Executive Summary
of
"Genesis and Spread of Maoist Violence and Appropriate State Strategy to Handle it"
(2011)

STUDY SPONSORED BY
BUREAU OF POLICE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS
NEW DELHI

By D. M. Mitra

Institute of Social Sciences,
8, Nelson Mandela Road,
New Delhi
"Genesis and Spread of Maoist Violence and Appropriate State Strategy to Handle It"

Maoist violence, which has emerged as the biggest internal security challenge since independence, started as two independent streams in the forests of North Telengana region of Andhra Pradesh and forest areas of Bengal and undivided Bihar in the 80s and spread to a large number of states. The area of this study, which included all the states affected by Maoist violence, was too vast and complex as well as inaccessible and dangerous. Nevertheless, certain common trends, factors and sequences could be observed. Andhra Pradesh, which has been one of the birthplace of Maoist form of naxalite violence, has been able to contain Maoist violence to a great extent during the last decade. While Andhra Pradesh has gone through different stages of development of Maoist violence and has been able to reverse the trend, other states can be seen struggling at various earlier stages that Andhra Pradesh (AP) has gone through. Therefore, AP was studied and then the factors observed in AP were compared with other states. Similarly, steps taken in AP to counter Maoist violence were analysed in order to find out their efficacy, which were later compared with steps taken in other states.

1. Executive Summary

The study tried to identify the factors that helped Maoist violence to develop and grow; evaluate efficacies of different governmental approaches to handle Maoist violence; and understand the factors influencing public perception of Maoist violence. The study has tried to develop a macro picture juxtaposing the underlying factors and recommend strategies which appear to be the most appropriate ones for countering Maoist violence. This study tries to integrate many theories from different disciplines to develop a multi-disciplinary conceptual framework and collect empirical evidence for seeking answers to its research questions.

The area of study being dangerous, inaccessible and sometimes out of bound, the researcher was forced to adopt a combination of methodology. While help of professors and students were taken for conducting structured interviews of general public in the affected areas and some Maoists of varying status in government jails, the researcher made unstructured interactions with general public in the affected areas, wherever possible,
with or without being accompanied by the academics. Researcher conducted large number of workshops, conferences and roundtables in the affected areas and outside, and interacted with government officers and policy makers at different levels. Since the study was interested in a big picture comprising of all the affected areas and all possible aspects, the study by design has large scope and limited depth.

This study has focussed on the Maoists referring to those belonging to Communist Party of India (Maoist) which was formed in 2004 by the merger of Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI) and People’s War Group (PWG). All references to the Maoists refer to the members of MCCI and PWG before 2004 and CPI (Maoist) after its formation. The area covered by the study comprises of the affected areas of Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, and Maharasthra, West Bengal, Bihar and Jharkhand. Andhra Pradesh was studied first and then the factors and actions observed in Andhra Pradesh were compared with other states.

1.1. Brief History of Left Wing Extremism in India

Communist political movement, which first emerged in 1920, has grown into many streams. While all of its proponents profess adherence to the ultimate goal of building a classless society, there are disagreements about the appropriate political strategy for achieving it. They vary from election-contesting political parties like Communist Party of India (CPI), Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI-M) to underground armed rebels like Communist Party of India (Maoist). CPI joined electoral democracy in 1951. Some of the CPI’s more radical elements broke away from the CPI in 1964 to form CPI-M. When CPI-M also embraced electoral politics, this was unacceptable to the more radical Maoist faction within CPI-M, who started the violent Naxalite movement.

A new party called Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) {CPI(ML)} was formed in April 1969, with Charu Mazumdar at the head. The CPI(ML) was totally opposed to the electoral process and advocated violent revolution as the only means of realizing its political objectives. While Naxalite activity and violence during this period were reported from across the country, it mostly remained confined to West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh. By 1972, concerted and determined action by the central and state governments put an end to what can be described as the first phase of naxalite violence.
Naxalism remained subdued during 1972-1991. It was repeatedly fragmented on ideological grounds, strategies and personality clashes. This period was followed by a second phase of naxalite violence, which will be referred to as Maoist violence in order to distinguish it from the earlier naxalite violence. The origin of Maoist violence can be traced to two factions of naxalites, namely, the People’s War Group (PWG) of Andhra Pradesh and Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) of Bihar.

1.2. Historical Origins of The Maoists

While there were other naxalite groups opposed to CPI(ML) in Andhra Pradesh, Naxalbari movement led by CPI(ML) spread to Srikakulam and North Telangana districts of AP by 1971. The Andhra Committee split away from CPI-ML, became the People’s War group (PWG) led by Kondapalli Seetharamiah in 1976, which formed CPI (ML) People’s War group (PWG) in 1980. They decided to persist in armed struggle and during 1980-85, the party formed armed squads (Dalams). It spread its area of operation to other States. It indulged in attacks on the police, kidnappings, extortions, killing of civilians and political leaders. Its strength kept increasing, though through ups and downs.

