and suspended night-running of goods trains on the route as a precautionary measure.\textsuperscript{203}

Surprisingly in Andhra Pradesh too, where security situation has improved significantly, Maoists appeared to be impacting on the availability of essential commodities. Not surprisingly, on 7 July 2010, the 48-hour bandh called by the CPI-Maoist to protest the killing of their spokesperson Azad affected normal life in Maoist-infested 11 tribal Agency areas in the coastal districts of Srikakulam, Vizianagaram and Visakhapatnam. The East Coast Railways authorities cancelled some trains in the areas bordering Andhra Pradesh and Orissa in view of the reported threat by Maoists to target trains.\textsuperscript{204}

Impact on availability of essential commodities (Experts and Security force personnel)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experts</th>
<th>security force personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A 69%</td>
<td>A 52.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B 85%</td>
<td>B 76.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C 82.6%</td>
<td>C 83.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D 6.8%</td>
<td>D 12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A = Rise in the price of essential commodities
B = Supply of essential commodity due to bandhs announced by extremists
C = Shops remain closed due to extortion demands by the extremist
D = There is no impact

1. Andhra Pradesh: Close to 88 percent of the 50 experts who answered the query regarding the impact of extremism on the availability of essential commodities in Andhra Pradesh said that such an impact is felt regularly. Among the security forces, 75 per cent respondents agreed with this view point. 72 per cent experts felt that Maoist extremism has an adverse impact on the price of such commodities. 80 per cent experts said that bandhs called by the Maoists result in short supply of essential commodities. 87.8 per cent experts including 100 per cent security force personnel said that shops and other business establishments remain shut due to the extortion demands by the Maoists.

2. Chhattisgarh: Ninety-four percent (47 respondents) of the 50 experts who answered the query regarding the impact of extremism on the availability of essential commodities in Chhattisgarh said that such an impact is felt regularly. Seventy-two per cent experts and 66.7 per cent security force personnel felt that Maoist extremism affects the price of
such commodities. Eighty-two per cent experts and 88.9 per cent security force personnel said that bandhs called by the Maoists result in short supply of essential commodities. Eighty-two per cent experts and 66.7 per cent security force personnel said that extortion demands lead to shutting down of shops and other business establishments.

3. Jharkhand: Close to 98 percent of the 50 experts said that such an impact is a reality. This included all the 12 security force personnel who participated in the survey. Sixty-two per cent experts and 91.7 per cent security force personnel felt that Maoist extremism has an adverse impact on the price of such commodities. 94 per cent experts and 100 per cent security force personnel said that bandhs called by the Maoists result in short supply of essential commodities. 78 per cent experts and 83.3 per cent security force personnel said that shops and other business establishments remain shut due to extortion by the Maoists.

Extremists have systematically targeted industrial infrastructure and this has been an integral component of Maoist strategy. At its first Unity Congress in 2004, the CPI-Maoist leadership had detailed its violent vision for its struggle and their stand on various issues, including industrialisation. The document ‘The Call of the Unity Congress’, declares its opposition to the present economic policies of ‘globalisation, liberalisation and privatisation being pursued by the ruling classes.’ The resolution also calls on the “vast oppressed peasant masses to rise as a storm against these policies to sweep away their oppressors and establishes their own people’s political power in every village.”

The Unity Congress also named “huge projects like POSCO, Kalinganagar, bauxite mines in Orissa; Chargaon and Raoghat in Chhattisgarh, bauxite mines and Polavaram project in AP [Andhra Pradesh], iron ore mines and uranium projects in Jharkhand”, accusing them of massive displaceinent of adivasis and their marginalization. Besides, the Maoists also named the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) for identified opposition.

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206 ibid.
Again on 24 June 2010, the CPI-Maoist declared that it would “rise up as a collective fist to drive out MNCs”\textsuperscript{207} from the country.

**Impact on private economic investment (Experts and Security force personnel)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Experts</th>
<th>security force personnel</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A = Investors are afraid of investing in the state</td>
<td>91.3%</td>
<td>86.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B = Extremists try to extort money from the business houses</td>
<td>93.3%</td>
<td>96.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C = Frequent attacks have taken place on business establishment</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>80.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D = Extremists have abducted/ killed businessmen and/ or their associates</td>
<td>81.9%</td>
<td>92.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\footnotesize{A = Investors are afraid of investing in the state  
B = Extremists try to extort money from the business houses  
C = Frequent attacks have taken place on business establishment  
D = Extremists have abducted/ killed businessmen and/ or their associates}

1. **Andhra Pradesh**: Responding to queries on the impact of Maoist violence on private economic investment, 84 per cent of the 50 experts and 60 per cent of the security force personnel (calculated separately) who responded to the query said that the investors are afraid of investing in the state. Another 98 per cent experts including all the five security force personnel also said that the extremists try to extort money from the business houses. Where as only 46 per cent experts confirmed that frequent attacks have taken place on business establishments, among the security forces 60 per cent said that such attacks have indeed taken place. 83.7 per cent experts and 100 per cent security force personnel confirmed that Maoists have abducted or killed businessmen and their associates on a number of occasions.

2. **Chhattisgarh:** 94 per cent of the 50 experts including all the nine security force personnel who responded to the query said that the investors are afraid of investing in the state. Another 86 per cent experts and 88.9 per cent security force personnel also said that the extremists try to extort money from the business houses. Similarly, 82 per cent experts and 88.9 per cent security officials interviewed (calculated separately) confirmed that frequent attacks have taken place on business establishments. Another 76 per cent experts and 77.8 per cent security force personnel confirmed that Maoists have abducted or killed businessmen and their associates on a number of occasions.

3. **Jharkhand:** 96 per cent of the 50 experts including all the 12 security force personnel (calculated separately) who responded to the query said that the investors are reluctant to invest in the state. Another 96 per cent experts including all the 12 security force personnel also said that the extremists try to extort money from the business houses. Similarly, 82 per cent experts and 91.7 per cent security forces confirmed that frequent attacks have taken place on business establishments. Another 86 per cent experts and 100 per cent security force personnel confirmed that Maoists on a number of occasions have either abducted or killed businessmen and their associates.

A senior journalist in Andhra Pradesh said, “Extremists had supported and never targeted officers who took development and welfare of poor seriously.” A senior police official too agreed. She said, “Extremists have attacked only those officials and contractors who try to veto their influence and not general administration or development activities. Senior officials and contractors always compromise with extremists in executing major development activities to have a trouble free environment. Even politicians do the same.”

Abduction and killing of government as well as business house officials by Maoists is fairly common in most Maoist affected states. Way back on 27 December 1987, seven Indian Administrative Service (IAS) officers, including Principal Secretary of the Andhra Pradesh government were abducted by the PWG in the Agency area in East Godavari district. The outfit demanded the release of its arrested senior leader

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208 Interview with Pothuri Venkateswar Rao, former editor of *Eenadu, Vaartha, Andhra Prabha* and also a member of the dialogue committee with Maoists in 2004, held in Hyderabad.

209 Interview with Ms. Rupinder Virk, Senior Police official (Intelligence Branch), held in Hyderabad.
Wadkapur Chandramouli alias Ramana and six other extremists. On 29 December 1987, the State government released all seven extremists to secure the release of these officials. Buoyed by this success PWG resorted to frequent kidnappings of government and village officials, landlords and policemen. According to an estimate, between 1988 and 1992, 445 cases of abductions were reported from Andhra Pradesh. In more recent instances, on 2 January 2002, PWG cadres abducted four government officials are abducted from Guntur district. These officials were later released.

Similar attacks on businessmen too have been reported. On 19 June 2006, Naxalites belonging to the CPI-ML-Pratighatana group abducted senior General Manager of the Nagarjuna Cements Limited, V.V. Rama Raju and his colleague Galib Saheb from the factory premises in Kadimpothavaram in G. Conduru mandal in Vijayawada district. The abductors demanded Rupees one crore ransom. However, both captives were reportedly set free following police operations. While V.V. Rama Raju was released on 21 June 2006, Galib was released the next day. On 3 June 2008, Maoists killed Andhra Pradesh businessman N. Ramakrishna and his associates T. Laxmaiah and S. Nagaraju, all residents of Chintakunta village in the Charla mandal of Khammam district in the adjacent Dantewada district of Chhattisgarh.

On 27 March 2010, Maoists abducted eight officials of the Chhattisgarh government and the Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL) unit--Bhilai Steel Plant (BSP) in Durg district. The abducted officials were released the next day. On 21 April 2010, Maoists killed a local businessman, Vinay Kodium, suspecting him of being a police informer in Bijapur district. Back in June 2009, Maoists had killed a tribal leader Vimal Meshram, who was the president of Lohandiguda village council in Bastar district, for supporting

the TATA Steel project. On 20 June 2009, Maoists abducted and shot dead an official of the Chhattisgarh government in Bijapur district. The bullet-ridden body of M.D. Gandhi, the sub-divisional officer with water resource department, was found on 21 June 2009 in a forested area in the district. These are only few examples of a sustained regime of fear and retribution let loose by the Maoists on government functionaries and business people.

Abduction and killing of government as well as business house officials by Maoists is fairly common in Jharkhand. Most abduction cases are related to unpaid extortion. Government officials are at times abducted to secure releases of arrested Maoists. In March 2010, Maoists abducted four top government officials—an Additional Collector, an Executive Engineer, an officer in the dairy department and an Assistant Engineer—in Latehar district. All these officials were, however, released. In February 2010, Maoists abducted a Block Development Officer (BDO) and released him after 14 Maoists were released by the State administration. The pace of work at Abhijeet Group’s flagship project, Corporate Power Limited (CPL), which was setting up a power plant at Chandwa in the Latehar district slowed down after Maoists killed four of its security guards in April 2009. On 17 August 2009, 10 staff of aluminium company HINDALCO were abucted by the Maoists. Though they were subsequently rescued, the incident came as a rude shock to the company, which has a plant in Muri in Latehar. These are only few examples of a sustained regime of fear and retribution let loose by the Maoists on government functionaries and business people.

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218 “BDO set free as Soren buckles”, Indian Express, February 26, 2010.
Killing/ abduction of government officials/ business people
(Common people, Experts and Security force personnel)

1. Andhra Pradesh: Out of the 200 common people who participated in the survey, close to 60 per cent (119 respondents) confirmed that Maoists in Andhra Pradesh have killed and abducted government as well as businessmen. Out of the 48 experts who answered the query, 29 including all the five security force personnel confirmed the trend.

2. Chhattisgarh: All the 200 common people confirmed that Maoists in Chhattisgarh have killed and abducted government as well as businessmen. Out of the 50 experts who answered the query, 47 including all the nine security force personnel confirmed the trend.

3. Jharkhand: Out of the 200 common people, 94 per cent (188 respondents) confirmed that Maoists in Jharkhand have killed and abducted government servants as well as businessmen. Out of the 50 experts who answered the query, 49 including all the 12 security force personnel had similar opinion.
G. Perception of the Government:

Has extremism made the government look at the area differently?
(Experts and Security force personnel)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experts</th>
<th>Security Force Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes 67%</td>
<td>Yes 60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No 33%</td>
<td>No 40%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Andhra Pradesh: Fifty-six per cent of the 50 experts who responded to the question, ‘whether extremism made the government look at the area differently’ answered positively. Security forces, however, differed with the opinion expressed by their experts counterparts. All the security force personnel indicated that extremism has not brought about any change in the attitude of the government towards the area. Elaborating their response 14 experts said that the now development activities are reaching remote areas. Three more experts added that the government is giving priority to development issues to lure extremists away from violent activities. Another six experts said that the state of extremism has pushed the government to provide more security forces to the State.

2. Chhattisgarh: Eighty-two per cent of the 50 experts who responded to the question, ‘whether extremism made the government look at the area differently’ answered positively. Close to 78 per cent of the security forces too shared similar opinion. Noting the positive as well as negative connotations of such a phenomenon, seven experts indicated the problem of Left Wing Extremism has brought the central and the state government together. Another six experts said that development issues are getting a
priority as a result of the prevailing conflict. Nineteen experts, however, believed that the central and state governments are still playing blame game on each other on the issue of extremism, resulting in a weak response to Maoist activities.

3. **Jharkhand**: Over 63 per cent of the 49 experts who responded to the question, ‘whether extremism has made the government look at the area differently’ answered in the positive. Security officials, however, differed with the opinion expressed by their expert counterparts. Over 58 per cent indicated that extremism has not brought about any change in the attitude of the government towards the area. Six experts including three security force personnel said that the region is seen as a troubled area. Another six experts said that the state of extremism has pushed the government to initiate development activities to lure the extremists away from the path of violence.

**Reimbursement made to the Naxalite affected states under Security Related Expenditure Scheme**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Andhra Pradesh</th>
<th>Chhattisgarh</th>
<th>Jharkhand</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008-09</td>
<td>582.59</td>
<td>2011.64</td>
<td>2350.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009-10</td>
<td>227.51</td>
<td>3614.24</td>
<td>1111.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key Findings of the Survey:**

**Northeast**

- Respondents indicated that extremism has had a negative impact on the society (Common People – 79.6%) as well as on the economy and development of the Northeast (Professionals – 90.2%, Security Officials – 95%). Majority of the

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respondents (Professionals – 86.4%) indicated that extremism has retarded development initiatives and activities in backward regions of Northeast.

- According to majority of the respondents (Professionals – 77.2%), extremism has provided an excuse for official inactivity, corruption and neglect in the region. Survey of open source literature had underlined the role played by an ineffective and detached bureaucracy in the underdevelopment of region, which continues to provide a lifeline to the extremists.

- Factors like growing unemployment continue to make extremism a viable career option for the youth. However, this trend is undergoing gradual change, although the pace at which such change is occurring is far too slow for comfort.

- Prevalence of conflict situation was described as having affected normal functioning of educational institutions in the affected areas. (Common People – 58.2%, Professionals – 66.8%) People believe that extremism has, to an extent, contributed to the dropout rate in schools and teachers absenteeism.

- The literature survey had indicated of a nexus between the politicians and extremists of the region. The survey also corroborated the same notion. Majority of the respondents (Common People – 75.6%, Professionals – 71.6%) believed that there exists a nexus between the politicians and militants. Respondents said that extremists remain an effective tool of garnering political support, especially during elections. Situations in states like Tripura were, however, described to be different.

- Majority of the respondents (Professionals – 57.7%) believed that because of the problem of extremism, Northeast is being looked at as a troubled spot and hence, more attention is being paid to the security situation rather than to development issues. This appeared to be a notion which has been traditionally reiterated by the media and appears to have stuck in spite of the change in the situation.
• Majority of the respondents (Professionals – 72.2%) tried establishing a causal link between the extremism with the high presence of army and para-military forces in the region. Writings in the media by security experts, on the other hand, indicate the presence of security forces is inadequate and vacancy in the police forces needs to be filled up urgently.

• Majority of the respondents (Common People – 53.2%), especially those living in the rural areas, are first hand witnesses to the operations by security forces. However, barring a few respondents (60 out of 700 respondants), most respondents revealed that they had not faced misbehaviour by the security force personnel. This is in contrast to the widely believed perception that the security forces misbehave with general public during their search operations.

Left Wing Extremism Affected States

• An overwhelming majority of respondents underlined the negative impact of Left Wing Extremism on society (Common People – 84.4%) and as well as on economy and development (Professionals – 89.3%, Security Officials – 82.2%) of their respective states.

• Respondents in Jharkhand (Common People – 83.5%, Professionals – 92%) and Chhattisgarh (Common People – 100%, Professionals – 96%) indicated that education in their respective states has suffered severely due to Left Wing Extremism. Either the naxalites have destroyed the school buildings or the security forces have turned the schools into barracks for accommodation.

• Respondents in Chhattisgarh (Common People – 91%, Professionals – 96%) and Jharkhand (Common People – 61%, Professionals – 86%) indicated that Left Wing Extremism has had serious impact on the political scene of the state. Although in states like Chhattisgarh, the nexus is mostly confined to individual politicians, in Jharkhand, all political parties have been accused of nexus with the
extremists for electoral gains. The improved security situation in Andhra Pradesh appeared to have brought about a decline in the extremist-politician nexus. However, the Telangana statehood agitation is again being used by the Naxalites to stage a comeback into the state.

- Recruitment of children by the Naxalites is an acknowledged fact. The CPI-Maoist has formed Bal Sangham to recruit children who receive training as couriers and also as future armed cadres. A significant portion of the respondents (Common People – 44.3%, Professionals – 69.3%) confirmed the recruitment of children by Naxalites. In addition, they also indicated that private militias and anti-Naxal vigilante groups like the Salwa Judum in Chhattisgarh too have roped in children for their activities.

- Respondents (Common People – 68.4%, Professionals – 76.7%) felt that explosion of landmines and IEDs have remained a primary mode of attacks by the Naxalites. This is supported by available open source information. Over the years, the Naxalites have perfected the art of assembling IEDs and increasing their lethality and such explosions continue to claim civilian as well as SF lives.
CHAPTER-V: STATE RESPONSE AND END GAME

Speaking at the Chief Minister’s Conference on Internal Security on 1 February 2011, Home Minister P Chidambaram claimed that the internal security situation in India has vastly improved over the last two years. Indicating that “No country in the world appears to be entirely immune to the threat of terror”, Chidambaram went to provide an assessment of the internal security situation in the country.

“There has been a dramatic change in the situation in the Northeast. 2010 witnessed the lowest level of violence in many years. Barring Assam and Manipur, the other states have shown remarkable improvement. Nine insurgent groups are in talks with the Government or are poised to commence talks. The time has come to change our perceptions of the insurgent groups. So long as they are willing to talk and reach honourable and just settlements, we must treat their leaders honourably and fairly; we must give their cadres an opportunity to return to the mainstream of society and start new lives; and we must prepare the people for reconciliation. We hope to be able to conclude agreements with some of the groups in the near future.”

Where as situation in the Northeast has indeed improved, the left-wing extremist situation continues to be a serious. The Home Minister accepted,

“Left-wing extremism or Left Wing Extremism remains a grave challenge. Looking back at 2010, my assessment is that there is a kind of a stalemate. The State governments concerned cannot claim any major advance, nor should we conclude that the CPI (Maoist) has gained the upper hand. There is no dilution in our two-pronged approach of development and police action to contain the challenge of Left Wing Extremism. I am of the firm view that our two-pronged approach will succeed, but we must be resolute and patient.”

