

SOCIAL, ECONOMIC
AND
POLITICAL DYNAMICS
IN EXTREMIST AFFECTED AREAS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

STUDY COMMISSIONED BY:

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NEW DELHI**

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OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

- Identification of extremist affected areas
- Identification of social, economic and political factors and their dynamics (region / state-wise) in the extremist affected areas
- Preparation of model/mechanism for forecasting an area lapsing into extremism
- Recommendations

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

- Literature Survey: Journal Articles, Newspaper Clippings, Open Source government and NGO documents/ reports etc.
- Primary data collected from random sample survey using two sets of structured questionnaires.
- Interviews with academicians, former militants, police officers, media personnel, NGO activists, retired and serving government officials.
- Data entry and statistical analysis using SPSS 16.0

FACT SHEET

STATES AND DISTRICTS COVERED IN THE STUDY

NORTHEAST

ASSAM

- Kamrup
- Kokrajhar
- Nalbari
- Tinsukia

MANIPUR

- Imphal East
- Imphal West
- Tamenglong

NAGALAND

- Dimapur
- Kohima
- Mon

TRIPURA

- West Tripura
- South Tripura

MEGHALAYA

- East Khasi Hills
- West Garo Hills

SAMPLE SIZE

Common People: 700

Professionals in the field: 250

LEFT WING EXTREMISM-HIT STATES

ANDHRA PRADESH

- Karimnagar
- Hyderabad
- Nizamabad
- Warangal

- Raipur
- Rajnandgaon

JHARKHAND

- Khunti
- Giridih
- Latehar
- Ranchi

CHHATTISGARH

- Bastar
- Kanker

SAMPLE SIZE

Common People: 600

Professionals in the field: 150

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Assessing the social, political and economic impact of armed movements in affected regions and on the country as a whole has never been an easy task. It is an exercise that needs constant revision taking into account the progression in the conflict situation, and yet, there can be no finality to the assessment. Probably the enormity of the challenge has prevented such an exercise from being undertaken in Indian conflict theatres—in the Northeast as well as in the Left Wing Extremism affected states.

The present study, encompassing five northeastern states and three states affected by Left Wing Extremism, is an attempt to fill the void. It indulges in a stock taking exercise not just in terms of deriving available open source wisdom, but also taking the opinion from the field—from ordinary people who have seen the conflict from close quarters and in some way have been affected by it, from professionals who have analysed it with a perspective and also from the security force personnel, who have been primary participants in a conflict management mechanism. On its completion, the study is in a position to summarise its key findings and suggest recommendations and action plans to make a successful transition from conflict to peace and development.

A. THE NORTHEAST

The Narrative:

The volatile northeastern region of India, in recent times, is demonstrating signs of returning towards normalcy. A fundamental factor initiating this wind of change is the marginalisation of many armed insurgent movements of the region, as a result of internal as well as external pressures. The absence of violence is beginning to translate into a phase of consolidation of peace. In spite of the fact that certain pockets in Assam, Manipur and Nagaland continue to remain violence prone, a return of peace in those areas too cannot be ruled out. Much would, however, depend on how the prevailing peace or the peace processes are handled, sustained and carried forward to boost the pace or efforts to bring in development.

The over five-decades long history of insurgency in the Northeast is as much a narrative of violence and mayhem as an unending story of remoteness, underdevelopment and alienation, each of these phenomena feeding the other. High levels of corruption in government departments, in charge of utilisation of substantial amount of developmental fund allocated by the Centre, have resulted in slow economic and industrial development of the region. Inadequate or non-implementation of developmental programmes continuing over decades perpetuates the sense of alienation among the common people, who perceive the Northeast to be far removed from the Indian mainland. The monitoring mechanism of the development programmes have either not been effective or have been bypassed by the respective states.

Deployment of security forces in the region in response to the fragile security situation is an unavoidable tool. However, prolonged deployment of the forces and the longevity of extremism in states like Manipur often reinforce popular perception of government's insincerity in resolving the conflict. Accusations of human rights violations and popular opinion against security legislations like the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) are exploited by the extremists to alienate the civilian population further.

The government remaining the sole engine of growth has been a story associated with all conflict theatres. The Northeast is no different. With little infrastructure and industrial growth in the northeastern states, government combines the role of a development initiator and also the dominant provider of employment for a large number of unemployed youth. Poor fiscal management recurrently leading to a freeze on government employment further drives such educated unemployed youth to the lap of the extremists. Non or partial implementation of development schemes and the lack of monitoring brings the focus back to New Delhi's lack of attention to the area.

Geographical reality of the Northeast is its remoteness from India and proximity with countries like Bhutan, Bangladesh, Myanmar and China. While Northeast's locale presents administrative challenges, it has come as a boon to extremist outfits of the region who have traditionally received constant support in the form of funds, arms, safe havens and training from foreign intelligence agencies / terrorists. The arms haul in the port city of Chittagong in Bangladesh in April 2004, in which ten truckloads of arms meant for the ULFA were captured, is an example. Although the Bangladesh route has gradually been plugged, the porous Indo-Myanmar border continues to be a problem area. Post-Bhutan military

operations and recent cooperation from Bangladesh, Myanmar remains a critical area for the extremists.

Easy availability of a range of small arms and explosives in the region has augmented the capacities of the extremist groups to carry out their armed insurrections as well as unrestrained extortions over wide geographical areas. The sheer volume of weapons floating about in the region becomes a primary source of escalation and transformation of social tensions into armed conflict.

Generic problems apart, state specific problems like illegal migration from Bangladesh in Assam has led to popular upheavals. Extremist outfits have exploited popular sentiments to garner support, although outfits like the ULFA are known to have favoured accommodating the Bangladeshis at least once formally in the nineties while its leaders were trying to consolidate their bases in that country. On the other hand, outfits in Assam, Manipur, Nagaland and Meghalaya have targeted the Hindi-speaking population to drive a wedge between mainland India and the Northeast. New Delhi, despite using the soft as well as hard power at its command, remains an unwelcome entity, in many parts of the region in the sense that the Centre is seen as the ‘exploiter’ of the people and resources of the region.

The overall insurgency situation, encompassing the insurgency and counter-insurgency measures, has invariably impacted on the economic progress and nation-building project in the Northeast. Caught in the crossfire between the security forces and the extremists, civilians have very little option but to live a life of prolonged misery. At the same time, India’s aspiration of moving ahead as a nation continues to be slowed down due to the complications it encounters in the forms of challenges to its security.