Seetharamaiah was expelled from the party in 1991 due to ideological differences and Muppala Laxman Rao, also known as Ganapathi, emerged as PWG’s leader. Guerilla Zones were formed in North Telangana and Dandakaranya. In 1998 CPI(ML) Party Unity, based in Jehenenabad, Bihar, merged with PWG. People’s Guerrilla Army was formed in 2000. PWG had spread their area of activities to through contiguous forest and hilly areas of Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Bihar and Jharkhand. In 2002 Tactical Counter Offensive was launched by the party by forming striking forces.

Meanwhile, the Dakshin Desh group had broken away from CPI-M in 1968 and became the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) in October 1969. It indulged in squad activities mainly in forest and mountainous regions of West Bengal (WB) and spread to undivided Bihar. Later on, it became Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI). On September 21, 2004 when PWG merged with MCCI to form Communist Party of India (Maoist) (CPI-Maoist), Muppala Laxman Rao, *aka* Ganapathi, became its General Secretary.
1.2.1. **Present Spread, Size and Structure**

Maoists are known to have their presence in 21 States. Estimation of Maoist cadre strength varies from 10,000, 15000 to as much as 25000. Similarly, geographical spread of Maoist activities is estimated over 190 districts with Maoist violence is reported to be seen in 90 districts out of 627 districts in the country. This is somewhat exaggerated because for just one incident reported in one remote corner of a district a whole district is counted as affected. It is no surprise that less than 10% of police stations of the nine most affected states have reported Maoist violence, whereas more than 50% of the districts are identified as affected by Maoist violence.

1.2.2. **Areas Targeted by the Earlier Naxalites**

The naxalites, like the Maoists were supposed to have followed Mao’s prescription of *protracted war strategy* in which in the first stage, the small revolutionary force starts in a remote area with mountainous and difficult terrain in which the revolutionary’s enemy is weak. After growing in power, in the second stage, it was supposed to establish other revolutionary base areas and spread its influence in the surrounding countryside. Finally in the third stage, it was expected to have enough strength to encircle and capture urban areas, gradually covering the entire country.

However, earlier naxalites seem to have followed the strategy partially. They created bases in remote rural areas close to dense forest areas, where the contradiction in landholding existed and the presence of government agencies, particularly police, was minimum. Normally, a protracted war strategy of slowly consolidating the countryside and proceeding towards the urban centre would have taken decades, but Charu Mazumdar seemed to have been in a hurry and targeted the state capital city of West Bengal within only three years of start of naxalism.

1.2.3. **Areas Targeted by the Maoists**

However, Maoists seem to have followed Mao and Che Gueverra’s thinking more meticulously. The overwhelming emphasis on choice of place based on need for self preservation in the initial stage could be easily seen from the following table. The Maoists chose more forested, inaccessible and remote areas.
District  | Percent of Dense Forest | Percent of Open Forest | Percent of Total Forest |
--- | --- | --- | --- |
Muzaffarpur | 0.2 | 0.0 | 0.2 |
Medinipur | 4.5 | 5.9 | 10.4 |
Kheri | 14.5 | 4.6 | 19.0 |
Srikakulam | 2.9 | 4.8 | 7.7 |

**Average Naxalites Choice (1968)**

- 6.2 | 4.7 | 11.0 |

Adilabad | 24.0 | 13.5 | 37.5 |
Karimnagar | 7.8 | 6.0 | 13.8 |
Khammam | 32.6 | 12.2 | 44.8 |
Nizamabad | 3.3 | 10.9 | 14.1 |
Warangal | 19.8 | 5.3 | 25.1 |

**Average Maoists Choice**

- 19.8 | 9.9 | 29.7 |

### 1.2.4. Factors Responsible for the Choice of Target Area by the Maoists

#### 1.2.4.1. Socio-economic Factors Influencing the Choice

For his protracted war Mao relied on the contradiction between the feudal elite and poor peasants in Chinese rural areas. The earlier naxalites also had chosen remote areas which had big landlords and poor peasants. Tribal areas where Maoists have their bases, however, do not have the agrarian contradiction. In these areas the average landholding was found to be about 3 to 4 acres whose productivity is both poor and dependent upon rain. There are no rich landowning class which employs a class of poor landless labour, who can be pitted against each other in an agrarian class struggle. Maoists, however, claim the existence of class contradiction between the inhabitants (adivaisis) of those areas and Indian state.

#### 1.2.4.2. Geographic Factors Influencing the Choice

More likely, the Maoists have chosen security through geographic features and history of primitive warfare of the base areas over existence of agrarian class contradiction. Even for MCCI, which had expanded to rural areas of Bihar, the deep forest areas of Bihar and Jharkhand have always provided the safer bases for them. Mao too had to take shelter in Jinggang Mountains, Jiangxi (the east) province in 1927, from where he started his protracted guerrilla based peasant revolution, in which in the first stage, the small revolutionary force started in a remote area with mountainous and difficult terrain in which the revolutionary’s enemy is weak.
1.2.4.3. State of Administration and Police in the Target Areas

State administration was found to be either absent or negligible in these sparsely populated areas. The police did not have the usual network of friends and informers. Vacancy level on an average in these areas were about three times that of more populated and urbanized areas.