It was crucial for this Study, however, to understand the popular perception on state response to extremism over the years. The questionnaire attempted to generate responses on a wide range of issues relating to state response and what the participants believed is the best way to tackle extremism.
SECTION A: NORTHEASTERN STATES

A. Special Laws and Special Forces:

The alleged draconian anti-terrorism legislations such as the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA) have been a rallying point for a number of movements in the Northeast, especially Manipur. In Nagaland, anti-terrorism legislation the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA) has been in existence since 1958, when it was first enacted by Parliament to contain Naga dissidence. In Tripura, AFSPA was enforced in 1997 in 34 of the 64 police stations. Notwithstanding the improvement in the extremist situation, the Left Front government has extended the AFSPA periodically. As per last available information, the Act was extended for six months starting September 2010. Common people as well as the human right activists believe that these legislations provide unnecessary extra power to the security forces which allows their misuse. They allege that in spite of the existence of such legislations for decades, the security situation remains unchanged. Thus, there is a need to re-look at the continuity of such legislations which have encouraged large scale human rights violations. The security forces especially the army, on the other hand, have maintained that they need these laws to deal with insurgency. Opposing any dilution in the Act, Army Chief General V K

221 The whole of Assam, Manipur (except Imphal Municipal area) and Nagaland, Tirap and Changlang districts of Arunachal Pradesh, and 20 km. belt in the States of Arunachal Pradesh and Meghalaya having a common border with Assam, have been declared as ‘Disturbed Areas’ under the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958 as amended in 1972. See Annual Report 2008-09, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, p.13.

222 For example, Sanjib Baruah says that the AFSPA enables stealthily, in certain situations of armed conflicts, a localized form of emergency rule. See “AFSPA encourages localized emergency rule: Expert”, Assam Tribune, January 8, 2010.


224 Amar Asom Executive Editor Prashant Rajguru said, “Security forces are lacking credibility due to their involvement in incidents like rape in rural areas.” Interview conducted on October 9, 2009 at Guwahati, Assam.
Singh said, “Any dilution of the Act will impinge adversely on the manner in which the armed forces operate. While operating against terrorists, insurgents and anti-national elements in constrained and trying circumstances, the armed forces need requisite legal protection.”\textsuperscript{226} The Act is presently under the consideration of the union cabinet.

The questionnaire asked three questions to the respondents in the common people category regarding their perception about these legislations and their impact in the region.

**Awareness regarding security legislations (Common people)**

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{chart.png}
\caption{Bar chart showing awareness regarding security legislations in Assam.}
\end{figure}

A = AFSPA (Armed Forces Special Powers Act)  
B = NSA (National Security Act)  
C = Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act

1. **Assam**: There is a great deal of awareness about the existence of laws such as the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, the National Security Act (NSA) and the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), both in rural as well as in the urban areas. Apparently, the continuing debate over the utility of such legislations has kept many informed about these acts and their impact on their daily lives. While awareness regarding AFSPA appeared to be the highest (81 per cent respondents were aware of this act), 79 per cent said that they are aware of the NSA and another 75 per cent said that

\textsuperscript{226} “AFSPA dilution will affect operations: Army chief”, Times of India, April 16, 2010.
they know about the UAPA. Compared to the urban and semi-urban areas, awareness level in the rural areas was marginally low, but no means insignificant.

2. **Manipur**: Awareness regarding the security legislations was found to be quite high among the common people. While 99.3 per cent of the respondents were aware of the AFSPA, 97.3 knew about the NSA. Similarly, 72 per cent were aware of the UAPA. The pattern of response was uniform in the rural as well as in the urban areas. Intense agitation against these acts by several organisations in the state appeared to have contributed to the level of awareness among the common people. There seems to be a popular feeling among the people against these acts and the non-removal/amendment to these legislations, in spite of promises made by the Prime Minister himself227, is adding to the feeling of alienation among the people.

3. **Meghalaya**: AFSPA is in force in the 20 kilometres area in Meghalaya bordering Assam. However, awareness regarding the security legislations including the NSA and the UAPA was found to be considerably low among the common people. Only 35 per cent of the common people surveyed had heard of AFSPA. Similarly, barely 34 and 36 per cent were aware of the NSA and the UAPA. The pattern of response was uniform in the rural as well as in the urban areas. The lack of civil society activism against these laws probably explains the low level of awareness.

4. **Nagaland**: Awareness regarding the security legislations was found to be quite high among the common people. While 86.6 per cent of the 149 respondents who answered the query were aware of the AFSPA, 75.8 per cent knew about the NSA. However, a much lesser 56.4 per cent were aware of the UAPA. Prolonged agitation against these

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227 Addressing a public rally in Imphal on December 2, 2006, Dr. Manmohan Singh had said, “I had given an assurance earlier that we will try to redress legitimate grievances on the AFSPA. A Committee had been set up to review its provisions and it has done its job. I believe that we need to consider some amendments to the Act by modifying existing provisions or inserting new provisions, whereby it could be made more humane giving due regard to the protection of basic human and civil rights ... The Home Ministry is working on this matter just as I had promised. Once these amendments are in place, I am hopeful that many of your grievances would be effectively addressed.” K V Prasad, “Manmohan's promise to Manipur”, *Hindu*, December 3, 2006.
Acts by several organisations in the state appeared to have contributed to the level of awareness among the common people.

5. Tripura: Despite the fact that AFSPA was introduced in Tripura in 1997 following a spate of murders and kidappings by extremist groups, awareness regarding the security legislations, barring the NSA that was introduced a couple of years later, was found to be rather poor among the common people. While 88 per cent were aware of the NSA, barely 35 and 43 per cent were aware of the AFSPA and the UAPA. Barring the INPT, no other organisation ever speaks of the negative impacts of these acts in the state. This probably explains the low level of awareness. The NSA’s awareness appears to be the result of its use as an instrument that could be used against the extremists as well as political opponents.

Special laws encourage growth of extremism
(Common people, Experts and Security force personnel)

1. Assam: Responding to whether such special security legislations have encouraged growth of extremism indirectly 60 per cent (120 respondents) of the common people out of 200 replied in the affirmative. Opinions of the experts, however, were evenly divided. The security force personnel rejected the assumption. A high 82.4 per cent respondents in that category (who were part of the experts category) said that special laws do not
encourage growth of terrorism. This brought into sharp focus the divergent opinion between the security forces and the common people on this issue.

2. Manipur: Close to 89 per cent (133 respondents) of the common people out of 150 said that special laws do encourage extremism. Out of the 44 experts who responded to the query, 70.5 per cent (31 respondents) replied in the affirmative. The security force personnel component among the experts, however, differed with the wisdom of the common people and the experts. Out of the 17 security force personnel who answered the query, only six (35.3 per cent) said that special security legislations have indirectly encouraged the growth of extremism.

3. Meghalaya: Responding to whether such special security legislations have encouraged growth of extremism indirectly, 49 per cent of the common people replied in the affirmative. While only 6.2 per cent disagreed with the assumption, a fairly large 45.4 per cent pleaded ignorance. The pattern of response was similar both in the rural and urban areas. Majority of the experts, however, were clear in establishing a link between the security legislations and the growth of extremism in Meghalaya. Over 69 per cent experts including security forces answered in the affirmative. Responses of the security officials, when analysed separately, contradicted the opinion of the experts. Over 58 per cent did not appear to think that a link exists between the security legislations and the growth of extremism.

4. Nagaland: 60.3 per cent (85 respondents) of the 141 common people said that the security legislations have indeed encouraged growth of extremism. At the same time, however, a sizeable number of respondents (52 respondents) replied in the negative. A lesser percentage of experts agreed with the majority opinion of the common people. Out of the 49 experts who responded to the query, 55.1 per cent (27 respondents) replied in the affirmative. The security force personnel component among the experts, however, was equally divided in their responses. While four personnel replied in the affirmative, four others differed with the collective wisdom.
5. Tripura: 47 per cent (47 respondents) of the common people out of 100 replied in the affirmative. Thirty-five persons said ‘No’, while 18 others did not respond to the question. Opinions of the experts indicated a rejection of this assumption. A very high 87 per cent maintained that there was no linkage between the security legislations and the growth of extremism. As expected, all the security force personnel who were part of the experts’ category toed a similar line. Alienation of the tribals and not excesses committed by the security forces has been the prime reason behind extremism in the state.

Should special security laws be repealed and amended?
(Common people, Experts and Security force personnel)

1. Assam: Respondents demanding repeal of these laws were in minority both among the common people and the experts (which included security force personnel). Only 15 per cent (30 respondents) common people and 20 per cent (10 respondents) experts (this included security personnel) demanded their repeal. Both the common people as well as the experts appeared to believe that such laws have their utility and can be continued with some amendments. Amendment option found favour among 41.2 per cent security personnel segment among the experts. The responses revealed that while generally such laws are considered to be important, they can be made error-prone with some
modifications or ‘humanisation’ so that the innocent persons are not inconvenienced due to their use. More than 47 per cent of the security force personnel believed that the laws should be continued in their present form.

2. Manipur: While 68.7 per cent of the common people wanted the legislations to be repealed, 28.7 per cent wanted them to be amended. Only three persons wanted them to continue in their present form. Among the experts, 26 (57.8 per cent) of the 45 persons who answered the query wanted the legislation to be repealed, while 18 others (40 per cent) wanted them to be amended. Surprisingly, the security force personnel too appeared to be favouring amendment to the legislations. 15 of the 17 security force personnel who participated in the survey wanted the acts to be amended. The majority mood among all the participants, thus, appeared to be amendment of the legislations, which appeared to have hurt the sensitivities of the people of Manipur.

3. Meghalaya: Ignorance about the security legislations was apparent as the common people answered the question whether these should be repealed, amended or left untouched. Only 16 common people said that these should be repealed. Thirty-eight respondents said these should be amended. While a lone respondent said the laws should continue in their present form, 45 respondents chose the ‘Cannot say’ option. A majority 53 per cent among the experts preferred amendment to these legislations to make them more humane. Only 12 per cent wanted their repeal, while over 34 per cent wanted them their continuation in the present form. Among the security officials, 33.3 per cent wanted their amendment, while the rest 66.7 per cent wanted their continuation.

4. Nagaland: While 42.1 per cent of the common people wanted the legislations to be repealed, 37.1 per cent wanted them to be amended. At the same time, 17.9 per cent respondents wanted them to continue in their present form. Among the experts, 21 (42.9 per cent) of the 49 persons who answered the query wanted the legislation to be repealed, while 26 others (53.1 per cent) wanted them to be amended. Only two experts (which did not include any security forces) wanted them to continue in their present form. Majority of the security force personnel too appeared to be favouring amendment to the
legislations. Five of the eight security force personnel who participated in the survey wanted the acts to be amended. Three personnel wanted the laws to be repealed. The majority mood among the common people was a repeal of the legislations, while among the experts majority preferred amendment to these Acts.

5. Tripura: Respondents demanding repeal of these laws were clearly in microscopic minority both among the common people and the experts. Only five per cent of the common people and 4.7 per cent experts demanded their repeal. The general lack of awareness among the common people regarding the laws probably translated into 52 per cent respondents favouring the continuation of the Acts in their present form. Close to 35 per cent experts (including those from the security forces) had similar opinion. Twenty eight common people, 19 of who were from the rural areas, said that the laws should be amended. Similar opinion was expressed by 60.5 per cent (26 respondents) experts. Amendment option found favour among 14.3 per cent security personnel segment among the experts, who were predominantly (85.7 per cent) in favour of the continuation of the Acts in their present form.

Past experience of successful counter-insurgency operations in Punjab, Tripura and Andhra Pradesh highlights the contribution of the state police. Police-led operations have been crucial in eroding the influence of the extremists in Tripura. Extremism that had forced the ‘abduction centre of the Northeast’ tag on Tripura not so long ago, has been considerably weakened. It is worth mentioning that capacity building among the police through police modernisation programme has been a key factor. In the words of Manik Sarkar, “Modernisation of the police forces and offensive deployment of police and para-military forces helped contain insurgency.” Capacity building among the state police further meant that the state’s dependence on central forces were comparatively less than

228 As per information on the Tripura Police website, Between 2000 and 2001, 2741 numbers of police personnel received their in-service and re-fresher training to improve their awareness and professional skills. The opening of the Jungle Warfare & Counter Insurgency School at Kachucherra by the Tripura State Rifle was another important milestone. In 2001, Tripura Police procured 158 numbers of AK-47 Rifles, 1500 number of Bullet proof jackets and was in the process of procuring 100 numbers of AK-47 Rifles. 1500 number of bullet proof jackets. “Modernisation”, Website of the Tripura Police, http://tripurapolice.nic.in/amodern.htm
the other states in the Northeast. Even in Jammu and Kashmir, the state police has done significantly well against the Pakistani-sponsored militants. The achievement of the Meghalaya police in countering the extremists too has been significant. Using the resources available under the police modernisation scheme, the Meghalaya police have been able to upgrade its capacities and emerge as an effective counter-insurgent force.

In many theatres of the Northeast, however, police is considered to be under-prepared to take on the fire power of the extremists. In spite of the continuing police modernisation programme\(^{230}\), a police-led counter-insurgency operation is yet to become the order of the day.\(^{231}\) The report of the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) on the Nagaland Home Department – 2006-07— indicates that despite the enormous force available, the police department has failed to deploy its manpower rationally, either in terms of the security requirements or the distribution of population across various districts and police jurisdictions. The report notes, “Deployment of Police personnel in rural areas was significantly low in comparison to the urban areas. Due to improper deployment, the people in rural areas remained out of security coverage.”\(^{232}\) Thus, in addition to the police, army and central para-military forces are also engaged in counter-insurgency operations. As a result, states remain overtly dependant on the army and the para-military forces, who are considered to be better trained and better equipped. In Assam, since 1997, all three forces have been coordinating their activities under the unified command

\(^{230}\) An amount of Rs.424.37 Crore have been sanctioned and released under MPF Scheme for Assam since 2000-01. Out of the fund released till 15 th July, 2009, an amount of Rs.357.39 Crore have been utilized. http://assamgovt.nic.in/speech.asp

\(^{231}\) Detailing the lacunae in the preparedness of the police, IGP Pallab Bjhattacharya said, “The recruitment process in police is faulty as it is prone to political intervention. When the intake is bad the output is also equally bad. The deplorable strength of police in comparison to other countries, lack of regular training and lack of adequate funds are undoubtedly impediments in police performance. The cumbersome procurement procedure is also queering the pitch. In spite of passing of various state acts there is no denying the fact that political intervention is palpably noticeable in police functioning. Inability to separate law and order staff from investigation staff has taken its toll in police performance.” Interview conducted on 14 November 2009 at Guwahati . Former Chief Secreatry H N Das maintained, “Our police has potential but due to the political pressure, discontinuity, they can’t show their leadership quality.” Interview conducted on June 23, 2009 in Guwahati, Assam.

structure under the leadership of the Chief Minister. In Manipur, too there is a Unified Command Structure in place since 2004.

**Best force to control extremism**

*(Common people and Experts)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Common people</th>
<th>Experts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td><strong>B</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.9%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
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A = State police  
B = Para Military Force  
C = Army  
D = National Security Guard  
E = None of the above  
F = All together

Northeast: Performance of the Police Modernisation Scheme

<table>
<thead>
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<td>9.95</td>
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</table>

1. Assam: Perceptions of the respondents regarding the category of security forces best capable to control extremism revealed poor opinion on all types of forces deployed in the state. Only four common people and two experts said that the para-military forces alone can control the situation. While only 26 common people said that the Assam Police can do it alone, 14 experts appeared to believe so. Since the security force personnel category was mostly dominated by personnel from the Assam Police, a high 58.8 per cent of them maintained that the state police can handle the situation alone. While forty common people maintained that the army will be able to control the situation single-handedly. Forty-six per cent (90 respondents) in the common people category and 48 per cent experts (24 respondents) that included the security forces maintained that all the forces should be used simultaneously. Nearly one third of the security force personnel segment among the experts supported this proposition.

2. Manipur: More than 48 per cent (70 respondents) said that none of these forces are capable of controlling extremism. While a little more than 26 per cent (38 participants) said that all forces should work together, over 13 per cent (19 respondents) trusted the state police to do the job. Only six per cent felt that the army can execute the responsibility, whereas a meagre three per cent felt that the para-military is capable enough. Among the experts, 45.7 per cent felt that all the forces should work together, whereas 23.9 per cent said the state police can do the job. Ten participants constituting 21.7 per cent of the 46 experts who answered the query said that none of the forces are capable. Interestingly, while only two per cent felt that the para-military can be trusted to do the job, none favoured the army. Among the security forces (calculated separately from the experts), 61.9 per cent opted for all the forces, while 23.8 said that the state

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234 Amar Asom Executive Editor Prashant Raiguru said, “Police is capable to counter extremism. But if some senior police officers have nexus with extremists (for their posting purposes, etc.) it becomes difficult for the police to act properly.” Interview conducted on October 9, 2009 at Guwahati, Assam.
police is capable enough. None preferred the army, whereas a lone security force personnel said that the para-military can play a lead role. The pattern of responses points to a distrust among the common people in the capability of the security forces to control extremism. The distrust was most towards the central forces.

3. Meghalaya: Among the common people, the image of the police as an efficient counter insurgency force is yet to emerge, although among all the forces listed in the questionnaire, the police remained the preferred one. Being asked to choose between police, the para-military and the army as the force best capable to control extremism, 33 per cent chose state police. Only two persons chose army as the most effective force. Another 31 per cent opined in favour of all three forces working together. Twenty-nine per cent felt that none of the forces are effective. Among the experts and security forces, however, police was the most preferred. Forty-eight percent (24 respondents) experts, that included eight security force personnel, said that state police is the potent force to control extremism. Seventeen experts—who included three of the 13 security force personnel who participated in the survey—maintained that all three forces should work together.