Findings of the Survey

(1) Popular Perceptions on the Conflict Situation

- Unemployment and prevailing insecurity in the region were described by the respondents (Common People – 89.4%, Professionals – 88.4%) as important factors behind the growth of extremism in the Northeast. In Assam, the problem of illegal

migration (Common People – 75%, Professionals – 76%) was additionally cited as a crucial factor behind emergence of the extremist movements.

- Respondents (Common People – 60.9%, Professionals – 62.4%) termed ‘neglect by the Central government’ as a critical factor for the growth of extremism in the region. They appeared not to have taken into account a definite change in the perception of New Delhi, availability of adequate developmental funds and formulation of projects. It’s a different matter altogether that the implementation of these schemes, a responsibility of the State governments in most cases, is found wanting.
- Contrary to what the extremists claim, majority of the respondents (Common People – 78.6%, Professionals – 84.8%) claimed that extremists do not represent the interests and aspirations of the people. This finding was encouraging as it was reiterated both in Tripura where the insurgency has been considerably weakened as well as Manipur where it is still thriving.
- Leakage of developmental funds and extortion continues to be the major source of terror funding in the region according to the security officials and the professionals. (Professionals – 70%, Security Officials – 68.4%)
- Respondents indicated that peaceful protests are never noticed in the corridors of power (Common People – 66.2%, Professionals – 55.1%). The open source literature survey had indicated that there is a tendency by the government to ignore emerging movements until a threshold is broken.
- Majority of the respondents (Professionals – 64.4%, Security Officials – 67.1%) believed that the support received by the extremist outfits from foreign elements helped sustain armed violence in the Northeast. Examples of assistance provided to the extremist outfits from foreign sources in the form training, arms, funds as well as provision of safe havens are often cited to back up the claim.

- Political patronage received by the extremists was described as a crucial reason behind the persistence of extremism (Professionals – 81.6%, Security Officials – 85.1%).
- Majority of the respondents (Common People – 69.9%, Professionals – 58.2%) indicated that local media and intelligentsia have played an independent and non-partisan role in Northeast. Open source literature survey, however, indicates the challenges an independent media faces in conflict theatres and the pressures it is generally subjected to both by the State and the extremists. The same holds true for the intelligentsia as well.

(2) Cost of the Conflict:

- Respondents indicated that extremism has had a negative impact on the society (Common People – 79.6%) as well as on the economy and development of the Northeast (Professionals – 90.2%, Security Officials – 95%). Majority of the respondents (Professionals – 86.4%) indicated that extremism has retarded development initiatives and activities in backward regions of Northeast.
- According to majority of the respondents (Professionals – 77.2%), extremism has provided an excuse for official inactivity, corruption and neglect in the region. Survey of open source literature had underlined the role played by an ineffective and detached bureaucracy in the underdevelopment of region, which continues to provide a lifeline to the extremists.
- Factors like growing unemployment continue to make extremism a viable career option for the youth. However, this trend is undergoing gradual change, although the pace at which such change is occurring is far too slow for comfort.
- Prevalence of conflict situation was described as having affected normal functioning of educational institutions in the affected areas. (Common People – 58.2%, Professionals – 66.8%) People believe that extremism has, to an extent, contributed to the dropout rate in schools and teachers absenteeism.

- The literature survey had indicated of a nexus between the politicians and extremists of the region. The survey also corroborated the same notion. Majority of the respondents (Common People – 75.6%, Professionals – 71.6%) believed that there exists a nexus between the politicians and militants. Respondents said that extremists remain an effective tool of garnering political support, especially during elections. Situations in states like Tripura were, however, described to be different.
- Majority of the respondents (Professionals – 57.7%) believed that because of the problem of extremism, Northeast is being looked at as a troubled spot and hence, more attention is being paid to the security situation rather than to development issues. This appeared to be a notion which has been traditionally reiterated by the media and appears to have stuck in spite of the change in the situation.
- Majority of the respondents (Professionals – 72.2%) tried establishing a causal link between the extremism with the high presence of army and para-military forces in the region. Writings in the media by security experts, on the other hand, indicate the presence of security forces is inadequate and vacancy in the police forces needs to be filled up urgently.
- Majority of the respondents (Common People – 53.2%), especially those living in the rural areas, are first hand witnesses to the operations by security forces. However, barring a few respondents (60 out of 700 respondents), most respondents revealed that they had not faced misbehaviour by the security force personnel. This is in contrast to the widely believed perception that the security forces misbehave with general public during their search operations.

(3) State Response and End game:

- Significant awareness about the special security legislations among the respondents, both in rural and urban areas, was noticed (AFSPA – 67.4%, NSA – 74.8%, UAPA – 56.4%). This appeared to be the fallout of the ongoing demands for removal of acts like the AFSPA, which human rights/ civil society organisations say are draconian and encourage high handedness by the security forces.

- Respondents (Common People – 60.8%, Professionals – 50.6%) indicated that special security legislations have, in a way, encouraged the growth of extremism. Open source literature is dominated by writings about how prolonged military presence has not been able to dent the capacities of the extremists. Popular opinion appeared to endorse such thinking.
- At the same time, the field survey refuted the prevailing perception, created mostly by the media, that people of Northeast want security laws like AFSPA to be repealed. Respondents in states, barring Manipur, indicated their preferences for amendments only to the security laws (Common People – 43.4%, Professionals – 51.2%).
- Respondents indicated their preference in favour of simultaneous and coordinated operation by the police, para-military and the Army for an effective control over extremism. Preference for any one of these forces operating in isolation was rather limited.
- Majority of the respondents (Common People – 70.5%, Professionals – 68.3%) said that neither the central government nor the respective state governments has done enough to resolve the problem of extremism in the region. Such opinion appeared to origin from the prevailing desperation among the peace loving people in the region, who appear to be caught in the middle of insurgency and counter-insurgency operations.
- Respondents (Common People – 77.4%, Professionals – 87%) were rather dismissive of the results of the existing peace negotiations between the government and the extremist outfits. Even though during the survey and also in the open source literature, people of the region endorse peace talks as an important conflict resolution tool, they blame the lack of political will on the part of the government and the lack of seriousness and unconstitutional demands of the extremists, for the failure of the ongoing or past peace talks.
- In addition to peace talks, respondents favoured development initiatives and employment generation as the preferred modes of conflict resolution in the region.