1.2.4.4. Ideological Weaknesses of State in the Target Areas

Ours is a liberal democratic political system, as embodied in our Constitution, which promises democratic opportunities and democratic political space to every citizen. The laws made under our Constitution protects individual’s rights, and expands and increases democratic political space available to the citizens, but state cannot enforce its laws or deliver on its ideology in remote and inaccessible areas where it does not have effective presence through its agencies. Moreover, politics based on muscle power, casteism, communalism, nepotism etc, on the other hand, tends to squeeze available democratic political space. Wherever available democratic political space is small because of the above factors, democratic actors like the political parties, civil society and press try to expand the democratic political space within the political framework of liberal democracy. However, they are not able to operate at all if the available democratic political space is too small. Armed rebellion groups like the Maoists, who offer alternative ideologies, find such situations the ideal niche for their activities.

1.2.4.4.1. Administrative and Political Baldness

Since democratic political space is created and protected by the state through its agencies, because of the near total absence of administration in the deep forest areas of North Telengana, Bastar, Malkangiri, Jharkhand and other contiguous forest areas, democratic opportunities and democratic political space is unavailable in those areas.

1.2.4.4.2. Social and Political Factors in Rural Areas in Bihar

MCCI saw armed revolutionary opportunities in the caste ridden areas of rural Bihar where democratic opportunities and democratic political space was highly restrictive due to muscle power, casteism, communalism, nepotism etc. Though these social and political factors provided some limited opportunities to the Maoists for some time only, it is worth discussing them in a little more details because these factors by constricting
the political space provide scope for political violence of different types including that of other less militarist naxalite groups.

1.2.4.3. Muscle Based Politics

Wherever muscle men are being used for dominating the political space, it becomes correspondingly less democratic. Depending on the level of political hooliganism, it becomes difficult, and in worst case impossible, to practice politics without having the backing of musclemen. Though constriction of democratic political space by muscle power is equally acute in urban areas, state agencies, civil society and other democratic actors having stronger presence try to preserve and expand the democratic political space in urban areas. In rural areas, on the other hand, if the space becomes too small, democratic actors like the political parties, civil society and press are not able to even try to fight the undemocratic forces. Maoists have tried to take advantage of such situations, making the situation even worse for democratic actors.

1.2.4.4. Casteism and Communalism

Social hierarchy and discrimination through casteism and communalism are other important factors that restrict democratic political space and opportunities in rural India. Wherever, in combination with muscle power, a dominant caste or community monopolises the entire political space, armed rebels like the Maoists find it a convenient niche. Maoists, who otherwise do not subscribe to identity based politics, have been found to align with social groups in such areas.

1.2.4.5. Corruption

Though complaints against corruption are some of the most common complaints heard everywhere including the Maoist affected areas, the role and nature of corruption are highly relevant while discussing Maoist niche. The state’s legitimacy gets questioned in the eyes of the inhabitants due to corrupt practice of government servants, which is very critical in face of Maoists’ armed challenge which otherwise has no legitimacy. People in remote areas are more concerned about how corruption affect their existential reality than its broader repercussions. The following aspects are important in this connection. (i) Volume of corruption is perceived as the main cause of all the developmental problems of the area. (ii) Vulnerability felt by an inhabitant becomes very acute when the agencies which are supposed to protect his or her rights are seen to be corrupt. Another type of vulnerability comes from high profile cases at provincial and national level, which makes corrupt among the local officials more powerful. (iii) Vitality
of the agencies like Public Distribution System, Health, Police and many other government agencies for the inhabitants make their corruption more scathing for the inhabitants. (iv) **Visibility** of corruption is quite high in those areas where the local government servants are often quite brash and arrogant because of the little supervision they face. High visibility make corruption appear more common place.

Moreover, pumping in resources without taking care of anti-corruption mechanism in a conflict area makes corruption deep-rooted and creates a large section of persons having vested interest in perpetuation of the armed rebellion. This further gives rise to strong conspiracy theories which are very damaging for the legitimacy of the state.

### 1.3. Factors Enabling the Genesis of Maoist Violence

#### 1.3.1. The Niche

The importance of niche for the Maoists have been already discussed in the previous section. It has been brought out how the growth and spread cannot be understood by studying the earlier and other naxalite groups, though the Maoists have evolved from the earlier naxalites. In fact they owe their hitherto remarkable success to the difference they have with the earlier and other naxalite groups. As discussed earlier, the geographical situational factors of inaccessibility combined with administrative baldness in the remote forest areas of Andhra Pradesh provided the initial niche to the Maoists in Andhra Pradesh and elsewhere. Even MCCII had their niche in forest areas of Bengal, Jharkhand and Bihar before their expansion into rural Bihar and identity based violence.