4. Nagaland: More than 36 per cent (53 respondents) in the common people category said that all the forces (Army, para-military and state police) together are capable of controlling extremism. Significantly, 41 respondents (27.9 per cent) said none of these forces are capable of controlling extremism. Among individual forces, state police appeared to be the most preferred as 12.2 per cent (18 participants) chose it as the best force. Less than five per cent preferred the army, whereas 5.8 per cent respondents appeared to prefer the para-military. Among the experts, 40.8 per cent felt that all the forces should work together, whereas 24.5 per cent said none of the forces are effective. The state police was again preferred as the most effective force among all the forces. The responses displayed a distrust in the individual capability of the central forces to control extremism. However, among the individual forces, state police appeared to be the most preferred.
5. Tripura: Surprisingly, however, among the common people and the experts (which
included security forces), police alone was not considered to be a potent force to control
extremism. Only 18 per cent common people and 20 per cent experts thought that police
alone would be capable of controlling the extremists. Among the security forces
(calculated separately from the experts), 57 per cent opted for the police. While 22 and 15
per cent common people opted for paramilitary and army respectively, among the experts
34 per cent opted for the army and 22 per cent for the paramilitary. A majority of the
common people (45 per cent) thought that all the forces operating together would be an
effective way of controlling extremism. Nearly 43 per cent security forces supported the
idea, though among the experts only 16 per cent thought in similar lines.

B. Response of the Government:

The beginning of the peace talks with the ULFA on 10 February 2011 will remain a
landmark in the history of insurgency in Assam.\(^{235}\) Various factors including cooperation
from Bangladesh which arrested and handed over several ULFA leaders to India were
responsible for the development. Bangladesh has also handed over chief of UNLF active
in Manipur R K Meghen to India.\(^{236}\)

While direction of the talks between the Government and the insurgent groups would
remain critical for the sustenance of peace in the Northeast, the past does not inspire
much confidence. Intractability of the extremist movements and mushrooming of rebel
outfits has made the common man in Assam develop a sense of ‘no confidence’ in the
ability and sincerity of the government to solve the problem. As former ULFA leader
Prabal Neog maintained, “Extremist groups are coming forward for talks to bring out
solutions of their problems politically, but on the part of the Government sincerity is still
not to be seen.”\(^{237}\)

\(^{235}\)“Ulfa, govt talk peace”, Hindustan Times, February 11, 2011.
\(^{236}\)“UNLF calls for peoples’ Participation to regain Right to Self-Determination”, February 8, 2011,
\(^{237}\)Interview held in Tinsukia, Assam on November 7, 2009.
Then Naga insurgent outfits too have made similar charges. The NSCN-IM in a statement in January 2010 said, “No doubt, the records will show that India’s dealing with the Northeast issue is smeared with insincerity, and Indo-Naga issue is just another issue where the government of India is trying to handle in the manner that does not befit the historical status that has been reflected by the NSCN during the last 12 years of Indo-Naga peace process.”

Lack of political will on the part of a government in distant New Delhi as well as the one installed in Imphal is often pointed as the reason behind the intractability of the extremist movements in the Northeast. A police official termed the state response to extremism as only a ‘fire-fighting measure’. He said, “State response to extremism has been basically in the nature of fire-fighting exercises without a cohesive long term strategy. Lack of “political will” and inability to counter extremism by “positive action for development” are the two major lacunae.” He concluded, “Going by the present trend, there appears to be no solution to the problem in the near future unless there is a radical change in the composition and outlook of the political leadership in particular and general sense of responsibility of the public in general.”

As Assam’s former Director General of Police H K Deka points out, “Two of the principal duties of the state are to provide an atmosphere of peace and security to the people it governs, and to ensure development and growth of its citizens for their economic well-being and social satisfaction. The failure of governance leads to socio-economic discontent and loss of peace and security in a society.”

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239 Interview with P. Dhankumar Singh, Superintendent of Police, CMT, Manipur, held at Imphal on November 5, 2009.
1. Assam: Ceasefire agreements with odd outfits notwithstanding, the common man in Assam feels that both the state and the central governments have not done enough to solve the problem of extremism. This was apparent in their response to the question whether the government has done enough to solve the problem of extremism. Only three per cent (six respondents including five from the urban areas) believed that the government has done enough and an overwhelming 181 respondents said that the effort is clearly lacking. Among the experts, only four per cent believed that the government has done enough and 74 per cent (37 respondents) dismissed the government’s efforts as ‘not enough’. The security force personnel component also appeared to generally agree with such opinion. While only six per cent security force respondents believed that the government has done enough, over 47 per cent found inadequacy in the government’s efforts.

2. Manipur: Over 83 per cent (125 respondents) said that the government has not done enough to solve the problem. While barely 6.7 per cent expressed satisfaction with the government’s approach, 8.7 per cent maintained that whatever could be done under the circumstances has been done. 74 per cent experts too found the government efforts
lacking. Only three experts (all security forces) said that the government has done enough. Among the security forces, significantly, 47.6 per cent (10 respondents) said that the government efforts have not been enough.

3. Meghalaya: The relative success against extremism in Meghalaya did not appear to have convinced the common people regarding the intent of the state in resolving extremism. Responding to the question whether the state government has done enough to solve the problem of extremism, as many as 82 per cent respondents including 36 from the rural areas believed that the government has not done enough. Only 15 persons felt that the government has done what it could and a mere three persons said that the government has done enough. Similar opinion was expressed by the experts as well. Thirty-eight of the 50 experts expressed their dissatisfaction with the efforts of the government. Significantly, nine of the 13 security force personnel also were of the similar opinion. While ten experts including three security force personnel said that the government has done what it could do, a lone expert who incidentally was a security force personnel appeared to be fully satisfied with the government’s efforts.

4. Nagaland: Close to 78 per cent (115 respondents) said that the government has not done enough to solve the problem. While barely two per cent of the respondents expressed satisfaction with the government’s approach, 18.2 per cent maintained that whatever could be done under the circumstances has been done. 84 per cent (42 respondents) experts too found the government efforts lacking. Only two experts (including a security force personnel) said that the government has done enough. Five experts maintained that the government has done whatever it could do. Among the security forces, significantly, 62.5 per cent said that the government efforts have not been enough.

5. Tripura: As many as 80 per cent respondents including 61 from the rural areas believed that the government has done enough. Experts, however, were divided and unwilling to give the government much of credit. While 40.8 per cent felt that the government has done enough, 32.7 per cent dismissed the government’s efforts as ‘not
enough’. Eighteen per cent experts, however, felt that the government has done what it could. The entire security force personnel component of the experts’ category, however, agreed with the majority of common people and said that the government has done enough.

The government’s overall approach towards extremism has been labelled as security force operation-centric by many analysts. Although many believe that extremism is a political problem which has no military solution, operations by the security forces have been used to meet the military challenge of the outfits. On some occasions, operations have forced the outfits to enter into a process of dialogue with the government. On another level, the government has been inclined to continue with its development assistance to the state knowing fully well that in a conflict environment, full utilisation of such funds is not possible. A large chunk of such funds passes into the coffers of the outfits who indulge in rampant extortion. Stopping the development programmes altogether, on the other hand, have reinforced the belief of alienation among the common populace and have emboldened the extremists.

**Best way to deal with the extremism problem**

*(Common people, Experts and Security force personnel)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Common People</th>
<th>Experts</th>
<th>Security Force</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A Hold peace dialogue with the extremists</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>40.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Continue the use of security force operations</td>
<td>18% 17.4%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Provide developmental assistance to the state</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D Others</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>31.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A = Hold peace dialogue with the extremists
B = Continue the use of security force operations
C = Provide developmental assistance to the state
D = Others
1. Assam: Responding to the question regarding the best way to deal with the problem of extremism, a majority 70.5 per cent of participants was of the opinion that the government must hold peace talks with the militants. Both the experts as well as the security force personnel, however, appeared to be sceptical about this method. Only 38 per cent experts which included security force personnel supported this viewpoint. Separate analysis of security force responses indicated that 23.5 per cent of them had similar opinion. Only three common people and one expert were of the opinion that security force operations must continue against the extremists. Similarly, only 35 common people and seven experts believed that development assistance can provide a solution to the problem.

2. Manipur: In spite of the fact that all the dominant armed formations like the UNLF and PLA have rebuffed repeated official offers of peace dialogue, majority of the common people seemed to prefer dialogue as the best way to deal with the problem of extremism. 125 of the 150 respondents said that the government should hold dialogue with the government. While 14 others said that development is the best answer, only three persons preferred continuation of security force operations. The experts too expressed a similar opinion. 34 of the 50 experts preferred dialogue with the extremists, while only five supported security force operations. Two preferred developmental approach. Strangely, the security forces too preferred dialogue with the government. 14 of the 21 security force personnel, whose response was analysed separately, said peace dialogue is the key. Only two security officials preferred military operations. These

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241 On 27 December 2009, the UNLF rejected the proposal of Union Home Minister P Chidambaram to hold talks provided the organisation drops the issue of sovereignty. The outfit reiterated that it will never compromise on the issue of sovereignty and independence of Manipur. “Not even the biggest development package under a new governing structure within the Indian Union can buy us out”, it added. “UNLF rejects Chidambaram’s appeal”, December 27, 2009, http://www.mynews.in/News/UNLF_rejects_Chandamaram%2E%2009%99s_appeal_N33813.html Similarly, on February 24, 2008, addressing the ‘29th raising day’ of the PLA, its ‘president’ Irengbam Chaoren reiterated that the outfit would not sit for peace talks. He said, “The more than 30-year-long battle aims to win back the lost freedom of the Manipuris. India's army is killing the Manipuris. No Indian leader takes the issue of Manipur's freedom seriously. Under these circumstances, how can we enter into peace talks?” “People’s Liberation Army”, South Asia Terrorism Portal, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/manipur/terrorist_outfits/Pla.htm
responses indicated a clear preference for the method of dialogue and dismissal of the security force operations against the extremists.

3. Meghalaya: Responses of the common people on the best way to deal with the problem of extremism were mainly two. While 57 per cent opted for peace dialogue with the extremists, 31 per cent said that the union government should provide developmental assistance to the state. Among the experts, 46 per cent opted for peace dialogue whereas 26 per cent said that developmental assistance should be provided. Security officials expressed a somewhat different perception. Among the 13 security officials, five (38.5 per cent) opted for peace dialogue, while three others (23.1 per cent) said that security force operations should be continued. Peace dialogue thus appeared to be the most preferred way to deal with all the categories of respondents.

4. Nagaland: More than 57 per cent (85 out of 148 respondents) of the common people said that the government should hold dialogue with the extremists. While 19 others said that development is the best answer, 15 persons preferred continuation of security force operations. The experts too expressed a similar opinion. 25 of the 50 experts preferred dialogue with the extremists, while three experts supported security force operations. Seven experts preferred developmental approach. Among the security forces, 25 per cent preferred dialogue with the government, while 37.5 per cent indicated that peace dialogue, security force operations and developmental assistance should be pursued simultaneously.

5. Tripura: Only 26 per cent respondents of the 100 interviewed opted for peace dialogue with the extremists where as another 21 per cent said that development assistance should be provided. Among the experts, 36.7 per cent opted for developmental assistance where as 34.7 per cent said that peace dialogue should be held. Only nine per cent of the common people and 14.3 per cent of the experts among whom were security force personnel chose security force operations as the most effective method. Even a majority of the security force personnel, responses of whom were calculated separately, opted for peace dialogue. Only 14 per cent said that all three approaches should be continued simultaneously.
C. Gains from the Peace Processes:

Over the years in the Northeast, a number of outfits have entered into ceasefire agreements with the state and union government. But the process after the agreements have both been positive as well as stalemated. For example, in Tripura, number of outfits, mostly factions within the NLFT, have entered into ceasefire agreements with the state and union government. Hardships in the camps of the outfits in Bangladesh, disillusionment with the outfits’ lack of ideology and lavish lifestyle of the extremist leaders and also pressures created by the security force operations have forced the extremists to come over-ground. The overtures of the state government and rehabilitation policy for the surrendered extremists too have played important role. While a formal dialogue process is yet to begin, the government has managed to decapitate the outfits by engineering such large scale surrenders. Unlike other states, Tripura has not allowed the surrendered extremists to move out of the designated camps to carry out extortion and killings.

On the other hand, protracted peace talks with NSCN-IM have gone through their ups and downs, interspersed with occasional moments of success and long periods of uncertainty. In other cases, extremist cadres, following the agreement, have moved into designated camps pending the beginning of a dialogue process between the government and the individual outfits. While the actual beginning of dialogue has taken years, the agreement has given a license of sorts to the outfits to indulge in extortion, abduction and killing spree. On occasions, outfits have split along pro and anti-talks factions, with a group walking out of the ceasefire agreement to carry on with its armed activities.

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243 For example, the pro-talk faction of the DHD, despite the ceasefire agreement, continues to extort civilians, public servants and most importantly the tea gardens in the areas under its influence, i.e. NC Hills district, Cachar district, pockets of Karbi Anglong and Nagaon district. See http://cdpsindia.org/assam_mgp.asp

244 After the declaration of ceasefire with the government on 23 May 2002, a faction of the UPDS went on to form the KLNLF, which continued to be involved in extremist activities. Quite similarly, a faction of the DHD went on to form the BW on 24 June 2004. The NDFB too was split into pro and anti-talk factions after some of the outfit’s senior leaders decided to come over ground in May 2005.
In Manipur, successes of the security forces in weakening the outfits have primarily been in the realm of smaller outfits in the valley areas, who have also been further weakened by constant infighting. The larger valley based outfits, on the other hand, have either remained unscathed or have been able to benefit from a steady source of recruitment. Moreover, the primary strength of these outfits, i.e. their bases in Myanmar have remained intact, providing them with additional capacity to train their cadres, amass small arms and even drugs. In addition, none of these major outfits have lost their senior cadres to security force operations. This set of hardcore leaders facilitate the outfits’ unsevered link with the original ideology of independence from ‘colonial’ India. This appears to be the reason why proposals for peace talks have been steadfastly rebuffed by the valley based outfits.

In Meghalaya, on 23 July 2004, the ANVC entered into a peace process with the Meghalaya government after sustained efforts involving several players including the Church. Following the agreement, the ANVC cadres moved into two designated camps—Samada and Chokpot—heralding hopes that the Garo hills region of Meghalaya, where the ANVC was most active would now be peaceful. The hopes were, however, belied. Nearly six years after the ceasefire, dialogue between the government and the outfit is yet to start. The ANVC cadres have indulged in killing, extortion and have moved out of their camp with impunity. According to the State police chief, they have not disclosed their weapons holding. In the meanwhile, ceasefire with the ANVC has been periodically extended.

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Has peace dialogue achieved desired results? (Common people)

1. Assam: There has been hardly any example, barring the BLT, of any peace dialogue reaching its logical conclusion. Quite naturally, 91.5 per cent (183 respondents) dismissed the assumption that ‘dialogue between the Government of India and the extremist groups’ has been a useful process of achieving results. Prodded to explain their answer, 70 respondents, equally divided between urban and rural areas, maintained that none of the dialogue processes have achieved any result. Similarly, 30 others maintained that both parties are to be blamed for the overall affairs as both lack seriousness. Eleven persons maintained that the required political will simply does not exist, both in Guwahati and New Delhi to arrive at a solution to the problem of extremism. Ten others maintained that the delay in fulfilling the demands of the extremists could be a problem in achieving the results.

2. Manipur: 94 per cent (141 respondents) in the common people category, who included 66 persons from rural areas, were of the opinion that ‘dialogue between the Government of India and the extremist groups’ has not been a useful process of achieving results. Prodded to explain their answer, 22 respondents maintained that there has been a lack of political will to solve the problem. Eleven respondents said that there has been a lack of seriousness on both sides. While 19 others said that the existing peace deals have
not achieved anything substantial, 12 respondents rued the fact that extremism still persists in areas where extremists are under a peace agreement with the government.

3. Meghalaya: 97 of the 100 respondents in the common people category expressed their dissatisfaction. Prodded to explain their answer, 19 respondents pointed out that the problem of extremism still persists in the state and 17 others rues the lack of any definite result out of the peace process. Fifteen others maintained the talks have not started between the government and the outfits as yet. Thirteen respondents said that all this amounted to the lack of political will to solve the problem.

4. Nagaland: 92.4 per cent (134 respondents) in the common people category who included 33 persons from rural areas were of the opinion that ‘dialogue between the Government of India and the extremist groups’ has not been a useful process of achieving results. Prodded to explain their answer, 57 respondents pointed at the lack of concrete result, whereas 16 others maintained that the problem of extremism continues to persist. Thirteen respondents said there has been a lack of political will to solve the problem.

5. Tripura: 87 per cent (87 respondents) in the common people category among who were 62 persons from rural areas maintained that ‘dialogue between the Government of India and the extremist groups’ has been a useful process of achieving results. Prodded to explain their answer, 61 respondents maintained that peace dialogues have led to solution of insurgency in some cases. Twenty-four respondents maintained that talks have led to surrenders of extremists. Only 11 persons said that problems of extremism persist even after the talks.
Has peace dialogue achieved desired results? (Experts and Security force personnel)

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<tr>
<th>Experts</th>
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<td>87.1%</td>
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<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>12.9%</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
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1. **Assam**: Majority 86 per cent (43 respondents out of 50) experts maintained that dialogue between the Government of India and the extremist groups has not achieved desired results. This was reiterated by 82.4 per cent (14 respondents) security force personnel. Explaining their response further, 24 per cent of the experts (12 respondents) said that such a state of affairs is due to the lack of seriousness on part of both sides—the Government as well as the extremists. Seven more experts felt that lack of results on any of the ongoing dialogue has acted as a dampener for possible resolution of conflicts. While five experts blamed the lack of political will on part of the government, four others maintained that in view of the unconstitutional demands of the extremists, such dialogue processes cannot be expected to deliver any result.