Open source literature indicates a stagnancy of sorts in employment generation in the region, both due to a freeze imposed by cash-strapped state governments as well as lack of private investments. In addition, implementation of development projects remains captive to bureaucratic inertia as well as extremist domination.

B. LEFT WING EXTREMISM AFFECTED STATES

The Narrative:

The history of the Left Wing Extremism (Naxalism or Maoism) movement in India, at least in its latest episode, has been one of continuous expansion. Whereas extremist influence was visible over 50 odd districts in 2001, over the next decade such influence had been expanded to over 223 districts. At the root of such expansion lies the familiar tale of underdevelopment, mis-governance, lack of land reforms and a poorly trained police force. Barring Andhra Pradesh, where a police-led response was instrumental in the marginalisation of the military capacity of the extremists, leading to a noticeable reduction in extremism related fatalities, most of the other Naxal-hit states continues to hopelessly meander through the challenges posed by the extremists.

Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh in his speech on 23 April 2006 identified the problem of Left Wing Extremism as “the single biggest internal security challenge ever faced by our country”. This position has been reiterated subsequently. In terms of fatalities, the Naxalite violence has surpassed militancy in Jammu & Kashmir and the insurgency movements in the Northeast.

Apart from Chhattisgarh, which is the epicentre of the conflict, Naxalite presence and activities is reported from 20 Indian states. Orchestration of regular violence, however, has been confined to seven states. The 2004 formation of the CPI-Maoist, through a merger of the MCCI and the PWG has boosted the capacities of the extremists, who now control a large swathe of the country’s territory. The outfit aims to overthrow the government by a violent people’s war by 2050.

The military formation of the CPI-Maoist includes estimated 10,000 armed cadres, apart from a huge mass of 100,000 people's militia. Besides, a number of front organisations have been formed in various states to generate support, funds and cadres for the CPI-Maoist. A section among the intelligentsia too justifies Naxalite activities, if not their violent activities.

States affected by Left Wing Extremism are among the poorest and underdeveloped in the country, and also among the poorly governed. Areas affected by the extremists are inhabited by the tribal population, particularly Chhattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh, Orissa and Jharkhand. Parts of West Bengal and Maharashtra where extremists are present too conform to this narrative. Paradoxically, the areas are mineral rich. Chhattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh, Orissa and Jharkhand account for approximately 85 per cent of India's coal resources. Exploitation of the natural resources remains crucial for the economic progress of the country. However, entry of the state and the private/public sector companies has also been source of tribal dissent, which has been exploited by the Naxalites.

The state response to Naxalite violence has suffered due to perceptual differences among the states as well as lack of a unified outlook among the regimes in power. Lack of inter-state coordination has been exploited by the Naxalites to move between states and minimise losses. Poor state of police forces has led to deployment of large battalions of para-military forces in several states. However, coordination between the police and the para-military remains a problem. Inability of the civil administration to restart its activities in many of the tribal areas has been a key factor behind Naxalite growth and sustenance. Andhra Pradesh, however, has been able to put together an effective counter-Naxalite response. Combining development approach with security force operations, it has been able to drive the Naxalite cadres out of the state to neighbouring states.

Findings of the Survey

(1) Popular Perceptions on the Conflict Situation

- 'Unemployment and social insecurity' (Common People – 96%, Professionals – 95.3%), 'failure to bring about land reforms' (Common People – 75.8%, Professionals – 77%) and 'economic backwardness of the state' (Common People – 87.8%,

Professionals – 90%) were identified by majority of the respondents as major reasons for growth of Left Wing Extremism.

- Majority of the respondents (Common People – 84%, Professionals – 90%) opined that Naxalites do not represent the interests and aspirations of the civilian population. Although the percentage of common people who believed that the Naxalites still represent the interests and aspirations of the people was higher in Andhra Pradesh (23%) compared to Chhattisgarh (10%) and Jharkhand (15%), the survey noted an overall rejection by the people of the notion that Naxals represent the tribal community.
- The image and ideology of the Naxalites, however, continue to be somewhat positive compared to the terrorists. A large section of respondents (49%) opined that the Naxalites cannot be construed as terrorists. Since the Naxalites do not pursue a secessionist goal and do not act as vehicles for external powers' agenda, even New Delhi refrains from equating them with terrorists.
- It is believed by majority of the respondents (Common People – 77.3%, Professionals – 66%) that orchestration of violence by the Naxalite groups is largely a result of the ineffectiveness of peaceful methods of protest. In the opinion of experts, however, violence remains a key tool for attainment of the Naxalite objective of capturing the state power.
- Majority of the respondents, in all three surveyed states, believed that Naxalites want political power and not development (Common People – 74.6%, Professionals – 79.3%). This finding is in conformity with the objective of the CPI-Maoist to capture state power by 2050.
- Although majority of the respondents (Common People – 61%, Professionals – 78.7%) indicated that the media and intelligentsia have played an independent and impartial role, a sizeable section did indicate that a nexus exists between the Naxalites on one hand and the media and intelligentsia on the other.

(2) Cost of the Conflict:

- An overwhelming majority of respondents underlined the negative impact of Left Wing Extremism on society (Common People – 84.4%) and as well as on economy and development (Professionals – 89.3%, Security Officials – 82.2%) of their respective states.
- Respondents in Jharkhand (Common People – 83.5%, Professionals – 92%) and Chhattisgarh (Common People – 100%, Professionals – 96%) indicated that education in their respective states has suffered severely due to Left Wing Extremism. Either the Naxalites have destroyed the school buildings or the security forces have turned the schools into barracks for accommodation.
- Respondents in Chhattisgarh (Common People – 91%, Professionals – 96%) and Jharkhand (Common People – 61%, Professionals – 86%) indicated that Left Wing Extremism has had serious impact on the political scene of the state. Although in states like Chhattisgarh, the nexus is mostly confined to individual politicians, in Jharkhand, all political parties have been accused of nexus with the extremists for electoral gains. The improved security situation in Andhra Pradesh appeared to have brought about a decline in the extremist-politician nexus. However, the Telangana statehood agitation is again being used by the Naxalites to stage a comeback into the state.
- Recruitment of children by the Naxalites is an acknowledged fact. The CPI-Maoist has formed Bal Sangham to recruit children who receive training as couriers and also as future armed cadres. A significant portion of the respondents (Common People – 44.3%, Professionals – 69.3%) confirmed the recruitment of children by Naxalites. In addition, they also indicated that private militias and anti-Naxal vigilante groups like the Salwa Judum in Chhattisgarh too have roped in children for their activities.
- Respondents (Common People – 68.4%, Professionals – 76.7%) felt that explosion of landmines and IEDs have remained a primary mode of attacks by the Naxalites. This is supported by available open source information. Over the years, the Naxalites have

perfected the art of assembling IEDs and increasing their lethality and such explosions continue to claim civilian as well as SF lives.