#### 1.3.2. State's Initial Response

Even after being noticed by the local Forest department and police, Maoist activities remained neglected by the State capitals till the Maoists started their guerrilla warfare targeting the security forces. While the Maoists grew, the state continued to remain ambivalent in its approach vacillating between soft approach and induction of armed police in ad hoc manner, without making any real effort to strengthen the administrative machinery in the affected areas including the police. It was obviously a more costly and time taking effort to improve governance in the affected areas, compared to the other ad hoc steps adopted by the States.
1.3.3. **Maoists Utilize the Borders**

It so happens that most of the inaccessible areas are also on the borders of different states. Maoists utilize this to their advantage as the security forces, and State administrative and security strategies change across the State boundary.

1.4. **Factors Enabling the Growth and Spread of Maoist Violence**

Once a small base area was created in a remote forest area the following generally happened.

1. The vast under-privileged people living in nearby places generally felt empowered.
2. Being ill equipped, lacking in strength, lacking in friends and informers, the police retreated to their PS buildings and stopped going into the forest, which included areas adjoining the area dominated by the Maoists.
3. Some businessmen, petty contractors and others working in the core and adjoining forest areas did not mind paying the Maoists for carrying on their business. This provided the resources needed by the Maoists to increase their activities and expand to newer areas. Others, including the politicians, who found themselves at the mercy of the Maoists, mostly left the interiors. Some elements in nearby townships found new avenues because of the presence of Maoists in the vicinity.
4. Violent developments in the remote areas were mostly ignored and resources were not mobilized to meet the growing Maoist challenge. At best ad hoc measures were adopted to tackle the Maoists who have protracted strategy spanning over more than half a century. While rumours of conspiracy theory gained ground, liberal democratic state appeared to be retreating from the core and its adjoining forest areas in face of an adversary determined to dismantle it.
5. The people living in the Maoist base areas in the interiors gradually started accepting establishment of a new political entity calling the shots in their areas. Flow of information about the interior to the police totally dried up. Demand for intelligence from government and armed police forces were not met.
6. Thus the initial base areas created conducive situation in the nearby areas in the forest for expanding and creating more base areas. By mid nineties, in other states where Maoists have reached later and
were still in less violent expansion mode, the governments chose to treat it as a temporary spill over from Andhra Pradesh.

7. Maoists’ will to expand became desperate need for expansion by 2000, facing reverses at the hands of AP police and Greyhounds. The economics of expansion into resource rich areas was positive compared to defending the bases in AP.

1.4.1. **Stages of Maoist Violence**

The following five stages have been observed wherever the Maoists have tried to establish a base.

1.4.1.1. **Survey**

In this stage, spanning over many years, one or more small groups of Maoist cadre (dalams) from an established base area come to an area targeted by the Maoists. They survey the area and familiarize but do not indulge in violence. They appear like highly motivated and selfless political activists fighting for the poor, who would be forced to use violence against extreme provocation or tyranny. This is the time when even Chief Ministers have gone on record praising the Maoists.

1.4.1.2. **Petition**

The above stage is followed by a period when activists coming to the area educate the local population about their democratic rights and petition to the government for their fulfilment. With growing awareness, population’s sense of perceived injustice also increases. Unable to isolate those working for the Maoists from those who genuinely belong democratic civil society, administration targets all activists suspecting them to be working for the Maoists. State is not able to face the challenge the right way which would have been to address the rightful demands made by the local population in those remote areas, irrespective of who instigates them.

1.4.1.3. **Resistance**

Some of the local youths and activists are encouraged to take some direct political protest actions like *Chakka Jam* etc. to press for their rightful demands. Suspecting the Maoists behind the actions, no real effort is made to improve the administration and meet the growing aspirations of the local population. The local population is compelled to accept that the Maoist claim that the democratic setup is exploitative towards them.
1.4.1.4. Guerrilla

The above situation is used for motivating some of the youth to take up arms. Besides this, many local youths join the Maoists for income, power and/or status. The guerrilla stage starts normally with killing or beating up a policeman or police party. Reverses suffered by the unprepared and hurriedly inducted government forces in ambushes laid by the Maoists add to the prestige and image of the Maoists, apart from providing them the much needed arms and ammunitions. A successful attack on police station gives a perception that the support for the naxalites in that area has reached a very high level which in turn increases the probability of naxalites gaining more support.

1.4.1.5. Liberated

Once an area gets affected by the above form of violence, all symbols and representatives of government flee from the area. Unless the government makes determined counter attacks on the Maoists, the area becomes out of bound for everyone and the local citizens come under total and unopposed influence of the Maoists. The Maoists try to establish some administration in these areas. Their coercive apparatus sometimes create extreme adverse reactions. Lack of legitimacy and ideological acceptance forces them to be very severe in their coercive methods. Participation in elections by the people living in the Maoist dominated areas braving dire threats from the Maoists, is clear indication of the local population’s desire to get back into the democratic setup.