2. **Manipur**: Opinion of the experts demonstrated a clear lack of satisfaction with the process of peace dialogue. Majority 91.3 per cent (42 out of the 46 who answered the question) experts maintained that dialogue between the Government of India and the extremist groups has not achieved desired results. Among the security forces, 17 out of the 20 personnel who answered the query too expressed their dissatisfaction. Explaining their response further, nine experts said that there has been a lack of seriousness on both sides. In a similar vein, another five experts maintained that both sides have been
extremely rigid on their respective positions. Security forces indicated that there is a complete lack of trust between both sides. In such a scenario, no peace deal can be expected to deliver results.

3. Meghalaya: All the 50 experts were categorical in their response saying that dialogue between the Government of India and the extremist groups has not achieved desired results. Explaining their response further, 47.8 per cent of the experts (22 respondents) said that peace dialogue is yet to produce any result. Over 15 per cent said that the lack of progress can be attributed to the unconstitutional and non-feasible demands of the extremist organisations. Five experts maintained both sides have not been serious in pursuing peace. All the 13 security force personnel, whose responses were analysed separately, were categorical in their opinion that peace dialogue has not produced desired results in the state.

4. Nagaland: Opinion of the experts too demonstrated a clear lack of satisfaction with the process of peace dialogue. Barring a lone expert, 97.9 per cent (47 out of the 48 who answered the question) experts maintained that dialogue between the Government of India and the extremist groups has not achieved desired results. Among the security force personnel, too, all seven respondents who answered the question expressed their dissatisfaction with the peace process. Explaining their response further, 18 experts said that there has been no concrete result. Another six experts maintained that both sides have been extremely rigid on their respective positions whereas five experts maintained that there has been a lack of political will. Four security forces lamented the lack of any concrete result.

5. Tripura: Majority 60.4 per cent (29 respondents out of 50) experts maintained that dialogue between the Government of India and the extremist groups has not achieved desired results. Explaining their response further, 40 per cent of the experts (16 respondents) said that peace dialogue has led to the solution of extremism only in some cases. Over 27 per cent complained that problem of extremism continues to persist even after a peace dialogue begins. Voicing a similar opinion, four other experts maintained
that there have been no ‘results’ as yet. Probably the fact that the NLFT and ATTF top brass are continuing to keep the fire of extremism burning in Tripura influenced the responses of the experts. The security force personnel, whose responses were analysed separately, displayed no such trend. More than 71 per cent affirmed that peace dialogue has indeed produced desired results in the state.

D. Resolving Extremism:

Dialogue, development and security force operations- three possible methods of conflict resolution have their own followers and detractors. However, a lot many analysts and professionals worldwide suggest a judicious mix of all three.

While attempting to resolve extremism, the perception of an outfit in the minds of people remains a crucial factor. In the specific context of ULFA, H K Deka points out, “ULFA is the manifestation of some deep social discontent. Unless these causes are addressed, the seedbed remains fertile for discontent to germinate.” While talking about the most popular method of conflict resolution, Deka observes, “While there should be a dialogue with the rebels at least to know their mind, civil society, close to the pulse of the people, should be widely consulted. Being between the state and the people, civil society may provide a balanced view. The same can be said regarding a lot of other extremist outfits operating in Assam.

B G Verghese pointed out, “The answers (to extremism) lie in more rapid and innovative economic development and not in the division of a limited cake into smaller and smaller portions.” It has been an effort of the government lately to dissect the reasons behind the growth of extremism and mitigate them in a bid to control armed movements.

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The questionnaire in an open ended question encouraged the participants in the common people category to list out, what they thought is an effective method of resolving extremism. The participants were allowed to list more than one method.

1. Assam: Peace talk was high in the opinion of the respondents in the common people and experts category. Among the 200 respondents in the common people, 135 believed it to be an effective step to resolve extremism. Similarly, among the 50 experts, 17 expressed similar opinion. Seventy-eight common people and ten experts maintained that employment generation would cut down recruitment for the extremist groupings and would help control extremism. Seventy-three common people and fifteen experts felt that development initiatives would be key to deal with the problem of alienation and deprive the extremists from justifying their acts of violence. Over 23 per cent security force personnel supported this view. While 30 common people said that government must strive to streamline development for all communities, experts differed. A lone expert asked for empowerment of the autonomous councils and another asked for empowering people economically and culturally through inclusive development. Over 17 per cent security force personnel asked for the development of remote and far flung areas. Twenty common people favoured military action to “wipe off” the militants. Only two experts called for “strong measures against the militants”. Other inputs asked the civil society to get involved in the process and the government to demonstrate political will to resolve the problem.

2. Manipur: Over 35 per cent of the common people (53 respondents) identified peace dialogue as an effective method. Twenty-eight persons each indicated their preference for developmental initiatives and more emphasis on education. Thirty-eight persons felt that employment generation would strip the ‘career’ in extremism as an attractive option for the youth. 22 persons interviewed felt that removal of corruption would be the key to removing the grievances of the people against the system, while seven said honest politicians could solve the problem. Thirteen persons each argued for greater involvement of the civil society in the conflict resolution process as well as sympathetic consideration of the demands of the extremist outfits. Fifteen respondents asked for limiting the powers
of the security forces and making them sensitive to the rights of the common people. Among the 50 experts, 19 opted for peace dialogue with the extremists. Thirteen experts asked for employment generation, whereas 10 others argued for finding ways to reduce corruption in Manipur. Eight experts said proper development initiatives would solve the problem. Seven others indicated that extremism is the result of lack of good governance and steps must be taken to ensure good governance. Responses of the security force personnel (who are part of the experts’ category) were analysed separately. Peace dialogue was accorded highest priority by eight of the 21 security force personnel. Seven respondents argued for employment generation whereas three respondents asked for development initiatives, good governance and steps to tackle corruption.

3. Meghalaya: While 52 respondents opted for peace dialogue, 43 others thought that development initiatives would do the trick. Thirty-one participants said that employment creation would be an effective method. The experts too thought similarly, although the order of the steps suggested varied. Among the 50 experts, 27 opted for development initiatives and 21 respondents said that employment creation would be an effective method. Twenty experts maintained that the state should engage in peace dialogue with the extremists. Responses of the security force personnel (who are part of the experts’ category) were analysed separately. Interestingly, seven security officials maintained that providing employment opportunities would solve the extremism problem. Five respondents preferred development initiative. Peace dialogue was accorded priority by four security force personnel. Three others said that long term peace education would go a long way in preventing extremism.

4. Nagaland: Maximum number of participants appeared to link the problem of unemployment with extremism. 42 common people participants suggested that employment generation would cease to make a career in extremism an attractive option for the youth. In spite of the ‘lack of results’, existing peace agreements have shown results. Perhaps, this is why there appeared considerable support for this mode of conflict resolution among the common people. Forty respondents identified peace dialogue as an effective method. The fact that factionalism among the Nagas has been a crucial
impediment for the peace process was acknowledged by 27 respondents who prescribed bringing about unity among the various factions of the extremists. Eighteen participants favoured development initiatives on part of the government, whereas 14 others argued in favour of greater participation of the civil society. Among the 50 experts, 16 opted for peace dialogue with the extremists. Fifteen experts asked for employment generation, whereas 13 others argued for continuing development initiatives. Nine experts said unity among the warring extremist groups would be the key to peace in Nagaland. Responses of the security force personnel (who are part of the experts’ category] were analysed separately. Maximum number (50 per cent) of security force personnel argued for development programmes in Nagaland. Over 37 per cent said that creation of employment opportunities could solve the problem of extremism, whereas 25 per cent preferred peace dialogue with the extremists.

5. Tripura: Twenty-four respondents opted for ‘strong measures against the extremists’, which meant support for the security force operations in the state. Marginally less 22 persons chose peace dialogue as an effective method. Sixteen common people indicated development initiatives would be effective to control extremism. Twelve and ten participants maintained that involvement of civil society and creation of jobs respectively would be good methods of resolving extremism. Among the 50 experts, 14 opted for development initiatives and four others maintained that the state should carry out development work in the remote areas. Twelve experts chose peace dialogue as an effective method. Eight others expected the government to demonstrate seriousness in its approach towards solving extremism. Six experts said providing employment opportunities would create an avenue for the unemployed and would weaken extremism. Responses of the security force personnel (who are part of the experts’ category] were analysed separately. Peace dialogue was accorded highest priority by fifty per cent of the security force personnel. Some argued in favour of better policies for the surrendered extremists, development initiatives, development of remote areas and provision of employment opportunities for the educated youth.
The respondents in all categories were subsequently asked to answer the open ended question, “How state response can be made more effective to meet the challenges of extremist violence?” the responses brought out several facets of the state’s counter-insurgency policy, which the respondents thought need re-examination.

1. Assam: Peace dialogue was accorded highest priority by the common people with maximum 64 respondents opted for it. For the experts including the security force personnel, modernisation of the police force was the most favoured option with 13 respondents opting for it. Among the security forces, nine respondents opted for police modernisation. The option of peace dialogue was supported by 11 experts. Thirty-one common people felt that the government is not serious in its peace talks and asked for a change in that approach. Another 30 common people felt that development initiatives would be useful as far as meeting the challenges posed by the extremists is concerned. Ten experts felt that good governance can be an answer to the challenge of extremism in Assam, a view that was reiterated by 26 common people. Among the common people, 28 participants thought that employment creation would take care of the problem of extremism. Other significant opinions expressed pertained to removal of corruption from government, creation of infrastructure, taking assistance from the civil society, treating all communities equally, organising awareness camp for the common people, and trying to understand and respond to the problems of the common man. V M Thomas summed up what could be an effective counter-insurgency approach on part the government. “Government can take steps to prepare people for a psychological game to fight against extremists. First change the mindset of the community for a peace strategy, create opportunity for employment, rapid development, address the identity issues of the ethnic groups, give them full security and liberty”, he said.250

2. Manipur: 39 common people argued that the state must be open to initiate dialogue with the extremists. Twenty-four persons maintained that the state must try to understand and respond to the problems of the common people. Good governance with facets such as removal of corruption and creation of employment avenues were also accorded priority.

250 Interview conducted on June 19, 2009 in Guwahati.
by 36 respondents in the common people category. Ten experts also argued for a responsive, transparent and corruption-free government. Seven experts, on the other hand, argued for making the security forces sensitive to the rights of the people. Among the security forces, seven argued for employment generation.

3. Meghalaya: Peace dialogue was accorded highest priority by the common people with 45 respondents opting for it. Forty-one common people maintained that development initiatives would be an effective instrument to meet extremist challenges. While 33 preferred employment generation, ten respondents said that good governance holds key to peace in Meghalaya. Twenty-six experts including seven security force personnel said that creation of employment infrastructure would be essential. Eighteen experts including three security forces preferred peace dialogue while 12 experts including four security forces said development initiatives can make state response effective to meet extremist challenges.

4. Nagaland: 23 common people argued that the state must be open to initiate dialogue with the extremists. 15 persons maintained that the politicians and government officials should be free from the influence of extremists. Another 14 common people called for unity among the groups continuing with internecine clashes. 12 respondents said that the politicians themselves should stop providing support to extremist groups. Ten experts too argued for peace process with the extremists and six each favoured unity among the Nagas and less of extremist influence on politicians and government officials. Four experts each called for a proper policy formulation for achieving peace in Nagaland, development initiatives, creating physical infrastructure in the state and also creating awareness in the minds of the local population. The security forces argued for uniting the various extremist outfits and carrying out a proper analysis of the demands of the extremists.

5. Tripura: Development initiatives were accorded highest priority both the common people and the experts including the security force personnel. Forty per cent of each category opted for it. Among the security forces alone, 37.5 per cent opted for faster
development initiatives in remote and extremist-affected areas. The option of peace
dialogue was supported by 20 common people and 11 experts. Twenty-eight common
people felt that the government should continue with its strong measures against the
outfits. Twelve experts said that creating employment opportunities would be effective in
meeting the challenges posed by the extremists, an idea that found support among 10
common people and three security force personnel. Another 12 common people argued in
favour of the involvement of the civil society. Arguing similarly, some security force
personnel interviewed said that community-based approach to peace negotiation would
be an effective instrument.

SECTION A: LEFT WING EXTREMISM AFFECTED STATES

A. Pitfalls of Security Legislations:

Terming of security legislations in conflict theatres as draconian is a relatively common
phenomenon. The Chhattisgarh Public Security Act (CSPSA), 2005 has been termed as
one of the most abused security legislations in the state. It has been criticised by some for
its broad definition of unlawful activities and the stringent penalties for those convicted.
As per the law, anyone who “in any manner contributes or receives or solicits any
contribution or aid” for an unlawful organisation can be punished for up to two years.251
The human rights organisations have alleged that the state government has used the Act
to silence any opposition to its armed campaign against the Maoists which has caused
immense hardships to the tribal population.

The Communist Party of India-Marxist-Leninist (CPI-ML), People’s War, Maoist
Communist Centre (MCC) and all their front organisations were banned under Prevention
of Terrorism Act (POTA) by New Delhi in 2002. The Andhra Pradesh government had
separately banned the PWG under the Andhra Pradesh Public Security Act, 1992
(APPSA). The ban was allowed to lapse in July 2004 in view of the peace talks with the

outfit. After the peace process fell through, the CPI-Maoist and six of its frontal organisations in Andhra Pradesh continue to be banned under the APPSA.

Where as POTA has been repealed, human Rights activists allege that APPSA allows “the government to arrest virtually anyone with political leanings or associations it does not approve of, and thus threaten the fundamental rights guaranteed to citizens by the constitution.” Some of the arrests under the Act have been contested. In December 2007, Pittala Srisailam, editor of online television Musi TV and co-convener of Telangana Journalists Forum (TJF) was arrested under the APPSA. Police alleged that Srisailam was acting as a courier for the outfit. Srisailam was released after a week in custody.

The Study generated responses of the common people regarding their awareness about various security legislations and their impact in the Left Wing Extremism affected states.

**Awareness regarding security legislations (Common people)**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15%</td>
<td>54.4%</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
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</table>

A = AFSPA (Armed Forces Special Powers Act)
B = NSA (National Security Act)
C = Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act

1. Andhra Pradesh: Awareness regarding the security legislations was found to be quite poor as far as the AFSPA was concerned. Unlike the Northeast and Jammu & Kashmir, the Army personnel are not involved in the operations against the Maoists anywhere in the country. Hence, AFSPA is not in operation in any of the Maoist-affected states. As a result, only 74 of the 199 common people participants who answered the query were found to be aware of the AFSPA. However, 53.8 per cent (107 respondents) were aware of the NSA. A marginally higher 59.8 per cent (119 respondents) knew of the UAPA.

2. Chhattisgarh: Only seven of the 200 common people participants were found to be aware of the AFSPA. Similarly, only six people were aware of the UAPA. Knowledge regarding the NSA, however, appeared to be more as 52 per cent (104 respondents) indicated their awareness about the Act.

3. Jharkhand: Knowledge about AFSPA was limited to only 12 of the 200 common people participants. Similarly, only three common people were aware of the UAPA. Knowledge regarding the NSA, which is in vogue in Jharkhand, was comparatively more as 57.5 per cent (115 respondents) knew about the Act.

Special laws encourage growth of extremism
(Common people, Experts and Security force personnel)
1. **Andhra Pradesh**: In spite of the allegations of the human rights organisations that the security legislations facilitate abuse of rights and hence indirectly promote the growth of extremism, responses of the common people were divided. While 35 per cent common people respondents agreed that special laws encourage growth of extremism, 25.6 per cent de-linked the legislations from the growth of Maoist extremism. Over 39 per cent common people chose the ‘Cannot comment’ option. Among the experts, however, a sizeable majority of 76.6 per cent (36 respondents) of the 47 experts who answered the query said that special laws do not encourage the growth of extremism. All the five security force personnel agreed with this assertion.

2. **Chhattisgarh**: 49 per cent (98 respondents) of the 200 common people who participated in the survey replied that security legislations do not encourage the growth of extremism. Only 5.5 per cent said that the legislations do promote extremism. This indicated a very low level of awareness regarding the security legislations in Chhattisgarh. Among the 46 experts, 37 participants indicated that there is no link between the security legislations and the growth of Left Wing Extremism in Chhattisgarh. Among the security force personnel component among the experts, whose responses were analysed separately, almost 90 per cent had a similar opinion.

3. **Jharkhand**: Common people and the experts appeared to find Acts like the National Security Act quite useful. Responding to whether such special security legislations have encouraged growth of extremism indirectly rather than helping in tackling/reducing it, more than 60 per cent (121 respondents) of the 200 common people who participated in the survey replied in the negative. Only three respondents representing a meagre 1.5 per cent of the total common people respondents said that special laws do encourage growth of terrorism. A large number of 76 respondents pleaded ignorance, indicating a very low level of awareness regarding the security legislations in Jharkhand. Similarly, 66 per cent of the 50 experts indicated that there is no link between the security legislations and the growth of Left Wing Extremism in Jharkhand. The security force personnel component among the experts, however, was divided in their responses. Out of the 12 personnel, six
indicated that such legislations have indeed encouraged the growth of extremism, whereas the rest six dismissed the claim.

**Should special security laws be repealed and amended?**

*(Common people, Experts and Security force personnel)*

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Common People</th>
<th>Experts</th>
<th>Security Force</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Repealed</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amend</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continue as it is</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can't say</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>21%</td>
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1. **Andhra Pradesh**: Response of the common people respondents to the question, whether the security legislations should be repealed or amended, indicated divided opinion. A large percentage of the respondents (over 41 per cent) chose the can not say option. This possibly was linked to the lack of awareness of the Acts like the AFSPA. While 18 per cent of the participants asked for repeal of the security laws, over 26 per cent asked for amendments to the Acts to make them more humane. Continuation of the Acts in their present form found favour within 14 per cent of the common people. Among the experts and the security forces who were part of that group, majority came out in support of the Acts. 45 per cent wanted the continuation of the Acts in their present form, where as close to 24 per cent preferred amendments to be brought in. 31 per cent of the experts wanted the Acts to be repealed altogether.
2. Chhattisgarh: Barely 4.5 per cent of the common people wanted the legislations to be repealed, 24.6 per cent wanted them to be amended. At the same time, 25.6 per cent respondents wanted them to continue in their present form. A large 45.2 per cent respondents chose the ‘cannot comment’ option. This was indicative of the low awareness of the legislations rather than a principled stand in their favour. Among the experts, seven (14.6 per cent) of the 48 persons who answered the query wanted the legislation to be repealed, while 14 others (29.2 per cent) wanted them to be amended. Majority 56.3 per cent of the experts, however, wanted continuation of the security legislations in their present form. Majority of the security force personnel too appeared to be favouring undisturbed continuation of the legislations. Six out of the nine security force personnel who participated in the survey wanted the acts to continue in their present form.