(3) State Response and Endgame:

- Majority of the respondents (Common People – 44.7%, Professionals – 74.3%) rejected the assumption that special security legislations can be a source of intensification of Left Wing Extremism in their states. This appeared to be a positive development from the Naxal theatres where the human right organisations accuse the government of wielding draconian power to target civilians accusing them of being Naxal sympathisers.
- Although counter-insurgency doctrines and experiences oppose the use of the Army against the insurgents and prescribe a police-led operation, majority of the respondents in Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand wanted Army, Police and para-military forces to take on the Naxalites together. The response indicated a lack of faith in the ability of the police, in spite of the fact of the success of the police-led counter-Maoist operations in Andhra Pradesh. The setbacks suffered by the CRPF in some of the attacks in 2010 in Chhattisgarh appeared to have influenced the opinion of the respondents.
- Notwithstanding the reservation of the common people, a thin majority of the professionals in Andhra Pradesh (54.5%) and Jharkhand (52.1%) endorsed the utility of using SPOs in anti-Naxal operations. In Chhattisgarh, majority respondents among the common people (83%) as well as the professionals on the field (72%) indicated that the contribution of the SPOs in tackling the Maoists have been effective.
- Opinions among the respondents of the three surveyed states ranged from satisfaction to total rejection on the issue of Government's efforts to solve Left Wing Extremism. In Jharkhand, majority of the respondents in all categories (Common People – 82.5%, Professionals – 88%) expressed their complete dissatisfaction with the government response. In Andhra Pradesh, common people (35%) appeared to be marginally satisfied, notwithstanding moderate satisfaction expressed by the professionals (54%).

In Chhattisgarh, while majority (Common People – 50.5%, Professionals – 52%) rejected the scale of success as not enough, a large number of respondents (Common People – 47%, Professionals – 40%) did indicate that the government has managed to achieve what it could in the given challenging circumstances.

- Developmental approach was preferred over other modes of conflict resolution mechanisms by the respondents. Creation of employment opportunities and carrying out land reforms were also given primacy by the respondents. The MHA two pronged strategy in Naxal theatres was endorsed. Governance, the respondents opined, can act as an anti-dote against the growth and sustenance of the Naxalites.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE NORTHEASTERN STATES:

C1. Developmental Recommendations:

C1.1 The mushrooming of extremist outfits, a trend which is largely connected to the problem of lack of governance and opportunity, needs to be tackled through creation of a responsible and sensitive bureaucracy. IAS cadres posted in the Northeast are in constant lookout for getting out of the region, after serving the minimum required number of years. The Centre and the State governments may take steps to bring about a reform in the mindset of the bureaucracy and in the way it functions. An effective and sensitive bureaucracy would form the core strength of the governmental initiatives in a region which has been freed of extremist influence.

Action Plan: This can be achieved either through a creation of a separate north-eastern cadre in the IAS/IPS or through impartment of regular specialised training to the existing officers regarding the role of the administration in such areas. Open to all Indians, the IAS/IPS officers of the NE cadre will have to serve considerable part of their career in the region, thereby developing expertise in and rendering service to the region.

C1.2 Improving connectivity between Indian mainland and the Northeast is a core issue that may aid in developing the region as well as dealing with extremism. Road network within the Northeast has not grown at a desirable pace. The national highways are in bad

shape due to lack of maintenance. Frequent strikes by organisations make the highways, especially those connecting Manipur in-operational. Border roads are either grossly inadequate or are in a deplorable condition and needs urgent attention.

Action Plan: A five year plan to improve connectivity- both land and air- need to be formulated and implemented. The highways connecting different states need to be broadened and made functional all round the year. In addition to the building of the roads, the contractors need to be made responsible for their maintenance as well. The highways need to be declared as non-tolerance zones and any blockade on them need to be tackled with a strong hand.

C1.3 Establishment of the autonomous councils as a method to improve governance needs to be examined. It is an accepted reality that the experiment of autonomous councils has met with complete failure in most of the northeastern states. The personal ambitions of the local leaders as well as the State government's reluctance to delegate powers to the councils are at the core of the problem.

Action Plan: A detailed study of the performance of the autonomous councils needs to be carried out to bring into picture their contribution to the development of the areas under their administration. While a constitutional amendment to scrap autonomous council provision would be a farfetched idea involving political debate, the State governments should be encouraged to stop further creation of such councils. Further decentralization of powers to the village level needs to be considered and this can be done by setting up Village Councils under the autonomous councils. The panchayati raj model could be used as a framework for setting up such village councils. In this way economic democracy would reach the grassroots.

C1.4 District development plans need to be formulated and implemented. Development initiatives must go side by side with the anti-insurgency operations. Just like the void in governance is filled up by the extremists, the government must start its activities immediately after the security force take over an area. The government must have a District Development Plan, separately for each district in the state. Once violence is brought under control, the plan can be put into immediate implementation, without wasting time. It needs emphasis that such a plan should be purely location-specific and can be prepared in consultation with local people, which will ensure people's participation in the development process. Of late, a

section of the political class is considering formulation of constituency-wise development plans. However this seems to be a politically-motivated thinking and would not fetch any benefit for the people and hence, should not be encouraged.

Action Plan: Along with the government, the expertise of the NGOs can be used in this. NGOs can bridge the gap between the grassroots and the district headquarters.

C1.5 *The rising problem of unemployment needs to be addressed through a comprehensive action plan focusing on vocational education.* Large-scale unemployment prevailing in each of the states is sure recipe for disaster in the days to come. These youths are vulnerable to the lure of easy money and hence extremism. While the government cannot be the sole job creator in the state, the non-generation of job opportunities in the secondary and tertiary sector has either pushed these youth outside the state or into the hands of the extremist groups.

Action Plan: The states need more number of vocational training institutes and also soft loans for students passing out of these institutions. The State governments may have to take a pro active stand in including vocational skills in the school curricula so that the education system realistically prepares the students for their future life. This and not the regular education that creates unemployables may become the focus of the educational system.