1.4.2. Maoist Strategy for Public Perception

Maoists use their action to influence perception at every stage as described above. In fact, people actually think they are fighting for strengthening the liberal democracy, though they themselves make it very clear in their documents and pronouncements that their political objective is to dismantle the liberal democratic setup through armed revolution. They project strength by attacking police stations but carefully select targets to give the impression that they are against corrupt officials only. They control the noise level of violence to be loud enough to be heard locally but ignored at provincial and national level. They fail in public perception management only when they miscalculate the amount and nature of violence. They take up local issues. They exploit the anti-establishment sentiment of the civil society and cultivate them. They give guided tours to some to show what the Maoists want others to think of them. They try to convince the local population about their monopoly on coercion through harsh punitive actions.
They fail when they are not able to stop people from exercising their electoral rights. They have also failed when people living in their areas of influence muster courage to oppose them. They oppose developmental activities like roads and education, which result in loss of their pro-people image. Having no mandate whatsoever, their collection of funds make them look like organised criminals and extortionists.

1.5. Different State Approaches to Handle the Growing Challenge

States have also shown remarkable similarity in ineffective handling of the situations at different stages. This is helpful to the Maoists as the States do not seem to learn from each other’s experience and prefer to be satisfied with short term measures.

1.5.1. Traditional Approaches

1.5.1.1. Denial

In the initial stage, a state tries to deny the Maoists activities and plays down their threats.

1.5.1.2. Induction of Armed Police

In face a spectacular and growing violent action by the Maoists, urgent demands for induction of CPMFs are made forcing the Central government to mobilize CPMFs into the affected areas. After a temporary lull in Maoist violence, the cycle keeps getting repeated and more central forces get inducted.

1.5.1.3. Stalemate

Sometimes between two cycles of expansion, a stalemate is reached where both Maoists and the security forces are seen to be able to hold their ground without any significant casualty on either side.

1.5.1.4. Soft Approach

In this approach, the socio-economic causal factors are proposed to be addressed to take the wind out of the Maoist sails. This approach, when adopted in non-core areas, has been effective in preventing the spread of Maoist violence to the non-core areas.

1.5.1.5. Dialogue

The state undertook dialogues with the Maoists, which the Maoists used to lift the pressure on them like ceasefire and/or lifting of ban, and went
about freely consolidating their gains. During the process in 2004, Andhra Pradesh also utilized the time to initiate many development and defensive actions which later paid off.

1.5.2. **Differential Approach**

By 1997, AP had experienced all the above approaches and adopted proactive, long term and costly approach in a determined way against the Maoists. It opted for curative security action against the Maoists in the core areas and preventive actions like improvement of governance, development of infrastructure and creation of democratic opportunities etc in all the vulnerable non-core areas including the areas adjoining the core areas. All the effective aspects of preventive and offensive strategy adopted by Andhra Pradesh and elsewhere have been incorporated in the recommendation part of this report.

1.6. **Conclusion**

The study has exposed the following facts, many of which negate some common perceptions about Maoism.

(1) The popular theory that earlier naxalism was controlled because the government addressed the causal factors like land reform does not appear to be correct. The naxalite violence lasted less than five years and such socio-economic factors cannot be addressed in such a short period. For example, even today one cannot say that land reform has been implemented effectively in all the former naxalite areas.

(2) The earlier naxalites did not fully follow Mao’s protracted war strategy. Mao took decades to reach the national capital starting from country side, whereas the naxalites reached Kolkata in five years. Mao was against such over-confidence. Mao went for sustained and systematic guerrilla war while as naxalites followed an annihilation theory which had no resemblance to Mao’s strategy.

(3) It is in fact the wrong strategy by the naxalites combined with weak defensive locations which made it easy for the state to quell earlier naxalism 1967-72.

(4) Earlier naxalism did not have the well planned strategy that the Maoists have.

(5) The Maoists are just not the rekindling of old amber. They are a different species which evolved out of the earlier
species. Very little of what applied to earlier naxalites actually applies to the Maoists.

(6) Agrarian contradiction of land holding is irrelevant to most of the areas affected by Maoist violence at the moment.

(7) The confusion comes because the Maoists are often clubbed together with other Left Wing Extremists.

(8) Choice of operational area gives the Maoists the edge over every other naxalite group.

(9) They will not be satisfied with development of tribal area as some people believe. Following of Mao’s prescription about initial hideouts has made their area coincident with the tribal areas at the moment.

(10) They are not fighting for the interest of an ethnic group. In fact they are ready to sacrifice tribal interest for the sake of revolution.

(11) Though they are not able to get out of the forest cover and expand to the open countryside, it will be highly undesirable to have a stalemate situation because they are sitting over the soft belly of the country’s economy and can have tremendous bargaining power.

(12) Creating of opportunity through education and communication is key to prevention against Maoist expansion.

(13) Defense is more important than offence for countering a protracted war strategy.

(14) Smaller size of offensive units hold key to their success.

(15) We have not been learning from our own experiences.

1.7. Recommendation

1.7.1. National Strategy

In India federal structure, conceptual integration and coherence in government approach to handling of Maoism is necessary. All the different strategies adopted by different State governments should be part of an all India strategy. Similarly, one State cannot have a strategy which negates the overall strategy or parts of it.