3. Jharkhand: Barring a sizeable section within the common people and experts whose awareness about security legislations was poor, majority came out in support of the prevalent legislations. Responding to whether these legislations should be repealed, amended or kept undisturbed, nearly 60 per cent common people (119 respondents) and 57.8 per cent experts (26 respondents) wanted the legislations to continue in their present form. Among the common people, a lone person asked for repeal of the Acts, whereas three others asked for their amendment. Among the experts, three persons asked for their repeal whereas 16 persons representing 35.6 per cent of the 45 experts who answered the query asked for their amendment. Among the 12 security forces, six wanted the Acts to continue in their present form. Five wanted their amendment whereas a lone security force personnel wanted the Acts to be repealed.

B. Police or the Army?

Success behind the anti-Maoist operations in Andhra Pradesh is mostly attributed to the State police who crafted an extremely efficient response to extremist violence with assistance from the central-para-military forces. In fact, the example of Andhra Pradesh, just like the similar experiences in Punjab and Tripura, is being cited in envisioning a
police-led counter-Maoist response across the country. Whereas Indian Army is involved in counter-insurgency operations in Jammu & Kashmir and some states of the Northeast and there are demands for Army deployment by some of the left-wing extremist (LWE) states, the case of Andhra Pradesh demonstrates that it is possible to deal with the challenge by an efficient police force. Many of the LWE affected states are trying to follow the Andhra model to deal with the Maoists. The dominance of the State police was demonstrated in the fact that not a single police personnel was killed in Andhra Pradesh in counter-Maoist operations in the 2009. Where as a lone security force personnel was killed in 2008, in 2010, police fatalities in the State remained zero.

The story is, however, different in other states like Chhattisgarh, which is struggling with a weak police force. On 21 November 2009, Chief Minister Raman Singh conceded that the Chhattisgarh police was not prepared to face the guerrilla war waged by Maoists. The persistent lack of ability among the state police personnel makes these anti-Maoist operations essentially central para-military force (CPMF)-led offensives. Starting 2005, when the para-military forces were introduced into the state, as on April 2010, Chhattisgarh has about 23 CPMF battalions including the Border Security Force (BSF), Indo Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and the Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB). However, the state government insists that the present level of deployment is inadequate and more CPMF battalions should be assigned to the state. In addition, the state government is also a votary of the Army involvement in anti-Maoist operations. In May 2010, Chhattisgarh Home Minister Nanki Ram Kanwar said, “In today’s scenario, the Army should be used to tackle the Naxals.”

A senior retired police officer threw light on the lacunae of counter-Maoist operations in Jharkhand. Pointing out that police leadership plays a crucial role in countering terror he

253 “Chhattisgarh police is not prepared for guerrilla war with Maoists”, Indian Express, November 22, 2009.
said, “Support received from the junior police officers was not up to the mark. None wanted to be transferred from the lucrative posts. And the police top brass only shunted disgruntled officers to extremist areas compromising on the quality of operations they were to direct.” He further added, “Lack of intelligence continues to be a problem area. The force that is deployed has almost no knowledge of the terrain, language and hardly has contact with the people. The local thana people also avoid to move into the interior areas. Caste factor also counts.257

The improvement in the security situation has allowed Andhra Pradesh to not implement the Centre’s suggestion to establish a unified command to ensure better synergy and coordination, command and control among different security forces operating in a region against a common threat. Where as states like Chhattisgarh, Orissa, West Bengal and Jharkhand have agreed to form the unified command, authorities in Andhra Pradesh along with Bihar and Maharashtra felt there was no immediate need for a unified command.258

The respondents in all categories were asked to choose the best force to control extremism from all available forces.

258 MHA Officials explained that while the level of violence in Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra does not warrant creation of such a command in these two states at this juncture, Bihar had been opposed to this idea. See “Naxal-hit states to form unified commands”, Times of India, July 14, 2010.
Most effective force to control Maoists  
(Common people, Experts and Security force personnel)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Common people</th>
<th>Experts</th>
<th>Security force personnel</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A = State police</td>
<td>A = State police</td>
<td>A = State police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B = Para Military Force</td>
<td>B = Para Military Force</td>
<td>B = Para Military Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>C = Army</td>
<td>C = Army</td>
<td>C = Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D = National Security Guard</td>
<td>D = National Security Guard</td>
<td>D = National Security Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>E = None of the above</td>
<td>E = None of the above</td>
<td>E = None of the above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F = All together</td>
<td>F = All together</td>
<td>F = All together</td>
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1. Andhra Pradesh: It emerged from the responses that both common people and the experts want counter-insurgency to be a cooperative effort between all the forces, the Army, para-military and the state police. 46 per cent common people, 61 per cent experts and 60 per cent security force personnel opted for the ‘all together’ option signifying that all the forces should function in cooperation with each other. Not surprisingly, among the individual forces interpreted as best to control extremism, police was the highest rated. Close to 25 per cent common people, 20.4 per cent experts and 40 per cent security forces opted for the state police.

2. Chhattisgarh: More than 65 per cent (131 respondents) in the common people category said that all the forces together are capable of controlling the Maoists. Significantly, among the individual forces identified for their effectiveness, the state police received the least support. A lone respondent among the 200 common people said that the state police alone can be vested with the responsibility. While 16 persons opted for the CPMFs, eight others preferred the Army. Preferring commando type operations
against the Maoists, 42 respondents indicated that the National Security Guards should be deployed. Preference for the police remained the least among the experts as well. A lone expert (who was not a security force personnel) preferred the state police. Forty per cent of the experts preferred all forces to work together. The CPMFs were preferred by 26 per cent experts, whereas 22 per cent felt that the Army should be deployed. Among the security force personnel, whose responses were analysed separately, over 55 per cent preferred that all forces should work together. Another 33.3 per cent opted for the CPMFs. Among the all respondents, a clear distrust in the capacity of the state police was evident. There was a common belief that Maoists can be controlled only with the combined use of all the forces.

3. Jharkhand: Army appeared to be the preferred force among common people to fight the Naxalites. 43 per cent (86 respondents) in the common people category opted for the Army. More than 29 per cent (59 respondents) said that the para-military would be an effective force, whereas only 6.5 per cent (13 respondents) said that the state police is capable. More than 16 per cent common people, however, said that all three forces (Army, para-military and state police) together are capable of controlling the Maoists. Majority among the experts (32 per cent), however, opted for all three forces. Among individual forces, Army was preferred over the para-military and the state police. 20 per cent experts opted for the Army, whereas 18 and 12 per cent opted for the state police and para-military forces respectively. Among the security forces, whose responses were analysed separately, 50 per cent preferred the state police and 25 per cent opted for the para-military forces. A lone security force personnel said that all forces should work together. Incidentally, none among the security forces asked for the deployment of the Army. Among all respondents in the common people and experts’ category, a clear distrust in the capacity of the state police was evident.
C. Of Vigilante Groups and Private Militia:

In Chhattisgarh, apart from the police and the para-military, the state government has deployed about 3500 special police officers (SPOs) in counter-Maoist operations. For the police, these SPOs have been sources of vital information. Being locals, they act as guides for the regular forces during operations. In July 2010, the MHA cleared proposals related to induction of 16,000 more SPOs in the Maoist affected states. The utility of the SPOs for the police can be made out from the fact that they have been hounded for annihilation by the Maoists. On occasions, family members of these SPOs too have been targeted for attacks.

The human rights organisations, however, tell a different story about the SPOs. They accuse the government of arming tribals and letting them loose on the so called Maoist sympathisers. A civilian vigilante programme *Salwa Judum* (purification hunt) which is supported by the state government as part of its counter-Maoist strategy is accused of orchestrating human rights abuses on the tribal population in the name of anti-Maoist operations. The *Salwa Judum* volunteers are accused of killing, injury and rape of tribals. Human Rights groups also allege that a large number of private armies, consisting mostly of former/ surrendered Maoist cadres sprang up in Andhra Pradesh under the guise of anti-Maoist private militia. Some of these vigilante groups were Fear Vikas, Green Tigers, Nalladandu, Red Tigers, Tirumala Tigers, Palnadu Tigers, Kakatiya Cobras, Narsa Cobras, Nallamalla Nallatracchu (Cobras) and Kranthi Sena. Human Rights groups allege that most of these groups had the backing of the State government.

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262 A number of articles have critiqued the Salwa Judum. For example, see “Exposing Death Squad Murders in Chhattisgarh”, *Tehelka*, vol 6, no. 5, February 07, 2009.

The Chhattisgarh government on the other hand maintains that Salwa Judum is a “tribal movement against the diktat of the Maoists not to pluck tendu leaves which created seasonal employment in that area.” Even the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) which had been mandated by the Supreme Court to probe the alleged excesses committed by the Salwa Judum in Chhattisgarh’s Bastar region, gave a clean chit to the programme. The Commission, after conducting a detailed on-the-spot investigation of the activities of the Salwa Judum found that, barring a few stray cases of violence, there was nothing to suggest the direct involvement of its members.

The respondents among the common people and experts were asked about their opinion on the role of the SPOs and the effectiveness of using these poorly-trained tribals against the superiorly armed Maoists.

**Is there any private militia or armed civilians engaged in fighting Maoists?**

*(Common people, Experts and Security force personnel)*

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<th>Common people</th>
<th>Experts</th>
<th>Security force personnel</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Yes</strong></td>
<td><strong>No</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>10.9%</strong></td>
<td><strong>89.1%</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>11.7%</strong></td>
<td><strong>88.4%</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>17%</strong></td>
<td><strong>83%</strong></td>
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1. **Andhra Pradesh**: 74.9 per cent common people (149 respondents) were of the opinion that no private militia or armed civilians are involved in fighting the Maoists in

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Andhra Pradesh. The experts too expressed similar views. 38 out of the 48 experts amounting to 79.2 per cent respondents in this category who answered the question denied having knowledge of private militia or armed civilians taking on the Maoists. 40 per cent among the security force personnel, who participated in the survey and whose responses were analysed separately, however, admitted the presence of such private militia and armed civilians in Andhra Pradesh.

2. Chhattisgarh: Close to 99 per cent common people (197 respondents) indicated that no private militia or armed civilians are involved in counter-Maoist operations in Chhattisgarh. 45 out of the 50 experts who participated in the survey too denied having knowledge of private militia or armed civilians taking on the Maoists in Chhattisgarh. Similarly, eight out of the nine security force personnel who participated in the survey and whose responses were analysed separately, expressed similar opinion.

3. Jharkhand: 94 per cent common people (188 respondents) were of the opinion that no private militia or armed civilians are involved in fighting the Maoists in Jharkhand. The experts too expressed similar views. 45 out of the 48 experts who answered the question denied having knowledge of private militia or armed civilians taking on the Maoists in Jharkhand. A lone expert indicated that an unnamed private militia group had to be wound up due to stiff resistance by the Naxals. Similarly, all the 12 security force personnel expressed similar opinion.

Effectiveness of the SPOs (Common people, Experts and Security force personnel)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Common people</th>
<th>Experts</th>
<th>security force personnel</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>62.4%</td>
<td>59.5%</td>
<td>63.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35%</td>
<td>40.5%</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can't say</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>36.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>62.4%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>63.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can't say</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>36.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. **Andhra Pradesh**: In a related question, whether recruitment of SPOs has helped in weakening the Maoist movement, the opinions were divided. While 46.8 per cent common people (65 respondents) were of the opinion that the SPOs have indeed been helpful in tackling the Maoists, another 48.2 per cent (67 respondents) said that SPOs have not been effective. Experts too were divided in their opinion on the effectiveness of the SPOs. Where as 54.5 per cent (24 respondents) experts said that SPOs have been effective, 45.5 per cent (20 respondents) experts answered in the negative. Surprisingly, all the security force personnel were, however, categorical that the SPO experiment in Andhra Pradesh has been unsuccessful.

2. **Chhattisgarh**: 83 per cent common people (166 respondents) were of the opinion that the SPOs have indeed been helpful in tackling the Maoists. Majority 72 per cent of the experts (36 respondents) which included all the nine security force personnel expressed similar opinion. The answers indicated a broad based support for the official policy of using SPOs against the Maoists.

3. **Jharkhand**: 57.3 per cent common people (114 respondents) were of the opinion that the SPOs have indeed been helpful in tackling the Maoists. Another 83 respondents indicated that SPOs have not been effective. Experts too were divided in their opinion on the effectiveness of the SPOs. Whereas 52.1 per cent (25 respondents) experts said that SPOs have been effective, 47.9 per cent (23 respondents) experts answered in the negative. 11 of the 12 security force personnel were, however, categorical that the SPO experiment in Jharkhand has been a success. The answers of the common people and experts (barring the security forces) indicated lack of conviction in the ability of the SPOs to be of any help to the State police in anti-Naxal operations.

**D. How has the Government fared?**

In the history of left-wing extremism in Andhra Pradesh, two peace processes stand out at attempts by the State to resolve the problem by negotiation. In June 2002, a short-lived
peace process was initiated between the State government and the PWG. Three rounds of talks were held between the two sides on 5 June, 9 June and 20 June that year. However, the peace process collapsed on mutually conflicting perceptions on the types of activities that could be undertaken or, more specifically, not undertaken, during the peace process. The rebels wanted to continue to propagate their cause and move about with arms, even as they demanded that the police should be instructed not to act against them. The State government, on the other hand, accused the extremists of indulging in widespread extortion and intimidation. It indicated that while the police would not be pro-active, it could not be inactive in the face of the PWG’s illegal activities. The State government refused to accede to PWG demands for an official cease-fire, and termination of alleged fake encounters and arrests of Naxal cadres. The continuing hostilities between the State government and PWG reached a flashpoint when the latter called for a two-day Statewide bandh on 11-12 July 2002, in protest against encounters. PWG withdrew from the process on 19 July 2002 through a statement issued by its Andhra Pradesh State Committee secretary Akkiraju Haragopal alias Ramakrishna.

Following the breakdown of talks, conflict between the security forces and the PWG intensified. In 2003, it resulted in approximately 300 deaths. An assassination attempt on Chief Minister Chandrababu Naidu (discussed in Chapter Three) by the PWG in October 2003 served to reinforce the government’s hard-line position against the rebels.

In 2004, both sides gave peace another chance by engaging each other in another phase of peace process. The Congress government under Dr. Y.S. Rajasekhara Reddy suspended security force operations against the Naxalites and gave an invitation for direct talks to the Naxalite leadership. In May 2004, the Naxals left their hideouts inside the Nallamalla forests to travel to Hyderabad for talks with him. The PWG and the MCC merged in October 2004 together to form the CPI-Maoist. Contrary to the spirit of talks, Naxals used the period of the ceasefire for massive fund-raising and recruitment. According to an

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268 “India - Maoist Insurgency”, http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/ACRText/ACR-IndiaAP.html
estimate from an estimated 650 before the unilateral ceasefire declared by the State government, Naxal strength rose to over 1100 by the time the talks collapsed in December 2004. In January 2005, the CPI-Maoist announced its withdrawal from peace negotiations with the State government following a series of encounters with the police.

The Maoist spokesperson in a statement said that the rebels were pulling out of the peace process because of what they described as ‘combing operations by the Greyhound’. They accused Chief Minister Rajashekhar Reddy of running a ‘fascist regime’ and ‘deceiving’ the rebels by promising peace in the election campaign and now giving the police a ‘free hand’.

That was the last initiative on part of the Andhra Pradesh government to initiate peace talks with the extremists. Since then the CPI-Maoist has refused to be a part of the peace process with the Union Government. Union Home Minister P Chidambaram’s repeated offer of peace talks with the Maoists has met with pre-conditions laid down by the extremists, displaying a complete lack of seriousness. In August 2010, Maoist leader Kishenji suggested a 90-day ceasefire by New Delhi as a pre-condition for starting a process of dialogue with the government. These conditions were rejected by the government which said, “We have not received any formal communication from CPI-Maoist nor have the ultras abjured violence. It seems the Centre's suggestion to abjure violence and come for dialogue is falling on deaf ears. Their (ultras) idea is to create confusion and buy time for themselves amid intense offensive against them from security forces.”

The Study attempted to elicit perception of the common people as well as the experts regarding the approach of the State and Central governments to deal with Maoist

269 Ajai Sahni, “The State Advances, the Maoists Retreat”, *South Asia Intelligence Review*, vol. 6, no. 10, September 17, 2007, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/6_10.htm


extremism. It also asked them for their opinion about the best way forward with the current problem.

**Has the government done enough to solve the problem of Left Wing Extremism?**

*(Common people and Experts)*

![Bar chart showing responses to the question.*](chart.png)

1. **Andhra Pradesh:** Opinion of the common people on the government response to Left Wing Extremism was somewhat divided. In spite of the relative success of the Andhra Pradesh police against the Maoists, only 14.5 per cent (29 respondents) said that the government has done enough as far as solving the problem of Left Wing Extremism is concerned. Where as 34.5 per cent (69 respondents) said that what ever could be done under the circumstances has been done, a sizeable 49 per cent (98 respondents) indicated that the government’s efforts are far from satisfactory. The experts were relatively more appreciative of the government’s efforts. While only 14 per cent (seven respondents) found the government efforts to be completely satisfactory, majority 54 per cent (27 respondents) maintained that the government has done whatever it could do. Thirty-two per cent (16 respondents) were dissatisfied with the government’s efforts. Among the security forces, 80 per cent said what could have been done has been done and the rest 20 per cent expressed dissatisfaction with the government’s efforts. The responses were
indicative of a moderate level of satisfaction among the experts and security forces. The common people, however, wanted the government to do more.