C1.6 *Using the NGOs to reach out to people as a method of development needs to be tried in states like Meghalaya and Nagaland.* The NGOs can be used to carry out independent social audits, basically to list the development needs of the people living in remote areas and report back to the government, which can then take remedial steps. Social audits of the work done by the government can also be undertaken in order to see whether common people have really been benefitted by the developmental schemes or not.

Action Plan: NGOs generally carry a negative perception among the official circles. They are either seen as corrupt or as front organisations of the extremist outfits. While odd NGOs do fall into this category, there are a number of genuine organisations whose services can be used by the State to implement development schemes as well as to build up a movement against violence. A detailed survey needs to be carried out by the State governments to identify such NGOs.

C1.7 *The function of the traditional structures of governance needs to be protected.* With the growth of democracy and representative form of government, the traditional structures of governance and local institutions have either disintegrated or have weakened. In Meghalaya, the *durbars* are a case in point. They, in spite of their hold over the population, are fast losing out to mainstream political institutions, who do not command similar authority. In the case of extremism, the weakening of the *durbars* has meant lack of social control over the youths who are taking to extremism.

Action Plan: An institutional structure that accommodates these institutions must be evolved. To the extent possible, such institutions need to be empowered to solve minor disputes at their level, which will give them a legal position to sustain.

C1.8 *Frequent familiarisation tours to Indian cities for students and youths from the northeastern states should be arranged.* People of the Northeast, especially people in the interior states suffer from a sense of alienation which adds to the acceptability of the extremists. This can be addressed through ensuring greater exposure to mainland India. The school curriculum may also be made to include more materials promoting national integration and unity.

Action Plan: Whereas frequent trips of youths and students from these states can be arranged to different locations in India, regular performance by artistes from various Indian states should be arranged in the northeastern states. Such tours may go beyond the state capitals.

C1.9 *Centre and the State governments need to take steps to revive tourism industry in the northeastern states.* Tourism potential of the northeastern states have suffered due to the prevailing security scenario. For states like Nagaland, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh, the need for an inner line permit creates a mental block among the people wishing to visit the states. For other states, the image of a gun-toting extremist killing and extorting people at will deters them from ever venturing into these states.

Action Plan: Of late, significant publicity has been provided in the national media encouraging people to visit the Northeast. Individual State governments can also be encouraged to reach understanding to this effect with outfits under ceasefire, so as to ensure

the safety of the tourists. For example, the NSCN-IM in Nagaland can be encouraged to issue a statement expressing its openness to tourists visiting the state.

C1.10 *Culture and sports can be used as modes of integration of northeastern states with mainland India.* States like Manipur, Nagaland and Mizoram not only have a thriving cultural heritage, but also are homes to excellent sportspersons. These strengths of the states need to be cultivated as sources of bonding between India and the Northeast.

Action Plan: Regular shows of cultural troops from the Northeast can be arranged in the metropolitan cities including the national capital. In addition, artistes from other states should be encouraged to perform in Northeastern State capitals. Sports facilities and infrastructure need improvement within the Northeast. Sportspersons need to be constantly encouraged and therefore, special central packages may be worked out.

C1.11 *There is a need for proper formulation and implementation of Citizen's Charter in the government departments.* The charter provides information to the public about the quantity and quality of service provided by the respective government office. This would increase transparency and accountability in the works of the government.

Action Plan: The Citizen's Charter needs to be displayed in all the government offices. The entire staff of the office should be made aware of what is contained in the charter. This would make the government officials more responsive towards the public. The government departments should regularly publish their performance and also periodically review the charter standards.

C2. Operational Recommendations:

C2.1 *The government needs to follow a consistent policy on peace negotiations with the extremist outfits.* It has entered into negotiations with the NSCN-IM in Nagaland without forcing the outfit to surrender arms. However, with outfits like ULFA, this condition, is being reiterated. It needs to be realised no outfit would ever enter into negotiations with the condition of surrendering its weapons.

Action Plan: Surrender of all the cadres of the outfits, not factions, and cessation of violence, instead of arms surrender, can be used as a precondition. This condition must be followed strictly and the outfits on ceasefire must not be allowed to carry arms and indulge in extortion and violence.

C2.2 *The existing vacancies in the police force need to be filled up.* This applies both to the vacancies existing at the level of the IPS officers to be posted in each of the State and also other personnel.

Action Plan: Quality of the personnel need not be sacrificed for the sake of quickly filling up the vacancies. The state government may take a time frame of three years to fill up the vacancies at the constabulary level. This will not constitute an immediate drain on the state's resources and would also provide time for a thorough recruitment process.

C2.3 *Tenures of at least two to three years need to be ensured for SPs in districts most affected by extremist violence.* An earlier study done by BPR&D indicated that short tenures for Superintendents of Police (SPs) in various states of the country have been a problem as far as evolving and executing a sound counter-insurgency policy is concerned. Appointment and duration of the SPs in particular districts has been subjected to political decisions. SPs have been transferred even after isolated incidents of extremist attack. The short tenures have done justice neither to their ability nor to the basic need of familiarisation with a particular area.

Action Plan: The DGP as well as State government will have to be responsible for implementation of the plan. If needed, an amendment in State Police Acts may be brought in to formalise the plan.

C2.4 *A decision on the AFSPA's repeal/amendment needs to be made.* Opposition to the AFSPA continues to remain the major rallying point in states like Manipur. Agitations demanding its repeal have broken out every now and then which have its repercussions on the law and order, economy as well as educational sectors. It has also been a source of alienation among the people.

Action Plan: Amendments to the Act are under Cabinet consideration. Urgent move to seek Cabinet clearance and steps to notify the amendments could be considered.

C2.5 *Improving conviction rates of arrested extremists should be a critical part of the counter-insurgency strategy.* Many states in the Northeast scores poorly as far as conviction rates of arrested extremists are concerned. Extremists are released as a result of poor investigation processes, poor mechanisms for prosecution, as well as the tardiness and formalities of the judicial process.

Action Plan: Police personnel specifically need immediate and intensive training in scientific investigation, and stronger forensic facilities need to be created within the state structures to secure a wider and more effective range of judicially admissible evidence. Prosecution Directorates must be set up in states and those that already have the directorates needs revamp.