1.7.2. Hierarchy of Strategy in Our Federal Structure

A hierarchy of strategy has to be maintained where lower order strategies should be in confirmation with the higher order strategies. Central
Forces cannot have strategies independent of the State government’s strategy, in whose aid they have been deployed in the State. Similarly, State strategy should be in line with the national strategy.

1.7.3. Long Term Strategies

The state needs to have long term strategies, as many of the factors to be addressed are too deep rooted and cannot be addressed in a short period. Moreover, short term strategies can be sometimes counterproductive. While short term measure may be taken as an immediate action to assuage public feelings, long term strategies should be drawn up and started simultaneously.

1.7.4. Prime Role of the Concerned State Governments

Apart from the conceptual and legal reasons discussed here, there are many practical reasons why Central Forces should not be encouraged to have operations independent of the State authorities. Firstly, police stations, which are the main agencies for harnessing community cooperation and criminal intelligence, can never be put under any authority other than the concerned State government. Secondly, local knowledge, language, appearance etc which are so important in anti-insurgency operations, are naturally available with the State agencies. Thirdly, the concerned State government will not feel the ownership unless all the operations are done under its authority. Fourthly, police stations having the main legal authority, other agencies depend on the police stations for the legal back up and sanction. Unless an agency is in tandem with the local police stations, its members can be very vulnerable to motivated action by the supporters of Maoist violence to demoralize them.

1.7.5. Role of Central Government

Article 355 of Constitution of India makes it a duty of the Union government to protect the States from internal disturbances. Unless it is felt that a state government cannot discharge its Constitutional duties and action taken under article 356, in view of the foregoing discussions, the Central government role remains that of support. Over the years, the Central government has been liberalizing its help in form of deployment of Central Forces, funds through Police Modernization Scheme, Security Related Expenditure, Integrated Action Plan etc. Central Intelligence Agencies have been providing pan-national and international intelligence, and coordinating between different State and Central agencies. Ministry of Home Affairs and its Naxal Management Division have been pivotal in coordinating and
synergising anti-Maoist efforts. Nevertheless, *the States have to fight the Maoists with the help of the Central government and not vice-versa.*

**1.7.6. Creation of Special Security Zone (SSZ)**

In the Chapter dealing with Public Order and Internal Security of the draft Police Act prepared by Soli Sorabjee Committee, creation of Special Security Zones has been envisaged. The Union Government, “at the request of the concerned State Governments, may declare areas falling in more than one state, as a Special Security Zone and provide for an appropriate integrated mechanism to be funded and resourced by the concerned State Governments and the Union Government”. If a SSZ falls in many different States, its Administrator will have a herculean task of being accountable to that many State governments and State legislators. However, for a difficult problem like Maoist violence, he or she will hopefully get encouraging support.

**1.7.7. Differential Approach**

As a broad strategy, differential approach needs to be followed in handling Maoist violence. Curative security action need to be taken against the Maoists in the core areas (about 16% of the so called Red Corridor) where developmental departments are not able to function due to Maoist violence. In all the vulnerable areas including the areas adjoining the core areas (about 84% of the so called Red Corridor + all areas having similar geographic and social conditions) preventive actions like improvement of governance, development of infrastructure and creation of democratic opportunities through education, medical facilities etc are to be done.

**1.7.8. Integrated Approach**

In the vulnerable areas, particularly those where the Maoist actively oppose or likely to oppose developmental work, all developmental works are to be integrated with security by making it mandatory for the Collectors/ District Magistrates/ Deputy Commissioners to associate the District SPs and District Forest Officers in all empowered meetings where developmental decisions were taken. Moreover, in all the vulnerable areas, particularly those having isolated inaccessible areas, security should be integrated to developmental strategies.

**1.7.9. Andhra Model**

Naxalism led by Charu Mazumdar has little resemblance with the Maoist violence and not much can be learnt from how it was quelled 40
years ago. Andhra model should be followed by others struggling to control Maoist violence with some exceptions to parts of rural Bihar where the situation has been slightly different.

1.7.10. **Democratic Political Space**

Democratic political space should be created and maintained in the inaccessible and remote rural areas through good and effective administration. Some suggestions in these regard are given below.

1. Panchayati Raj is to be extended to the remote tribal areas.
2. Panchayats should be given necessary powers, wherewithal and funds for fulfilling their mandates.
3. The tendencies of administration and police to side with the local dominant persons and groups should be clearly discouraged.
4. Criminal elements, particularly political goondas, should be controlled with iron hand.

1.7.11. **Panchayati Raj**

In the remote areas where the ratio of weaker section to more dominant section is not low, Panchayati Raj is more effective than it is commonly perceived. In this connection, PESA (Panchayati Raj Extension to Schedule Areas) should be implemented in letter and spirit.

1.7.12. **Democratic Opportunity**

Democratic opportunity for every citizen should be ensured through appropriate development strategy.