2. Chhattisgarh: A little more than 50 per cent (101 respondents) of the 200 common people said that the government has not done enough to solve the problem. This was followed by 47 per cent (94 respondents) who indicated that whatever could be done under the circumstances has been done. Complete satisfaction with the government’s performance was limited to only five respondents. The experts too demonstrated a similar trend. While 52 per cent (26 respondents) found the government efforts lacking, 40 per cent experts (20 respondents) maintained that the government has done whatever it could do. Among the security officials, significantly, 44.4 per cent said that the government efforts have not been enough. While more than 33 per cent said what could have been done has been done, 22.2 per cent expressed complete satisfaction with the government’s approach. A senior police official commented, “Bridge of trust (between the government and the tribals) is yet to be seen. The security forces are yet to gain desired adequate support from the common masses particularly in the remote interior areas where the development process has not reached. (Winning against the Maoists is) not possible without effective popular backing.”

3. Jharkhand: Opinion of the common people on the government response to Left Wing Extremism indicated complete dissatisfaction. Over 82 per cent (165 respondents) common people said that the government has not done enough as far as solving the problem of Left Wing Extremism is concerned. Only nine respondents were satisfied with the government’s initiatives, whereas 26 respondents said that whatever could be done under the circumstances has been done. The experts too demonstrated a similar trend. While 88 per cent (44 respondents) found the government efforts completely lacking, 12 per cent experts (six respondents) maintained that the government has done whatever it could do. None of the experts expressed satisfaction with the government’s efforts. Among the security forces, too, 66.7 per cent expressed dissatisfaction with the

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273 Interview with Mr R K Vij, Inspector General of Police Planning and Operation in PHQ and Chhattisgarh State Police Spokesperson, held at Raipur on November 25, 2009.
government’s efforts and the rest 33.3 per cent said what could have been done has been done. The responses were indicative of the complete dissatisfaction with whatever steps have been initiated to solve the Maoist problem.

In August 2009, the MHA implemented a revised surrender-cum-rehabilitation policy for the Maoists. In addition to money received by the surrendered Maoist for the different kinds of arms and explosives they surrender with274, the policy also provides for a generous financial grant.

“An immediate grant of Rs 1.5 lakh shall be kept in a bank in the name of surrendered ultra as a fixed deposit which may be withdrawn by him or her after completion of three years, subject to good behaviour to be certified by the authorities designated for this purpose by the states concerned. This money can also be utilised as collateral security/margin money against loans to be availed of by the surrendered militant from any bank for self-employment.”275

The table below is an indication of the interest the scheme has generated among the Naxalite cadres in specific states like Andhra Pradesh, where it has found less takers in Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of Maoists Surrendered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Andhra Pradesh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009*</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Till January)

274 As per the policy following incentives for surrender of weapons are offered. Rs 15,000 for depositing one AK 47 or AK 56 or AK 74 Rifle, Rs 25,000 for each RPG/Sniper rifle, Rs 3,000 for one Pistol/Revolver, Rs 1,000 for a rocket, Rs 3,000 for a Remote Control Device, Rs 1,000 for IED, Rs 3,000 for one mine, Rs 20,000 for a SAM Missile and Rs 10,000 for a Satellite Phone.


The questionnaire elicited perceptions of the people on the surrender and rehabilitation scheme.

**Has heavy cash rewards succeeded in reducing Maoist problem?**
*(Common people and Experts)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Common People</th>
<th>Experts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. **Andhra Pradesh:** The method of enticing the extremists through cash rewards to join the mainstream did not appear to find favour with the common people, though majority of the experts were satisfied. In response to the question whether giving heavy cash rewards to the Maoists solved the problem, only 33.5 per cent common people indicated that such a measure has been successful. 70.2 per cent of the experts, however, were clear that such a scheme has broken the back of the Maoist movement. Elaborating their responses 26 common people and four experts said that cash rewards can not solve the problem of Left Wing Extremism. However, at the same time, 21 common people and eight experts said that cash award provides encouragement to the surrendered extremists and brings down the level of violence. Ten experts and nine common people said that since the implementation of the scheme, government is being able to get information about extremists from the people. However, eight common people said that this policy is giving a bad name to the police. Seven other common people maintained that because of this policy, extremists kill common people suspecting them to be spies.
2. **Chhatisgarh:** Majority of the common people appeared to support the rehabilitation scheme. Over 57 per cent respondents in this category indicated that such a measure has been successful. However, at the same time, a sizeable number of 85 respondents indicated that such a policy has failed. Explaining their responses 107 respondents said that many Maoists have surrendered as a result of the cash incentives. At the same time, 25 respondents maintained that cash rewards cannot solve the problem. Another 19 respondents said that the surrendered Maoists have misutilised the money received after their surrender. Commenting on how to make the surrender programme successful, a respondent in the common people category said that the state government should “help surrendered extremists to develop skill sets which will help to earn a livelihood and let this be an example for extremists to come forward to lay down arms.”

The response of the experts too followed the trend set by the common people respondents. While more than 52 per cent of the 48 experts who chose to answer the question said that cash rewards have been effective in addressing the problem of Left Wing Extremism, close to 48 per cent disagreed. While 19 experts pointed at the fact that many Maoists have availed the scheme to surrender, 10 others said that the scheme has been misused both by the corrupt officials and the Maoists. The eight security force personnel who answered the query, however, asserted that the surrender-cum-rehabilitation scheme has been a success.

3. **Jharkhand:** The surrender cum rehabilitation scheme for the Naxalites did not find favour either with the common people or the experts. In response to the question whether giving heavy cash rewards to the Maoists solved the problem, majority in both categories replied in the negative. Over 82 per cent (165 respondents) common people and 90 per cent experts (45 respondents) indicated that such a measure has not been successful. Explaining their responses 64 common people and 16 experts said that cash rewards cannot solve the problem of Left Wing Extremism. Another 59 common people and eight experts said that the past instances of cash rewards to surrendered extremists have failed to entice more extremists to join the mainstream. If cash rewards were to solve the

277 Interview with Saleem Memun, a businessman in Kanker district on November 26, 2009.
problem, Left Wing Extremism would have disappeared in Jharkhand long time ago, they said. Six experts indicated that the rehabilitation scheme has been misused by corrupt officials and the Naxalites.

The Central government’s policy and approach to deal with Naxalite activities has been outlined as following. “The overall objective being to uphold the law of the land, provide security of life and property and provide a secure environment for development and economic growth, Government’s approach is to deal with Naxalite activities in a holistic manner, in the arenas of security, development, administration and public perception management.” However, the approach, especially since the launch of the multi-State Operation Green Hunt, has been criticised as tilting towards security force operations and ignoring the development aspects. For example, former PWG cultural head Gaddar says, “Extremism can be solved only through dialogues and politically-by spreading awareness on their (extremists’) ideology and involving them in nation building activities like what has happened in Nepal.” Similarly, a senior police official said, “State always looked upon extremist activity only on par with thefts, burglaries and also temporary violence. It should review its attitude towards extremists as a political activity. Then only it will look at it in a new approach, conceive strategies to resolve it.”

The CPI-Maoist, on the other hand, has resisted the offers of peace negotiations from the government. But there also have been occasions when the outfit has laid down conditions before such a process can take off. For example, CPI-Maoist General Secretary Ganapathy in an interview in January 2010 said,

“To put concisely the main demands that the party has placed in front of the government for any kind of talks are 1. All-out war has to be withdrawn; 2) For any kind of democratic work, the ban on the Party and Mass Organizations have to be lifted; 3) Illegal detention and torture of comrades had to be stopped and immediately released. If these demands

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279 Interview with Gaddar, held at Hyderabad.
280 Interview with Ms. Rupinder Virk, Senior Police official (Intelligence Branch), held at Hyderabad on.
are met, then the same leaders who are released from jails would lead and represent the Party in the talks.”

Accusations that the government is overtly relying security force operations have not only been made by pro-Maoist sympathisers but also by senior members of the ruling Congress Party. For example, Congress General Secretary Digvijay Singh termed the approach of the MHA as “narrow, sectarian”. He said the “the Maoists, at the most, are misguided ideologues who have lost faith in the system and feel that the only way to deliver is through the barrel of a gun.” Member of Parliament from Andhra Pradesh, K Keshava Rao who also served as the Andhra Pradesh Congress Committee president told Union Home Minister P Chidambaram in the Parliament during a debate on the Naxal situation, “Hope you will not only tell us how many police have been recruited or how many companies of paramilitary forces have been sent to Naxal-affected areas, but also tell us how many schools, hospitals and roads have been built in those areas.”

However, such criticism notwithstanding, success of Andhra Pradesh in tackling the Maoist menace, apart from the security force operations, is also based on several economic development and welfare measures initiated by the State government. State economic advisor Somayajulu in a media interview claimed, “Massive irrigation, construction and welfare programmes have created so much employment and income that Left Wing Extremism has lost its attraction for once-unemployed youths. The casual labour wage in the state is now well above the minimum wage of Rs 120 per day, which itself has doubled in five years. Welfare schemes, notably rice at Rs 2 per kilo, have provided safety nets.”

The Study asked the respondents belonging to all the three categories regarding the best to deal with the Maoists.

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Best way to deal with the Maoist problem  
(Common people, Experts and Security force personnel)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>37.7%</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.7%</td>
<td>30.8%</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32.8%</td>
<td>25.5%</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
<td>47.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A = Hold peace dialogue with the extremists  
B = Continue the use of security force operations  
C = Provide developmental assistance to the state  
D = Others

1. Andhra Pradesh: Opinions expressed by the common people weighed heavily in favour of the developmental approach. Out of 200 common people respondents, 94 people indicated that developmental assistance to the Naxal affected states would be the best way to deal with the problem. While 54 people amounting to 27 per cent of the common people opined in favour of holding peace dialogue with the Maoists, only 19 persons opted for continuation of the security force operations against the extremists. Majority of the experts, however, appeared to prefer continuation of security force operation against the extremists. Maximum number of experts (23 out of 50) preferred the security force operations to continue. Another 14 experts preferred dialogue with the extremists, whereas only 11 experts said that developmental assistance would hold the key for resolving the Maoist problem. Interestingly, none of the security forces opted in favour of military operations. While 60 per cent security forces personnel preferred developmental approach, rest 40 per cent opted for peace dialogue with the extremists.
2. **Chhattisgarh:** Respondents demonstrated considerable support behind peace dialogue with the Maoists. Sixty-eight per cent (136 respondents) among the common people said that the government should hold dialogue with the Maoists. While 32 others said that development is the best answer, 26 persons preferred continuation of security force operations. The experts too expressed a similar opinion. 24 of the 50 experts preferred dialogue with the extremists, while eight experts supported security force operations. Nine experts preferred developmental approach. Among the security officials, 50 per cent preferred dialogue with the government, while 25.5 per cent opted for security force operations.

3. **Jharkhand:** Opinions expressed by the respondents demonstrated complete lack of faith in peace talks with the Maoists. Out of 200 common people respondents, 99 people indicated that developmental assistance to the Naxal affected states would be the best way to deal with the problem. While 65 common people opted for continuation of the security force operations against the extremists, only 36 opined in favour of holding peace dialogue with the Maoists. The experts too expressed a similar opinion. Maximum number of experts (18 out of 50) preferred developmental approach. Another 15 experts supported security force operations and only nine experts preferred dialogue with the extremists. Among the security forces, seven out of the 12 security force personnel preferred continuation of military operations and four others said that developmental assistance would hold the key for resolving the Maoist problem.
E. Gains from the Peace Processes:

Has peace dialogue achieved desired results? (Common people, Experts and Security force personnel)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Common People</th>
<th>Experts</th>
<th>Security Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19% Yes</td>
<td>9% Yes</td>
<td>17% Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81% No</td>
<td>91% No</td>
<td>83% No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. **Andhra Pradesh**: The two failed peace processes with the Maoists in Andhra Pradesh appeared to have influenced the responses of the common people as they answered the question: “Has dialogue between the Government of India and the extremist groups achieved the desired results?” A majority 67.6 per cent (117 respondents) in the common people category were of the opinion that ‘dialogue between the Government of India and the extremist groups’ has not been a useful process of achieving results. The experts were even more emphatic on the futility of peace process with the extremists. Over 91 per cent of the experts including all the security force personnel maintained that dialogue between the Government of India and the extremist groups has never achieved desired results. Explaining their response further, experts mostly pointed at the previous failed talks, lack of political will on part of the government, lack of seriousness on part of the Maoists and lack of trust between the government and the Maoists.

2. **Chhattisgarh**: The fact that no peace process with the Maoists worth its name has taken off in Chhattisgarh appeared to have influenced the responses of the common
people. An overwhelming 99 per cent (198 respondents) in the common people category were of the opinion that ‘dialogue between the Government of India and the extremist groups’ has not been a useful process of achieving results. Explaining their response, 70 common people said that the extremists are never interested in holding dialogue with the government. Another 38 respondents pointed at the lack of political will in solving the problem. 33 more respondents said that the failure of the negotiation process is rooted in the fact that they have never been properly conceptualised. Opinion of the experts too demonstrated a complete lack of satisfaction with the process of peace dialogue. All the 50 experts, including nine security force personnel, who participated in the survey, maintained that dialogue between the Government of India and the extremist groups has never achieved desired results. Explaining their response further, 12 experts found fault with the approach of the government. Eleven others said that there has been a lack of will on both sides to solve the problem amicably. Seven experts blamed the lack of political will on the part of the government. An expert commented, “Strong political will remains missing. Irrespective of which party rules, the problems persists since the seriousness is missing. Whatever statements are given by the government is to divert the public attention or hide their own failures.”

3. Jharkhand: A majority 76.5 per cent (153 respondents) in the common people category were of the opinion that ‘dialogue between the Government of India and the extremist groups’ has not been a useful process of achieving results. Explaining their response, 28 common people pointed at the futility of talks with extremists. Endorsing this view point another 21 common people said that the extremists are never interested in holding dialogue with the government. Another 16 respondents pointed at the lack of political will in solving the problem and 15 others said that no peace process worth its name has so far been initiated in the state. Opinion of the experts too demonstrated a complete lack of satisfaction with the process of peace dialogue. Out of the 50 experts, including 12 security force personnel who participated in the survey, 41 maintained that dialogue between the Government of India and the extremist groups has never achieved

285 Interview with Dr A R Dalla, Senior Surgeon, former Chairman of Chhattisgarh Red Cross Society and President of Chhattisgarh Doctors Association, held at Raipur on December 20, 2009.
desired results. Security forces, however, were equally divided in their responses. While six of the 12 security forces indicated that peace talks have been useful in solving extremism, the rest disapproved of such conclusions. Explaining their response further, experts mostly indicated at the lack of political will on part of the government and lack of seriousness on part of the Maoists.

F. Resolving Extremism:

Measures to resolve extremism range from using the might of the State to recognising the extremists as equal partners in charting out a course of development of tribals. For example, Maoist ideologue Varavara Rao said during an interview conducted during the survey, “Revolution is not a law and order situation. It is a political problem and can be solved only through political solution. It can not be solved by unleashing force and state violence on the revolutionaries and the local people for supporting them.”

The questionnaire in an open ended question encouraged the participants in both the common people and experts’ category to suggest steps to resolve the problem of Left Wing Extremism in their respective states. The participants were encouraged to list more than one method, if they find a combination of methods would be effective.

1. Andhra Pradesh: The highest number of respondents (64 common people) suggested that creation of employment avenues in the state would be effective in solving the problem. The youth who form the bulk of the support base and potential cadres among the Naxalites would not be available for the Maoist outfit. 62 respondents preferred development, while 30 respondents called for more emphasis on education. Twenty common people suggested that the government should try to understand and respond to the problems of common people. The lack of faith in the peace process was again reflected in the answers of the common people as barely 13 people preferred peace process with the extremists. Among the 50 experts, 18 called for generating employment opportunities in the State, while 15 others underlined the need for emphasis on education. Nine experts preferred development initiatives. Five experts indicated that
implementation of land reforms in the state would be an effective tool for conflict resolution. Among the security force personnel, whose responses were analysed separately, generation of employment opportunities was the highest ranked method followed by development initiatives and more emphasis on education.

2. Chhattisgarh: In spite of the lack of faith displayed in the peace talks between the Government of India and the extremist groups, majority 111 common people opted for a peace process with the Maoists to resolve the problem of extremism in Chhattisgarh. Whereas 85 common people suggested that development initiatives should be undertaken, 84 respondents suggested that land reforms hold the key to the problem. Fifty common people suggested that security force operations against the Maoists should be intensified. Among the 50 experts, 31 opted for development initiatives as an option. Unlike the common people, only 14 experts said peace dialogue with the Maoists would be an effective tool for conflict resolution. An equal number of experts also advocated land reforms in Chhattisgarh. 13 others said that creation of employment opportunities could solve the problem of Left Wing Extremism. Among the security force personnel, whose responses were analysed separately, development initiatives were the highest ranked method with seven respondents opting for it. Three security force personnel advocated taking care of the ‘day to day security issues of the common people’ whereas a lone security force personnel advocated ‘strong measures against the Maoists’.

3. Jharkhand: The highest number of respondents (148 common people) suggested that creation of employment avenues in the state would be effective in solving the problem. The youth who form the bulk of the support base among the Naxalites would not be available to join the extremists’ ranks. 100 respondents preferred development, eradication of poverty and educational schemes to be honestly implemented in the state. In spite of the lack of faith displayed earlier in peace processes with the extremists, 54 respondents called for peace dialogue with the Maoists. Another 52 common people wanted strong measures to remove corruption in the state. Among the 50 experts, 20 opted for development initiatives. Another 20 called for generating employment opportunities in the state. Ten experts indicated that implementation of land reforms in
the state would be an effective tool for conflict resolution. Nine others sought strong measures to remove corruption and eight experts asked for involvement of the civil society in the peace process with the Maoists. Among the security force personnel, whose responses were analysed separately, generation of employment opportunities was the highest ranked method with five respondents opting for it. Four security force personnel advocated implementation of development programmes.

The respondents in all categories were subsequently asked to answer the open ended question, “How State response can be made more effective to meet the challenges of extremist violence”.