C2.6 *The training quality of the police force is quite poor in the northeastern states.* Also the police personnel are not provided much refresher training after their initial training. This acts as a hindrance for their proper professional career growth and also in their ability to tackle the insurgency in the region.

Action Plan: Police personnel should be made to undergo continuous training programmes all through their careers. This will make them professionally competitive as well as boost their confidence for successfully tackling the situation in the region.

C2.7 *MHA may bear the entire cost of counter-insurgency (CI) operations for the northeastern states rather than asking for a state share.* It has been a persistent demand of the State governments of the region that the Centre bears the entire cost of CI operations. Since the costs of such CI operations are a huge burden on the limited resources of the State governments, this demand can be considered.

Action Plan: It is entirely the prerogative of the MHA to accede to this demand.

C2.8 Fencing along the porous Indo-Bangladesh border, which continues to provide an easy access to the extremists, needs to be completed on an urgent basis.

Action Plan: Fencing is only a small part of a sound border management policy. To ensure that the fencing is an effective barrier, road network along the border may be improved, mobile telephony need to reach those areas, healthcare and education facilities may be put in place for the population in the border areas and crucially, good officers (both bureaucrats and police) may be posted to border areas with, if necessary, special border allowances.

C2.9 A regional anti-terror framework with the neighbouring countries like Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan and Myanmar needs to be institutionalised. It will assist the processes of intelligence sharing as well as extradition of wanted fugitives. This will act as a deterrent on the capacities of the north-eastern groups to use the territories of those countries as safe haven.

Action Plan: Efforts at the diplomatic level can be made to establish such groupings.

D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LEFT WING EXTREMISM AFFECTED STATES:

D1. Developmental Recommendations:

D1.1 Committed, transparent and high priority implementation of land reforms measures could form a critical component of the anti-Naxal strategy. Tribal land alienation has been exploited by the Naxals to build up their movement. Without a land reform programme, the landless tribals have no option but to throw in their lot with the Naxals with the hope that justice would be done to them. The state of land reforms through the Naxal dominated states has remained unsatisfactory. States are either not inclined to bring in land reforms or have delayed the process by not implementing recommendations of land reforms commissions set up by themselves. Andhra Pradesh is an example.

Action Plan: The Union government should issue advisories to the state governments on taking immediate steps for bringing out land reforms. Though land reforms are a state subject, still the centre can play an advisory role. Intra-state differences should be addressed

by brain storming at the state as well as the national level. While state-wide implementation of the programme and subsequent monitoring of such implementation would be too ambitious, it could be attempted district by district, starting with the least Naxal affected districts where it would be easy to implement. Setting up of a permanent authority such as Land Reforms Implementation Commissioner could be thought of. Also land reforms need to be area specific and community specific and the existing land ceiling laws should be taken into account while bringing out the reforms.

D1.2 Empowering the grass roots level self-government organisations like the Panchayats and Gram Sabhas would help building a primary line of defence against the Naxalites. In a situation where governance and local administration has collapsed in many of the Naxal dominated areas, the local self government institutions may be revived as the first step towards stamping the presence of the government. This would allow the people of the region to develop a sense of participation and stake in the development of the area.

Action Plan:: The Panchayat (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 (PESA), a progressive piece of legislation that recognises the competence of tribal communities to govern themselves is yet to be implemented vigorously in states like Chhattisgarh. In other states, *Panchayats* are adversely affected by lack of power and resources. The State Government needs to ensure that the PESA Act provisions are implemented strictly and vigorously to particularly ensure that rights over minor forest produce are assigned to the Gram Sabhas. Regular and adequate flow of resources needs to be ensured to these bodies. And also to increase their influence in the region, the *Panchayats* may be given legal power to adjudicate over petty criminal as well as property disputes.

D1.3 An element of transparency may be brought into the deals of land acquisition by private/public sector undertakings in the tribal areas. Much of the tribal angst against the State governments has been due to the manner in which tribal land has been transferred to the private and public sector companies. Many of these deals where companies promise benefits to the tribals or the state promises to compensate the tribals are shrouded in secrecy. Consent of the *Gram Sabhas*, which is mandatory in the event of transfer of tribal land, is being overwritten by imposition of Central Land Acquisition Act of 1894, which allows government to overtake land for public purpose.

Action Plan: All big land deals should be made public by the government through advertisements in local language newspapers. Amount of compensation provided and details of beneficiaries should also be made public. Individuals and organisations should be allowed to raise objections, although a mere objection may not put a serious hurdle in the deal.

D1.4 Resettlement and rehabilitation process of the displaced people should remain transparent and compensation provided may be ensured to be adequate. Closely linked with the above point is the non-settlement and inadequate compensation provided to people who have lost their lands to developmental/ infrastructure projects. The displacement of the tribals has been a rallying point for the Maoists to gain support and recruit cadres among such aggrieved population. Seemingly peaceful modes of protests have been attempted to be turned into violent movements against the state.

Action Plan: Each project implementation must carry a clause that unless the affected people are adequately rehabilitated, no project work can start. This would push the companies to sincerely undertake the resettlement programmes to the satisfaction of the affected people. A detailed report on the resettlement may be filed before the government before the company is given a go ahead on the project proper. Needless to say, the government may not wait for a violent movement to origin before it contemplates such an action plan. Also, the resettlement programme of the displaced people should be devised in advance so that undue delay does not cause discontent to be exploited later by the extremists.

D1.5 A process of making the land losing tribals permanent beneficiaries from the industrial units may be inserted in the memorandum of understandings. A persistent complain of the tribals losing land to the industrial units has been the uselessness of money given in return for their land. A bleak future awaits them once the money gets over. Due to the lack of education, only manual jobs can be given to them in the industrial units, where as the plum jobs go to the outsiders. This arrangement needs to change to make the land transfer process smoother and attractive.

Action Plan: A clause may be introduced into the MoUs that at least 0.5 per cent of the profits made by the companies would be kept aside on a permanent basis for the land contributing tribals. While this would put no strain on the profitability of the companies, it

would vastly improve the financial condition of the tribals on a continuous and permanent basis. As long as the companies operate, this benefit may accrue to the tribals.

D1.6 Jobs for people under the central schemes in the Naxal-affected areas should be ensured throughout the year. The lack of job opportunities among the tribal population has been taken advantage by the Naxalites to recruit cadres and mobilise people. The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) guarantees 100 day minimum work in one year for every family who registers in this programme. However, a bare 100 days of work may not be sufficient for the tribals who have no other means of earning their livelihood.