1. Dedicated Ministries should be created in all affected states for development of the remote areas.
2. Alternatively or in addition, special cells can be created in the state and central planning boards for making and implementing strategies to improve administration and undertake inclusive and appropriate development in these usually neglected areas.
3. Border Road Organization (BRO) type agencies should be created in the states to take up infrastructural work in the affected areas.
4. Certain minimum life standard is required for fully taking advantage the opportunities. Food, drinking water and health care should be improved in those difficult areas for this purpose.
1.7.13. **Roads**

Construction of roads should be taken up to open up the area. It does not matter if many of them are *kachcha* roads which may be of no use for movement of security forces. Roads are very important for mainstreaming the population living in the remote areas, for increasing economic activities, political empowerment and presence of state agencies.

1.7.14. **Education**

Education is a great enabling factor which should be provided despite the many difficulties in this regard in these areas. Incentives to the teachers, school buildings and teachers’ quarters, employment of local teachers are the many ways education availability in those remote areas can be improved. Education help the population to participate better in the political space as well take advantage of the opportunities created through economic development and government policies.

1.7.15. **Employment**

Employment opportunities should be created to induct the local population into the mainstream. Local population should be prepared to take advantage of job and other economic opportunities being created in the country. This creates role model for the youth to take to education and democratic ways to improve their lives. It creates stake of the local population in the liberal democratic structure. Availability of employment also stops youth from getting attracted towards joining Maoist armed cadre as source of income.

1.7.16. **Strengthening State Agencies**

For all the activities mentioned above, the state needs to strengthen its agencies. Without these agencies being effective, the state cannot have effective presence or deliver the services it plans. The state needs some core competence to be able to monitor the outsourcing to non-government organizations. Moreover, there are many sovereign duties that cannot be outsourced by the state. The following actions should be taken immediately in right earnest.

(1) Attractive incentive should be given to motivate government servants to serve in the remote areas.

(2) Vacancies in those areas should be filled up. Downsizing policy should not be applied to these areas.

(3) A proper transfer policy should be adopted for those areas.
1.7.17. **Defensive Security**

1. In the protracted conflict defence is more important than offence.
2. Police station buildings should be strengthened on top priority.
3. There should be zero vacancy in police units working in these areas.
4. Security audit of all police stations should be completed at the earliest.
5. Standard Operating Procedure for static duties should be prepared and drilled into the minds of those on static duties.
6. Ex-Army men should be re-employed for static duties.

1.7.18. **Role of Special Police Officers (SPOs)**

1. SPOs inducted from affected population should be correctly used, otherwise it can become counter-productive.
2. They can supplement the police in static/guard duties so that regular manpower can be used at more demanding areas.
3. They can be used as guides for patrolling parties.
4. They can be used for interacting with the local population in their lingo.
5. They can be used for helping in civic actions.
6. They can be used for gathering information.
7. They can be later inducted into regular government services and become role models for others.
8. They should be properly trained.
9. Whenever they are given arms, they should be under proper command and control by regular officers.
10. The emotional content of their attitude towards the Maoists must be kept in mind.
11. They should never be deployed in large numbers compared to the regular security personnel.
12. Security of the SPOs should be always kept in mind as they often become easy targets for the insurgents.

1.7.19. **Vigilante Groups**

1. Forming vigilante groups is a part of citizens’ right to self-defence, particularly in areas where the state is not been able to protect their life and property.
2. Therefore, they should be purely defensive in purpose and action.
(3) However, making pre-emptive attacks on suspect villages or persons can by no means be described as defensive. Such attacks if deliberately ignored can lead to lawlessness.

(4) Therefore, it is important to keep an watch on the vigilante groups lest they exceed the limits of their right to self-defence.

(5) Maoists like all other insurgents are most unhappy with the vigilante groups and target them mercilessly. Therefore, security of the members of vigilante groups should be given priority.

1.7.20. Offensive Security Action

(1) The above recommendations have been mostly preventive action dealing with the enabling factors for growth of Maoist violence. However, once a phenomenon has come into existence, it may not be possible to control it by addressing the enabling factors. Most of the recommendations given above cannot be implemented in the core areas under Maoist influence.

(2) Therefore, differential approach has been recommended with curative offensive action against the Maoists in the core areas.

(3) Every state affected by Maoists, and for that matter any forest based armed insurgency, should have Greyhounds like offensive organizations.

1.7.21. Cloning of Greyhounds

(1) Greyhounds should be cloned correctly in all aspects.

(2) Fighting units for the jungle should be small in size appropriate for the particular jungle.

(3) Grey hound like organizations should not be embedded in some other different kind of organization.

(4) It should have low age profile.

(5) It should have a mixture of local tribals and outsiders.

(6) It should be a state agency.

(7) Its personnel should get very high incentives.

(8) It should be deputation based.

(9) It should have low age profile.

(10) It should have appropriate arms, equipment and food.

(11) It should have rigorous and appropriate training.

(12) It should not be used for any other kind of work.

(13) District level commando forces should also be created in Greyhound pattern.
1.7.22. **Dialogue and Surrender Policy**

1. Since we are a democracy, we should be ready to talk if the Maoists are ready to give up arms.
2. Proper surrender policy applied carefully can be very useful in weaning away the innocent youth who get trapped in political violence which they hardly understand.