1. **Andhra Pradesh:** Among the common people, 29 respondents suggested implementation of development initiatives in rural and remote areas. 21 respondents said that the government should try to understand and respond to the problems of common people. 15 others indicated that employment generation would go a long way in strengthening the counter-extremist measures in Andhra Pradesh. While nine respondents called for intensification of security force operations against the Maoists, nine others said the government should work towards removing corruption. Seven respondents suggested that the government should consider taking help of the public and the media. Five experts called for proper rehabilitation of the surrendered extremists. Four experts each emphasised on modernisation of the police force and empowerment of women. Four other experts said emphasis on education would be critical factor in making the State response to meet the challenges of extremist violence more effective. Majority of the security forces called for involving the civil society in crafting out an effective State response.

2. **Chhattisgarh:** Among the common people, 92 respondents suggested modernisation of the state police as an effective mechanism to contain Maoist violence. Another 45 common people suggested continued ‘direct action to wipe off the Maoists’. 25 respondents advocated development initiatives in the Maoist affected areas. Modernisation of the police force as part of an effective state response to Maoist violence
was suggested by 19 experts. Interestingly, these 19 experts included only one security force personnel. 14 experts including two security force personnel suggested development initiatives as a tool to contain Maoist violence. Nine experts suggested that the state government should be more responsive towards the grievances of the people, whereas eight experts suggested establishment of more police stations in Maoist affected areas. Interestingly, this group of experts did not include a single security force personnel. An expert, however, indicated that the “Government should see that innocents are not made to suffer by security forces. This will help in gaining public cooperation to fight against insurgency.” In a similar vein, another expert said, “The common villagers always find themselves trapped in the problem. The state must be able to distinguish between the hardcore Maoists and the innocent civilians. Innocents should never be harmed in any way.”

3. Jharkhand: Among the common people, 95 respondents suggested intensification of security force operations against the Maoists. Forty others pointed at the need for modernisation of the state police as an effective mechanism to contain Maoist violence. Another 35 common people suggested implementation of development initiatives in rural and remote areas. Thirty-three respondents suggested that the government should involve community based organisations in formulating its anti-Maoist policies. Initiation of developmental schemes and their proper implementation especially in the rural and remote areas was suggested by 19 experts as a method to make the state response to Maoist problem more effective. 11 experts indicated that involvement of the civil society organisations in government policy formulation would make the state response more effective. Modernisation of the police force as part of an effective state response to Maoist violence was suggested by 10 experts. Eight experts suggested continuation of strong measures against the extremists. Pointing at the alarming misuse of the cell phone network by the extremists, eight experts asked for a regular monitoring of the calls made by the extremists. Four security force personnel felt that key to any success against the Maoists is in the formulation of a proper policy against the extremists. Four other security

286 Interview with Shanti, NGO activist in Narayanpur district, held on December 7, 2009.
287 Interview with Mr Prateek Pandey, Activist on Right to Information (RTI) Campaign, State Coordinator of Chhattisgarh Citizen Initiatives, held at Raipur on January 5, 2010.
force personnel felt that there is scope for involvement of civil society organisations as far as formulating an effective anti-Maoist policy is concerned. An expert summed up his idea of solving the problem of Maoist extremism in Jharkhand—it can be removed through “removal of corruption and economic disparity with proper implication of all development programmes launched by government with the help of devoted NGOs and public participation.”

Key Findings of the Survey:

Northeast

- Significant awareness about the special security legislations among the respondents, both in rural and urban areas, was noticed (AFSPA – 67.4%, NSA – 74.8%, UAPA – 56.4%). This appeared to be the fallout of the ongoing demands for removal of acts like the AFSPA, which human rights/ civil society organisations say are draconian and encourage high handedness by the security forces.

- Respondents (Common People – 60.8%, Professionals – 50.6%) indicated that special security legislations have, in a way, encouraged the growth of extremism. Open source literature is dominated by writings about how prolonged military presence has not been able to dent the capacities of the extremists. Popular opinion appeared to endorse such thinking.

- At the same time, the field survey refuted the prevailing perception, created mostly by the media, that people of Northeast want security laws like AFSPA to be repealed. Respondents in states, barring Manipur, indicated their preferences for amendments only to the security laws (Common People – 43.4%, Professionals – 51.2%).

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288 Interview with Dr. Umesh Kumar Verma, Research Officer, Jharkhand Tribal Welfare Research Institute, Ranchi, held at Ranchi on January 21, 2009.
Respondents indicated their preference in favour of simultaneous and coordinated operation by the police, para-military and the Army for an effective control over extremism. Preference for any one of these forces operating in isolation was rather limited.

Majority of the respondents (Common People – 70.5%, Professionals – 68.3%) said that neither the central government nor the respective state governments has done enough to resolve the problem of extremism in the region. Such opinion appeared to origin from the prevailing desperation among the peace loving people in the region, who appear to be caught in the middle of insurgency and counter-insurgency operations.

Respondents (Common People – 77.4%, Professionals – 87%) were rather dismissive of the results of the existing peace negotiations between the government and the extremist outfits. Even though during the survey and also in the open source literature, people of the region endorse peace talks as an important conflict resolution tool, they blame the lack of political will on the part of the government and the lack of seriousness and unconstitutional demands of the extremists, for the failure of the ongoing or past peace talks.

In addition to peace talks, respondents favoured development initiatives and employment generation as the preferred modes of conflict resolution in the region. Open source literature indicates a stagnancy of sorts in employment generation in the region, both due to a freeze imposed by cash-strapped state governments as well as lack of private investments. In addition, implementation of development projects remains captive to bureaucratic inertia as well as extremist domination.

**Left Wing Extremism Affected States**

Majority of the respondents (Common People – 44.7%, Professionals – 74.3%) rejected the assumption that special security legislations can be a source of intensification of Left Wing Extremism in their states. This appeared to be a
positive development from the Naxal theatres where the human right organisations accuse the government of wielding draconian power to target civilians accusing them of being Naxal sympathisers.

- Although counter-insurgency doctrines and experiences oppose the use of the Army against the insurgents and prescribe a police-led operation, majority of the respondents in Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand wanted Army, Police and paramilitary forces to take on the Naxalites together. The response indicated a lack of faith in the ability of the police, in spite of the fact of the success of the police-led counter-Maoist operations in Andhra Pradesh. The setbacks suffered by the CRPF in some of the attacks in 2010 in Chhattisgarh appeared to have influenced the opinion of the respondents.

- Notwithstanding the reservation of the common people, a thin majority of the professionals in Andhra Pradesh (54.5%) and Jharkhand (52.1%) endorsed the utility of using SPOs in anti-Naxal operations. In Chhattisgarh, majority respondents among the common people (83%) as well as the professionals on the field (72%) indicated that the contribution of the SPOs in tackling the Maoists have been effective.

- Opinions among the respondents of the three surveyed states ranged from satisfaction to total rejection on the issue of Government’s efforts to solve Left Wing Extremism. In Jharkhand, majority of the respondents in all categories (Common People – 82.5%, Professionals – 88%) expressed their complete dissatisfaction with the government response. In Andhra Pradesh, common people (35%) appeared to be marginally satisfied, notwithstanding moderate satisfaction expressed by the professionals (54%). In Chhattisgarh, while majority (Common People – 50.5%, Professionals – 52%) rejected the scale of success as not enough, a large number of respondents (Common People – 47%, Professionals – 40%) did indicate that the government has managed to achieve what it could in the given challenging circumstances.
Developmental approach was preferred over other modes of conflict resolution mechanisms by the respondents. Creation of employment opportunities and carrying out land reforms were also given primacy by the respondents. The MHA two pronged strategy in Naxal theatres was endorsed. Governance, the respondents opined, can act as an anti-dote against the growth and sustenance of the Naxalites.
A.1 Developmental Recommendations:

A1.1 *Unending mushrooming of extremist outfits, a trend which is largely connected to the problem of lack of governance, needs to be tackled through creation of a responsible and sensitive bureaucracy.* IAS cadres posted in the Northeast are in constant lookout for getting out the region, after serving the minimum required number of years. The Centre and the State governments may take steps to bring about a reform in the mindset of the bureaucracy and in the way it functions. An effective and sensitive bureaucracy would form the core strength of the governmental initiatives in a region which has been freed of extremist influence.

**Action Plan:** This can be achieved either through a creation of a separate north-eastern cadre in the IAS/IPS or through impartment of regular specialised training to the existing officers regarding the role of the administration in such areas. Open to all Indians, the IAS/IPS officers of the NE cadre will have to serve considerable part of their career in the region, thereby developing expertise in and rendering service to the region.

A1.2 *Improving connectivity between Indian mainland and the Northeast is a core issue that may aid in developing the region as well as dealing with extremism.* Road network within the Northeast has not grown at a desirable pace. The national highways are in bad shape due to lack of maintenance. Frequent strikes by organisations make the highways, especially those connecting Manipur in-operational.

**Action Plan:** A five year plan to improve connectivity- both land and air- need to be formulated and implemented. The highways connecting different states need to be broadened and made functional all round the year. In addition to the building of the roads, the contractors need to be made responsible for their maintenance as well. The highways
need to declared as non-tolerance zones and any blockade on them need to be tackled with a strong hand.

**A1.3 Establishment of the autonomous councils as a method to improve governance needs to be examined.** It is an accepted reality that the experiment of autonomous councils has met with complete failure in most of the northeastern states. The personal ambitions of the local leaders as well as the State government’s reluctance to delegate powers to the councils are at the core of the problem.

**Action Plan:** A detailed study of the performance of the autonomous councils needs to be carried out to bring into picture their contribution to the development of the areas under their administration. While a constitutional amendment to scrap autonomous council provision would be a farfetched idea involving political debate, the State governments should be encouraged to stop further creation of such councils. Further decentralization of powers to the village level needs to be considered and this can be done by setting up Village Councils under the autonomous councils. The panchayati raj model could be used as a framework for setting up such village councils. In this way economic democracy would reach the grassroots.

**A1.4 District development plans need to be formulated and implemented.** Development initiatives must go side by side with the anti-insurgency operations. Just like the void in governance is filled up by the extremists, the government must start its activities immediately after the security force take over an area. The government must have a District Development Plan, separately for each district in the state. Once violence is brought under control, the plan can be put into immediate implementation, without wasting time. It needs emphasis that such a plan should be purely location-specific and can be prepared in consultation with local people, which will ensure people’s participation in the development process. Of late, a section of the political class is considering formulation of constituency-wise development plans. However this seems to be a politically-motivated thinking and would not fetch any benefit for the people and hence, should not be encouraged.
**Action Plan:** Along with the government, the expertise of the NGOs can be used in this. NGOs can bridge the gap between the grassroots and the district headquarters.

**A1.5 The rising problem of unemployment needs to be addressed through a comprehensive action plan focusing on vocational education.** Large-scale unemployment prevailing in each of the states is sure recipe for disaster in the days to come. These youths are vulnerable to the lure of easy money and hence extremism. While the government cannot be the sole job creator in the state, the non-generation of job opportunities in the secondary and tertiary sector has either pushed these youth outside the state or into the hands of the extremist groups.

**Action Plan:** The states need more number of vocational training institutes and also soft loans for students passing out of these institutions. The State governments may have to take a pro active stand in including vocational skills in the school curricula so that the education system realistically prepares the students for their future life. This and not the regular education that creates unemployables may become the focus of the educational system.

**A1.6 Using the NGOs to reach out to people as a method of development needs to be tried in states like Meghalaya and Nagaland.** The NGOs can be used to carry out independent social audits, basically to list the development needs of the people living in remote areas and report back to the government, which can then take remedial steps. Social audits of the work done by the government can also be undertaken in order to see whether common people have really been benefitted by the developmental schemes or not.

**Action Plan:** NGOs generally carry a negative perception among the official circles. They are either seen as corrupt or as front organisations of the extremist outfits. While odd NGOs do fall into this category, there are a number of genuine organisations whose services can be used by the State to implement development schemes as well as to build
up a movement against violence. A detailed survey needs to be carried out by the State
governments to identify such NGOs.

**A1.7 The function of the traditional structures of governance needs to be protected.**
With the growth of democracy and representative form of government, the traditional
structures of governance and local institutions have either disintegrated or have weakened.
In Meghalaya, the *durbars* are a case in point. They, in spite of their hold over the
population, are fast losing out to political institutions, who do not command similar
authority. In the case of extremism, the weakening of the *durbars* has meant lack of
social control over the youths who are taking to extremism.

**Action Plan:** An institutional structure that accommodates these institutions must be
evolved. To the extent possible, such institutions need to empowered to solve minor
disputes at their level, which will give them a legal position to sustain.

**A1.8 Frequent familiarisation tours to Indian cities for students and youths from the
northeastern states should be arranged.** People of the Northeast, especially people in the
interior states suffer from a sense of alienation which adds to the acceptability of the
extremists. This can be addressed through ensuring greater exposure to mainland India.
The school curriculum may also be made to include more materials promoting national
integration and unity.

**Action Plan:** Whereas the frequent trips of youths and students from these states can be
arranged to different locations in India, regular performance by artistes from various
Indian states should be arranged in to the northeastern states. Such tours may go beyond
the state capitals.

**A1.9 Centre and the State governments need to take steps to revive tourism industry in
the northeastern states.** Tourism potential of the northeastern states has suffered due to
the prevailing security scenario. For states like Nagaland, Mizoram and Arunachal
Pradesh, the need for an inner line permit creates a mental block among the people
wishing to visit the states. For other states the image of a gun-toting extremist killing and extorting people at will deters them from ever venturing into these states.

**Action Plan:** Of late significant publicity has been provided in the national media encouraging people to visit the Northeast. Individual State governments can also be encouraged to reach understanding to this effect with outfits under ceasefire, so as to ensure the safety of the tourists. For example, the NSCN-IM in Nagaland can be encouraged to issue a statement expressing its openness to tourists visiting the state.

**A1.10 Culture and sports can be used as modes of integration of northeastern states with mainland India.** States like Manipur, Nagaland and Mizoram not only have a thriving cultural heritage, but also are homes to excellent sportspersons. These strengths of the states need to be cultivated as sources of bonding between India and the Northeast.

**Action Plan:** Regular shows of cultural troops from the Northeast can be arranged in the metropolitan cities including the national capital. In addition, artistes from other states should be encouraged to perform in Northeastern State capitals. Sports facilities and infrastructure need improvement within the Northeast. Sportspersons need to be constantly encouraged and therefore, special central packages may be worked out.

**A1.11 There is a need for proper formulation and implementation of Citizen’s Charter in the government departments.** The charter provides information to the public about the quantity and quality of service provided by the respective government office. This would increase transparency and accountability in the works of the government.

**Action Plan:** The Citizen’s Charter needs to be displayed in all the government offices. The entire staff of the office should be made aware of what is contained in the charter. This would make the government officials more responsive towards the public. The government departments should regularly publish their performance and also periodically review the charter standards.
A2. Operational Recommendations:

A2.1 *The government needs to follow a consistent policy on peace negotiations with the extremist outfits.* It has entered into negotiations with the NSCN-IM in Nagaland without forcing the outfit to surrender arms and talk within the ambit of the Indian constitution. However, with outfits like ULFA both these conditions are being reiterated. It needs to be realised no outfit would ever enter into negotiations with the condition of surrendering its weapons.

**Action Plan:** Surrender of all the cadres of the outfits, not factions and cessation of violence, instead of arms surrender can be used as a precondition. This condition must be followed strictly and the outfits on ceasefire must not be allowed to carry arms and indulge in extortion and violence.

A2.2 *The existing vacancies in the police force need to be filled up.* This applies both to the vacancies existing at the level of the IPS officers to be posted in each of the State and also other personnel.

**Action Plan:** Quality of the personnel need not be sacrificed for the sake of quickly filling up the vacancies. The state government may take a time frame of three years to fill up the vacancies at the constabulary level. This will not constitute an immediate drain on the state’s resources and would also provide time for a thorough recruitment process.

A2.3 *Tenures of at least two to three years need to be ensured for SPs in districts most affected by extremist violence.* An earlier study done by BPR&D indicated that short tenures for Superintendents of Police (SPs) in various states of the country have been a problem as far as evolving and executing a sound counter-insurgency policy is concerned. Appointment and duration of the SPs in particular districts has been subjected to political decisions. SPs have been transferred even after isolated incidents of extremist attack. The short tenures have done justice neither to their ability nor to the basic need of familiarisation with a particular area.
**Action Plan:** The DGP as well as State government will have to be responsible for implementation of the plan. If needed, an amendment in State Police Acts may be brought in to formalise the plan.

**A2.4 A decision on the AFSPA’s repeal/amendment needs to be made.** Opposition to the AFSPA continues to remain the major rallying point in states like Manipur. Agitations demanding its repeal have broken out every now and then which have its repercussions on the law and order, economy as well as educational sectors. It has also been a source of alienation among the people.

**Action Plan:** Amendments to the Act are under Cabinet consideration. Urgent move to seek Cabinet clearance and steps to notify the amendments could be considered.

**A2.5 Improving conviction rates arrested extremists should be a critical part of the counter-insurgency strategy.** Many states in the Northeast scores poorly as far as conviction rates of arrested extremists are concerned. Extremists are released as a result of poor investigation processes, poor mechanisms for prosecution, as well as the tardiness and formalism of the judicial process.

**Action Plan:** Police personnel specifically need immediate and intensive training in scientific investigation, and stronger forensic facilities need to be created within the state structures to secure a wider and more effective range of judicially admissible evidence. The police departments such as in the State of Tripura need to establish separate prosecution wings or a directorate.

**A2.6 MHA may bear the entire cost of counter-insurgency (CI) operations for the northeastern states rather than asking for a State share.** It has been a persistent demand of the State governments of the region that the Centre bears the entire cost of CI operations. Since the costs of such CI operations are a huge burden on the limited resources of the State governments, this demand can be considered.
**Action Plan:** It is entirely the prerogative of the MHA to accede to this demand.

**A2.7 Fencing along the porous Indo-Bangladesh border, which continues to provide an easy access to the extremists, needs to be completed on an urgent basis.**

**Action Plan:** Fencing is only a small part of a sound border management policy. To ensure that the fencing is an effective barrier, road network along the border may be improved, mobile telephony need to reach those areas, healthcare and education facilities may be put in place for the population in the border areas and crucially, good officers (both bureaucrats and police) may be posted to border areas with, if necessary, special border allowances.