Action Plan: Members of the Central Employment Guarantee Council (CEGC), the government body for implementation of the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MNREGS), have suggested that jobs be guaranteed round the year in Naxal-hit regions. This is an extremely useful suggestion for implementation. Moreover, instead of keeping the wages fixed, they should be linked to the Consumer Price Index and should be done in compliance with the Minimum Wages Act. In addition, the State governments may take a pro active stand in including vocational skills in the school curricula so that the education system realistically prepares the students for their future life.

D1.7 Government may ensure compulsory presence and functioning of administrative structures in Naxal affected areas. It has been noticed that the officials simply abstain from duties in Naxal affected areas, making a farce of the government presence. While reasons of fear behind the absence of the officials are genuine sometimes, to a large extent it is also an excuse and a part of the scale of corruption in those areas.

Action Plan: The state governments may implement strict guidelines for ensuring their presence and functioning. While this may be encouraged by provision of required security and additional incentives, a minimum tenure of service in Naxal areas may be made compulsory for postings in ‘peaceful’ districts. Similar steps may also be taken to ensure the presence of teachers in schools and doctors in hospitals. The *Panchayats/ Gram Sabhas* may be authorised to check on this.

D1.8 Ways to establish close coordination between the security forces and the administration may be explored. As often is the case, the failure of the administration to step into areas freed from Naxal presence increases the likelihood of extremist return. The inability of the civil administration to provide immediate relief to the tribal population as well as to set up permanent mechanisms of governance in recovered areas makes the goal of ‘hold, consolidate and govern’ virtually unattainable.

Action Plan: As soon as an area is cleared by the security forces from the extremist menace, the district administration should promptly step in to start developmental actions within a pre-planned developmental plan with visible effect. Both security forces and the district administration should closely coordinate in this respect. To increase coordination between para-military and the police forces, a unified command structure has been proposed to be set up in different Naxal affected states. A similar ‘Unified Development Command Structure’ may be set up to increase coordination between the administration and the security forces. This may come up at the district level with the District Collector, Superintendent of Police and CRPF/ para-military authorities as members. The main role of this structure will be to revive the civil administrative structure and functions so that immediate and long term needs of the affected people are taken care of.

D1.9 Stricter and transparent anti-corruption measures may form a critical part of the efforts to improve administration. Charges of corruption against the officials/ bureaucracy paint the government in a poor light and leads to a decline in its acceptability. Jharkhand, for example, in its short history of statehood, has witnessed some serious corruption scandals. It is alleged that many of its senior bureaucrats are also neck deep in corruption. Investigation into such scandals and prosecution against such officials has been slow. The Maoists have continuously highlighted these as ills of the system of governance that need to be changed through a revolution.

Action Plan: To the extent possible, anti-corruption measures may be initiated in the states and exemplary punishment needs to be given to persons involved. Setting up an Accountability Commission to probe into the corruption scandals would be an important step. There is a need to showcase the sincerity of the state in providing honest and transparent administration as well as implementing rule of law.

D1.10 Measures to improve connectivity between the district headquarters and the remote areas need to be a national priority. Improved connectivity is a key prerequisite behind the reach of the administration and the security forces to the remote parts of the state. For long, the Naxal presence has been used as a pretext by the state administration for the non-implementation of building roads/ bridges connecting far away hamlets and villages. As a result, these areas remain permanent base areas of the Naxalites.

Action Plan: Absence of a suitable construction agency has been pointed as a major problem. The Maoists have managed to scare away small contractors and as a result, many such projects lie unimplemented for a long time. This problem may be tackled by designating building roads and bridges in the Naxal affected areas a national priority and securitising the effort. Dedicated SF battalions can be put in charge of such construction as well as repair activities. If private contractors become unwilling partners, these projects need to be undertaken either by the state PWD or the BRO. These projects may also use local labourers only which will generate employment for the local population.

D1.11 The tribals should be provided rights over the forest land where they have been living for decades. The Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 was supposed to improve the lives of the poor indigenous tribes by recognising their right to inhabit the forests. But the implementation of the act has been very poor and the tribals are still living in fear of losing their ancestral lands. After all, one must not forget the key slogan of the tribals is to get their right over 'jal, jangal, jameen'.

Action Plan: There has to be proper implementation of the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 and it has to be ensured that the tribals get the legal rights over the land that they are residing. The tribals living in the forest areas should not be harassed unnecessarily.

D1.12 The Advisory Committees in the 5th Scheduled areas should be fully functional and the Governors should hold their meetings at regular intervals. Also the V Schedule of the Constitution provides exclusive powers to the Governor in forest related matters but this has not been exercised by any governor so far. The Governors need to exercise their powers in this matter.

Action Plan: The Governor's Annual Report on the 5th Scheduled areas of the states concerned should be sent to the President without fail by a particular date every year and the Central Government should promptly act on the suggestions/recommendations made by the Governors and a reply should be sent to the Governor concerned regarding acceptance or rejection of the suggestions/recommendations.

D1.13 Sensitization on gender issues and human approach in solving extremism is very much necessary for tackling issues concerning national security.

Action Plan: The police needs to be sensitized on gender issues. For this, cases involving abuse of women should be given priority and prompt investigations should follow. Also a humane approach towards solving extremism has to be taken. It has to be ensured that the security forces don't abuse human rights during their operations against extremists. These operations must be clean and in accordance with the law.

D2. Operational Recommendations:

D2.1 The State governments should regularly release its share of resources for the police modernisation scheme and not base the entire programme on the central contribution only.

The report of the Comptroller & Auditor General of India titled, "Compendium of Performance Audit Reviews on Modernization of Police Force" has brought to light some of the anomalies in the Andhra Pradesh police department. According to the report, between 2002 and 2007, Andhra Pradesh released only 10 per cent of the State share in the police modernisation scheme. The lack of funds, therefore, resulted in non completion of projects such as the buildings for police personnel. The CAG report also mentioned that sophisticated weapons brought by Andhra Pradesh were mostly kept in district police headquarters and were not provided to the police stations. Similar anomalies have also been noted in case of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand.

Action Plan: Given the time lag between the publication of the CAG report and the period under investigation, it is difficult to independently verify whether concerns raised by the CAG have been addressed by the State police departments or not. If not, they need to be addressed on an urgent basis. It is sometimes the genuine lack of finances that forces a State to default on making its share available for the police modernisation programme. The MHA

may initiate a study to find out the reasons for all such states who have periodically not contributed their share of the fund. The findings will go a long way in taking care of the funding pattern.