1.7.23. **Perception Management**

1. The conduct of the government agencies including that of its security agencies shapes the public perception about the state the most.
2. In addition, perception management efforts like civic action, use of cultural media and films etc should be used to counter Maoist efforts in this regard.
3. Positive information, particularly role models, should be given to the affected people as an alternative to the formula given by the Maoists.
4. This can be done instead of or in addition to any negative information that the state may be using for disabusing the public perception about the Maoists.
5. The public perception actions should be integrated by police by making use of the concerned departments like education, health and culture etc., rather than doing everything on their own.
6. All strategies regarding public perception management should be approved at the highest level as any contradiction can be extremely counter-productive.

1.7.24. **Other Aspects of Offensive Action**

1.7.24.1. **Leadership by State and its Police**

State and its police should take the leadership and lead from the front in offensive actions.

1.7.24.2. **Special Intelligence Branch**

Dedicated Special Intelligence Branch should be created for the affected areas. The more accurate the intelligence about the Maoists, less likely is the chance for collateral damages during offensive operations.
1.7.24.3. Importance of Human Rights

Human Rights should be respected while undertaking offensive actions against the Maoists. Apart from the legal and democratic requirements, strategically also Human Rights violation is counter-productive in fighting insurgency. There are no shortcuts for the government and its security forces in fighting armed rebellion. Government has to spend on security related infrastructures and logistics, and security forces have to work hard in difficult environment.

References


13. Frontline magazine (September 21, 2007) (Annexure-II)


24. Kuppuswamy, B. *Social Change in India*, Delhi, India: Vikas Publishing House, 1960


42. Skocpol, Theda. Social Revolutions in the Modern World, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994


46. Tilly, Charles “War Making and State,” Bringing the State Back In, Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985

News Papers


50. Indian Express, “AP Govt extends ban on PWG” July 31, 1999

51. Times of India of 28th September 2010 – Study by IMRB and Times of India,

**Web Pages**


22. PM’s speech at the Chief Minister’s meet on Naxalism,(New Delhi,13th April 2006), http://pmindia.nic.in/speech/content.asp?id=311 – Accessed 30 November 2010;


26. ‘Transcript of the Prime Minister’s National Press Conference’,
(New Delhi, 24th May 2010)

About ISS and the Researcher

The Institute of Social Sciences,
8 Nelson Mandela Road, New Delhi – 110 070

The Institute was founded in 1985 to study contemporary social, political and economic issues, and problems that confront India in an interdisciplinary perspective and to make available its findings and recommendations to members of decision-making organisations such as government bodies, social scientists, policy makers, people’s and workers’ organisations, so as to widen their options for action. The evolution of an informed and action-oriented public opinion is the primary aim of the Institute. The research projects undertaken by the Institute cover a wide range of subjects in the areas of local governance, women’s studies, environment and contemporary economic and political issues. The Institute also organises seminars, workshops, discussions and training programmes for exchange of ideas and dissemination of its research findings. The major research thrust of the Institute is in the areas of Local Governance (Panchayati Raj), Urban Studies, Women’s Empowerment, Human Rights, South Asian Studies and Economic Affairs. The Institute seeks to build a community of concerned scholars and activists engaged in ushering in a humane and just society.

The Research Team

D. M. Mitra was assisted by Ms. Sadiksha Waiba, Research Associate. She also joined the academic groups consisting of Professors and students of Delhi University, JNU and IP University, Delhi, whenever such a group on behalf of this research project undertook field trips to the affected areas.

D. M. Mitra

D.M. Mitra, who is Principal Advisor to Madhya Pradesh State Planning Commission since January 2011, has been studying Maoism both conceptually as well as strategically through academic as well as field studies since 2004. He took sabbatical during 2009–10 to join ISS as a Visiting Fellow for undertaking this research project on behalf of BPR&D, MHA, Government of India. He is an IPS officer of 1983 batch belonging to MP cadre. He has held many charges in MP Police, including those of three
districts, in the ranks of SP, DIG, IG, and Addl.DGP. He has also served in the Central Government which has given him opportunity to observe and analyze left wing extremism in Odisha and tribal militancy in Tripura. He has been decorated with Indian Police Medal for Meritorious Service and President’s Police Medal for Distinguished Service.

He has served in the Bureau of Police Research & Development (BPR&D) and has been the Director of National Institute of Criminology & Forensic science (NICFS). As a special invitee, he has assisted Police Act Drafting Committee headed by Shri Soli Sorabji. He has assisted Naxal Management Division in MHA, Government of India from 2007 to 2009. He is a member of National Police Mission.

He has done Master of Science in Defense Analysis from Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, CA, USA and PG Diploma in Public Administration from IIPA, New Delhi. He has received International Award for Outstanding Academic Achievement in the USA.

Strategic Studies Institute of USA has published a monograph titled “Understanding Indian Insurgencies” written by Mitra. The monograph has become the prescribed reading material for graduate history course on revolution and military doctrines in the prestigious Leeds University of U.K.