**A2.8 A regional anti-terror framework with the neighbouring countries like Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan and Myanmar needs to be institutionalised.** It will assist the processes of intelligence sharing as well as extradition of wanted fugitives. This will act as a deterrent on the capacities of the north-eastern groups to use the territories of those countries as safe haven.

**Action Plan:** Efforts at the diplomatic level can be made to establish such groupings.

**SECTION B: LEFT WING EXTREMISM AFFECTED STATES:**

**B1. Developmental Recommendations:**

**B1.1 Committed, transparent and high priority implementation of land reforms measures could form a critical component of the anti-Naxal strategy.** Tribal land alienation has been exploited by the Naxals to build up their movement. Without a land reform programme, the landless tribals have no option but to throw in their lot with the Naxals with the hope that justice would be done to them. The state of land reforms through the Naxal dominated states has remained unsatisfactory. States are either not
inclined to bring in land reforms or have delayed the process by not implementing recommendations of land reforms commissions set up by themselves. Andhra Pradesh is an example.

**Action Plan:** The Union government should issue advisories to the state governments on taking immediate steps for bringing out land reforms. Though land reforms are a state subject, still the centre can play an advisory role. Intra-state differences should be addressed by brain storming at the state as well as the national level. While state-wide implementation of the programme and subsequent monitoring of such implementation would be too ambitious, it could be attempted district by district, starting with the least Naxal affected districts where it would be easy to implement. Setting up of a permanent authority such as Land Reforms Implementation Commissioner could be thought of. Also land reforms need to be area specific and community specific and the existing land ceiling laws should be taken into account while bringing out the reforms.

**B1.2 Empowering the grass roots level self-government organisations like the Panchayats and Gram Sabhas would help building a primary line of defence against the Naxalites.** In a situation where governance and local administration has collapsed in many of the Naxal dominated areas, the local self government institutions may be revived as the first step towards stamping the presence of the government. This would allow the people of the region to develop a sense of participation and stake in the development of the area.

**Action Plan:** The Panchayat (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 (PESA), a progressive piece of legislation that recognises the competence of tribal communities to govern themselves is yet to be implemented vigorously in states like Chhattisgarh. In other states, Panchayats are adversely affected by lack of power and resources. The State Government needs to ensure that the PESA Act provisions are implemented strictly and vigorously to particularly ensure that rights over minor forest produce are assigned to the Gram Sabhas. Regular and adequate flow of resources needs to be ensured to these
bodies. And also to increase their influence in the region, the *Panchayats* may be given legal power to adjudicate over petty criminal as well as property disputes.

**B1.3 An element of transparency may be brought into the deals of land acquisition by private/public sector undertakings in the tribal areas.** Much of the tribal angst against the State governments has been due to the manner in which tribal land has been transferred to the private and public sector companies. Many of these deals where companies promise benefits to the tribals or the state promises to compensate the tribals are shrouded in secrecy. Consent of the *Gram Sabhas*, which is mandatory in the event of transfer of tribal land, is being overwritten by imposition of Central Land Acquisition Act of 1894, which allows government to overtake land for public purpose.

**Action Plan:** All big land deals should be made public by the government through advertisements in local language newspapers. Amount of compensation provided and details of beneficiaries should also be made public. Individuals and organisations should be allowed to raise objections, although a mere objection may not put a serious hurdle in the deal.

**B1.4 Resettlement and rehabilitation process of the displaced people should remain transparent and compensation provided may be ensured to be adequate.** Closely linked with the above point is the non-settlement and inadequate compensation provided to people who have lost their lands to developmental/infrastructure projects. The displacement of the tribals has been a rallying point for the Maoists to gain support and recruit cadres among such aggrieved population. Seemingly peaceful modes of protests have been attempted to be turned into violent movements against the state.

**Action Plan:** Each project implementation must carry a clause that unless the affected people are adequately rehabilitated, no project work can start. This would push the companies to sincerely undertake the resettlement programmes to the satisfaction of the affected people. A detailed report on the resettlement may be filed before the government before the company is given a go ahead on the project proper. Needless to say, the
government may not wait for a violent movement to origin before it contemplates such an action plan. Also, the resettlement programme of the displaced people should be devised in advance so that undue delay does not cause discontent to be exploited later by the extremists.

**B1.5 A process of making the land losing tribals permanent beneficiaries from the industrial units may be inserted in the memorandum of understandings.** A persistent complain of the tribals losing land to the industrial units has been the uselessness of money given in return for their land. A bleak future awaits them once the money gets over. Due to the lack of education, only manual jobs can be given to them in the industrial units, where as the plum jobs go to the outsiders. This arrangement needs to change to make the land transfer process smoother and attractive.

**Action Plan:** A clause may be introduced into the MoUs that at least 0.5 per cent of the profits made by the companies would be kept aside on a permanent basis for the land contributing tribals. While this would put no strain on the profitability of the companies, it would vastly improve the financial condition of the tribals on a continuous and permanent basis. As long as the companies operate, this benefit may accrue to the tribals.

**B1.6 Jobs for people under the central schemes in the Naxal-affected areas should be ensured throughout the year.** The lack of job opportunities among the tribal population has been taken advantage by the Naxalites to recruit cadres and mobilise people. The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) guarantees 100 day minimum work in one year for every family who registers in this programme. However, a bare 100 days of work may not be sufficient for the tribals who have no other means of earning their livelihood.

**Action Plan:** Members of the Central Employment Guarantee Council (CEGC), the government body for implementation of the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MNREGS), have suggested that jobs be guaranteed round the year in Naxal-hit regions. This is an extremely useful suggestion for implementation.
Moreover, instead of keeping the wages fixed, they should be linked to the Consumer Price Index and should be done in compliance with the Minimum Wages Act. In addition, the State governments may take a pro active stand in including vocational skills in the school curricula so that the education system realistically prepares the students for their future life.

**B1.7 Government may ensure compulsory presence and functioning of administrative structures in Naxal affected areas.** It has been noticed that the officials simply abstain from duties in Naxal affected areas, making a farce of the government presence. While reasons of fear behind the absence of the officials are genuine sometimes, to a large extent it is also an excuse and a part of the scale of corruption in those areas.

*Action Plan:* The state governments may implement strict guidelines for ensuring their presence and functioning. While this may be encouraged by provision of required security and additional incentives, a minimum tenure of service in Naxal areas may be made compulsory for postings in ‘peaceful’ districts. Similar steps may also be taken to ensure the presence of teachers in schools and doctors in hospitals. The *Panchayats/Gram Sabhas* may be authorised to check on this.

**B1.8 Ways to establish close coordination between the security forces and the administration may be explored.** As often is the case, the failure of the administration to step into areas freed from Naxal presence increases the likelihood of extremist return. The inability of the civil administration to provide immediate relief to the tribal population as well as to set up permanent mechanisms of governance in recovered areas makes the goal of ‘hold, consolidate and govern’ virtually unattainable.

*Action Plan:* As soon as an area is cleared by the security forces from the extremist menace, the district administration should promptly step in to start developmental actions within a pre-planned developmental plan with visible effect. Both security forces and the district administration should closely coordinate in this respect. To increase coordination between para-military and the police forces, a unified command structure has been
proposed to be set up in different Naxal affected states. A similar ‘Unified Development Command Structure’ may be set up to increase coordination between the administration and the security forces. This may come up at the district level with the District Collector, Superintendent of Police and CRPF/para-military authorities as members. The main role of this structure will be to revive the civil administrative structure and functions so that immediate and long term needs of the affected people are taken care of.

B1.9 **Stricter and transparent anti-corruption measures may form a critical part of the efforts to improve administration.** Charges of corruption against the officials/bureaucracy paint the government in a poor light and leads to a decline in its acceptability. Jharkhand, for example, in its short history of statehood, has witnessed some serious corruption scandals. It is alleged that many of its senior bureaucrats are also neck deep in corruption. Investigation into such scandals and prosecution against such officials has been slow. The Maoists have continuously highlighted these as ills of the system of governance that need to be changed through a revolution.

**Action Plan:** To the extent possible, anti-corruption measures may be initiated in the states and exemplary punishment needs to be given to persons involved. Setting up an Accountability Commission to probe into the corruption scandals would be an important step. There is a need to showcase the sincerity of the state in providing honest and transparent administration as well as implementing rule of law.

B1.10 **Measures to improve connectivity between the district headquarters and the remote areas need to be a national priority.** Improved connectivity is a key prerequisite behind the reach of the administration and the security forces to the remote parts of the state. For long, the Naxal presence has been used as a pretext by the state administration for the non-implementation of building roads/bridges connecting far away hamlets and villages. As a result, these areas remain permanent base areas of the Naxalites.

**Action Plan:** Absence of a suitable construction agency has been pointed as a major problem. The Maoists have managed to scare away small contractors and as a result,
many such projects lie unimplemented for a long time. This problem may be tackled by
designating building roads and bridges in the Naxal affected areas a national priority and
securitising the effort. Dedicated SF battalions can be put in charge of such construction
as well as repair activities. If private contractors become unwilling partners, these
projects need to be undertaken either by the state PWD or the BRO. These projects may
also use local labourers only which will generate employment for the local population.

**B1.11 The tribals should be provided rights over the forest land where they have been
living for decades.** The Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers
(Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 was supposed to improve the lives of the poor
indigenous tribes by recognising their right to inhabit the forests. But the implementation
of the act has been very poor and the tribals are still living in fear of losing their ancestral
lands. After all, one must not forget the key slogan of the tribals is to get their right over
‘jal, jangal, jameen’.

*Action Plan:* There has to be proper implementation of the Scheduled Tribes and Other
Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 and it has to be
ensured that the tribals get the legal rights over the land that they are residing. The tribals
living in the forest areas should not be harassed unnecessarily.

**B1.12 The Advisory Committees in the 5th Scheduled areas should be fully functional
and the Governors should hold their meetings at regular intervals.** Also the V Schedule
of the Constitution provides exclusive powers to the Governor in forest related matters
but this has not been exercised by any governor so far. The Governors need to exercise
their powers in this matter.

*Action Plan:* The Governor's Annual Report on the 5th Scheduled areas of the states
concerned should be sent to the President without fail by a particular date every year and
the Central Government should promptly act on the suggestions/recommendations made
by the Governors and a reply should be sent to the Governor concerned regarding
acceptance or rejection of the suggestions/recommendations.
B1.13 Sensitization on gender issues and human approach in solving extremism is very much necessary for tackling issues concerning national security.

**Action Plan:** The police needs to be sensitized on gender issues. For this, cases involving abuse of women should be given priority and prompt investigations should follow. Also a humane approach towards solving extremism has to be taken. It has to be ensured that the security forces don’t abuse human rights during their operations against extremists. These operations must be clean and in accordance with the law.

B2. Operational Recommendations:

B2.1 *The State governments should regularly release its share of resources for the police modernisation scheme and not base the entire programme on the central contribution only.* The report of the Comptroller & Auditor General of India titled, “Compendium of Performance Audit Reviews on Modernization of Police Force” has brought to light some of the anomalies in the Andhra Pradesh police department. According to the report, between 2002 and 2007, Andhra Pradesh released only 10 per cent of the State share in the police modernisation scheme. The lack of funds, therefore, resulted in non completion of projects such as the buildings for police personnel. The CAG report also mentioned that sophisticated weapons brought by Andhra Pradesh were mostly kept in district police headquarters and were not provided to the police stations. Similar anomalies have also been noted in case of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand.

**Action Plan:** Given the time lag between the publication of the CAG report and the period under investigation, it is difficult to independently verify whether concerns raised by the CAG have been addressed by the State police departments or not. If not, they need to be addressed on an urgent basis. It is sometimes the genuine lack of finances that forces a State to default on making its share available for the police modernisation programme. The MHA may initiate a study to find out the reasons for all such states who have periodically not contributed their share of the fund. The findings will go a long way in taking care of the funding pattern.
B2.2 **Basic requirements of the policemen participating in anti-Maoist operations need to be taken care of.** An officer with the Andhra Pradesh CID (Naxal Intelligence) said during an interview conducted for the Study, “Police forces are always at the mercy of political bosses in districts. They should have proper infrastructure and facilities. There were times when policemen had to beg for food in tribal areas as necessary arrangement was not made in some instances in Paderu and Khammam forests abutting Chhattisgarh.” While it is not possible to independently verify such charges, it is necessary that care is taken to address these concerns. Police modernisation plans need to go beyond upgrading the weapons and creating police infrastructure to taking care such basic needs.

**Action Plan:** Under normal circumstances, it is upto the superintendent of police of a district to ensure that the forces participating in operations are taken care of. A direct line of communication may be established to bring lapses in this front directly to the notice of the higher authorities. While situation appears to have improved a lot under many police stations, any complain to the contrary, must be addressed on an urgent basis by the police authorities.

B2.3 **Police personnel need to be trained to keep a constant watch on Maoist activities in vulnerable areas.** It is beyond doubt that the Naxalites would continue to resist security force operations, gain ground and attempt to stage comebacks to areas from where they have been forced to retreat. This could happen in three ways- (i) by carrying out big attacks, (ii) by carrying out sustained mass mobilisation programmes thereby building up the movement from the scratch and (iii) riding on the waves of mass movements such as the Telangana Statehood movement. While big attacks can be prevented through good human as well as technical intelligence, constant watch needs to be kept on the two other modes of seeking support.

**Action Plan:** Police stations must constantly endeavour to gather data and information on the type of actual Maoist activity, and also the kind of local disenchantment that could be exploited by the extremists. It is normal for police stations to keep an eye on the missing
youths in a village and try finding out if they have joined the Maoist movement. However, Maoist involvement/mobilisation, not necessarily amounting to violence, in local issues need constant monitoring. It is through those that the extremists will seek to widen their support base in an area. Police personnel in local police stations need to be trained to monitor the possibility of such involvement.

**B2.4 A sound strategic communication campaign is a prerequisite for the success of anti-Naxal operations.** It was observed during the survey that a huge gap still separates the common man and the Naxalites. While the former is not convinced of the ideology and objectives of the extremists, the lack of option factor is forcing him/her to turn into a Naxal sympathiser. This difference may be taken advantage of by the state. In order to gain support for its initiatives, the state must be able to reach out to the common people in terms of advertising the purpose of its programmes and its intended benefits.

*Action Plan:* The common people in remote areas must be reached through pamphlets, regional radio and television programmes, drama and theatre groups, advocacy groups etc. to the extent possible, battery run television and radio sets can be made available to villages. Services of professional groups may be utilised for the attractive conceptualisation and creation of such programmes.

**B2.5 A sensible policy to target the Naxalite bandwagon needs to be evolved.** In recent times, Naxalites have been described to benefit from the support they have managed to generate from key intellectuals in society. While the state governments in the past have tried to muzzle the voices of some of these activists, such policies have not worked.

*Action Plan:* Distinction needs to be made between the Naxal activists and the cheerleaders, between incitement and advocacy and between criminal conspiracies and ideological sympathies. While the state can go all out against the Naxal overground activists, alleged persecution of the cheerleaders would provide no operational benefit. It would only endorse the Naxal description of the state as an intolerant oppressor. As long
as the cheerleaders are confining their activities to the limits of the seminar halls, they should be left alone.

**B2.6 Tribal component among the state police forces needs urgent augmentation.** It was observed during the survey that the state police, mostly in Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, has insufficient tribal representation within its forces. The force, thus, faces difficulty in communicating to the tribals. Language as a barrier between the predominantly non-tribal police force and the tribal population continues to be a major hurdle during anti-Naxal operations.

*Action Plan:* The anomaly can be addressed by vigorous recruitment targeting the tribal youth. This will take the unemployed youth from being recruited by the Naxals. Education of promising tribal boys and girls can be sponsored by the police department with the objective of recruiting them in future.

**B2.7: The state should gradually reduce its dependence on the SPOs.** Regularisation of the SPOs is bound to emerge as a problem as states start winning against the Naxals. At the same time, the presence and continuous recruitment of the SPOs creates a condition which deters strengthening and consolidation of human intelligence network. It is also very much important as to how SPOs are handled to deliver as any misuse of SPOs will always give negative results. (There is also a strong opinion that SPOs cannot be ignored once an area become free from extremism. People who subscribes to this view includes police officials and according to them the SPOs should be made a part of the police force and their job be regularized.)

*Action Plan:* A no expansion policy on the current level of SPOs should be implemented. In case of unavoidable necessity, only contract based employment should be followed. SPOs should not be allowed to operate independently, without being a part of a team of regular police personnel. The District police heads should closely monitor their performances. Before they are inducted, they may be put through a crash course to sensitise them of their duties and responsibilities.
B2.8 The Andhra experience need to be shared as widely possible among the police officers from other Naxal affected states. The success of Andhra Pradesh brings upon itself a benign responsibility to teach the art of victory to other states currently fighting the Maoists. Currently, there is lot of ambiguity regarding the ‘Andhra-model of counter-insurgency’. In the absence of an authoritative narrative, mostly it is misconstrued as a commando type operation with the Greyhounds personnel in the lead. MHA needs to organise sessions in which the Andhra Pradesh police officials share the experience with their counterparts in other states. Moreover, to the extent possible, the key components of the counter-insurgency strategy must be shared with the intellectuals with a view to informing the public.

*Action Plan:* Police officers from other Naxal affected states may engage in regular discussions with the Andhra Pradesh police officers, both serving and retired, to analyse how exactly the Andhra police got the better of the Naxalites. Such sessions may be officially organised by the MHA. However, there should be an opportunity to enter into informal dialogues as the latter yields much better result.

B2.9 There is a need for sensitization of police officers coming from an area not hit by left-wing extremism to an area hit by left-wing extremism.

*Action Plan:* Police officers coming from an area not hit by Left Wing Extremism to an Left Wing Extremism affected area are not much aware of the actual ground situation in such areas. Specific training programs could be devised for them to make them cope with the conditions in such areas and make them able to tackle the situation effectively.

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