D2.2 Basic requirements of the policemen participating in anti-Maoist operations need to be taken care of. An officer with the Andhra Pradesh CID (Naxal Intelligence) said during an interview conducted for the study, “Police forces are always at the mercy of political bosses in districts. They should have proper infrastructure and facilities. There were times when policemen had to beg for food in tribal areas as necessary arrangement was not made in some instances in Paderu and Khammam forests abutting Chhattisgarh.” While it is not possible to independently verify such charges, it is necessary that care is taken to address these concerns. Police modernisation plans need to go beyond upgrading the weapons and creating police infrastructure to taking care such basic needs.

Action Plan: Under normal circumstances, it is upto the superintendent of police of a district to ensure that the forces participating in operations are taken care of. A direct line of communication may be established to bring lapses in this front directly to the notice of the higher authorities. While situation appears to have improved a lot under many police stations, any complain to the contrary, must be addressed on an urgent basis by the police authorities.

D2.3 Police personnel need to be trained to keep a constant watch on Maoist activities in vulnerable areas. It is beyond doubt that the Naxalites would continue to resist security force operations, gain ground and attempt to stage comebacks to areas from where they have been forced to retreat. This could happen in three ways- (i) by carrying out big attacks, (ii) by carrying out sustained mass mobilisation programmes thereby building up the movement from the scratch and (iii) riding on the waves of mass movements such as the Telangana Statehood movement. While big attacks can be prevented through good human as well as technical intelligence, constant watch needs to be kept on the two other modes of seeking support.

Action Plan: Police stations must constantly endeavour to gather data and information on the type of actual Maoist activity, and also the kind of local disenchantment that could be exploited by the extremists. It is normal for police stations to keep an eye on the missing youths in a village and try finding out if they have joined the Maoist movement. However,

Maoist involvement/ mobilisation, not necessarily amounting to violence, in local issues need constant monitoring. It is through those that the extremists will seek to widen their support base in an area. Police personnel in local police stations need to be trained to monitor the possibility of such involvement.

D2.4 A sound strategic communication campaign is a prerequisite for the success of anti-Naxal operations. It was observed during the survey that a huge gap still separates the common man and the Naxalites. While the former is not convinced of the ideology and objectives of the extremists, the lack of option factor is forcing him/her to turn into a Naxal sympathiser. This difference may be taken advantage of by the state. In order to gain support for its initiatives, the state must be able to reach out to the common people in terms of advertising the purpose of its programmes and its intended benefits.

Action Plan: The common people in remote areas must be reached through pamphlets, regional radio and television programmes, drama and theatre groups, advocacy groups etc. to the extent possible, battery run television and radio sets can be made available to villages. Services of professional groups may be utilised for the attractive conceptualisation and creation of such programmes.

D2.5 A sensible policy to target the Naxalite bandwagon needs to be evolved. In recent times, Naxalites have been described to benefit from the support they have managed to generate from key intellectuals in society. While the state governments in the past have tried to muzzle the voices of some of these activists, such policies have not worked.

Action Plan: Distinction needs to be made between the Naxal activists and the cheerleaders, between incitement and advocacy and between criminal conspiracies and ideological sympathies. While the state can go all out against the Naxal overground activists, alleged persecution of the cheerleaders would provide no operational benefit. It would only endorse the Naxal description of the state as an intolerant oppressor. As long as the cheerleaders are confining their activities to the limits of the seminar halls, they should be left alone.

D2.6 Tribal component among the state police forces needs urgent augmentation. It was observed during the survey that the state police, mostly in Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, has insufficient tribal representation within its forces. The force, thus, faces difficulty in

communicating to the tribals. Language as a barrier between the predominantly non-tribal police force and the tribal population continues to be a major hurdle during anti-Naxal operations.

Action Plan: The anomaly can be addressed by vigorous recruitment targeting the tribal youth. This will take the unemployed youth from being recruited by the Naxals. Education of promising tribal boys and girls can be sponsored by the police department with the objective of recruiting them in future.

D2.7 The state should gradually reduce its dependence on the SPOs. Regularisation of the SPOs is bound to emerge as a problem as states start winning against the Naxals. At the same time, the presence and continuous recruitment of the SPOs creates a condition which deters strengthening and consolidation of human intelligence network. It is also very much important as to how SPOs are handled to deliver as any misuse of SPOs will always give negative results. (There is also a strong opinion that SPOs cannot be ignored once an area becomes free from extremism. People who subscribes to this view includes police officials and according to them the SPOs should be made a part of the police force and their job be regularized.)

Action Plan: A no expansion policy on the current level of SPOs should be implemented. In case of unavoidable necessity, only contract based employment should be followed. SPOs should not be allowed to operate independently, without being a part of a team of regular police personnel. The District police heads should closely monitor their performances. Before they are inducted, they may be put through a crash course to sensitise them of their duties and responsibilities.

D2.8 The Andhra experience need to be shared as widely possible among the police officers from other Naxal affected states. The success of Andhra Pradesh brings upon itself a benign responsibility to teach the art of victory to other states currently fighting the Maoists. Currently, there is lot of ambiguity regarding the ‘Andhra-model of counter-insurgency’. In the absence of an authoritative narrative, mostly it is misconstrued as a commando type operation with the Greyhounds personnel in the lead. MHA needs to organise sessions in which the Andhra Pradesh police officials share the experience with their counterparts in other states. Moreover, to the extent possible, the key components of the

counter-insurgency strategy must be shared with the intellectuals with a view to informing the public.

Action Plan: Police officers from other Naxal affected states may engage in regular discussions with the Andhra Pradesh police officers, both serving and retired, to analyse how exactly the Andhra police got the better of the Naxalites. Such sessions may be officially organised by the MHA. However, there should be an opportunity to enter into informal dialogues as the latter yields much better result.

D2.9 *There is a need for sensitization of police officers coming from an area not hit by left-wing extremism to an area hit by left-wing extremism.*

Action Plan: Police officers coming from an area not hit by Left Wing Extremism to a Left Wing Extremism affected area are not much aware of the actual ground situation in such areas. Specific training programs could be devised for them to make them cope with the conditions in such areas and make them able to tackle the situation effectively.
